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The state-corporate crime research has been marked by an orthodoxy that fetishizes 
immediately perceptible events or actions, at the expense of understanding the more 
substantive social processes of state-corporate criminality. This orthodoxy has been changing 
as scholars from the Marxist tradition are increasingly transcending the empiricist perceptions 
by giving more attention to relations and processes that cause state-corporate events and imbue 
them with concrete meaning. This is evidenced in the UK by the work of Penny Green, Tony 
Word, Steve Tombs, David Whyte and Kristian Lasslett. Unlike the criteria-based approaches, 
Green’s and Ward’s process-driven approach recognises that it is not enough for an activity 
to be objectively illegitimate in order to be criminal, it must also be subjected to judgement. 
In the case of state-corporate crime, the civil society configurations are one social institution 
capable of inscribing deviancy labels on illegitimate activities through censure. One powerful 
means of censure is a longstanding resistance practice of ‘direct action’.  
 
This thesis explores how different resistance movements have employed direct action to 
censure state-corporate conduct as deviant. Yet, to effectively stigmatise state-corporate 
conduct, it must have illegitimate properties. In the examination of illegitimacy in state-
corporate conduct, it is argued, Tombs’ and Whyte’s concepts “state-corporate symbiosis” and 
“regimes of permission” are used to tease out the criminogenic potential latent in routine state-
corporate practices. Additionally, Lasslett’s use of the Marxist dialectical tradition informs us 
that state-corporate practices are constitutive of much broader relations and processes, 
constitutive of capitalism. The state-corporate activities that have socially harmful and/or 
criminal outcome are integral to the function of “social metabolism” and the very existence of 
the state system as well as organised capital. In this way, state-corporate crime is not an 
aberration caused by a unique collusion, but by routine and systemic practices. This thesis 
applies this conceptual insight and a Marxist dialectical method to a multiple-case study, 
examining two disparate case studies – Case 1 censure of the UK-Israel arms trade and a drone 
company; Case 2 censure of the biotechnology industry and a biotech-seed company. In so 
doing, the study advances the view that state-corporate crime, as a phenomenon, comes into 
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Orthodox criminology traditionally focused on the street offender as the prototypical 
criminal.  This signified a top-down approach to the study of crime. As a legal construct the 
concept of ‘crime’ is fraught with power disparities (Sutherland, 1940, 1945). Some have 
argued that because the legal discourse is constructed by the dominant groups in society, they 
use the category ‘crime’ as a mechanism of social control against dominated groups (Hillyard 
and Tombs, 2007; Burton, 2013; DeKeseredy, 2011). As such, the label ‘crime’ has been used 
by those in positions of power to stigmatise those who are marginalised and isolated. Howbeit, 
there is a growing recognition in the state and corporate crime literature that the criminal 
property can be affixed on the powerful and their actions from below by civil society (Green 
and Ward, 2000, 2004; Friedrichs, 2009; White, 2009; Stanley and McCulloch, 2013; Lasslett 
et al, 2015). Building on these critical traditions of criminological scholarship, this thesis 
examines how deviancy labels can be inscribed from below to state-corporate practices.  
 
Although, the notions of resistance and crime-control from below have been explored 
in the state crime literature, they have not been systematically applied to state-corporate crime 
research. The concept of state-corporate crime denotes the production of crime at an 
intersection of state and corporate interests (Kramer and Michalowski, 1991; Kauzlarich and 
Kramer, 1998; Kramer et al, 2002). This concept offers a very important contribution to the 
general study of crimes of the powerful. Yet, its integrated theoretical model underpinned a 
criteria-based definitional framework of state-corporate crime, and has been challenged on 
many fronts (Whyte, 2003; Lasslett, 2014a; Tombs, 2012; Tombs and Whyte, 2015; Lasslett 
et al, 2015). It is argued in this thesis that the dialectical approach to state-corporate crime, 
advanced by Penny Green, Tony Ward and Kristian Lasslett offers a more helpful foundation 
for conducting the inquiry into the fundamental relations and processes that produce and 
actualise criminal potentialities of states and corporations. Their process-driven approach has 
inspired literature that explores social processes through which state-corporate practices 
become labelled as criminal.  
 
To conceptualise the resistance the thesis draws on interventions from a special 
edition of Social Justice (2009) on resistance and state crime, as well as contributions to 
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Stanley and McCulloch’s (2012) volume Resistance and State Crime. This critical scholarship 
argues that studying resistance within state/corporate crime discourse can have an 
empowering effect on civil society engaged in struggles against the wrongdoings of the 
powerful. According to these works, emancipatory change and justice is achieved by civil 
society through some form of resistance. One form of resistance that stands out throughout 
history is direct action. Indeed, direct action has been employed by social audiences to censure 
wrongful state-corporate conduct. The use of direct action to stigmatise state-corporate 
conduct is be one of the focal points of the empirical content on resistance.  
 
Methodologically, this study is guided by Marxist dialectical tradition. It is 
operationalised through a multiple case study approach, employing a mixture of investigative 
data collection methods. The essential dynamics of resistance to state-corporate crime are 
studied within two contrasting historical junctures, to see how different historical trajectories 
produce different concrete antagonisms and traditions of resistance and how this mediates 
outcomes. Case Study 1 examines the censure of an engine company, UAV Engines Ltd, for 
exporting, and the UK Government for licensing exports of engines incorporated into Hermes 
drones used by the Israeli state in military operations in Gaza. Case Study 2 examines the 
opposition to transgenic cotton (Bt cotton) introduced by a biotechnology company, 
Monsanto, and endorsed by the Government of India. 
 
The study aims to, first, understand the historically constituted social processes 
through which state-corporate conduct becomes defined as deviant; second, identify the 
fundamental social dynamics that create the historical possibility for these processes to take 
place at particular junctures. To achieve these aims the study delves also into what makes 
state-corporate practices potentially deviant. Pursuing these aims the research extends 
scholarly understanding of different strategies resistance actors can use to more effectively 
censure deviant state-corporate conduct. By extending academic knowledge about resistance 
to state-corporate crime this research offers theorised guidance for more effective nonviolent 
direct action. By immersing resistance in theoretical explanation research can strengthen 
social processes that stigmatise deviant state-corporate activity (Lasslett, 2012a). A systematic 
theorisation of resistance can help us uncover the broader, social process resistance is part of.  
 
1.2 Conceptual and theoretical framework 
 
Drawing on the conceptual and theoretical insight proffered by the process-driven 




illegitimate conduct is stigmatised as deviant. The criminogenic property of state-corporate 
practices is a latent potential. It is realised when these practices cause harm and/or contravene 
a normative code of conduct. This potential is concretised when a substantial audience 
censures concerned state-corporate practices. Exploring the illegitimacy and deviancy, the 
thesis advances a Marxist dialectal understanding of state-corporate crime and resistance. The 
dialectical method can help the study see the interacting elements of the studied phenomenon 
and it immerses the phenomenon in a totality of relations it is part of (Engels, 1946; Jordan, 
1967; Harvey, 1993; Bukharin, 2005). In this way, the phenomenon is understood in terms of 
a broader social process, rather than a reductive set of variables or factors. The boundaries 
between empirical research and theoretical explanation erected by orthodox state-corporate 
crime scholarship will be removed, and theory shall be used to bridge appearance with reality. 
As Lasslett (2014b: 18) posits, the task of theory is to ‘orient consciousness to the empirical 
richness of offending contexts.’ The result will be a dialectically developed body of theory 
that can orient our consciousness to accurate representations of concrete reality. 
 
1.2.1 Illegitimacy in state-corporate practices 
 
Ideological and legal formations prescribe a set of relations between the state system, 
organised capital and society; but these relations are negated by the reality of achieving social 
reproduction under neoliberal capitalism (Lasslett, 2014c; Ward and Green, 2016). 
Illegitimacy is not always caused by an explicit commission. Rather, all state and corporate 
activities have a potential to cause some form of social harm (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004; 
Pemberton, 2007). Oftentimes, social harm or crime is caused by systemic or ‘routine 
practices’, e.g. production, exchange, investment, labour, employment, trade, regulation 
policymaking (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007; Tombs, 2012). States and corporations are not 
conceived here as malevolent agents seeking to cause harm, but as interdependent institutions 
pursuing ‘desired finalities’, e.g. economic growth, market share or investment (Lasslett, 
2014c; see also Barnett, 1981; Kramer and Michalowski, 1991). To achieve ‘desired finalities’ 
state institutions create, what Whyte (2014) calls, ‘regimes of permission’ to maintain a stable 
flow of capital, labour and tax revenue.  
 
Furthermore, processes of expanded reproduction tie states and corporations into a 
symbiotic relationship. Production, investment, labour, taxation, regulation, policymaking 
trade etc. are processes of ‘state-corporate symbiosis’ (Tombs, 2012). There is a general 
agreement in the literature that capital accumulation is a powerful impetus of state-corporate 
symbiosis, and a highly criminogenic force (Tombs, 2012; Tombs and Whyte, 2015; Green 
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and Ward 2004; Young, 1981). Central to a Marxist understanding of state-corporate 
criminality is its explanation in terms of the dominant mode of production (Young, 1976, in 
Pearce, 1976). This requires the analysis of political-economic arrangements within which 
states and corporations operate.  
 
1.2.2 Censure of state-corporate practices as deviant 
 
The principle premise of ontology is that “nothing comes from nothing”, every 
phenomenon comes into reality through some process of becoming. Crime too has an 
ontological reality, for it is constructed through concrete social practice, largely omitted by 
traditional criminology (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007; Burton, 2013). Reality is created in every 
day to day interactions between human agents, their environment, their institutions etc. For, 
nothing can exist in the world except in an overarching interrelationship of social forces; social 
phenomena emerge from complex web of interactions between multitudes of connected 
objects that have structurally inscribed qualities (Engels, 1946). Dialectical materialism traces 
the formation of phenomena through mutual conditioning of objects, and ‘through their 
interaction, the system that emerged and developed historically, and still continues to develop 
new forms of its existence and internal interaction’ (Ilyenkov, 1979: 168). Social phenomena 
are produced through interaction of different elements, subjects and objects. An objective 
event or action is imbued with meaning by subjects that act upon what they observe or 
experience.  
 
In line with this, it is argued that state-corporate crime exists as a potentiality 
expressed in accepted norms (Green and Ward, 2000, 2004; Lasslett, 2010a). This potential is 
actualised through social transactions between deviant institutions and norm upholding agents 
or agencies, e.g. civil society, the public, state’s legal apparatus or international institution. 
Not just any transaction, but a material, prohibitive action of human agents. Oftentimes, social 
actors concretise the deviant potential of state-corporate conduct through resistance. It is a 
material, social practice that can ascribe meaning and ontological reality to perceived events 
or conduct. From a dialectical approach ‘state [and corporate] crime is a historical property 
inscribed on certain practices, through a mediated process of struggle’ (Lasslett et al, 2015: 
516). Throughout history, social struggles have asserted values, ideals, rights and norms of 






1.3 ‘Researching through resistance’: methodology and research 
methods 
 
This is a qualitative research study operationalised through a multiple case study 
approach and conducted by means of investigative data collection methods. Research into 
crimes of the powerful poses quite different ‘methodological problems in comparison to 
criminology’s traditional subject matter, street crime’ (Lasslett, 2012a: 144). Social actors, 
e.g. researchers and activists, who investigate and expose state/corporate wrongdoings operate 
outside state-corporate power networks (Lasslett, 2012a). Activists and non-governmental 
organisations often put their liberty, safety and reputation at risk. Finding information about 
criminogenic state-corporate collusion proves challenging as it involves exhaustive 
investigative work into institutions that have the capacity to deny access. The reality of this 
field is that researchers rely on resistance communities or civil society for data. Thus, 
researchers investigating state/corporate crime must engage with and support resistance 
communities (Lasslett, 2012a). Due to this ineluctable reality, research into crimes of the 
powerful and resistance are intertwined.  
 
Additionally, because this study seeks to understand how resistance emerges or 
occurs, how resistance actors define state-corporate activity as criminal, and how this 
intersects with state-corporate reaction to resistance, e.g. denial or counter-resistance, civil 
society is the central source of information. By actively engaging with social movements the 
researcher expresses not just a wish for a rigorous understanding of the problem, but also an 
active political commitment to resolve the problem (Hale, 2008). A growing literature base on 




This study adopted a Marxist dialectical approach. The emphasis of dialectical method 
is on observing relations between interconnected phenomena, mutually conditioning processes 
and objects underpinning communities of resistance and how they censure state-corporate 
conduct they deem deviant (Lasslett, 2010b; Ward and Green, 2016; see also Engels, 1946; 
Lukács, 1971; Wallerstein, 1979; Banaji, 2010). From this approach, an empirical content/case 
is grounded in elementary processes of the totality of social relations, i.e. neoliberal capitalism. 
The focus of such an approach is on contradictions, interconnections, processes and mutually 
conditioning relations (Harvey, 1993; Ward and Green, 2016). The empirical content is 
perceived through dialectical lens to capture how relationships between the state, organised 
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capital and society create the contradictions and possibilities for state-corporate crime to come 
into being as a phenomenon – which require both illegitimate state-corporate practice, and 
organised censure that stigmatises this conduct as criminal. Case studies are methodologically 
suited to research informed by a Marxist dialectic. The case study approach presents a 
phenomenon in its entirety, a complex/bounded system with its own processes and interacting 
elements; and, as part of a larger totality of social relations. A dialectical use of case studies 
promises a deeper analysis of the process that cause illegitimate state-corporate practices and 
processes that actualise these practices as deviant.  
 
1.3.2 Multiple case study approach 
 
Case studies can advance our understanding of state-corporate crime, in as far as, they 
are grounded in fundamental processes of totality of social relations, i.e. neoliberal capitalism 
(Tombs, 2012). Case studies are appropriate for qualitative research where the objective is to 
explore and understand, rather than confirm or quantify (Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). A case 
study approach is, further, suited to dialectical inquiry, as it proffers a holistic understanding 
of processes and dynamics of a phenomenon (Kumar, 2011). Social phenomenon is bound to 
specific context, setting and historical specificity. Case study research is characterised by its 
capacity to produce ‘context-depended knowledge’ (Yin, 2003: 13). A case study can be any 
form of complex or bounded system, i.e. a phenomenon, situation, demographic, event, period, 
organisation, institution etc. Case study is not a method, nor a form of research design, it is 
simply a means of operationalising research (Stake 1995; Gerring, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 
2009). It is not limited to any one type of data collection methods, it is flexible and intuitive. 
An abundant variety of sources and research methods were employed. This endowed the 
empirical content with a sense of real-life events.   
 
1.3.3 Data collection methods 
 
The data for the thesis was collected through a wide range of qualitative methods. 
Data was divided into primary sources and secondary sources. Primary sources consist of first-
hand testimonies obtained through interviews and email correspondence with state actors, 
non-governmental organisations (NGO) actors, activists, and scientists; legal case files and 
affidavits; grey papers; parliamentary committees’ reports; and government reports. 
Secondary sources consist of second-hand interviews archived on YouTube; regulatory 
legislation and policy; NGO reports and data; published research; and media records. 




methods (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). The researcher implemented semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions (Noor, 2008). The legal case files were kindly shared 
by NGO participants and government data was obtained through Freedom of Information 
requests. Documentary data from secondary sources were obtained through internet searches, 
from NGO participants, government officials and Parliament Library.  
 
The study relied on a broad range of secondary sources due to an environment marked 
by distrust of outsiders. Due to distrust most state actors and all of the corporate actors refused 
to participate in the research. The researcher succeeded in establishing trust with NGO actors 
who assisted the researcher in gaining access to resistance actors. However, this took a 
substantive amount of time due to the sensitive nature of the issues and cautious attitude of 
resistance actors to outsiders. Conducting cross-cultural research was another challenging 
task. Substantial time was dedicated to building an understanding and appreciation of the 
social context in India and its agricultural context. The researcher spent five months in India 
establishing trust, learning about the resistance community and familiarising with the cultural 
and political context. The secondary sources were used to supplement primary data and to 
corroborate interview testimonies. In so doing, unexpected revelations were reached about the 
character and influences of resistance campaigns, which otherwise would not have been 
obtained.  
 
After data was compiled, a multi-stage thematic coding process was undertaken 
whereby information was organised into themes (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). NVivo – a 
qualitative data analysis software – was used to analyse crude data, to organise it into 
digestible excerpts through thematic coding. Overarching themes were broken into nodes with 
excerpts from interviews and documentary data. In the written output the themes are 
represented by chapter sections, where each element of the data constitutes only a piece of the 
puzzle (Bailey, 2007; Baxter and Jack, 2008). Data elements in the analysis output are 
presented as testimonial accounts and information extracted from documentary sources. 
Pieces are brought together in a story form which retells events in a sequence, adding to the 
sequence all the actions, actors, agencies, influences, and motives involved in the events 
(Elliot, 2005). In this way the empirical cases are set in a context and are presented as real-life 
events, which are dynamic and involve interaction of numerous components, both objective 






1.4 Introducing the case studies 
 
The study presents two disparate cases to explore how different trajectories of 
capitalism have produced very different, contextual struggles; how these struggles led to 
different traditions of civil society resistance; and, how these traditions of resistance defined 
as deviant the observed state-corporate conduct. Study 1 is a case of censure by a group of 
human rights, anti-arms trade, anti-war and Palestine solidarity campaigners of UAV Engines 
Ltd (UEL) for producing drone engines used by Israel in military operations in Gaza and the 
UK Government for licensing exports of companies like UAV. Study 2 is a case of opposition 
by anti-globalisation, Gandhian-nationalist, upper-caste, farmers’ movement to transgenic 
cotton and censure of Monsanto-Mahyco Biotech Ltd (MMB) for causing indebtedness and 
farmer suicides with biotechnology. A case study approach is not a sampling method, a case 
study is a whole in itself, a ‘context-bound system’, therefore case selection is based on a very 
different rationale (Tellis, 1997; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Case studies are 
very effective in testing theory, especially when they are contextually dissimilar (Stake, 1995). 
Case selection, where ‘theory replication’ is pursued, will aim for disparity (Tellis, 1997). 
Thus, the choice of case studies was based on disparity in traditions of resistance and politico-
economic context of state-corporate illegitimacy.  
 
Moreover, to obtain the greatest information on a given phenomenon, selected cases 
cannot be random (Flyvbjerg, 2006). For pragmatic reasons, best cases are ones which involve 
numerous actors and mechanisms in the studied event, as it expands the sources of information 
on complex phenomena (Flyvbjerg, 2006). When selecting cases, the researcher should also 
consider whether selected cases have a strategic value for the studied issue and whether they 
are paradigmatic, viz. whether they highlight more general characteristics of the phenomenon 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). Following these criteria, the cases were intentionally selected to test theory 
across diverse contexts and settings. Both cases involve civil society resistance to stigmatise 
illegitimate state-corporate conduct, and they both actualise resistance through direct action 
campaigns. However, these campaigns take place in different contexts, and so the study seeks 
to locate how this mediates their construction and execution. Even though the two cases occur 
in places with historically different trajectories of capitalist development, they are both 
underpinned by the same fundamental relations. Having two different cases can strengthen the 
dialectical approach, demonstrating that knowledge about state-corporate crime is context-






1.4.1 Censure of the UK Government and UEL 
 
The UK was, arguably, the first fully formed capitalist political-economy and the 
largest global empire in history. The British empire counteracted the contradictions of 
capitalism through colonialism and imperialism. British colonialism was, historically, a major 
component of capitalist development and its global pervasion. The unique capitalist trajectory 
in the UK created a fertile ground for anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance from within 
the British working-class and the diaspora of colonised subjects. Mass destruction and loss of 
human life caused by imperial conflicts in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, economic 
depression and gross inequality engendered social progress in human rights and welfare. 
International legal mechanisms were founded to protect human life and rights. In the second 
half of the 20th century, private capital’s takeover of the defence industry, the Cold War and 
decolonisation fomented human rights struggles, anti-war and anti-arms trade movements, 
human rights activism and peace movements. The UK’s trajectory of capitalist development 
and domestic, as well as global, struggles established anti-war, anti-arms trade, and human 
rights traditions. 
 
The UK Government and UEL were censured by anti-war, anti-arms trade, human 
rights and Palestine solidarity activists. UEL was censured because its products were 
incorporated in Israel’s drones used for military operations in Gaza, and the authorisation of 
defence exports of Israeli subsidiaries, such as UEL, breached UK regulation and international 
law.  According to the resistance actors, because of this relation the Government and UEL 
were complicit in the Israeli blitz of Gaza in the summer of 2014, ‘Operation Protective Edge’. 
A broad network of activists from War on Want, Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT), 
Palestine Solidarity Campaign, London Palestine Action (LPA) and Boycott Divest Sanction 
movement launched a campaign, ‘Stop Arming Israel’, during the Operation Protective Edge 
to expose the UK-Israel arms trade. Reports by Amnesty International and CAAT revealed 
evidence of Israeli Defence Force (IDF) incorporating UEL engines in Hermes drone, 
considered by the IDF the “backbone” of military operations in Gaza (Milmo, 2014a). As part 
of the campaign the LPA orchestrated a number of demonstrations and direct actions, most 
notably a rooftop occupation of UEL on 5-6 August 2014. Direct action was also employed in 
a follow up blockade of UEL in July 2015, named ‘Block the Factory’. Both direct actions 
resulted in a court trial of the resistance actors, which opened an opportunity to subvert the 




1.4.2 Opposition to transgenic cotton and stigmatisation of Monsanto in 
India 
 
India’s integration into the world capitalist system was mediated by British 
imperialism. India was a highly exploited colony for its raw resources, e.g. cotton lint. The 
nation gained independence in 1947 through a prolonged struggle rooted in anti-colonial and 
anti-imperialist resistance, Hindu-nationalist movement, and freedom movement. Three 
centuries of colonial rule left India in a state of relative underdevelopment. Subsistence 
agriculture and cash cropping dominated India’s socio-economic landscape, and 
industrialisation took place at a late stage. In the decades following independence, India was 
grappling low productivity, overpopulation, rampant inequality and effects of industrial 
development. From the socio-economic turmoil emerged new traditions of resistance, leftist-
socialist, farmers’ rights and Gandhian-nationalist movements. In the 1990s the Government 
of India, under the Congress Party, initiated liberal reforms and in 1995 signed India up to the 
Marrakesh Agreement, which formed the World Trae Organisation (WTO). As a member state 
of the WTO India was compelled to further liberalise its economy by shifting from Nehruvian-
protectionism to neoliberalism. Seeing this change as foreign influence and imposition of 
Western-corporate interests on India, farmers’ rights and Gandhian-nationalist movements 
began anti-globalisation, anti-liberalism and anti-corporate resistance traditions.   
 
The anti-imperialist and Hindu-nationalist traditions are active today as Gandhian-
nationalist resistance to neo-colonial forces of neoliberalism and globalisation. It is in this 
context that the opposition to transgenic cotton and stigmatisation of Monsanto took place. In 
1996 Monsanto, a biotech conglomerate, entered into a joint venture with an Indian seed 
company, Mahyco, and formed Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech Ltd (MMB). The company 
introduced transgenic cotton called Bt cotton – commercially known as Bollgard – under 
Indian Government’s policy vision to increase agricultural productivity through 
industrialisation, export-oriented production and crop technology, e.g. biotechnology. The 
transgenic cotton was released into commercial cultivation in 2001 after a prolonged 
assessment period designed in 1986. The Government of India created a regulatory structure 
to facilitate an environmentally safe development of biotechnological products.  
 
The Gandhi-nationalist, anti-globalisation movement led by a farmers’ association 
Karnataka State Farmers Association (KRRS) and an environmental NGO Navdanya saw the 
introduction of Bt cotton as a Western, corporate threat to farmers’ sovereignty and 




and farmer suicides. They saw Bt cotton as a corporate ploy to dispossess Indian smallholders 
of their means of production through monopoly over the seed market. After the release of Bt 
cotton new resistance movements emerged, mainly Coalition for GM-Free India (CGMFI), 
from environmental, holistic and conservationist traditions of resistance. According to 
CGMFI, Bt cotton failed to increase farmers’ incomes and, in many cases, caused 
indebtedness. Another prominent organisation in the resistance, namely the Gene Campaign, 
took a very different stance on the issue as a research driven NGO. The main concerns raised 
by the Gene Campaign were biological safety and agronomic performance. According to the 
campaign the Bt cotton created pest resistance and its agronomic performance was contingent 
on too many external variables. Overall, MMB was accused of causing farmer suicides and 
the Government was censured for facilitating the release of Bt cotton.   
 
1.5 Thesis overview  
 
The thesis is broken down into six chapters. Chapter I – Researching state-corporate 
crime and resistance; Chapter II – Conceptual and theoretical foundations: State-corporate 
crime and resistance; Chapter III – Methodology, data collection methods and data analysis; 
Chapter IV – Censure of the UK Government and UEL; Chapter V – Conclusion. This chapter 
introduced and summarised the conceptual and theoretical premise, methodology and research 
methods, and empirical content of the thesis. Chapter II sets the conceptual and theoretical 
foundations of the thesis by reviewing literature on state-corporate crime and resistance. The 
chapter identifies the lacunas in the main currents of state-corporate crime scholarships, 
scrutinising the integrated theoretical framework and the juridical approach to defining state-
corporate crime proffered by Kramer and colleagues. It then explores how the identified 
limitations can be addressed with a Marxist understanding and process-driven approach 
advanced by Ward, Green and Lasslett. Additionally, recent interventions by critical 
criminologists, Tombs and Whyte, advocate a process-based analysis as a remedy to the 
orthodoxy of events-based analysis. The chapter, further, reviews literature on resistance, 
setting the conceptual premises of resistance, identifying gaps and supplementing them with 
conceptual categories found in literature on different resistance traditions, including 
anarchism, civil disobedience.   
 
Chapter III details the philosophical underpinning of the thesis, the study design, 
operationalisation of research and how methodological choices will achieve study aims. It, 
firstly, explains how the adopted conceptual and theoretical foundations influenced the 
methodological approach, and how the methodology will advance research aims. The study 
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was guided by a Marxist dialectical approach, adopted from the Marxist understanding of 
state/corporate crime and the process-driven approach. It is argued that the dialectical 
approach captures the structural contradictions underpinning state-corporate practices and 
resistance as elements of a process through which these practices are realised as crime. 
Secondly, the chapter delineates the study design, research approach and data collection 
methods adopted to uncover the process of state-corporate crime and resistance in two real-
life cases. There the chapter substantiates the use of multiple case study approach and 
discusses the choice of investigative research methods. The multiple case study approach 
facilitates empirical research into disparate cases, where the intention is to apply a single 
theory to explain the same phenomenon occurring in a different setting. The multiple case 
study approach affords a comparison into how context, viz capitalist trajectory and tradition 
of resistance, affects resistance to deviant state-corporate conduct and its outcome.  
 
Chapter IV presents and analyses the empirical findings on the resistance campaign 
launched to censure defence exports to Israel by a UK based engine company, UEL, and the 
licensing of these exports by the UK Government. The chapter looks at the contradictory role 
of the Government as a regulatory and promoter of defence exports by evaluating policy, 
regulation, export licence data and parliamentary debates on the issue of arms exports to Israel. 
In so doing, the chapter points the reader’s attention to the way regulation and policymaking 
work as ‘regimes of permission’ that mediate the symbiosis between the UK Government and 
UEL. It then analyses interview testimonies of resistance actors and documentary data to 
explain the censuring process and importance of direct action to resistance. It also evaluates 
the impact of the resistance and whether it was effective.  
 
Chapter V presents and analyses the empirical findings on the resistance of the 
opposition to Bt cotton and Monsanto. The chapter explores Monsanto’s, alleged, contribution 
to the crisis of indebtedness and farmers suicides by introducing transgenic cotton and 
monopolising the cotton seed market. It looks at the role the Government of India played in 
the commercial release of Bt cotton by reviewing regulation and agricultural biotech policy. 
The chapter then analyses the resistance to Bt cotton and Monsanto with its many facades, 
how different elements of the resistance constructed the issue, and how they employed direct 
action to censure state-corporate institutions. Finally, it evaluates the impact of the resistance 
and whether it was effective.  Chapter VI concludes the thesis by explaining the theoretical 
meaning of empirical findings. It distils the process of resistance and the social dynamics of 




Chapter II – Conceptual and theoretical foundations: 
state-corporate crime and resistance  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This study aims to understand the fundamental dynamics that create the possibility 
for state-corporate crime to come into being. To this end, the thesis explores the underlying 
structural contradictions that produce the criminogenic potential of state-corporate practices, 
and organised censure that stigmatises this conduct as deviant. The purpose of this chapter is 
to review existing literature, identify lacunas and find a fruitful avenue to fill them. In so 
doing, the chapter explores the concepts and theory that underpin this study. Section 2.2 begins 
by outlining different explanatory approaches to state and corporate function, and how these 
approaches influenced the development of a sub-field that looks at state-corporate collusion. 
The section outlines Weberian, Foucauldian and Marxist approaches developed in state crime 
literature, and the historical-Marxist approached used in corporate crime literature. There are 
important overlaps in these tracts of scholarship, which offer insight into substantive structural 
dynamics that determine how states and corporations function. It then looks at how state-
corporate crime literature draws upon state and corporate crime literature to explain the 
dynamics of criminogenic collusion between states and corporations.  
 
Section 2.3 evaluates three theoretical approaches to state-corporate crime. The first, 
the integrated-theoretical model devised by Ronald Kramer, Raymond Michalowski and 
David Kauzlarich. The second, a Marxist understanding advanced by Penny Green, Tony 
Ward and Kristian Lasslett. The third theoretical approach looks at state-corporate crime as a 
process latent in ‘routine practices’ and mediated by ‘state-corporate symbiosis’ through 
‘regimes of permission’. These concepts were devised by Steve Tombs and David Whyte. 
Section 2.4 evaluates three definitional approaches to state-corporate crime: juridical 
framework, social harm paradigm and organisational deviance. The juridical framework – 
criteria-based approach – is associated with integrated theoretical framework and subscribes 
to international law as the strongest definitional criteria. The social harm paradigm rejects the 
legal category of ‘crime’ and calls on criminologists to focus on harms rather than crimes. The 
organisational deviance – process-driven approach – is rooted in the Marxist dialectical 
tradition and focuses on the role of social audiences in identifying, censuring and labelling 





Section 2.5 explores the recent tract of scholarship on resistance and state crime, 
prompted by the organisational deviance approach. The state crime literature on resistance 
was initiated in a special edition of Social Justice and further developed by Elizabeth Stanley 
and Jude McCulloch. This scholarship registered the important role civil society plays in 
exposing and censuring illegitimate state/corporate conduct. It analyses resistance, not as an 
abstract category, but a material action with real history. This literature, however, offers 
mostly a descriptive overview of resistance, it is an analytical category. Therefore, the section 
will also review Green and Ward’s use of Gramscian concepts – civil society and hegemony. 
These concepts offer the analytical tools required to break down the causes and process of 
resistance. Lastly, this section delves into direct action and its historical significance for 
resistance. Conceptual and historical insight on direct action is taken from different political 
traditions, including anarchism, socialism and civil resistance. Overall, this chapter lays the 
conceptual and theoretical foundation of the thesis. Foundation that props the methodological 
approach, empirical work and analysis of the findings. The methodology was informed by the 
process-driven approach and the choice of research methods was also influenced by a critical 
criminology approach to state-corporate crime. The concepts developed in this chapter are 
used to categorise empirical findings and to enrich them with deeper, theoretical meaning.  
 
2.2 States and corporations: a criminogenic collusion  
 
The study of state-corporate crime was initiated in a series of papers presented by 
Kramer and Michalowski in the early-1990s. Traditionally, state and corporate crime operated 
as two distinct streams, but Kramer and Michalowski saw the need to analyse them together. 
They argue that offending of either institution cannot be understood in isolation, as it takes 
place at the intersection of state and corporate interests (Kramer, 1990; Kramer and 
Michalowski, 1991). This approach emerged from a conception of states and corporations as 
interlinked capitalist institutions. Although they appear as autonomous entities, both these 
institutions are products of capitalist development and operate within politico-economic 
arrangements of capitalist relations that bind them together. The concept informs us that 
‘intersection of state-corporate interests often causes large-scale social harms, and that these 
harms are less likely to be criminalised and punished by the state’ (Whyte, 2003: 582). Before 
exploring the state-corporate crime literature in more detail, the reader is invited to consider 
theoretical approaches employed in state and corporate crime literature to classify features of 





2.2.1 The state 
 
The field of state crime offers insightful theoretical perspectives on the state. The main 
theoretical currents in state crime scholarship are Weberian, Foucauldian and Marxist. State 
crime as a distinct field of study can be traced back to Chambliss’ (1989) presidential address 
to the American Society of Criminology, although its antecedents are longer in origin. 
Chambliss analysed the colonial history of early European states. Tilly (1985) argued that 
modern nation-state making was a coercive endeavour, it entailed violence, piracy, war, 
colonialism and expropriation. The three theoretical traditions in the state crime literature 
inform us of the state’s propensity to use force/violence to achieve its interests, the 
criminogenic potential latent in state’s ordinary practices and where this potential emerges 
from.  
 
One of the leading theoretical cannons in state crime literature is the Weberian 
conception of the state. It focuses on the state’s prerogative to use physical force (Cohen, 
1996; Funk, 2003; Kauzlarich et al, 2003; Green and Ward, 2004). This focus was informed 
by the Weberian theory of the state. According to Weber the primary feature of statehood is 
the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ (Weber, 1947: 154). According to this 
perspective, the state does not have to always use coercion to maintain order. The threat of 
violence, symbolised by the state’s coercive apparatus (e.g. police, prison, taxman, military), 
maintain state power and dominance over the populace (Tilly, 1985; Green and Ward, 2004). 
Whether authoritative or liberal, in order to exist to populace must recognise and obey the 
state’s authority, and this is partly assured through constant presence of violence exerted on 
individuals who break the rules established by the powers that be (Weber, 1946). This 
perspective of the state is very important because it sensitises state crime researchers to the 
fact states have the capacity and, indeed, an exclusive right to use varied means of violence in 
order to enforce their order.  
 
The Foucauldian perspective has been used to argue that at the centre of state power 
lies ‘biopower’ – techniques used by a state to manage a population (Michalowski, 2010; 
Rothe, 2010). The Foucauldian power-knowledge nexus employed in state crime literature 
draws attention to state role as the main architect of law (Power, 2003; Hillyard, 2004; Tombs 
and Whyte, 2007). It influenced the social harm paradigm, where law is seen to play a dual 
role; it is a form of social control used to dominate a population and a normalising mechanism, 
in that it normalises socially injurious state behaviour (Berrington et al, 2003; Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003; Pemberton, 2007; Burton, 2013). Another Foucauldian concept, 
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governmentality, has been adopted to point to the state mechanics used to ‘penetrate and 
discipline a population in ways that individuals self-align their interests to those of the state 
and become part of the state by reproducing its ideology’ (Michalowski, 2010: 25). 
Governmentality has been also used to explain mechanics of capitalist states – legislation, 
infrastructure investment, policing, military intervention, taxation, regulation – used to affect 
‘social metabolism’ with a definite end in mind (Lasslett, 2014b; Lasslett, 2014c). However, 
governmentality reproduces the relations, constitutive of neoliberal capitalism, that hide the 
criminogenic potential of state practices. The Foucauldian perspective, especially 
governmentality, alert us to the criminogenic potential in the ordinary, routine state practices. 
 
Another important contribution to the understanding of state crime originates with the 
Marxist theory. The modern state system has emerged in the historical transition from 
feudalism to capitalism, and further engendered the promulgation and development of 
capitalism around the globe through imperialism (Pearce, 1976; Quinney, 1977; Barnett, 1981; 
Tilly, 1985; Chambliss, 1989; Ward, 2004; Lasslett, 2010a, 2010b 2014b). As feudal relations 
in Europe gave way to capitalism the states that conformed to the logic of capital accumulation 
saw greater revenue and increased their power (Ward, 2004; Callinicos, 2007; Lasslett, 
2014b). The state is an essential site of struggle and practice which creates the social 
architecture that capitalism requires to function effectively (Whyte, 2014; Tombs, 2016). In 
Gramscian theory, the state is an arena of political competition among vested interests, its task 
is to balance competing social forces through the formation of hegemonic blocs (Bonnanno et 
al, 1997). Under a hegemonic bloc, the state must continuously legitimise capital 
accumulation, whilst fulfilling its responsibility to the larger populace (Tombs and Whyte, 
2003). This complex relation creates antagonisms between the state system, the society and 
organised capital, and the interests these groups represent (Braithwaite, 2000; Ward and 
Green, 2004; Lasslett, 2010b, 2013). These antagonisms cause overt forms of rupture that 
result in state crime and social harm. This is a very important contribution because it explains 
how a state’s criminogenic potential arises.  
 
2.2.2 The corporation 
 
Just like the state, the corporation emerged in a period of transition from feudalism to 
mercantile and then industrial capitalism (Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Stephens, 2002). 
Developing trade, free competition, laissez-faire doctrine and liberal ideology assisted 
commercial arrangements whereby groups of merchants engaged in joint ventures to increase 




colonialism from the sixteenth century onwards these joint ventures operated in a political 
capacity in colonial territories, e.g. the East Indian Company. They were given Royal Charters 
that granted them legal status, governmental functions (e.g. levying of tolls) and authority to 
administer colonies on a government’s behalf (Cullen et al, 1987). By the nineteenth century 
much of the economic activities were deferred onto large companies that became autonomous, 
dominant economic entities. Governments of colonial states put in place policies and laws that 
supported and protected chartered companies. Coleman (1982: 40) describes the corporation 
as a ‘child of the state’ for a reason.  
 
Until the nineteenth century incorporation into companies was restricted to royal 
charters or private acts, which were limited by protectionist states that sought to keep the 
privileges thereby granted. With the rapid expansion of capital-intensive enterprises during 
the industrial revolution incorporation into companies, without charters or private acts, was 
instituted by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 in the UK. Corporations have, thereby, 
become legal entities with legal rights and obligations of a natural person. Corporations also 
have personhoods – in the US they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment – which means 
they can be held liable and can be treated as having means rea identified with the owners or 
managers (Clifford, 2014: 46-9). While some see profit maximisation as the raison d’être of 
organised capital (Chamberlain, 1973; Jacoby, 1973; Young, 1981; Shichor, 1989; Bonanno 
et al, 1997; Stephens, 2002), others argue that corporations simply seek stability and growth 
(Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Bozeman and Straussman, 1983; Braithwaite, 1985). Whether a 
corporation pursues prestige, stability and growth Clinard (1983: 18) maintains that its 
‘paramount objective is maximisation of profits and the general financial success…’ as its 
survival depends on this. These motives are part of intricate dynamics that cause corporations 
to engage in deviant conduct.  
 
Corporations may not necessarily bear malice on the society, but the drive for growth, 
market share expansion and profit maximisation often result in significant harm (Barnett, 
1981). Corporations operate under contradictory conditions where, on the one hand, they are 
expected to observe the law, and, on the other, some of these expectations frustrate capital 
accumulation (Henry, 1982; Whyte, 2007; Yeager, 2007). Only when legitimate means to 
achieve corporate goals are unavailable, it is argued, will a corporation resort to illegal means. 
Tombs and Whyte encourage critical criminologists to look beyond the organisational level 
and examine corporations as economic structure of underlying social relations. The existence 
of corporations depends on the fundamental functions of production, mobilisation and 
valorisation of capital (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). As institutions of economic production and 
distribution corporations are subject to relations and processes of the capitalist market 
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economy (Shichor, 1989; Bonanno et al, 1997; Snider, 2000; Tombs and Whyte, 2003). These 
relations and processes are expressed in temporal regimes, industrial capitalism, corporatist-
Fordist model and currently neoliberalism. As articulations of the underlying regimes of social 
relations, corporations embody their drives and antagonisms. Ascendency of neoliberalism in 
the past fifty years spawned a culture of egotism, irresponsibility and indifference, and 
elevated profit seeking as the highest social value to the detriment of other considerations, e.g. 
human rights, health and safety, environmental safety (Burton, 2013: 16-18; see also, Tombs 
and Hillyard, 2004; Whyte, 2007; Tombs and Whyte, 2007). As such, corporations have 
evolved into privileged legal entities with criminogenic propensity.  
 
2.2.3 The criminogenic collusion 
 
State-corporate crime, as Kramer (1990: 1) put it back in 1990, is a ‘harmful result of 
an interorganisational relationship between business and government.’ In later interventions 
the definition was refined to ‘illegal or socially injurious action that results from a mutually 
reinforcing interaction between policies and/or practices of institutions of political governance 
and institutions of economic production and distribution’ (Aulette and Michalowski, 1993: 
169; see also Kramer and Michalowski, 1991: 4; Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 20). They 
hold that states and corporations are functionally interdependent, offending of one happens 
with implicit or explicit assistance from the other, whether by commission or omission 
(Aulette and Michalowski, 1993: 173). The concept is grounded in a specific understanding 
of capitalism. They hold that ‘social relation through which capitalism functions blend the 
practices, interests and institutional arrangements constitutive of state and corporations in 
complex and contradictory ways’ (Lasslett, 2014a: 85). State-corporate crime, itself, is an 
outcome of interplay between pressure for goal attainment, availability of legitimate means, 
and presence of social control (Kramer et al, 2002; Kramer and Michalowski, 2006).  
 
An important distinction has been drawn between state-initiated corporate crime and 
state-facilitated corporate crime (Kramer and Michalowski, 1991: 6). The former refers to 
organisational deviance by a corporation either at the direction of, or with tacit approval of, 
the government (Kramer et al, 2002: 271). The latter refers to the failure of government 
regulatory institutions to control deviant business activities, either because of direct collusion 
between business and government of because they adhere to shared goals whose attainment 
would be hampered by aggressive regulation (Kramer et al, 2002: 271-2). For Kramer et al 
state-corporate crime is either initiated or facilitated by a state. Lasslett (2010c), however, 




corporations (see also, Tombs 2012: 174). Corporate-initiated crime may occur when a 
corporation uses its economic influence to induce states to take deviant action (Lasslett, 
2010c). Corporate-facilitated state crime occurs when corporations facilitate or provide the 
means for states to commit crimes (ibid). These are important developments that help us 
understand how instances of state-corporate crime occurre.  
 
By studying state crime in conjunction with corporate crime Kramer and Michalowski 
sought to, as Gregg (2007: 475) puts it, ‘breach the conceptual wall between economic crimes 
and political crimes underscoring the social reality that there is neither political nor economic: 
there is only political economy’ (see Michalowski and Kramer, 2007: 201). Political and 
economic spheres of social organisation are interwoven together, and so institutions 
representing these social spheres are also interwoven. State-corporate crime points our 
attention to the interdependence between political institutions and institutions of economic 
production and distributions (Kramer 1990; Kramer and Michalowski 1991; Kauzlarich and 
Kramer, 1998).  Governments rely on the private sector for the provision of investment and 
jobs, as well as revenue needed for the economic base upon which rise legal, political and 
ideological superstructures. In turn, the private sector depends on the government to manage 
and stimulate steady flows of capital, investment and labour. 
 
Kramer et al (2002: 270) contend that corporations developed with the help of legal 
and political infrastructure provided by states, and in turn states in private production systems 
rely on private enterprises to create goods, services, jobs and revenue (see also Kramer and 
Michalowski, 2006: 23). On a similar front, Barnett (1981: 4) made an analogous observation 
a decade earlier, 
 
Large corporations are assumed to pursue profit, growth, and market 
share expansion subject to constraints imposed by markets and the state. State or 
legal regulation of corporate behaviour is in turn assumed to be constrained by 
the need to promote capital accumulation and to satisfy diverse economic 
interests. 
 
That is not to say that the state is the subordinate executive of corporate interests, nor 
is the corporate sector the only means of satisfying diverse economic and social needs. Rather, 
states and corporations collude because goals they pursue can be achieved only through mutual 
assistance. State-corporate relationship is determined by the politico-economic conditions 
they are found in, and thus are subject to contradictory nature of these conditions (see Harvey, 




The world is currently shaped by decisions in pursuit of capital 
accumulation made by relatively few individuals. It is toward these decision 
makers and the political-economic arrangements in which they operate that the 
concept and theory of state-corporate crime is directed. 
 
The above excerpt reveals another important observation made by Kramer, 
Michalowski and Kauzlarich. The circulation and valorisation of capital is the lifeblood of 
capitalism, and its accumulation is the driving force of state-corporate relationships (Barnett, 
1981; Tombs and Whyte, 2003; Rothe, 2010). Elsewhere in the literature capital accumulation 
is identified as a catalytic motivation and a highly criminogenic force (Matthews and 
Kauzlarich, 2000). It is assumed that, because corporations are profit driven organisations and 
states need to constantly expand economic base upon which rise political, legal and ideological 
superstructures, the motivation to accumulate material wealth is a directing principle. Young 
(1981) notes, in this regard, that capital accumulation is the dominant factor in corporate and 
state crime. Kramer et al (2002) treat state-corporate crime as a consequence of capitalism, 
arguing that capitalist relations produce criminogenic potentialities which states and 
corporations execute.  
 
This section explored how the literature has defined the criminogenic properties of 
states and corporations. According to the literature, the state’s criminogenic properties lie in 
its monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the structural antagonisms constitutive of 
capitalism (Chambliss, 1989; Cohen, 1996; Kauzlarich et al, 2003; Tombs and Whyte, 2003; 
Hillyard and Tombs, 2004). The corporate crime literature characterises corporations as profit 
driven organisations, which place capital accumulation above other considerations, e.g. human 
rights, health and safety, environmental safety (Chamberlain, 1973; Jacoby, 1973; Shichor, 
1989; Slapper and Tombs, 1999). That is because as a form of organised capital the 
corporation must constantly reproduce itself by valorising invested capital, and this, 
sometimes, presupposes conduct that contravenes accepted rules or norms. The state-corporate 
crime literature sees capital accumulation as the primary drive of state-corporate criminality. 
Both institutions depend on each other to fulfil their interests and functions (Kramer 1990; 
Kramer and Michalowski 1991; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). To gain a better understanding 
of what causes the deviant collusion between the state and the corporation attention needs be 
given to the theoretical approaches in state-corporate crime literature.  
 
2.3 Theorising state-corporate crime 
 
Thus far, the chapter reviewed the ways in which states and corporations have been 




crime approaches influenced the development of the state-corporate crime concept. This 
section examines the theoretical approaches advanced in the state-corporate crime literature.  
It begins by evaluating the integrated-theoretical framework developed specifically to theorise 
state-corporate criminality. The integrated theoretical model has been the dominant 
framework since its introduction by Kramer and Michalowski’s (1990) at the American 
Society of Criminology paper. It was later revised by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), and since 
was employed in numerous case studies by other scholars in the field, most notably 
Christopher Mullins and Dawn Rothe. The core tenants of the integrated theoretical model 
have been encoded more comprehensively in Kramer et al (2002). The integrated model has 
been subjected to critique, particularly, by scholars who advocate a Marxist understanding of 
crimes of the powerful.  
 
The section points to the limitations of the integrated framework and proffers 
approaches taken by Lasslett, Whyte and Tombs as a remedy. According to these critical 
scholars, the integrated framework is limited by its empiricist analysis on surface level features 
of state-corporate crime and focus on events or ‘discrete acts’ rather than the processes that 
cause deviant state-corporate conduct (Whyte, 2003; Lasslett, 2010a, 2014b; Tombs, 2012; 
Whyte, 2014; Tombs and Whyte, 2015). To address this drawback in theory, Whyte and 
Tombs contend that the state-corporate crime research should focus on the routine practices 
of states and corporations, and the criminogenic potentiality hidden in them. They further 
suggest a Marxist approach can be more effective where empiricist approaches are limited. 
Lasslett gives an important insight on the Marxist dialectic that offers a scientific vantage 
point to the study of state-corporate crime. It can help the study penetrate the immediately 
perceived characteristics of state-corporate crime and tease out the hidden relations that cause 
it. A Marxist approach is not proposed as a theoretical model exclusive to state-corporate 
crime research, rather as a way of thinking about a complex social reality, deconstructing that 
reality and making it comprehensible to human consciousness. 
 
2.3.1 Integrated theoretical framework 
 
The integrated theoretical framework synthesises differential association theory, 
organisational theory and political-economy approach – each corresponding to a different 
level of analysis (micro, meso and macro) – to explain causal mechanisms behind state-
corporate crime (Kramer and Michalowski, 1990; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998; Kramer et 
al, 2002). Differential association theory (micro), originating with Edwin Sutherland, 
advances the view that criminal behaviour is learned through interaction with others who 
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engage in such behaviour (Sutherland, 1940, 1947; Matseuda, 1988). Organisational theorists 
(meso), drawing on Merton’s strain theory, hold that crime is inherent in the very structure of 
an organisation (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Braithwaite, 1985). That is because organisations 
are concerned with performance and goal attainment. Unavailability of legitimate means to 
achieve goals may cause strain and thus impel an organisation to employ illegitimate means. 
From political-economy perspective (macro) organisational crimes ‘arise from particular 
forms of social relations associated with the processes of capital accumulation’ (Kauzlarich 
and Kramer, 1998: 147). Internal contradictions of politico-economic systems can create 
criminogenic pressures on organisations to employ illegitimate means to achieve goals. 
 
Kramer et al (2002: 273) explain how these three levels merge to produce state-
corporate crime in the following way: 
 
The structure, dynamics, and cultural meanings associated with the 
political economic arrangements of any society will shape the goals and means 
of economic and political organizations, as well as the constraints they face. The 
organizational level of analysis links the internal structure of specific economic 
or political units with the external political-economic environment on one hand, 
and with the way in which the work-related thoughts and actions of the 
individuals who occupy positions in those units are conditioned by the 
requirements of the positions they hold and the procedures of the organization on 
the other hand. 
 
The three levels of analysis, outlined above, are linked with three catalysts for action 
referred to as: a) motivation or performance emphasis, b) opportunity structure, and c) the 
operationalisation of social control (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998; Kramer et al, 2002). It 
incorporates features of anomie, organisational theory, Merton’s strain theory and differential 
association theory. The first catalyst suggests that the emphasis on goal attainment by politico-
economic structures, organisations or individuals may compel individuals and even entire 
organisations to pursue deviant course. The second catalyst refers to the availability of 
legitimate or illegitimate means for goal attainment. The likelihood of crime occurring 
increases in organisations ‘where the allocation of means by the internal structure is 
inadequate relative to the organisation’s goals’ (Kramer et al, 2002: 275). The final catalyst 
represents existing restraints on organisational deviance. When social control is strong in a 
society, organisations will develop culture of compliance with laws and regulations. It follows 
that individuals working in such organisations will have strong personal morality that would 
go against engaging in organisational deviance (ibid). Criminogenic catalysts for action and 
levels of analysis are then organised across vertical and horizontal axis in a table format (table 
1). State-corporate crime occurs when these catalysts for action and social forces fuse together 









The integrated theoretical model has been effectively applied in a number of case 
studies. Harper and Israel (1999) employed the integrated model to explain social and 
environmental harms caused by Australian mining company, Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd, in Papua 
New Guinea. They were able to identify economic and organisational pressures which led the 
mining company to take a harmful course of action vis-à-vis the local ecosystem and 
communities who depended on that ecosystem. Similarly, Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000) 
studying the case of ValuJet flight 592 crash identified it as state-facilitated corporate crime 
because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the US government failed to enforce 
federal regulations that may have prevented this accident. They reasoned the issue originated 
with the organisational development of the FAA as regulator of airline safety and promotors 
of the airline industry. The interplay of goal emphasis and blockage of goals led to regulatory 
inadequacy which caused the crash of ValuJet.  
 
Bruce and Becker (2007) drew on the integrated model to identify the causes of the 
state-corporate harms at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. According to the study, the 
company, Lockheed Martin, caused substantial environmental damage by mishandling 
radioactive waste and falsified environmental reports. The US government facilitated this by 
failing to enforce regulation. They concluded that the state facilitated the corporate crime by 
prioritising economic development over the environmental safety, while the company 
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prioritised profit maximisation. They found the organisational goal seeking to be the primary 
impetus of state-corporate crime. Additionally, they used Kauzlarich et al’s (2003) ‘complicity 
continuum’, which categorises motives of behaviour into four heuristic archetypes (table 2), 
to classify the US government behaviour. Bruce and Becker (2007) contend that these models 
are very useful to identify motives of state-corporate crime and classify the illegitimate 
conduct. 
 
Mullins and Rothe construct an integrated theory of violations of international 
criminal law, which is an extension of causative forces identified by Kramer et al (Mullins 
and Rothe, 2008a; Rothe and Mullins, 2010). This expansion of the integrated model explores 
four catalysts of action (motivation, opportunities, controls and controls) at four levels of 
analysis (international level, macro-level of the states, meso-organisational level and micro-
individual level). Crime, Mullins (2009: 19) explains, ‘is produced by combination of 
motivation and opportunity elements influencing social actors’ decision-making processes, 
those processes are then further influenced by extant constraints and controls before an action 
is or is not committed.’ The levels of analysis serve as theoretical dimensions used to analyse 
catalysts of action. The focus is on emergence of strain when means of attaining socially and 
organisationally emphasised goals are blocked. 
 
Table 2: Complicity Continuum (Kauzlarich et al, 2003: 247) 
 
 
Lasslett (2014a) pointed out the integrated model resembles a Mertonian approach in 
that all organisations have a deviant disposition due to inbuilt drive for goal attainment. 
Whatever the goal – profit maximisation, growth, clientele service, fulfilment of government-
imposed quotes – it is the emphasis on them that produces crimes. Mullins and Rothe (2008b: 
9) asserted that this model provides an ‘analytical acuity’ which allows ‘a precise pinpointing 
of key forces and how they interact within a specific criminal event.’ The interplay of goal 
emphasis, the unavailability of legitimate means, blocked goals and competitive environment 




key criminogenic factors that are particularly useful in cataloguing case studies of state-
corporate crime. Green and Ward (2004) employed the integrated model to examine three case 
studies. Although, they found it a useful topography to locate specific criminogenic factors 
involved in the production of crime events, they found it does not account for the politico-
economic structures in which states and corporations operate. 
 
Lasslett (2014a: 90), launching a Marxist critique, acknowledged the integrated model 
as a ‘useful heuristic device’, which pinpoints immediately perceived practices that have 
criminal potential. However, it obscures ‘substantive social forces’ that construct 
‘immediately perceived realities’ (Lasslett, 2014c: 18). In other words, the integrated 
theoretical model offers only descriptive accounts of criminogenic factors but does not explain 
concealed social processes. That is because integrated models are grounded in empiricist 
orthodoxy, which ‘erects problematic boundary between empirical research and theoretical 
explanation, so that the former process involves describing immediately perceived criminal 
practices, while the latter distinct task is devoted towards identifying their cause’ (Lasslett, 
2010a: 212). Empirical research and theoretical explanation are not two separate tasks, but 
rather theory should be used to orient consciousness to the empirical content. As stated in the 
introductory part of this thesis, the task of theory is to bridge appearance with reality, which 
is not always obvious. Lasslett (2013: 119) is critical of scholars who ‘treat appearance as a 
foundation of science’. For, they only skim surface appearances and treat it as fundamental, 
explanatory factors.  
 
C. Wright Mills (1959) called this type of scholarship ‘abstracted empiricism’, a 
bureaucratic social science that lacks theory. What is presented as law of causation, is a mere 
tautology, an ‘abstracted generalisation’ (see Lasslett, 2010a). While integrated theoretical 
models generate variables that locate apparent ‘causes’ of crime, they conceal less evident, 
yet fundamental, social realities. The integrated framework does not fully utilise the 
explanatory power of theory. Theoretical concepts are used to mediate empirical richness that 
appears as a disjoined clump of criminogenic factors, thus unveiling fundamental social 
processes. Marxist theory offers a means of uncovering the elusive relations and processes 
with an eye for latent contradictions within them. However, to be effective Marxism must be 
applied with the correct method, namely materialist dialectic. In Ilyenkov’s (1979: 114) words 
‘materialist dialectic interprets concreteness of theory as a reflection of all the necessary 
aspects of the objects in their mutual conditionality and internal interaction.’ The Marxist 
dialectic to looks at states and corporations as mutually conditioning elements that are part of 
a larger totality of relations constitutive of capitalism. There are important Marxist 
contributions within state crime study that informed the methodology of this thesis. Whilst, 
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the integrated theoretical model offers a helpful starting point, Lasslett, Whyte and Tombs 
proffer a more substantive analysis of state-corporate criminality, grounded in understanding 
of the capitalist relations. 
 
2.3.2 Routine practices, symbiosis and ‘regimes of permission’   
 
Tombs and Whyte scrutinised the orthodox state-corporate crime research for its focus 
on ‘discrete acts’ or ‘moments of rupture’, arguing it obfuscates the systemic analysis of 
structural causes of state-corporate criminality that was originally envisioned by Kramer and 
colleagues. The focus centred on ‘discrete acts’ characterises states and corporations as 
isolated and oppositional entities that are brought together only by unique circumstances 
(Tombs, 2012). States and corporations are ontologically bound together by the same 
historical progression of capitalist development. The corporation was created by and is 
maintained through state activity for mobilisation of capital, and in turn corporations are key 
sources of goods, services, taxation and employment (Whyte, 2014). The integrated 
framework eschews an important critique of systems that facilitate deviant state-corporate 
conduct (Tombs and Whyte, 2015). According to Tombs and Whyte, a shift of analytical 
attention to ordinary, routine practices of states and corporations – regulation, policymaking, 
production, exchange, trade, investment, labour-supply, employment, taxation, infrastructure 
investment – can reveal the systemic relations and processes that create the criminogenic 
potential of states and corporations.  
 
Firstly, what appears, at a glance, to be a ‘moment of rupture’, an anomalous event 
caused by a deviation from normal conduct is better understood as an ongoing process 
perpetuated by routine, systemic practices integral to state system and organised capital 
(Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014). From this approach state-corporate crime is not just an 
omission, an accident, a corporate misdemeanour. Rather, it is actively produced by states and 
corporations pursuing, what Lasslett (2014c) called, ‘desired finalities’ – e.g. tax revenue, 
corporate profit, reducing costs of production, decreasing unemployment, electoral support, 
market share, international trade (Tombs and Whyte, 2009). Approaching state-corporate 
crime in this way has a profound, theoretical implication because the consideration of systemic 
practices integral to states and corporations in production of crime or social harm opens the 






Secondly, what has been termed “collusion” is not an anomalous case of deviant state-
corporate interaction, but systemic interdependencies, both institutions reproduce one another. 
Contrary to the belief that in the neoliberal era multinational corporations replaced the state 
as the most powerful agencies, Tombs and Whyte (2009) argue that the economic influence 
of corporations increased the power of some states and reshaped the way governments 
stimulate the reproduction of organised capital. In the period of transition to neoliberalism, 
i.e. privatisation of markets, there emerged government regulation which, rather than restrict, 
promoted and facilitated free-market activity (Whyte, 2003; Tombs and Whyte, 2009; Tombs, 
2016). Government regulation and policymaking mediate the interrelationships between the 
state and private capital. The state relies on organised capital for means of economic 
production, provision of services and commodities, employment etc. Yet, capital cannot exist 
without state support. State institutions create the legal, administrative and market 
infrastructure that permit incorporation into organisations and private investment, govern 
labour and commodity circulation, and form rules of surplus-value extraction (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2009). Such intricate interrelationship presupposes a more complex process in 
production of state-corporate crime, than state initiated or facilitated corporate crime.  
 
To explain this complexity, Tombs and Whyte introduced concepts of ‘state-corporate 
symbiosis’ and ‘regimes of permission’. They went against Gramscian understanding of the 
state as a “policeman” because it places the state in a binary opposition to organised capital 
(Whyte, 2014). According to Tombs (2012) the neoliberal state is bound to the free-market 
and is ideologically committed to values of capital accumulation. The neoliberal order engulfs 
states in an international competition of capital attraction and mobilisation, as source of goods, 
services, employment etc. (Tombs, 2016). This dependency draws the state into a symbiotic 
relationship with the corporate sector, hence ‘state-corporate symbiosis’ (Tombs, 2012). The 
process of symbiosis reproduces the state system and organised capital. In Tombs (2012: 184) 
words, the concept ‘points to a complex of long-term processes’, rather than ‘discrete acts’. 
Whyte (2014) explored the way states enable capital accumulation by creating, what he called, 
‘regimes of permission’. Lasslett (2014c) pointed out that economic, executive, social and 
legal environments through which capital production and circulation occur are structured by 
states. Whyte (2014: 242) postulated, 
 
Governments establish the juridical and administrative framework for 
corporations, transport and communication infrastructures and organize 
diplomatic relationships with states to enhance opportunities for import, export, 
investment and so on. States help to constitute capital, commodity, commercial 
and residential property markets…constitute labour markets; regulate the 
employment contract; constitute economic enterprises through specifying rules 




The reproduction of organised capital is facilitated or permitted through state created 
regimes. These regimes are configured through activities integral to state system, i.e. 
regulation, policymaking, legislation etc., and they mediate the relationships with 
corporations. The state must facilitate private economic transactions, i.e. finance, industry, 
manufacture, trade, labour, consumption etc. to achieve ‘desirable finalities’, e.g. economic 
growth (Lasslett, 2014c). Achieving desired ends are imperative to social metabolism. The 
analysis of symbiosis and regimes of permission can help us see beyond ‘moments of rupture’ 
and transcend the liberal isolation of the political from the economic towards an understanding 
of the symbiosis between the public and the private sector. The neoliberal ideology intensified 
this symbiosis through which deviant conduct is permitted and normalised (Tombs and Whyte, 
2015). Therefore, deviant state-corporate conduct, and systemic antagonisms that generate 
them, become increasingly difficult to capture.  
 
A Marxist approach can be effective in the analysis of the less salient, yet particularly 
harmful, effects of deviant state-corporate conduct. It can be especially helpful when the 
analytical focus is given to systemic processes and relations hidden behind immediately 
perceived phenomena of state-corporate crime (Lasslett, 2010a, 2014b). Tombs and Whyte 
encourage analysis of state-corporate crime as a process emanating from systemic relations 
that tie states and corporations together. To this end, they advocate the use of Marxist theory 
to tease out these systemic relations. Moreover, the Marxist dialectic is designed to capture 
interactions between actors, agencies, events etc. involved in the production of social 
phenomena. Indeed, Marx’s dialectical method and theory can help frame events, as a 
historical sequence that articulates a vast coming together of forces; rather than a conjunctural 
outcome of certain interactions. Having explained where the analytical attention should be 
given, viz. systemic processes of state-corporate symbiosis and routine practices, more 
consideration ought to be given to the theoretical approach Tombs and Whyte argue for.  
 
2.3.3 A Marxist understanding of state-corporate crime 
 
The most fallacious, yet the most common, ‘method in the realm of social phenomena 
is to tear out individual minor facts and juggle with examples’ (Lenin, 1974: 272). This 
approach was labelled in Mills’ seminal work, Sociological Imagination, ‘abstract 
empiricism’. A type of positivist research that isolates individual facts from their structural 
specificity and attributes causal dynamics to their characteristics. This tendency has been 




2014). An alternative approach is the Marxist dialectical method. Here, the chapter outlines 
how this alternative, methodological approach was implemented in research.  
 
To begin with, though Marx’s theory is not new to criminology, only a few have 
applied Marxist analysis in a substantive fashion to research state/corporate criminality. 
Marxist criminologists such as Richard Quinney, Frank Pearce and William Chambliss have 
sensitised criminology to the class-based nature of crimes of the powerful. Green, Ward, and 
Lasslett have further developed, what could be called, a Marxist dialectic of state and 
corporate crimes. Criminologists and sociologists guided by Marxism direct their efforts at 
developing concepts that can help us ‘uncover the reality behind the appearance which 
concealed it’ (Pearce, 1976: 52). Broadly speaking, from a Marxist perspective, crimes of the 
powerful are an expression of specific historic conditions; an effect of systemic contradictions 
of the dominant mode of production which mature to overt forms of rupture causing social 
harms. Young (1976: 14) stressed in the Forward to Pearce (1976): 
 
The task of Marxist criminology is to move beyond the oscillations 
between vulgar materialism and idealism characteristic of bourgeois thought. 
Central to our concern is the explanation of law and criminality in terms of the 
dominant mode of production and the class nature of the society. 
 
Quinney (1977) shared this view arguing that the basis for a Marxist understanding of 
crime lies in the understanding of the material condition of the society. A Marxist 
understanding of state-corporate crime, thus, would proceed by way of explaining 
fundamental relations and processes that states and corporations are part of. These relations 
are constantly evolving, developing, and correspond to the particular stage of the development 
of social conditions which determine the limits of interaction between objects (Pearce, 1976; 
Chambliss, 1989). The dialectical method allows Marxism to see these relations and process 
in their totality, wherein all things are interconnected and in a state of constant development. 
Quinney (1977: 32) posits in this regard:    
 
…dialectical method allows us to comprehend the world as a complex of 
processes, in which all things go through a continuous process of coming into 
being and passing away. All things are studied in the context of their historical 
development. Dialectical materialism allows us to learn about things as they are 
in their actual interconnection, contradiction, and movement. 
 
Quinney, however, employed Marxist theoretical categories to empirical data without 
having firstly ‘mediated this data through a process of dialectical inquiry’ (Lasslett, 2010a: 
216). Marxist categories should not be held up as the causes of state crime, while ‘empirical 
richness and variation is reduced to epiphenomena’ (Lasslett, 2013: 124). Instead theory 
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should be employed to look at more fundamental relations, and practices they espouse. 
Phenomena, such as state-corporate crime, are products of these relations. Lasslett (2010b: 4), 
devising a Marxist ontology of criminality, notes that corporations ‘face specific range of 
options that arise out of the relations of capitalism, which they will have to choose from in 
order to realise their historically constructed goal of capital valorisation.’ Similarly, the range 
of options available to states to fulfil historically ordained goals is constructed through 
capitalist relations.  
 
A Marxist dialectic of state-corporate criminality, thus, should focus on elementary 
relations and complex structural dynamics constitutive of the present mode of production. 
These substantive relations and processes, however, are observable only indirectly and 
partially, through the medium of ‘sense-perception’, as effects they produce (see Lasslett, 
2010a: 213-14). Sense-perception grasps only obvious effects, while less obvious relations 
and processes remain hidden, thus they require theoretical mediation. Marxist theory, 
however, is equipped with conceptual categories that give a more profound meaning to the 
immediately perceived empirical data.  
 
Lasslett (2012b), through the case of human rights violations in Bougainville in the 
1980s, demonstrates the use of Marxist theoretical categories to enrich the analysis of 
empirical facts. This analysis of state/corporate crime is situated in a specific spacio-temporal 
context where capitalist relations are expressed through idiosyncratic socio-cultural and 
political arrangements (Lasslett, 2014b). The challenge, Lasslett (2014b: 185) asserts, ‘is to 
understand how these relations can function through diverse ensembles of institutions and 
political forms, and the conjectural intricacies, tendencies and contradictions, that rise from 
these particular articulations of capitalist development.’ In Bougainville’s case a copper 
mining company, Bougainville Copper Limited, was implicated in serious crimes intended to 
supress resistance against mining. The company Bougainville Copper Limited, Lasslett (2013: 
131) explains, is ‘an expression of’ capital’s ‘accumulatory processes’. Accordingly, mining 
requires large outlay of constant capital that is absorbed through company’s variable capital 
(labour) over a certain period of time (ibid). In a competitive climate the company had to 
generate above average rate of profit, which was frustrated by a social struggle that 
destabilised the investment climate. In response, the state used force to supress the struggle 
(ibid). By employing Marxist categories, Lasslett demonstrates the criminogenic potentialities 
of capital valorisation articulated through the mining company.  
 
Of course, the difficulty Marxist state/corporate crime researchers face is the absence 




practices out of which capitalist states emerge (Lasslett, 2014b). Another critical challenge is 
the issue of capitalism’s ‘uneven and combined development’ (Trotsky, 2011). Despite its 
global character, capitalism is manifested through diverse socio-cultural contexts across 
regions and countries (Lasslett, 2014b). State-corporate crime research must, thus, explain the 
phenomenon within the totality of relations it is part of. The Marxist dialectic considers the 
internal contradictions, the totality of relations and the processes they generate, as the source 
of social phenomena (Ward and Green, 2016).  
 
This entire section evaluated the current theoretical approaches to state-corporate 
crime. It pointed out the limitations of the leading model, the integrated-theoretical 
framework, namely it focuses on events arising from unique circumstances and situates the 
causes of criminal conduct in organisational goal seeking. It was then proposed that a shift in 
analytical focus to process of state-corporate symbiosis and systemic practices has a potential 
to overcome the drawbacks of integrated framework. Furthermore, to tease out the relations 
and processes of state-corporate crime hidden under the surface appearance of empirical 
perceptions, the analysis should be informed by Marx’s dialectical method. The next section 
reviews the approaches to defining state-corporate crime.  
 
2.4 The definitional foundations of state-corporate crime 
 
Heretofore, the chapter presented how the scholarship theorised and explained the 
phenomenon of state-corporate crime. Different approaches have given attention to various 
features of states and corporations in attempt to locate what causes these institutions to act 
illegitimately, and under what circumstances. The integrated-theoretical framework focuses 
on unique circumstance, events they create and organisational goal seeking as the key causes 
of state-corporate crime (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998; Kramer and Michalowski, 2006; 
Mullins and Rothe, 2008b). Whereas, Tombs (2012) and Whyte (2014) propose a shift in 
analytical focus to processes and relations that cause criminal events. Lasslett (2014c) 
advances a more systemic analysis of the relations that give rise to the state and organised 
capital employing a Marxist dialectical approach. Now, the chapter turns the reader’s attention 
to the matter of defining state-corporate crime. Establishing a definitional framework for what 
constitutes crime when inquiring into state-corporate crime is no easy endeavour. There is a 
disagreement about what type of practices or actions should be labelled as crimes. 
 
Three definitional frameworks have been distinguished in the literature: the juridical 
framework, the social harm paradigm and organisational deviance (Rothe and Mullins, 2010; 
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Iadicola, 2010; Lasslett, 2014a). The juridical framework is based on international law and 
has largely dominated the field, though some have repudiated it as state-imposed definitions 
of criminal behaviour. The social harm paradigm, pioneered by Paddy Hillyard and Steve 
Tombs, broadens this definitional framework to include structural violence and harms that do 
not fall under legal definition of crime. In a way, these two approaches present a dialectical 
relationship between two contradictory statements in the state/corporate crime field. In some 
respect, this contradiction is resolved by a third proposition, organisational deviance approach. 
Advanced by Green, Ward and Lasslett, organisational deviance considers social exchanges 
that actualise the potentially criminal character of certain state-corporate practices. Its focus 
is on criminal labels imposed on state and corporate offenders, and their practises, by social 
audience through different forms of opprobrium.  
 
2.4.1 The juridical framework: a criteria-based approach 
 
The juridical framework is a criteria-based approach which is closely associated with 
the integrated theoretical model. Lasslett (2014) observes that integrated model works best 
when there is an explicit definitional criterion of crime. Such criteria are provided by a 
legalistic distinction between deviant or undesirable and illegal practices. Much of the 
traditional state/corporate crime literature relies on a legal prism to identify criminal state-
corporate conduct. From this approach, broadly speaking, crime, both state and corporate, is 
defined as conduct that is proscribed and punishable by law (Braithwaite, 1985; Chambliss, 
1989). Sharkansky (1995) averred that state action or behaviour cannot be labelled as criminal 
unless it violates a state law (see Rothe and Mullins, 2010: 24) 
 
Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1970) have argued that in democratic states 
commitment to human rights is an important prerequisite of state legitimacy. In this regard, 
they called for definitions of state crime based on violations of basic human rights. They 
proposed that crime should not be limited to state-sanctioned behaviour, but more broadly to 
violations of fundamental rights necessary for realisation of human well-being. Influenced by 
the Schwendingers, Henry (1982) highlights that transgressions of the powerful are less likely 
to be criminalised, therefore legalistic approach to state behaviour is rendered vain. However, 
Schwendingers’ appeal to human rights has been criticised by Cohen (1993) as a ‘moral 
crusade’. Cohen (1993) insisted on a stricter application of human rights restricted to ‘gross 
violations’, such as: genocide, state terrorism, torture, wars of aggression etc. Owing to this 
disagreement state/corporate crime criminologists began to use international law for firmer 




crime constituting acts, in a broad sense, defined by law as criminal (Chambliss, 1989), to one 
where he views violations of international agreements and principles as the most compelling 
definitions of state/corporate crime.  
 
International law has been adopted by advocates of the integrated theoretical 
framework. They found, in international law, expression of emancipatory values and rights 
organised into specific standards that classify socially injurious practices of states and 
corporations as crimes (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006). Kramer and Michalowski (2006), 
for instance, defined the invasion of Iraq as a state crime in so far as it was done in violation 
of international agreements and without the UN’s legal consent. Mullins and Rothe expanded 
upon a criteria-based approach arguing it offers the strongest foundation for defining 
state/corporate acts as crimes (Mullins and Rothe, 2008b; Mullins, 2009; Rothe and Mullins, 
2010). The value of using international law rests on legally codified normative standards, such 
as human rights, and is designed to address state behaviour. Mullins and Rothe (2008b: 84) 
specify that international law fulfils two functions: the normative (defining crime) and the 
punitive (punishing crime). It sets parameters for defining an act as criminal and specifies 
punishment as well as conditions of prosecution of offenders. In Rothe’s and Mullins’ (2008) 
view international law adds legitimacy, clarity and precision to definitions of state/corporate 
crime.  
 
This juridical framework has been challenged by Hillyard and Tombs (2007) on the 
grounds that it accepts a state-sanctioned perception of crime as a matter of fact, but seldom 
questions the discursive origin of ‘crime’. They are concerned that overreliance on legalistic 
definitions of crime may deflect criminology’s attention from state and corporate behaviour 
which is socially injurious, but not considered a crime in a legal sense (Hillyard et al, 2008). 
Criteria-based criminologists, too, have registered the juridical framework’s blindness to the 
fact that law, both domestic and international, does not recognise many state and corporate 
harms as crimes (Kauzlarich et al, 2003; Mathews and Kauzlarich, 2007). State-corporate 
crimes that are less ostensible because they are produced by the routine practices, integral to 
the state and organised capital are excluded from juridical framework. Matthews and 
Kauzlarich (2007: 49) acknowledged that law conserves power relations constitutive of class-
based society, while it criminalises behaviour of one group in a society, harms of another are 
ignored.  
 
Additionally, the criminal justice system fails to constrain criminal state and corporate 
behaviour in a meaningful and effective way. Since states dominate legal discourse, at national 
and international level, there is always the danger that states will normalise and legitimise 
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their own deviant behaviour and of their partners (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2007). Therefore, 
some have broadened the juridical framework to incorporate social harms, by identifying harm 
as a common quality of all crime (Kauzlarich et al, 2003). Some have criticised the use of 
legal definitions in state/corporate crime research because it is viewed as a form of ‘social 
control’ (Hillyard et al 2008; Pemberton, 2007; Burton, 2013). Others do not see the 
contradiction between state-sanctioned definitions of crime and state-corporate produced 
harms (Mullins and Rothe, 2008b; Mullins, 2009). That is because, the label crime implies 
that an act is harmful or injurious. Therefore, to them, there is no need to move away from 
legal definitions of crime.  
 
One of the key issues with criteria-based approach is that there is no basis upon which 
to treat state-sanctioned norms as neutrally derived. Yet, many socially harmful state-
corporate practices are excluded from legal definitions of crime. Indeed, if we are to develop 
research into state-corporate crime as a scientific discipline, we cannot allow the state to define 
our field of inquiry. McDowell (2013) stresses that definitions of the crimes of powerful need 
to move beyond legal categories and include social harm as the focus of inquiry. The next 
section considers this in more detail by evaluating the social harm paradigm.  
 
2.4.2 The social harm paradigm 
 
To begin with, from a broadly Marxist standpoint, social harm is used with reference 
to practices that ‘thwart basic welfare interests… in those elements of freedom and well-being 
that are necessary for human beings to function effectively as purposive agents’ (Ward, 2004: 
85). The notion of social harm extends the subject matter of state-corporate crime research 
beyond preordained definitions of crime to practices that are socially injurious yet are legally 
permitted. Its principle aim is to help the field of state/corporate crime breakout from the 
narrow confines of criminal law, criminological orthodoxy and state-sanctioned definitions of 
crime (Hillyard et al, 2008). The social harm paradigm is part of an alternative discourse, 
arising out of criminology’s oppositional agenda (Berrington et al, 2003: 131). The social 
reality of crime, as represented by the dominant legal discourse, perpetuates the preconceived 
notion of crime associated with the street offender (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004). Social harm, 
on the other hand, enunciates people’s experience of practices resulting from systemic state 
and corporate practices. Therefore, it allows a much wider investigation into who or what 





Exponents of the social harm paradigm repudiate legal foundations as a valid 
definitional criterion for state/corporate ‘crime’. The argument follows that because the legal 
discourse is constructed by states it is unlikely that states will criminalise their own, and their 
partners’ conduct (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004; Tombs and Whyte; 2007; Hillyard and Tombs, 
2007). Instead, Hillyard and Tombs sought an approach that would move away state-
sanctioned definitions of crime. Henceforth, this approach charts instances of routine practices 
that are not criminal per se, but by their nature and effect are highly harmful and thus ought 
to be labelled as criminal. Due to the top-down nature of legalistic sources of state/corporate 
crime definitions, Tombs and Hillyard (2004) saw a fundamental contradiction between the 
category ‘crime’ and actual social harms resulting from state-corporate behaviour. While some 
of these practices are captured by the criminal law, a great many escape criminal labels. Tombs 
and Hillyard (2004) hold that this is because law is constructed by state institutions to secure 
the system which keeps the ruling class in dominant position.  
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, Hillyard and Tombs (2004) considered the social 
harm paradigm as a resistance to the legalistic approach. Foucault (1978: 101) wrote that 
‘discourse can be both an instrument and effect of power, but also a hindrance…a point of 
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy.’ Critical scholars have a task of 
resisting accepted truths, what Foucault calls ‘regimes of truth’, produced through dominant 
criminological and legal discourses (Berrington et al, 2003; Hillyard, 2004; Hillyard and 
Tombs, 2007). Some have argued that the presence of legal discourse – which is dominated 
by the state – in state/corporate crime research signifies state influence over criminology’s 
subject matter (Tombs and Whyte, 2003). Hence, Hillyard seeks to change this by developing 
a new field of study called zemiology1. It is a nascent concept concerned with the study of 
harm rather than crime.  
 
To Hillyard and Tombs (2004 :24) the use of the ‘crime’ category excludes routine 
practices which are not reducible to actions, motives and intentions of individuals. They argue 
that legal definitions of ‘crime’ pay too much attention to ‘discrete acts’, articulated by Tombs 
(2012), but ignore harmful activities inherent in institutional and structural arrangements. 
They state, ‘by its focus on the individual, the structural determinants which lead to harmful 
events – such as poverty or deprivation – can be ignored’ (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004: 18). 
Whereas, the social harm paradigm shifts the focus from ‘discrete acts’ to routine systemic 
practices, inherent in the stable functioning of the system (see Tombs, 2012). Pemberton 
(2007) makes an important conceptual distinction. He suggests ‘social’ denotes the context 
                                                          
1 Zemiology comes from the Greek zemia meaning ‘harm’ 
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that produces harm. Then, crucial to the category ‘harm’ is an understanding of prerequisites 
for human well-being. Harm, thus, denotes acts or practices that impede human wellbeing. In 
view of this, the social harm approach implies a study of social relations, and the effects they 
produce (Pemberton, 2007; Hillyard and Tombs, 2008). Social harm refers to a state and/or 
corporate conduct that compromises human safety, wellbeing and ability to satisfy basic 
human needs. In a way, social harm refers to practices that are not illegal per se, but the effects 
of these practices are of criminal nature.  
 
Criteria-based scholars have criticised the social harm approach for lack of precision. 
Rothe and Mullins (2010: 26) charge the social harm paradigm with inconsistency, in that it 
uses ‘a more amorphous and relativistic definitional rubric.’ They see the broadness of the 
social harm approach as a weakness, as anything can be defined as a state crime, if there is 
any risk of deprivation or injury. Yet, the concept of ‘social harm’ is employed in a diverse 
range of academic disciplines to practices that are not proscribed by domestic or international 
law but have harmful effects. The broadness of this concept allows criminologists to measure 
people’s experiences of state/corporate acts.  
 
Hillyard and Tombs (2004: 20) averred, ‘the field of inquiry is (partially) defined by 
people’s understandings, attitudes, perceptions and experiences rather that preordained by 
states.’ Analysis of harm produces greater understanding of what is likely to have an adverse 
effect on human well-being. Additionally, practices may not be categorised as criminal, but 
by their harmful nature provoke social opprobrium. Although, Hillyard and Tombs give 
perfunctory attention to the role of social audience in defining state/corporate produced social 
harms, it lacks a more cogent conceptual grounding. Lasslett (2010b: 14) proposes that a shift 
to a discipline based on social harm can ‘foster examinations of heterogeneous harms 
produced by specific spacio-temporal antagonisms generated by global capitalism’. 
Ultimately, the study of harms, rather than crimes, may be more compatible with a process-
driven approach discussed below.  
 
2.4.3 Organisational deviance: a process-driven approach 
 
Organisational deviance, or a process-driven approach (Lasslett, 2014a), is ingrained 
in Marxist dialectical tradition. The advocates of this framework have sought to establish an 
ontology of state crime, professing the view that crime events have to be constructed before 
they come into social reality (see Hillyard and Tombs, 2004: 10; Lasslett, 2010b: 2). 




criminal, that potentiality must be then actualised through some form of social exchange 
(Green and Ward, 2000; Ward and Green, 2000; Lasslett et al, 2015). This social exchange 
denotes censure enacted by a social audience in response to state-corporate practices that 
breach normative code of conduct. In the popular labelling theory Becker (1973) contended 
that certain types of behaviour become deviant through labels collectively affixed to them by 
society. Likewise, Green and Ward (2000) recognised that state/corporate conduct that 
contravenes codified norms or certain commitments becomes defined as deviant by a social 
audience who ascribe deviancy labels on them.  
 
Historically, sections of society who have limited or no access to formal organs of 
institutional power have informally proscribed state/corporate conduct perceived as 
illegitimate, through social struggle (Green and Ward, 2000; Ward and Green, 2000; Lasslett, 
2012b). According to the process-driven approach, the criminal property of state/corporate 
conduct is a potential expressed in normative codes of conduct and formal rules (Ward and 
Green, 2000; Green, 2016). This potential is realised through structured social exchange, in 
other words when a substantial audience censure and stigmatise state/corporate conduct as 
deviant through a material activity (Lasslett, 2014a; Lasslett et al, 2015). As such, state-
corporate crime’s being, as a criminological/legal concept and social phenomenon, is a process 
(Lasslett, 2010b). A process that has an objective and subjective moments, which Green and 
Ward (2000) articulated through concepts of illegitimacy and deviancy. Illegitimacy refers to 
activities which contravene an objective rule or norm, and deviancy denotes a form of 
judgement that condemns illegitimate activities (Ward and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 
2004; Lasslett et al, 2015). One of the kernel conditions for state legitimacy in democratic 
nations is a commitment to human rights.  
 
Green and Ward (2000: 109) stated that ‘in most contemporary states, the values on 
which the legitimacy of a state practice depends will include, inter alia, the state’s real or 
nominal commitment to human rights.’ Human rights encapsulate elements of freedom and 
wellbeing that human beings need to exist as purposive agents (Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger, 1970; Ward, 2004). When states acquire legitimacy through public consent, 
they are expected to abide by human rights, which impose limits to legitimate conduct. 
Departure from these limits may attract censure. Internal contradictions inherent in the 
capitalist system often create rifts that cause states and corporations to exceed the norms they 
profess to follow (Lasslett, 2014b). Illegitimacy informs the social audience that an action 
violated a certain rule. How a deviancy label is inscribed on state-corporate conduct will have 
a varying impact in terms of delivering stigma. One of the core aims of this study is to 
understand how civil society mobilises through direct action to inscribe stigmatising labels on 
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state-corporate conduct. Therefore, state-corporate practices become criminal when they are 
objectively illegitimate and are subjected to social opprobrium. 
 
Building on the process-driven approach, Lasslett draws on Marx’s dialectical theory 
to construct an ontology of state/corporate crime. He contended that human beings, as 
conscious social actors, concretise social reality by acting on objective phenomena they create 
and observe (Lasslett, 2010b). In Marxist dialectical philosophy an object or a phenomenon 
has an ontological reality. The being of a phenomenon, viz. its existence, has a reality that is 
material and concrete (Engels, 1946; Jordan, 1967; Ilyenkov, 1979). In a Marxist dialectical 
sense, concreteness does not refer so much to the empirical reality of objects, but to ‘the 
important fact that phenomena never exists independently of other ‘things’, rather it is always 
part of a larger totality of relations and processes, which inscribe it with definite 
characteristics’ (Lasslett, 2010b: 3). In Ilyenkov’s (1982) words ‘each individual separately 
taken thing comprises its own essence potentially, only as an element of some concrete system 
of interacting things, rather than in the form of an actually given general feature’ (cited in 
Lasslett, 2014a: 72). Social reality consists of definite relations between people, and between 
people and objects. These relations mediated social metabolism and inspire processes that 
create various phenomena with their own characteristics and modes of existence (Lasslett, 
2010a). Human beings, as creative social actors, infuse phenomena they observe and 
experience with meaning and definite characteristics.  
 
In the Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx wrote ‘the chief defect of all hitherto existing 
materialism is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object 
or of contemplation, but not as a sensuous human activity, practice’ (cited in Lasslett, 2014a: 
73). Similarly, empiricist research fetishizes events and acts, but gives less attention to the 
relations between interacting agents that produce state-corporate events and ascribe criminal 
properties to them. From a dialectical approach, a thing expresses definite relations and 
processes, it does not exist in/by itself (Lukács, 1971; Engels, 2010a). Therefore, for Marx 
capital was a “thing” and a process based on relations between human beings and objects 
(Marx, 1976, 1981). Equally, events are constituted by relations and processes. A state-
corporate crime event is constituted by interactions of censuring actors with offending 
institutions, media, legal apparatus and broader social audience. In this way, state-corporate 
crime is a process, rather than just an event.  
 
Acts and actors obtain the property of being criminal when a significant audience: ‘1) 
accepts a certain rule as a standard of behaviour, 2) interprets the act as violating the rule, and 




2004). From a dialectical standpoint, norms of conduct to which state-corporate institutions 
concede were established by past social struggles, and they are the standard today for 
determining legitimacy (Green and Ward, 2004). What today is recognised as illegitimate state 
and/or corporate behaviour is a result of yesterday’s struggles for justice, emancipation, rights 
etc. As a process, state-corporate crime is a potentiality actualised through material practice, 
with concrete relations between social actors. This potential exists in ‘normative limits upon 
which rule is legitimated’, and it is actualised when an audience acts upon norms through 
material practice and applies judgement (Lasslett, 2012a: 127). Illegitimacy and censure are 
interlacing processes through which state-corporate activity can be inscribed with a criminal 
property. However, how this happens and with what outcome must be studied through 
empirical inquiry.   
 
The process-driven approach has not escaped scrutiny. In Rothe’s (2010) view 
organisational deviance is too nebulous concerning eligible censuring audience, and what 
might be legitimately labelled as crime. The argument follows that a process-driven approach 
does not furnish state/corporate crime research with clear definitional criteria. Kauzlarich et 
al (2010) argue that the focus on subjective deviancy labels privileges one social audience 
over another. Due to plurality of opinions in most nations, defining state/corporate crime is 
not as simple as listening to the loudest voice. Kauzlarich et al (2010: 244) are concerned with 
the inclusion and exclusion of some voices, and ‘Who is a valid labelling audience?’ 
Subjective constructionist definitions tend to ignore the phenomena itself in favour of 
deconstructing the response and reaction (Kauzlarich et al, 2010; Rothe and Mullins, 2010). 
Notwithstanding, Lasslett (2014a) contends that this is an empirical question, which should 
be addressed by looking at historical struggles.  
 
The process-driven approach offers conceptual tools that distinguish processes 
through which state-corporate practices can acquire criminal properties (Ward and Green, 
2000; Green and Ward, 2004). This approach calls for an empirical inquiry into how a social 
audience reacts to illegitimate state-corporate activities to apply deviancy labels. Contrary to 
Rothe, Mullins and Kauzlarich’s critique, it is not about finding which particular audience has 
the right to determine what kind of activities are illegitimate. The question is a historical and 
a concrete one. The point of empirical enquiry is to find out whether a social audience was 
successful in inscribing stigma at the levels necessary to qualify a state-corporate practice as 
criminal. This is what the thesis tries to achieve. Like all other phenomena, state-corporate 
crime cannot be defined in abstract terms, removed from historical context and concrete, 
material existence/being. We can certainly distinguish that certain conduct breaches 
international law or human rights. Crime’s ontological being is historically constituted through 
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structurally situated social praxis, configured from below through resistance. The civil society 
is but one social organ through which state-corporate conduct can be sanctioned.   
 
To establish how state-corporate conduct can obtain the quality of being criminal the 
study looks at ‘concrete historical struggles of resistance’ (Lasslett, 2041a: 74). In different 
contexts civil society has developed diverse traditions of resistance. The empirical inquiry, 
thus, situates the analysis of censure activities in historical specificity of resistance trajectories. 
To establish how state-corporate conduct obtains the quality of being criminal the study looks 
at history. The findings may not be definite, but we can approximate the processes through 
which illegitimate conduct can become criminal. Investigation of struggles of resistance is 
important to understand these processes. Resistance is the material, social practice that has 
been observed to inscribe state-corporate conduct with criminal qualities. Resistance 
concretises the criminogenic potential observed by social actors in some state-corporate 
conduct. However, we need to be able to identify and define resistance. Resistance is a broad 
concept, and it is not a simple case of subversive practice. Not all subversive acts can be 
regarded as social praxis that inscribes phenomena with definite characteristics and meaning. 
Therefore, the chapter explores in more detail how resistance has been defined and 
conceptualised.  
 
2.4.4 Legitimacy and social censure 
 
Legitimacy, Beetham (1991) contends, is not solely a case of ‘legal validity’, as legal 
theorists might argue, for there are moral questions and dilemmas which are concerned with 
justification of law itself. From a moral philosophical perspective, legitimacy is a much 
broader concept, which encapsulates not what the law proscribes, but what it ought to 
proscribe. However, the role of social scientist is not one of solving legal disputes or moral 
conundrums, but rather an explanatory one (Beetham, 1991). Though, Max Weber’s 
conceptualisation of legitimacy as Legitimitätsglaube (a belief in legitimacy), is one that is 
most commonly used in social science, Beetham (1991) subjected it to much critique. 
According to him, ‘belief’ alone is not sufficient to social-scientific explanation of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is a property conferred on power, institution or organisation through actions which 
express consent of a populace (Beetham, 1991). Thus, even though legal validity and moral 
philosophy are factors involved in legitimacy, the research here is interested in that which can 
be empirically evidenced through actions of social agents, which express that something is 





A social scientist ought to assess legitimacy against the normative standing of the 
power arrangements that the law validates; in turn, these arrangements are assessed not against 
universal criteria, but against those that pertain to a society in question; and, actions expressing 
consent are assessed against conventions of a particular society, not ideal conditions. As such, 
legitimacy is founded on three conditions, ‘1) conformity to established rules; 2) the 
justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs; 3) the express consent of [a populace] 
…’ (Beetham, 1991: 102). The fact that legitimacy is crucial to unhindered operations of the 
state and organised capital, this conceptualisation can help us understand when and how a 
state-corporate conduct qualifies as illegitimate. What is required for this thesis, is not just an 
explanation of the criteria for legitimacy of power, but a further understanding of the 
conditions of illegitimacy in state-corporate conduct and the process through which this 
property is actualised/concretised. A valuable insight into these matters can be found in the 
works of Colin Sumner on social censure.  
 
According to Sumner (1990), censure of certain conduct as crime is founded on the 
political-economy, culture and value system of a society. The focus of orthodox criminology 
on the street offender, Sumner (1990) argued, is an effect of criminologists’ reliance on official 
government statistics in the past. Whereas, most serious areas of crime, e.g. war crimes, human 
rights violations, corporate crime etc. was largely overlooked. Certainly, in a capitalist society, 
the class which dominates economic production and institutions of political power has the 
capacity to assert its censure in the legal and cultural domains of society (Sumner, 1990). 
Simultaneously, it has access to all the necessary institutions (legislature, courts, police) to 
enforce its censure. Sumner (1990), however, recognises the potential, in class-based societies, 
for oppositional censure by subordinate groups, subalterns, social movements and class 
movements. Such oppositional groups often clash with the ruling class in the courts, the 
streets, work places etc. applying censure from below.  
 
Censure is a historically significant practice, which ‘expresses, constructs and 
contains’ the historic struggles for justice and rights (Sumner, 1990: 29). This perspective 
captures the thesis that crime’s being is historically constituted (Green and Ward, 2004; 
Lasslett et al, 2015). In other words, what qualifies as state-corporate crime, is conduct that 
has been condemned and defined as criminal by past struggles. In a more recent intervention, 
Sumner (2012) emphasised that censure is no longer a prerogative of the dominant group in a 
society. For, it has a political dimension, in that it is not just the state that has the tools and the 
ability to censure certain act as deviant or indeed criminal. This does not, however, mean that 
anything that is subjected to social censure becomes immediately deviant or criminal. For, 
censure or labelling a state-corporate conduct as deviant may occur because of vested interests 
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or certain prejudices of a group performing social censure (Sumner, 2012). Thereupon, it is 
important to approach even the censuring of state-corporate conduct critically.  
 
In addition, Sumner and Sandberg (1990) emphasise the need to consider the 
ideological composition of social censure, and its historical roots. The ideological and 
historical composition of censure can explain what the police, courts and legislature define as 
deviant (Sumner and Sandberg, 1990). Sumner (199) builds this conceptualisation on the 
Marxist theory of ideologies, arguing that social relations produce specific ideologies, and in 
a capitalist society where class divisions persist specific ideologies persist in individual 
consciousness. Some of these ideologies will be hegemonic and supportive of the state and 
organised capital, but there is also a presence of counter-hegemonic blocs (Sumner and 
Sandberg, 1990). For example, the paramilitary style of policing in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
which targeted groups like the miners in the UK or blacks in the US is predicated upon 
ideological censure of minorities resisting inequality (Sumner and Sandberg, 1990: 164). 
Equally, the censure of state and corporate conduct is predicated by specific counter-
hegemonic ‘mode of life’ that expresses opposition to the status quo. It is precisely this 
conception of social censure that this thesis adopts, and one which dovetails with Green and 
Ward’s conceptualisation of civil society and Lasslett’s conception of resistance.  
 
2.5 Adopting the concept of resistance in state-corporate crime 
research 
 
The previous sections examined how states and corporations have been characterised 
in the literature, how state-corporate crime was conceptualised, and the definitional 
approaches. This section builds on the process-driven approach, conceptualising the social 
praxis involved in actualising state-corporate crime through the concept of resistance. The first 
comprehensive application of the concept of resistance to the study of state crime was 
introduced in the special issue of Social Justice (Rothe, 2009; Friedrichs, 2009; White, 2009; 
Iadicola, 2011). Following these important contributions, Elizabeth Stanley, in collaboration 
with Jude McCulloch, published a primer entitled State Crime and Resistance. This new tract 
of scholarship was, in part, influenced by Green and Ward’s call to consider the roll civil 
society plays in exposing and censuring deviant state conduct. Building on this, Stanley and 
McCulloch’s (2012) volume examined civil society configurations that resist illegitimate state 
conduct. This scholarly tract provides germane definitions of resistance for state-corporate 





Resistance is conceptualised here as a material, social practice of censure. The study 
aims to understand the role of resistance practices in inscribing wrongful state-corporate 
conduct with criminal properties. Throughout the contemporary history of successful social 
struggles resistance has been oftentimes configured through varied forms of direct action. It 
is a form of tangible, physical practice intended to bear material, and often immediate, effect 
of social mobilisation. The section begins with an overview of the definitional criteria of 
resistance and its conceptualisation in state crime literature. It then examines Gramscian 
concepts of hegemony, counterhegemony and civil society adopted to theorise the process of 
resistance. Finally, the section outlines what is direct action, what are its historical roots, and 
how the idea of direct action has been conceptualised in anarchist, leftist/socialist and social 
movements literature.  
 
2.5.1 Defining resistance in state and corporate crime scholarship 
 
The term resistance denotes social acts of dissent to practices perceived by civil 
society as illegitimate, and thus deviant. Although, there is no fixed and precise definition of 
resistance, several academics have identified its defining features. Resistance can be passive 
or active, offensive or defensive, continuous or intermittent, reactionary or progressive 
(Friedrichs, 2009). Whatever its form, resistance demonstrates four defining features: 
opposition, intention, communication and transformation (Stanley and McCulloch, 2012: 4-
5). Opposition is understood as the active element of resistance, which includes creative or 
assertive acts against what is perceived as unjust or deviant. Intention refers to conscious 
activity or human agency involved in opposition, for an act to be defined as resistance it has 
to be conducted intentionally and consciously. Communication signifies that actors engage in 
resistance to communicate that an action or event is deviant or wrong. Transformation refers 
to the way people understand their ability to instigate or stop change, whether it is changing a 
socio-economic system, a legal landscape, holding a company or a government institution 
responsible, stopping or preventing a harmful process. Similarly, Brighenti (2011: 66) 
observed that ‘resistance always implies a transformative drive’, transforming what is into 
what ‘resisters’ believe ought to be. Resistance may range from individual level to 
organisational, state and international levels (Rothe, 2009). Stanley and McCulloch (2012: 4) 
averred, 
 
Resistance ranges from the small, silent and personal through to the 
multitudinous, spectacular and momentous. The scope of activities that might be 
defined as resistance is broad. It may be violent or nonviolent, passive or active, 
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hidden or open, verbal or physical, spontaneous or strategic, local or global, and 
frequently a combination of some or all. 
 
The essence of the meaning of resistance is weaved through synonymous notions, e.g. 
people power, non-violence, satyagraha, civil disobedience etc. (Nepstad, 2013). Examples of 
resistance may include, WikiLeaks formed by Julian Assange to expose US state criminality; 
refusal by US soldiers to follow orders during Vietnam War; Standing Rock protests against 
the oil pipeline in Dakota, USA; safeguarding biological resources from international patent 
regimes by indigenous communities in India; or keeping a culture alive by Amazon tribes 
despite colonial violence. In the broadest sense of the meaning, resistance can be used in 
reference to a transformative drive that communicates opposition to state-corporate practices 
perceived as harmful by a social audience. Resistance, thus, can be anything that manifests 
these four, or either one, features.  
 
Resistance is also understood as an alternative way of doing politics, outside of the 
state-sanctioned arena where the elite and the ruling class have the upper hand (White, 2009; 
Stanley, 2012). As such, resistance allows civil society to voice their disapproval of state-
corporate practices by alternative means of political engagement where they can gain an 
advantage. In Stanley and McCulloch’s (2012: 9) words, ‘the master’s house cannot be 
dismantled with the master’s tools.’ While there are international and domestic mechanisms 
of control, e.g. International Criminal Court, Tribunals, International Court of Justice, 
international law, regulation etc. they do not address the system from which state-corporate 
crimes emerge (Friedrichs, 2009; Iadicola, 2011; Stanley and McCulloch, 2012). Effective 
strategies of crime control from below go beyond apparatus of the state.  
 
Resistance is politically, socially and culturally innovative. According to Stanley 
(2012), when a legal range of actions is unavailable, resisters are forced to forge their own 
tools of resistance, becoming ever more creative. Marx ([1871] 2010a: 328) famously wrote, 
‘the working class cannot simply lay hold on the readymade State machinery and wield it for 
their own purpose. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political 
instrument of their emancipation.’2 Effective resistance tends to occur outside of state-
sanctioned means of action. As such, another defining element of resistance is that its methods 
are characteristically subversive.  
 
                                                          
2 The full citation can be found in the second draft of Karl Marx’s Address to the General Council of 




Studying environmental activism, White (2009) identified spontaneous resistance 
(limited focus) and organised resistance (expansive focus), each with several dimensions. 
Spontaneous: victim exclusive, local, material relief, top-down leadership, rectification, 
appeals to authority, actions motivated by loss, victim focus. Organised: outsider inclusive, 
global, abstract principles, democratic/participatory forms of engagement, transformation, 
self-governance, action motivated by future, victim interests linked to New Social Movements 
and wider struggles. Although, these dimensions are induced by White (2009) from 
observations of environmental activism and justice, they can be extended to other fields of 
struggle to characterise and define resistance. In broad terms, resistance may be identified as 
a struggle for justice or relief (White, 2009). The defining features are a helpful set of tools 
for identifying resistance. They are not to be treated as checkboxes, for resistance is dynamic 
and multidimensional, not all of these defining features may be present and resistance to 
state/corporate crime is not fully understood. Thus, a deeper analysis of its dynamics, the 
processes and relations that cause it, are needed to explain why and how it happens.   
 
Following White’s (2009) analysis of environmental activism, resistance is context-
bound (culturally, socially, nationally), related to consciousness (transnational New Social 
Movements or local grass-roots groups), and determined by social experience (as victim, 
activist, citizen, observer). When studying resistance, the researcher should consider who 
defines the issue, who leads the struggle, how the issue is perceived and how the struggle is 
shaped. In another contribution, White (2012) finds that a central dynamic of resistance to 
state-corporate crime is the dichotomy between the narrow ‘national interests’, ‘private 
interests’ and broader ‘social interests.’ Private-corporate interests often come into conflict 
with broader, social interests, and states sometimes advance private interests under the guise 
of national interests, which are in fact narrow state interests (White, 2012). It is when these 
interests encroach on broader social interests that a social audience rises to censure and resist 
actions in pursuit of private and national interests.  
 
When considering what motivates resistance, or what is the ‘impetus for action’ 
(White, 2009), there are several possible factors that have been identified in the literature. 
These are, first-hand experiences of victims and eyewitnesses or motivating ideals/values of 
observers (White, 2009; Friedrichs, 2009). Resistance to state/corporate crime is often 
influenced by principles and values, such as liberal ideals or universal rights (Rothe, 2009; 
Friedrichs, 2009). It can also be a material response to a situation wherein state and corporate 
actions harm human life or the environment. Resistance is not solely about narrow interests of 
a group, a defined population, a state or a capitalist enterprise, it contests fundamental issues 
within global structures of power relations (Stanley and McCulloch, 2012). Hence, resistance 
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tends to express accepted principles and values. It raises moral, as well as legal, conundrums, 
and questions established norms of state and corporate behaviour (Stanley and McCulloch, 
2012). In this sense, resistance is more than dissent or subversive activity. It expresses values 
upon which norms of conduct are found. Rothe (2009) contends that resistance is based on 
shared and collective conceptions of humanism, ethical conduct and justice. Resistance is 
further, then, characterised by the principles and values it is based on. It is intended to preserve 
common values shared by a broad populace. 
 
The leading theoretical approach adopted in the resistance literature is a Foucauldian 
perspective of power-resistance nexus. According to this perspective, power is an infinite 
relation characterising all human exchanges, and resistance is an integral part of this relation 
(Stanley and McCulloch, 2012; Stanley, 2012; Nadarajah and Sentas, 2012). Power produces 
resistance, and resistance opens power to reformation and change. Foucault (1978: 95) 
famously wrote that ‘where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power.’ From this perspective resistance 
is simply a natural effect of power relations embodied in the state and corporation (Stanley 
and McCulloch, 2012). Although, true, the assertion that power and resistance are mutually 
reinforcing does not add analytical value to this study.  
 
Works by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdams on contentious politics 
are frequently cited in research that considers social movements. Contentious politics is a 
concept used with reference to a phenomenon dating back to 18th century Europe, which saw 
the advent of social movements struggling for democracy, workers’ rights, civil rights, 
equality, sovereignty/independence etc. (Tilly, 1978, 1981; Tarrow, 1996, 1998; McAdam et 
al, 2001; Tilly and Wood, 2009). It denotes, but is not exclusive to, collective actions such as, 
protest, demonstration, strike, civil disobedience and revolution. By contentious politics, 
McAdam et al (2001) mean episodic, collective interaction between makers of claims and their 
objects, primarily a government. In Tarrow’s (1998: 3) words, ‘collective action becomes 
contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the 
name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge 
authorities.’ From this approach, “resistance” can be understood as a form of claim-making 
by a social movement on a government.   
 
According to the contentious politics literature, mobilisation of collective action is 
enabled when: internal and/or external factors create a political opportunity; social movements 
mobilise forces in response to emergent opportunity or create one; the struggle is framed in a 




action are available to the movement, for effective claim-making (Tilly 1978; McAdam, 1982; 
Tarrow, 1998, 2005; Tilly and Wood, 2009). Notwithstanding, there are some important 
criticisms to be registered. The contentious politics literature is quite ambiguous as to what 
political opportunity is and how it affects mobilisation (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996).  It is 
unclear as to what forms an opportunity for action, whether external forces or internal 
movement dynamics (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The external, causal forces of contention 
are limited to political environment, which is unhelpful in explaining what causes resistance 
to certain state-corporate conduct (Kriesi et al, 1995; Klandermans, 1997; Goodwin and 
Jasper, 1999). Similarly, to the ‘integrated theoretical framework’, contentious politics may 
orient a researcher to a particular set of interactions that are contentious and the internal 
dynamic of mobilisations. However, it does not offer analytical tools for understanding the 
substantive social processes that produce opposition and resistance communities. 
 
Engagement in resistance to state-corporate deviance cannot be simply analysed as an 
effect of frames formed by a central organisation, which organise experience and direct a 
groups’ perception of an event (Diani, 1996; McAdam, 1996; McAdam et al, 2001). This 
thesis attempts to grasp the elementary processes through which resistance actors acquire 
consciousness that is fundamentally opposed to deviant state-corporate conduct. 
Consciousness that corresponds to a specific mode of life experienced by resistance actors. 
This cannot be achieved by focusing on a movement’s internal dynamics. It can be achieved 
by analysing resistance in a greater whole, as part of a process wherein social actors interact 
with the objective world in a conscious and productive way.  Such insight, however, can be 
found in the literature on civil society and hegemony.  
 
A more precise and strategic approach must be honed, one that explains the social 
process through which state-corporate events acquire criminal properties. The thesis contends 
that the Gramscian approach offers concepts which concretise the relations between censuring 
actors and offending institutions – civil society, hegemony and counter-hegemony (Ward and 
Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 2012). The Gramscian concept of counter-hegemony can be 
useful in explaining how resistance communities arise, how values expressed through 
resistance develop, what these values are and how they motivate resistance actors to censure 
wrongful state-corporate practices. This is important to the study because to understand the 
process of resistance we need to know how and wherefrom resistance communities emerge, 
what motivates them to mobilise and censure some state-corporate practices, and why they 




2.5.2 Civil society, hegemony and counterhegemony 
 
As pointed out in the previous sections, civil society has been identified in the 
literature as one of the strongest counterweights to the crimes of the powerful and an important 
source of norms that define state/corporate criminality (Green and Ward, 2004). Civil society 
organisations tend to be the frontrunners of social struggles, they mobilise resistance, 
orchestrate protest actions, and define the issues of resistance (Grewcock, 2012). Civil society 
configurations are important for a sociological understanding of resistance to state-corporate 
crime. Gramscian theory provides a meaningful explanation of the role civil society plays and 
how it emerges. In Gramscian theory civil society refers to the level of superstructure where 
ideology is produced and diffused; the ensemble of institutions, organisations and actors 
through which hegemony and counterhegemony is exercised (Mouffe, 1979). Civil society 
fulfils a dual role, on the one hand, civil society promulgates the capitalist ideology embodied 
by economic and state institutions; on the other, it stands outside the hegemonic order and 
sometimes challenges it (Green and Ward, 2012). It occupies the space between the hegemonic 
and counterhegemonic social structure.  
 
The concept of civil society refers to associations independent of the state and capable 
of articulating norms against which the legitimacy of state/corporate actions is judged (Green 
and Ward, 2004, 2012; Grewcock, 2012). These include NGOs, pressure and activist groups, 
associations, movement organisations etc. The mass media, academic and scientific 
institutions, parliamentary parties etc. are also part of the civil society, though their role is 
more ambiguous (Ward and Green, 2000). The civil society produces opinions, values, 
ideologies and norms that influence government and corporate conduct; it also shapes and 
reshapes cultural and political structures (Green and Ward, 2012). Civil society legitimises the 
status quo, where hegemonic rule prevails; but equally it can prohibit certain activities when 
they violate law or shared moral values (Ward and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 2000, 2004, 
2012). The hegemonic rule refers to the ideological dominance, whereby the ‘ruling class’ 
rules the society by disseminating its ideology (Gramsci, 1992). This is achieved, largely, by 
institutions that appear independent of the state.  
 
The independent institutions which exercise ideological leadership consist of the 
ensemble of educational, religious, political, associated institutions (Ward and Green, 2000). 
It is their intellectual leadership that promulgates a set of ideas, values and beliefs that support 
the status quo and legitimise state power. Gramsci, also, understood that ‘the apparent 




can very quickly be undermined in situations of class conflict where fundamental class 
antagonisms are brought to the surface, sometimes violently…’ (Ward and Green, 2000: 81). 
Civil society has the capacity to challenge and even undermine state power. In this sense, civil 
society can subject the state, as well as economic institutions, to social opprobrium by the very 
rules the state claims to uphold. However, only when they violate or are seen to violate these 
rules. Green and Ward (2012) emphasised that while civil society strengthens the democratic 
state, it can curtail authoritarian, corrupt and democratic imperial states. 
 
In Gramsci’s dialectical conception of history, human beings are shaped by social 
structure, and simultaneously are the subjects that reproduce, challenge and create new social 
relations (Gramsci, 1992). Hegemony imbues social actors with consciousness that supports 
capitalism and social relations that come with it (Boggs, 1976). However, the internal 
antagonisms of capitalism give rise to counter-hegemonic blocs (Carroll, 2007). According to 
the Gramscian perspective,  
 
as the oppressed strata reach awareness of limitations imposed by class 
society and struggle to redefine and transcend those limitations, they take the 
initiative and begin to move towards emancipation precisely as their needs, 
demands, perceptions expand and then explode beyond the old structural 
boundaries that have contained them for so long (Boggs, 1976: 32).  
 
The dominant class exerts hegemonic rule with a variety of social forces (institutions, 
associations, ideas, values), giving rise to a ‘historic bloc’ (Cox, 1993). It reproduces the 
hegemony of the dominant class, but it also opens space for counter-hegemonic influences 
and activities (Gramsci, 1992). Civil society takes up this role, where contradictory relations 
of capitalism are manifested in the activities of states and corporations perceived as wrongful 
the civil society has the capacity to challenge them.  
 
Notwithstanding, civil resistance is conceived as more than a simple expression of 
counter-hegemonic ideas. It is a social practice, and the counter-hegemonic ideas shape 
individuals’ consciousness, guiding their actions. Gramsci (1992: 352) wrote,  
 
man does not enter relations with the natural world just by being himself 
part of the natural world, but actively, by means of work and technique…these 
relations are not mechanical. They are active and conscious. They correspond to 
the greater or lesser degree of understanding that each man has of them.  
 
Marx held that social life is practical, and consciousness develops out of humans’ 
practical existence. In the Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx (2010b: 7) wrote that ‘in its reality [the 
essence of man] is the ensemble of the social relations.’ Building on this, Gramsci (1992) 
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explained that humans acquire consciousness through the ensemble of social relations they are 
part of. Their material existence shapes the form of consciousness which then influences their 
actions. Lukács (1971: 60) theorised that a ‘mode of life’ social actors experience shapes their 
consciousness. According to Lasslett et al (2015) the ‘mode of life’ experienced by resistance 
actors engenders counter-hegemonic values and practices, whereas the ‘mode of life’ the state-
corporate actors experience elevates capital accumulation. 
 
Resistance actors are conscious and active agents. Human beings not only understand 
the relations they are part of, but they further create and innovate the activities through which 
they enter relations with one another, though collectively (Gramsci, 1992). Consciousness and 
social practices are shaped to a degree by history and culture, traditions that are bequeathed 
by previous generations. Resistance communities, too, inherit traditions of action from 
previous social struggles. One of the means of resistance that has been adopted and employed 
by many social movements is direct action. The notion of direct action has a long lineage in 
various political traditions, both in the core nations and the periphery. As a material form of 
resistance, direct action is given more attention in the next section where it is defined and 
conceptualised.   
 
2.5.3 Direct action 
 
Direct action is one of the core subject matters of this thesis. It is a form of action used 
throughout the history of social struggle to make a tangible, immediate change. Whether it is, 
for instance, Ploughshares activists damaging US aircraft to protest the Iraq War or 
Greenpeace activists scaling a Russian drilling platform to draw attention to the hazards of oil 
drilling in the Arctic. These direct, active forms of resistance are, quite literally, a type of 
social praxis, whereby ideas and values induce action to achieve change. However, the 
literature on resistance has not put the notion of direct action into close scrutiny, and how 
these repertoires of action are used to imprint stigma on the practices of the powerful. Hence, 
the purpose of this section is to define and conceptualise direct action. The notion of direct 
action is important to the thesis because the empirical cases revolve around instances of direct 
action employed to censure state and corporate conduct. Additionally, despite its significance 
in the history of social struggle, direct action has been given little attention in the academic 
literature on resistance and social movements.  
 
‘History’, Stanley and McCulloch (2012: 5) asserted, ‘does not repeat itself, although 




resistance actors may employ learnt tactics or strategies, adapt them to their struggle and refine 
them; they act upon principles or values established through previous struggles; and, influence 
the norms of behaviour. In every struggle, agents of resistance act in learnt ways and their 
actions are motivated by established principles, values and norms. These principles, values 
and norms were established by and inherited by previous, successful struggles. With every 
new struggle, however different and unique to context, human agents adopt the traditions 
bequeathed by previous generations in a continues struggle for justice. Marx (2010c) theorised 
that men make their own history under prior existing circumstances, transmitted from the past. 
In a letter to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov, Marx wrote:  
 
The productive forces are the result of man’s practical energy, but that 
energy is in turn circumscribed by the conditions in which man is placed by the 
productive forces already acquired, by the form of society which exists before 
him, which he does not create, which is the product of the preceding generation 
(Marx and Engels, 2010d: 96). 
 
The same process can be observed in the practical energy of struggles for justice, 
emancipation, rights etc. Ways of thinking about and acting upon observed injustices are 
inherited from the previous generations. That is, repertoires of action are bestowed on today’s 
resistance communities by past social struggles.  
 
Direct action has long been fostered in diverse political traditions that have been raised 
around capitalism and social struggles, e.g. anarchism, trade unionism, socialism, 
environmentalism, libertarianism etc. With democracy and liberalism nestling in Europe and 
the US, the 19th was marked by revolutionary literature growing in the bosom of capitalism. 
It was then that civil resistance was established as a ‘consistently consequential political force’ 
(Schock, 2013: 278). In The Kingdom of God is Within You, Leo Tolstoy promoted nonviolent, 
passive resistance as a remedy to war and institutional corruption, e.g. conscientious objection 
and refusal to follow orders. In Resistance to Civil Government, Henry David Thoreau 
promoted civil disobedience as open resistance to unjust laws on the grounds of conscience, 
e.g. refusal to pay taxes. Thoreau refused to pay taxes because they supported slavery (Schock, 
2013). De Cleyre (2004) wrote in Anarchism and American Traditions and Direct Action 
about the civic responsibility people have to assert justice against unjust governments through 
civil disobedience and direct action. Mahatma Gandhi encouraged through his revolutionary 
pamphlet, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule, civil disobedience and passive resistance to 
British Rule, that is rejection of colonial authority and refusal to follow British laws. In these 
traditions resistance is defined, quite simply, as a sustained effort that challenges power, force, 
policy, regime etc. (Gregg, 1960; Nepstad, 2008, 2013; Roberts, 2011). Direct action can refer 
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to varied repertoires or resistance, e.g. occupations, blockades, strikes, squatting, mass 
protests, industrial sabotage, marches and civil disobedience. 
 
The use of direct-action dates as far back as c. 411 BC, when Greek women, exempt 
from the right to vote, withheld sex from their husbands to end the Peloponnesian War (Moore 
and Shepard, 2013). In 449 BCE Roman plebeians organised a strike demanding political 
rights from the Senate (Schock, 2013). In 1930 Mahatma Gandhi led the Salt March, an act of 
civil disobedience against a British law that deemed the production of salt by indigenous 
communities illegal (Roberts, 2011). Modern acts of resistance were immersed in nationalist, 
labour and civil rights struggles, e.g. Hungarian resistance to Austrian rule from 1849-67, the 
trade union movement from mid-19th century, the Suffragists in the early-20th century, the 
Egyptian general strike against British occupation in 1919, Indian independence movement 
1915-47, the Civil Rights movement in the US 1954-68 (Gregg, 1960; Franks, 2003; Nepstad, 
2008, 2013; Schock, 2013; Moore and Shepard, 2013). Direct action was a prominent element 
of resistance in all these struggles.  
 
Central to direct action is rejection of political authority and hierarchy structures, viz. 
capitalism, and, moreover, performative and practical activity (Franks, 2003). Hence, it is 
associated with anarchist and socialist political traditions. Direct action is a practical means 
of achieving resistance objectives (Sharp, 1974; de Cleyre, 2004; Thoreau, 2008). For 
example, if an anti-arms campaign’s objective is to stop arms production at a factory, an 
occupation and decommissioning the means of production is a proactive and a practical means 
to the objective (Nepstad, 2008; Moore and Shepard, 2013). In contrast, indirect political 
action appeals solely to intermediaries, such as elected representatives (Moore and Shepard, 
2013). It is the weapon of those who are positioned outside of the institutional power (de 
Cleyre, 2004). Direct action, however, never occurs in isolation, it is most effective in 
combination with other tactics and as one element of a sustained resistance (Moore and 
Shepard, 2013). Yet, it is often the trigger of resistance movements, for example the 
Montgomery bus boycott in 1955 was sparked by Rosa Park’s refusal to give up her bus seat. 
De Cleyre (2004: 54) postulated,  
 
It is by and because of the direct acts of the forerunners of social change, 
whether they be of peaceful or warlike nature, that the conscience of the mass 
becomes aroused to the need for change…Direct action is always the clamourer, 
the initiator, through which the great sum of indifferentists become aware that 





Friedrichs (2012) found that the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria 
and Morocco, starting in January 2011, were essentially inspired by a single act of self-
sacrifice. A young Tunisian, whose means of earning money were curbed by the policy, self-
immolated in a public act of defiance. His self-sacrifice ignited a popular uprising that led to 
the ousting of country’s president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Sacrifice of one’s liberty, safety, 
or life is a distinctive feature of direct action. Nepstad (2008) explained that being arrested, 
charged with aggravated trespass or property damage and trial is an integral part of actions in 
the Ploughshares movement.  
 
In brief, direct action has a long lineage in several political traditions and there is a 
lengthy history of direct-action use in social struggles. These traditions consider direct action 
a repertoire of resistance available to communities or individuals who do not have access to 
formal means influencing change, e.g. political or legal institutions (Franks, 2003; de Cleyre, 
2004; Nepstad, 2008; Moore and Shepard, 2013; Schock, 2013). It can be defined as 
performative and practical activity (Franks, 2003), a social praxis of counter-hegemonic blocs. 
Resistance actors performing direct action put their ideas and values into action. Direct action, 
wherever used, is intended to galvanise people to enforce a change for the better (de Cleyre, 
2004). The inspirational/galvanising element of direct action is self-sacrifice (de Cleyre, 2004; 
Friedrichs, 2012). Sacrificing one’s safety, liberty or life is an integral part of direct action. It 
is this broad conception of direct action that informs the analysis of resistance activities and 




This thesis critically examines how civil society can inscribe deviancy labels on 
harmful and wrongful state-corporate conduct through resistance, particularly direct action. 
To this end, it situates state-corporate conduct within a broader political-economic structure, 
and by situating direct action campaigns within a historical context of resistance traditions. 
This chapter reviewed scholarly literature out of which the research aims and questions 
emerged. These questions were informed by state-corporate crime scholarship which draws 
our attention to the criminogenic character of state-corporate power under neoliberal 
capitalism (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998; Kramer et al, 2002; Rothe and Mullins, 2009; 
Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014), and the social process through which state-corporate conduct is 
defined as deviant (Ward and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 2004; Lasslett, 2010a, 2010b, 
2014a). The latter is informed by Marxist criminological traditions, mainly the dialectical 
method and the Gramscian theory of civil society. It influenced a tract of literature that 
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considers the important role mobilisation or resistance from below plays in actualising the 
criminogenic potential latent in state-corporate practices through social opprobrium (Rothe, 
2009; White, 2009, 2012; Friedrichs, 2009, 2012; Stanley and McCulloch, 2012; Green and 
Ward, 2012). The method these scholars use to understand the historically constituted 
processes of state-corporate crime is Marx’s dialectic.   
 
The orthodox, positivist state-corporate crime literature sees the main impetus of 
state-corporate crime in the pursuit of organisational goals, and the primary goal these 
powerful institutions seek is capital accumulation (Kramer et al 2002, Kramer and 
Michalowski, 2006; Bruce and Becker, 2007; Mullins and Rothe, 2009). The Marxist 
approach situates the criminogenic potential of state-corporate institutions in the routine 
practices employed to achieve ‘desired finalities’ (Tombs and Whyte, 2009; Tombs, 2012; 
Lasslett, 2014c). Whereas, integrated theoretical framework focuses on ‘discrete acts’, the 
Marxist dialectical approach seeks to penetrate the surface appearances of social phenomenon 
and extract the systemic relations that produce phenomena such as state-corporate crime 
(Lasslett, 2010a, 2010b, 2014b, 2014c). In so doing, it extends the definitional criteria to 
routine practices that are not illegal per se, but which have socially harmful effects, 
nonetheless.  
 
Building on the process-driven approach we can situate the process of resistance 
within broader social relations and processes of capitalism. This can be achieved through 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony, civil society and counter-hegemony (Ward and Green, 
2000; Green and Ward, 2004, 2012; Grewcock, 2012). Drawing on literature from different 
political traditions, e.g. anarchism and socialism, direct action is defined as a performative and 
active practice of challenging what is perceived to be unjust and affecting change with 
immediate results (Gregg, 1960; Frank, 2003; de Cleyre, 2004; Thoreau, 2008; Moore and 
Shepard, 2013; Schock, 2013). One of the most important contributions of the approaches 
advanced in this chapter is the philosophical traditions of Marx’s dialectical materialism. The 
dialectical thinking devised by Marxist theorists offers a very important scientific vantage 







Chapter III – Methodology, data collection methods 




This is a qualitative research study operationalised through a multiple-case study 
approach. Chapter II outlined the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the thesis, which 
informed the research aims and questions. These foundations originate from the literature 
advancing a Marxist dialectic and the process-driven approach. The emergent aims are to 
identify the elementary social dynamics that create the potential of illegitimate state-corporate 
conduct occurring at particular historical junctures; and, to understand the historically 
constituted social processes through which illegitimate state-corporate conduct acquires the 
property of crime. In pursuit of these overarching aims, the previous chapter scrutinised the 
empiricist approach of orthodox state-corporate crime research, and advocated for a dialectical 
framing of relations, processes and state-corporate crime events. The positivist state-corporate 
crime research fetishizes ‘the data of sense-perception, i.e. empirical data, while the power of 
[theoretical] thought to illuminate less evident social realities is inverted and instead employed 
to generate general categories’ (Lasslett, 2010a: 212). These categories are, then, treated not 
as conceptual representations of reality, but as variables characterising isolated elements of 
empirical data.  
 
The research study, thus, adopted Marx’s dialectic as the underlying methodology. 
The explanatory power of the dialectical thought lies in the study of contradictions between 
opposites, and interactions between phenomena within a complex whole or a totality of 
relations (Lasslett, 2010b; Lasslett et al, 2015; Ward and Green, 2016). Guided by the 
dialectical thought, the research sought to design research in a way that would present the 
phenomenon of state-corporate crime as a totality in itself, with interacting objects and 
subjects that create the phenomenon, but also immerse it in the larger complexity of the social 
whole (see Harvey, 1993). The research was operationalised through qualitative case studies, 
because they facilitate the presentation of empirical data as interacting parts of a whole, the 
case itself being the whole. Simultaneously, the case can be immersed in the relations and 
processes of a larger complex system, viz. capitalism. The data collection methods were 
selected with this in mind. In other words, the research approached the data as pieces of 




The chapter begins with an outline of the Marxist dialectical method and its 
application to state-corporate crime research in Section 3.2. This section closely examines the 
methodology to demonstrate how it informed the research design and the choice of research 
methods. Section 3.3 outlines the multiple case study approach, why it was employed, and 
how it was operationalised. The section includes a statement of study aims and questions that 
guided the research process. The closing remarks outline the project’s purpose (aims and 
objectives) and the rationale for case selection, explaining how and why the two case studies 
were chosen. Section 3.4, then, delineates the data collection methods, data analysis 
techniques and ethical considerations. It details the sources of data sets, how information was 
collected, and how it was broken down. Lastly, this section discusses research challenges and 
ethical considerations, and how they were resolved. 
 
3.2 Methodology: the Marxist dialectical approach 
 
Critiques of positivist state-corporate crime scholarship called for an approach that 
conceives state-corporate crime as a process mediated by systemic practices (Tombs, 2012; 
Whyte, 2014; Tombs and Whyte, 2015). In furtherance of this, the thesis advances the Marxist 
dialectical method. It shifts the focus from data of sense-perception to historically determined 
social relations and processes, hidden behind events and actions. The point is to identify the 
processes that create the possibility of state-corporate crime and those processes through 
which this possibility is actualised (Ward and Green, 2004; Lasslett, 2010a, 2014c; Tombs, 
2012). Events and actions, just like “things” for Marx, express definite relations and processes 
(Marx, 1976; Engels, 2010b). The causes behind state-corporate events and actions are to be 
found in these elementary dynamics. Howbeit, they cannot be grasped with sense-perception, 
they must be mediated through cognition. It is not enough to extract abstract generalisations 
from crude, empirical data; it must be broken down into constitutive elements and analysed in 
its historical specificity. 
 
Empirical research has its purpose, as sensuous beings we experience the world 
through organs of sense-perception, as information enter the human mind it is given meaning 
through notions and concepts (Lasslett, 2010a). Notwithstanding, by itself, sense-perception 
does not produce nuanced understanding of social phenomena (ibid). It can reveal empirical 
facts with definite characteristics, but in order to understand their meaning and significance to 
the phenomena we study they must be mediated theoretically through cognition. Pioneers of 
the dialectical method encourage away from inductive generalisations, common to 




which theory and concepts are applied to enrich data of sense perception (Lasslett, 2010b). 
This is achieved by looking at interactions between individual facts, drawing connections 
between them, identifying the social relations that underly them, the processes they induce, 
and then categorising these relations and processes through theoretical concept (Jordan, 1967; 
Ollman and Smith, 2008; Levins, 2008). This research attempted to capture these dynamics 
through dialectical thinking.  
 
3.2.1 Marx’s dialectical materialism 
 
Hegelian thinkers, most notably Karl Marx, were some of the first philosophers to 
challenge positivism. Hegel initially, attempted to synthesise rationalism and empiricism 
which conceived the world in ‘thought-reality dualism’, reducing knowledge creation to one 
or the other (Reuten, 1998). Following Immanuel Kant, Hegel wished to transcend the 
dichotomy between the two, however, without abandoning either. The dialectic was a natural 
outcome of Hegel’s logic. He saw in opposite positions only partial representation of a 
complex reality. However, Marx contended that Hegel turned the dialectic on its head by 
placing it in the realm of ideas, rather than concrete facts (Marx and Engels, 2010). Hegel’s 
dialectic was, inadvertently, idealist. Marx, then, ‘rectified’ Hegelian (idealist) dialectic by 
grounding it Feuerbach’s materialism. In so doing, the dialectical theory of totality in process 
was turned ‘right side up again’ (Marx, 1976: 19), and was transformed into a materialist 
science of historical motion, ‘dialectical materialism’. 
 
Hegel proclaimed that ‘truth is a whole’, but the whole cannot be grasped empirically, 
we can only perceive its elements (Levins, 2008: 32). The solution to this is found in the 
movement of consciousness from the abstract to the concrete, systematically concretising the 
abstract with empirical facts (Ilyenkov, 1979). But the whole cannot be grasped by reducing 
it to single empirical facts, e.g. objects, acts or events. Everything exists in relation of mutual 
dependence; the Marxist dialectic is a philosophy and, indeed, a science of ‘internal relations’ 
(Bukharin, 2005: 109). It looks, not at things or objects, but at relations between things and 
the processes these relations generate; it ‘comprehends things and their representations, ideas, 
in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin and ending’ (Engels, 2010a: 23). 
Capitalism, for example, is so omnipresent that it cannot be observed directly; it was observed 
by Marx through specific elements he theorised using concepts of value, surplus-value, 
commodity, exchange etc. (Ollman, 2008). Similarly, when one considers a specific case, 
event or instance of state-corporate crime, it is difficult to make sense of it as a whole. The 
elements that make up the case can be recorded empirically. Empirical data does not present 
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itself in entirety, but as disjoined parts. It is up to the researcher to excogitate interconnections 
between the parts and present the whole.  
 
In Anti-Duhring Engels (2010) offers one of the clearest articulations of the Marxist 
dialectical method. There, he advanced Heraclitus’ conception that everything is in state of 
constant change, coming into being and passing away. He stated that ‘when we consider…the 
history of mankind…at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and 
reactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything changes, comes 
into being and passes away…’ (Engels, 2010a: 21). Thus far, only one tenet of dialectical 
philosophy has been identified, viz. ‘the determination of the thing itself…through the entire 
totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others’ (Lenin, 1976: 220). The other central 
tenet of dialectics is that the development of all phenomena comes about through 
‘contradictory forces and tendencies’ (Lenin, 1976: 221). The law of the ‘unity of opposites’ 
states that motion (development and being) of a phenomenon is fostered by internal 
contradictions, ‘the conflict of different forces and tendencies reacting inside a given 
phenomenon…’ (Jordan, 1967: 229). The source of existence of a phenomenon lies within it. 
A phenomenon comes into being through its internal relations and processes, interaction 
between mutually conditioning objects and contradictions that set it into motion.  
 
3.2.2 The dialectical approach in state-corporate crime research 
 
By considering a phenomenon as a totality of relations, one breaks it down into its 
primary parts, i.e. objects, actors, processes, events etc. Lenin (1976: 357) postulated that ‘the 
splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the essence of 
dialectics’, in as far as this is done to comprehend the totality. Albeit, these parts are not the 
end goal, for ‘dialectical thinking prioritises the understanding of processes, flows, fluxes and 
relations over the analysis of elements, things, structures and organised systems’ (Harvey, 
1993: 34). Sense-perception is not able to grasp the totality of diverse interconnections, but 
with the right tools we can approximate them in thought. We cannot, as Bukharin (2005: 95) 
wrote, ‘perceive the endless diversity of nature…but we can think about it.’ First, we need to 
identify the parts that are perceived as empirical detail; and, then, we can analyse them 
together to understand the entire phenomenon. Engels (2010b) theorised that until we explain 
the details of the whole picture, we cannot understand the picture;  
 
In order to understand these details, we must detach them from their 
natural or historical connection and examine each one separately, its nature, 




historical research: branches of science which the Greeks of classical times, on 
very good grounds, relegated to a subordinate position, because they had first to 
collect the material (Engels, 2010b: 21-2). 
 
Trying to comprehend elusive processes of capitalism and its laws of motion Marx 
had to, firstly, study ‘the molecular social bonds, before conceptualising how they form part 
of more complex social compounds’ (Lasslett, 2013: 119). Marx’s Capital was a dialectical 
investigation of capitalism’s laws of motion. In the process of dialectical analysis Marx 
concretised simple abstractions – commodity-form, value-form, wage-labour, money etc. – as 
expressions of bourgeois relations of production (Ilyenkov, 1979). To flesh out the laws of 
motion of capitalism Marx used the ‘power of abstraction’ to isolate the parts from the whole. 
Thus, he analysed capitalism at two levels, ‘at the level of individual enterprise (Lenin’s 
‘economic unit’) and at the level of the social totality of enterprises’ (Banaji, 2010: 59). 
Capital Volume I deals with the analysis of single capital as an isolated entity, where labour-
process as a value-producing process and capital accumulation as a process of capital 
valorisation are characterised as motion of individual capital. The other two volumes, 
particularly Volume III, deals with the ‘laws of motion of capital’ at the level of ‘social capital’ 
(Banaji, 2010: 60). Before presenting the totality of capitalist relations, in entirety, Marx 
abstracted and analysed its elementary parts, starting with the commodity. 
 
The objective is to apply dialectical thinking to state-corporate crime research. Firstly, 
dialectical thinking is concerned with relations and processes hidden behind things they 
structure. Secondly, it looks at the totality specific relations and processes form. In this totality 
we can observe the dynamic interconnections between things, objects, events and actions. The 
subject matter of analysis in this thesis are events. Just like a ‘thing’, an event is produced 
through relations between various objects, subjects, processes etc. These relations are the key 
to understanding the phenomenon as a whole, but first the research had to collect the empirical 
material, the empirical detail about the criminogenic features of state-corporate conduct, how 
this conduct produces events that are perceived as illegitimate and how this conduct comes to 
be defined as criminal. This study looks at the use of direct action by resistance communities 
to inscribe deviancy labels on state-corporate conduct. To obtain the right material the study 
drew on previous research as an example of what type of information is needed to explain a 
case of state-corporate crime. To investigate these processes the research was operationalised 






3.2.3 Researching the crimes of the powerful: a case for activist research  
 
The term “activist research” denotes commitment to addressing and transforming the 
researched social issue, and not just documentation and understanding of a phenomenon. The 
focus of activist research is on issues related to some form of human struggle, it is conducted 
in cooperation with subjects of the struggle and with the intent to transform said struggle 
(Hale, 2001). In other words, it is research driven by praxis, whereby theory is put into practice 
in order to solve social problems, rather than driven solely by the quest for understanding. 
This relationship between theory and practice has, perhaps, been articulated no clearer than in 
the Thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it’ (Marx, 2010: 8). Karl Marx and his counterpart, Fredrich 
Engels, sought to produce an intellectual tradition that could challenge the status quo and bring 
about a revolutionary change.  
 
Drawing on the above, this thesis accepts that research should not be exclusive to 
‘scholarly speculation about being’, but rather it should seek to affect change and improve 
human experience (Nabudere, 2008). Of course, social science – like all science – is concerned 
with knowledge that can be applied, whether to policy, programme, legislation, development 
or social progress (Greenwood, 2008). Notwithstanding, this may take a very different form 
in research concerned with state-corporate deviance and social struggle, where subjects are 
diverse resistance communities. In a case like this, to borrow from Hale (2001: 15), ‘the 
assumption is that one or more groups of people – especially those with whom particular 
affinities have developed – are interested in receiving the knowledge we have produced, in 
forms that will be useful to them.’ This requires that the research findings are articulated in a 
meaningful and useful manner, that is, useful to those with whom the researcher engaged and 
cooperated throughout the process.   
 
With the above proviso, this research was conducted in cooperation with the 
individuals and groups who contributed their testimonies and expert knowledge of the case 
studies. This cooperation was achieved through engagement and information sharing with the 
participants and NGOs. More specifically, the research findings were shared with the 
participants and used in one significant event organised by Navdanya and La Via Campesina. 
In Case Study 1, the researcher shared with NGOs involved in the research – Campaign 
Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) and War on Want – information on export licences of UAV 
Engines Ltd. obtained through Freedom of Information releases. The releases contained 




CAAT does and were included in CAAT’s database of export licences granted by the UK 
Government to defence industry exporters. War on Want and Stop Arming Israel Campaign 
were able to use this information to confirm that UEL does indeed manufacture and export 
engines incorporate in armed drones.  
 
In Case Study 2, the cooperation was achieved through participation in an 
international event held in Den Haag, organised by La Via Campesina in liaison with 
Navdanya and numerous other movement organisations from across the globe, International 
People’s Tribunal of Monsanto. The Tribunal was held over two days, wherein delegates, 
victims and experts offered testimonies about the numerous wrongdoings committed by 
Monsanto across the globe, to a panel of expert judges from the International Court of Justice. 
The purpose of the Tribunal was to ascertain legitimate grounds to charge Monsanto with 
crimes against humanity. In parallel to the Tribunal, La Via Campesina held series of lectures, 
workshops and seminars where delegates, experts and victims shared knowledge and 
information which formed a larger report on the crimes committed by Monsanto. The 
researcher participated in the Tribunal and several workshops, as well as seminars, reporting 
on the research findings on Indian farmers’ experience of Bt cotton. The report included a 
brief into the promises made by Monsanto and cotton producers’ lived experience of Bt 
hybrids. Accordingly, the Bt cotton proved non-viable in the Indian context, and indeed, 
harmful where farmers lost crops due to failure of Bt technology to protect the yield potential 
from insects. It is on the basis of cooperation and engagement with participants that this 
research fits into a broader spectrum of “activist research”.  
 
3.3 Multiple-case study approach 
 
The choice of case study approach was influenced by the methodological perspective 
adopted in the research. This research required an approach wherein, the empirical content is 
not the sole objective, but rather a means of attaining an understanding of deeper dynamics 
that cause state-corporate crime; where data can be presented with interconnections between 
various elements of phenomenon; where the phenomenon is looked at as a whole and part of 
a greater totality (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The rationale for a multiple case 
study approach relates back to the overarching aims of the study. The research was conducted 
into two different cases to see how illegitimate state-corporate conduct becomes defined as 
criminal in contexts with different historical trajectories of capitalism. By studying how social 
movements employ direct action in different contexts – one in the UK and the other in India 
– and in different fields of social struggle – anti-arms trade campaigning and opposition of 
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globalisation – the research could inquire how trajectories of capitalist development and 
traditions of resistance shaped the outcome of these struggles.  
 
3.3.1 Defining the case study 
 
A case study is ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2003: 13; see also Flyvbjerg, 2006; Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
Social phenomena contain processes and relations that are, often, concealed. By means of a 
case study a social scientist can show how these relations and processes play out in real life 
experience of human beings. Case studies are used when ‘an empirical inquiry must examine 
a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not evident’ (Yin, 1981: 98). It is also an ideal approach to 
research ‘when a holistic depth investigation is needed’ (Tellis, 1997: 1). There are manifold 
definitions of a case study, some that treat it as a method or methodology (Fidel, 1987; Stake, 
1995; Yin, 2003), and others that describe it, quite simply, as a research design or a strategy 
(Yin, 1981; Gerring, 2004). The case study can be broadly defined as an empirical 
investigation ‘informed by the interpretive paradigm’ (Sarantakos 2005: 212), which seeks to 
explore social phenomenon in its context. 
 
Wynsberghe and Khan (2007: 90) defines the case study as ‘a [transdisciplinary] 
heuristic that enables the circumscription of the unit of analysis…and…involves the careful 
delineation of the phenomena for which evidence is being collected (event, concept, program, 
process, etc.).’ The case study is not the end goal, but a device or a vehicle used to uncover 
the dynamics hidden in it. It is the preferred method when research tries to answer questions 
‘how’ and ‘why’, particularly in a ‘real-life context’ (Yin, 1981). In Fidel’s (1984: 274) words, 
case studies attempt ‘on the one hand, to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the event 
under study but at the same time to develop more general theoretical statements about 
regularities in the observed phenomenon.’ Stake (2005: 438) emphasised that ‘case study is 
not a methodological choice, but a choice of what is to be studied.’ The case study approach 
offers methodological guidance on the design of empirical inquiry, and guidance on research 
methods with a broad range of data collection techniques. 
 
Stake (1995) distinguishes between intrinsic, instrumental or collective (multiple) 
case studies. An intrinsic case study isolates the case with no expectation of generalisation to 
similar cases. Yin (2003) adds three more useful dimensions: descriptive, exploratory or 




than a phenomenon or a hidden dynamic. An instrumental case study is used to gain insight 
into an issue or to refine theory. The case is of secondary interest and facilitates understanding 
of something hidden in the case. Though, the case is looked at in depth, its context anatomised, 
and events detailed, it serves as a means of excogitating hidden meaning (Stake, 1995). The 
multiple case study uses a variety of cases to explore a specific issue, concept or condition and 
commonly involves a wide geographical scope, and it can be used to replicate theory and draw 
comparisons. The descriptive case study describes a phenomenon in its real-life context, it 
also describes participants experiences in the context of events; exploratory case study 
explores phenomena that have no clear set of outcomes; explanatory case study explains causal 
dynamics of a phenomenon in real-life context (Yin, 2003). 
 
Baxter and Jack (2008: 551) suggest an instrumental case study works well when 
coupled with a multiple case study design. The special feature of the instrumental case study 
is the analysis of phenomenon across settings (Stake, 1995). It allows a theoretical analysis of 
the same phenomenon in different contexts. Drawing on this typology, this thesis adopts the 
instrumental, multiple case study approach with an explanatory dimension. The inquiry is 
framed around social issues, i.e. harms caused by states and corporations, and social censure; 
it seeks to refine concepts of state-corporate crime and resistance; it attempts to further 
advance a Marxist approach to the study of state-corporate criminality; and, it attempts to 
deduce theoretical insight with broader application than the cases themselves. 
 
When building a case study, the researcher considers, in order: research questions; 
proposition(s); unit(s) of analysis; the linkages between the data and propositions; and, criteria 
for interpreting the findings (Yin, 1994). Research questions concern the phenomenon studied, 
they, then, guide the proposition and inform what the case (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The unit 
of analysis is the case itself. When selecting a case, the researcher makes important decisions 
about what kind of information is needed, where are the sources of that information and what 
is the most optimal means of obtaining it (Baxter and Jack, 2008). A case study approach 
involves the iterative-parallel strategy, which refers to research that is intuitive in character, 
rather than pre-structured and determinate, each stage of the research informs the next with 
emerging design and the research itself is a dialectical process (Stake, 1978; Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008). Case study designs do not have a set reporting format, the final report can take 
any structure and form, depending on the investigator’s experience (Tellis, 1997). 
Notwithstanding, guided by a dialectical tradition the final report of the empirical findings 
was narrated as a story with sequences of events, descriptions, explanations and linkages (Yin, 
1981; Lewis, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). The distinct feature of a 
narrative report is that is presents the findings as a context-bound whole. 
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3.3.2 The narrative in case study research 
 
Case studies produce, what Flyvbjerg (2006) called, ‘context-depended knowledge’. 
As such, case studies feature complex descriptions, which are holistic and involve 
interconnected variables; the writing style is narrative and comparisons are implicit (Stake, 
1978). Description is a natural outcome of a case study, to describe is to categorise, and when 
categorisation is informed by a rigorous theoretical analysis, then it can generate a much richer 
and meaningful understanding of social reality (see Tombs, 2012). Through a narrative, case 
studies retain the essential characteristic of real-life events. Social reality does not present 
itself as a set of ordered categories, rather it is dynamic, ambiguous, and constantly changing. 
Case studies are expansionist rather than reductionist, proliferating rather than narrowing 
down (Yin, 2003). Descriptions do not make the study ‘descriptive’, as they are accompanied 
by evaluation, explanations and theoretically analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The linking of the 
empirical data to the research questions and propositions are not always explicit in case study 
designs. When the final report follows a narrative form, the data tells the story. Because the 
empirical content of the case is context specific, the data itself does not offer explanations of 
the studied phenomenon (Tellis, 1997). It is the task of theoretical mediation to enrich 
empirical data and explain what is happening. 
 
According to Flyvbjerg (2006: 21) ‘a thick narrative is a sign that the study has 
uncovered a particularly rich problematic’. This may be thought as a weakness, however a 
’rich problematic’ means that understanding of the phenomenon requires a deeper, more 
thoughtful explanation. A narrative in a case study forms a story, wherein sequence of events, 
actions, objects etc. are presented as a whole, in a way that each element is understood through 
its relation to the whole (Elliot, 2005). Narratives connect events and give them meaning so 
as to present a fuller picture of the phenomenon. A narrative framework is chronological – it 
represents sequences of events – and all events are meaningful (Elliot, 2005). A narrative 
inquiry depends on the social context in which the events happened (Fidel, 1984). Events 
cannot be separated from their contextual and historical specificity. Without the social context 
respondents’ accounts would hang in a vacuum.  
 
3.3.3 Strengths and limitations of the case study approach  
 
The key strength of case study research is the wide spectrum of available sources and 
data collection techniques, which supports research validity (Tellis, 1997; Sarantakos, 2005; 




characteristic of real-life events (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gomm, 2008). The focus of the case study 
is on ‘direct and verifiable life experiences’, the respondents are treated as ‘experts’ and not 
simply ‘sources of data’ (Sarantakos, 2005: 2012-16). The common criticisms of case studies 
are found on the empiricist derision of qualitative research. The first, case study findings 
cannot be generalised to a population across variety of cases (Yin, 1993). The second, case 
studies are vulnerable to subjective bias, its results lacking in objectivity, validity and 
reliability (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The third, findings produced by a case study can be ambiguous 
and indeterminate (Gerring, 2004). Lastly, a case study approach is said to lack scientific 
rigour because of flexibility, researcher’s and participants’ subjectivity, and intuitive approach 
(Fidel, 1984; Stake, 1995).  
 
In response, case studies, firstly, do not seek to produce inductive generalisations 
across a demographic, nor to enumerate frequencies (Yin, 2003). The main purpose is 
discovering unique interactions, events and cause-effect connections as well as verifying a 
theory, not generalizability (Bryman; 2008). Having said this, unlike experiments or surveys, 
case studies can produce analytical generalisations rather than statistics, by replicating an 
analytical approach across multiple cases (Yin, 2009; Shakir, 2002). Secondly, the question 
of subjective bias is not unique to a case study approach or qualitative research, it is something 
that all research methodologies deal with. There are several ways in which case study research 
assures greater objectivity and to mitigate subjective bias. For example, the use of multiple 
sources of data to corroborate evidence and interviews with actors from a broad spectrum of 
opinion (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Additionally, heterogenous sampling assures that accounts 
and testimonies reflect a spectrum of views, evidence and perspectives. Yet, it is accepted that 
personal impressions will always subjectively influence the research (Yin, 2003). Objectivity 
is the merit of exploration.  
 
The third criticism can be answered with classical philosophy. In Novum Organum, 
Bacon (1886: 391) insisted that ‘the human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily 
supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds; and although 
many things in nature be sui generis and most irregular, will yet invent parallels and 
conjugates and relatives, where no such thing is.’ Bacon held that the idea that things and 
phenomena occur as human mind constructs them is highly erroneous. Reality is complex and 
dynamic, while ‘human understanding is prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is 
fluctuating to be fixed…it is better to dissect than abstract’ (Bacon, 1886: 394). On a similar 
front, Nietzsche (1974: 335, italics original) argued that ‘above all, one should not wish to 
divest existence of its rich ambiguity.’ The purpose of research is, not to simplify social reality, 
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but to enrich empirical data with meaningful representations that penetrate the empirical 
appearance and presents reality in its dynamic and concrete form. 
 
Lastly, scientific rigour is established through focus, coherent design and clearly 
stated research questions that guide the research process (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003; Baxter and 
Jack, 2008; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Research questions are developed through an 
extensive literature review, these questions then guide the inquiry into a particular case and 
the kind of information the researcher seeks (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995). Case study research 
starts with a general issue or phenomenon, and then establishes that phenomenon in the context 
of the case through research (Lewis, 2003). Additionally, case study research achieves 
scientific rigour by using multiple data sources, which corroborates facts and verifies findings. 
Case study research, however, does not require the same level of planning as other research 
methodologies (Fidel, 1984). The research is guided as much by what the researcher sees in 
the field as by the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Case studies afford a lot of space 
for flexibility, adjustability and adaptation to changing circumstances. These are the kinds of 
matters that must be bore in mind when designing research and building case studies. 
 
3.3.4 Multiple-case study design and instrumental cases 
 
In this thesis, the analysis focuses on events, practices and process. It tries to 
understand how state-corporate crime events occur – what are the specific practices that 
produce them – and how do they acquire the quality of being criminal – through what social 
practices are they defined as deviant/criminal. To investigate this empirically the research 
employed a multiple-case study design and used an instrumental case study approach to both 
cases. In Yin’s (1981: 101) words, ‘multiple-case designs are appropriate when the same 
phenomenon is thought to exist in a variety of situations.’ The same phenomenon was studied 
in different contexts. However, the successful use of multiple-case study design requires that 
individual cases follow within-case design (Yin, 1981). The individual cases followed the 
instrumental design, wherein a case is used to reveal more than is empirically perceivable 
(Tellis, 1997). As Stake (1995) defined it, an instrumental case is of secondary interest, it 
facilitates empirical understanding of a phenomenon and testing the explanatory power of a 
theory.   
 
Multiple-case study design allows the researcher to identify complementary elements 
of the phenomenon by analysing it across settings or contexts (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 




objective, but rather follows a ‘replication logic’ (Tellis, 1997: 5). The researcher should be 
able to replicate the analysis across different case studies. The core aims of the study are to 
understand the phenomena of state-corporate crime and resistance. Nonetheless, the case study 
context is important to understanding how different trajectories of capitalist development, and 
associated traditions of resistance, mediate the outcome of censure through direct action. The 
contextual divergence of case studies strengthens the theory.  
 
Case studies are structured around the context of a case, but what is being examined 
is determined by the research questions (Lewis, 2003). Following the instrumental multiple-
case study design the two cases state from the outset what is the phenomenon studied and 
follow similar structure that explores the same type of processes and practices, only articulated 
through different forms (Lewis, 2003). The topics investigated through the cases are steered 
by the stated research questions. Pursuing the research questions (see section 3.3.5), the cases 
follow a similar structure: 1) they outline the historical context of the case exploring the 
trajectories of resistance traditions and background of state-corporate crime events, 2) 
document the state-corporate practices (regulation, policymaking, business operations) that 
produced the events which were censured and stigmatised as deviant, and 3) document direct 
action campaigns and resistance process through which censured state-corporate practices 
were stigmatised as deviant. This structural sequence guided the data collection process and 
the analysis.  
 
The type of research questions has a major influence over the design of the research. 
According to Sjoberg et al (1991) “what” questions signify an exploratory or descriptive study, 
whereas “how” questions are used in explanatory studies. A study can contain both types of 
questions, which would signify that the study seeks to explore and explain (Yin, 2003). In 
designing a case study research the researcher must establish research questions early on, as 
they will steer the strategy. The types of research questions, i.e. “what” and “how”, led to an 
exploratory-explanatory strategy. The cases explore the historical trajectory of resistance 
communities in the cases and the historical specificity of state-corporate practices; they then 
explain how these practices produced harmful events and explain the social process through 
which these practices were defined as deviant. Subsequently, the research questions determine 
the choice of units of analysis, e.g. individuals, groups, communities, organisations, 
institutions, nations, civilisation, economic system etc. (Sjoberg et al, 1991). The units of 
analysis in these cases are the resistance communities (i.e. activist groups, social movements, 
non-governmental organisations and associations), organisations (i.e. capitalist enterprises) 




The design, strategy and units of analysis all influence the choice of interview 
participants or samples. Participants are individuals who are integral to the case itself, for 
example through engagement in events explored in the study or expert knowledge on certain 
topic (Sjoberg et al, 1991). Thus, sampling in the instrumental multiple-case study design is 
strategic and purposive. Moreover, the research questions and strategy guided the researcher 
in determining what type of information was needed (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Once the 
type of information sought is established, the researcher can then start to identify the relevant 
sources and techniques of data collection (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Stake, 2005). The sources 
and data convergence techniques are outlined in Section 3.4. Before outlining the research 
methods employed to collect empirical data, one must consider the research aims and research 
questions that guided the study.    
 
3.3.5 Research aims and questions  
 
In line with the conceptualised dimensions of state-corporate crime, this study aims 
to understand the relations and processes that create the possibility of illegitimate state-
corporate conduct, and those social processes through which illegitimate state-corporate 
conduct acquires the quality of being criminal. These overarching aims are achieved by 
analysing censure of socially harmful and illegitimate state-corporate practices through direct 
action campaigns. The study explains the causal dynamics of state-corporate crime events by 
analysing practices constitutive of neoliberal capitalism. These overarching objectives are 
accompanied by the following subsidiary aims:  
 
 
• Conceptualise the social metabolism, social practice and tactical repertoires through 
which state-corporate practices are censured and defined as criminal. 
 
• Empirically document how social audiences censure state institutions and corporate 
entities who engage in harmful practices that contravene fundamental conduct 
norms. 
 
• Theorise the causal dynamics of state-corporate practices by appropriating Marxist 







The aims and objective were achieved by answering four research questions:  
 
 
1. How do resistance communities from different historical trajectories of social 
struggle mobilise, strategise, and inscribe deviancy labels, practically using direct 
action? 
 
2. What were the particular features of state-corporate practices that triggered a 
response from civil society and social opprobrium by resistance communities?  
 
3. How did censure configured through direct action affect the targeted state-corporate 
conduct?  
 
4. How did state-corporate institutions counter resistance to reduce the impact of 
censure, and what were the outcomes?  
 
3.3.6 Selecting the case studies 
 
Selection of cases, according to Seawright and Gerring (2008), should be based inter 
alia on methodology and theoretical propositions, not merely pragmatic rationale. Case 
selection is, also, guided by study aims, research questions and subject matter/issues (Yin, 
2003; Stake, 1995; Patton, 2002). Issues that the research explores can serve as criteria for 
selecting specific cases (Patton, 2002). Before deciding on the cases, the researcher must 
ensure that the all the issues of interest are present in the cases. In multiple-case study design, 
where theoretical replication is intended, the selecting process must consider the difference in 
setting and context (Shakir, 2002). Cases must have divergent setting in order to effectively 
replicate theoretical analysis. The theoretical and methodological approach should be able to 
explain a phenomenon occurring in different settings (Shakir, 2002). Patton (2002) offers 
sixteen purposeful sampling strategies that can be used for selecting cases studies: extreme 
case, intensity sampling, maximum variation, homogenous sampling, typical case, critical 
case, chain (snowball) sampling, criterion sampling, theory-based sampling, confirming and 
disconfirming cases, stratified purposeful cases, opportunistic or emergent cases, purposeful 
random cases, politically important cases, convenience sampling and combination sampling.  
 
Shakir (2002) clustered Patton’s strategies into three distinct groups: 1) significant 
cases, 2) different cases, and 3) and fieldwork/theory determined cases. The second cluster 
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contains maximum variation, random purposeful or the stratified purposeful case strategies. 
Maximum variation purposefully picks cases that exhibit empirical variation, in order to 
investigate a phenomenon in different contexts; random purposeful cases are selected to 
increase credibility of theory or analytical approach; and, stratified purposeful cases illustrate 
characteristics of subgroups of interest (Patton, 2002: 243-4). The combination of strategies 
allows broader criteria for case selection (Shakir, 2002). The ‘different cases’ strategy 
facilitates the analysis of a single phenomenon in diverse settings, where empirical variation 
causes the expression of the phenomenon to take contextually different forms (Shakir, 2002; 
Patton, 2002). The study opted for this strategy because the research seeks to understand how 
different trajectories of capitalism structure state-corporate practices that are being censured, 
and how different, historical trajectories of resistance influence the censuring process.  
 
Following these strategies, two disparate cases have been selected: 1) censure of UK-
Israel arms exports and a drone company, UAV Engines Ltd., and 2) censure of the 
Government of India and biotech company, Monsanto. The two cases occur in countries where 
capitalist development followed very different historical trajectories. The UK was a colonial 
empire and, arguably, the first fully developed capitalist nation, whereas India was integrated 
into the capitalist world-system by British imperialism. The different roads of historical 
development, and different cultural contexts, led to the emergence of distinctive industries, 
markets and economic landscapes in both countries. These differences account for types of 
organised capital that emerged in each country, the policy priorities adopted by the 
governments of these countries, and the ideologies that steer their activities. The distinctive 
social, political and economic development influences state-corporate conduct. Out of these 
disparate trajectories of capitalist development emerged very different traditions of resistance, 
specific to unique histories of social struggle. In Case 1, the anti-arms trade and Palestine 
solidarity resistance to UK-Israel arms trade is rooted in working-class movements. In Case 
2, the anti-Bt cotton resistance to Monsanto and biotechnology is rooted in the struggle for 
Indian independence, the Hindu-nationalist movement and the anti-globalisation movement.  
 
By exploring how these diverse contexts structure the possibility of illegitimate state-
corporate conduct and censure of this conduct through practical forms of resistance, the study 
can approximate the common features of the social practices involved in these phenomena. 
This will help reveal the underlying relations and processes that make these phenomena occur. 
This is achieved by stripping the cases of the empirical variations to reveal the structural 
relations and processes (Ilyenkov, 1979). Furthermore, investigation of a single phenomenon 
in two different settings tests the ability of a theoretical approach to explain how a 




examined in Chapter II. The cases were selected on the basis that there was a clear interaction 
between a state and a corporation mediated by regulation and policy, and an exposure by 
resistance campaigners of social harm caused by state-corporate activities. The use of direct 
action by resistance actors to censure state-corporate activities was a key criterion for selecting 
the case studies.  
 
The cases of resistance to state-corporate crime in the UK and India were selected 
because they contained the essential criteria. The first, the relationship between the states and 
the corporations was mediated by regulation and policy. The second, the state-corporate 
activities were censured by resistance movements and a social harm was exposed. The third, 
the resistance movements employed direct action to censure respective institutions. The 
fourth, the two cases differed in terms of: the history of capitalist development, the history of 
social struggle and emergent resistance traditions, and the field of struggle – Case 1 revolves 
around the defence industry and UK arms exports to Israel; Case 2 revolves around the 
biotechnology industry and introduction of a transgenic cash crop to India. These empirical 
differences influenced the type of data sources used in the case studies. The next section 
outlines the choices of the data collection techniques and analysis.  
 
3.4 Data collection, analysis and ethical considerations 
 
The above section discussed the Marxist dialectical method that underlies the study’s 
methodological approach and the multiple-case study design of the empirical research. This 
section outlines the data collection techniques, analysis of the raw data and ethical 
considerations. The data was collected using multiple techniques and sources. As Baxter and 
Jack (2008: 554) put it, the ‘hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, 
a strategy which also enhances data credibility.’ This research employed a mixture of 
interviews and documentary research. Selection of interview participants was conducted 
through purposive sampling, heterogenous sampling and snowball sampling. Because case 
study research tends to be context specific and participants are integral to the case itself, case 
study research requires a more strategic sampling method (Denzin and Lincoln,1994; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). To distil the empirical findings the crude data was organised by means 
of thematic (analysis) coding. Thematic coding is particularly useful where data sets are made 
up of texts from a diverse range of sources (e.g. interviews, documents, archives) and 
heterogenous samples (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). The study investigated sensitive issues 
concerning illegitimate state-corporate conduct and legal charges against resistance actors, 
which were addressed through a Research Protocol (Appendix 1). This section outlines how 
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the empirical data was collected and analysed; the fieldwork procedures; and, ethical 
considerations.  
 
3.4.1 Data collection techniques and sampling methods 
 
Case study research is characterised by multiple data sources (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000; Gerring, 2004; Baxter and Jack, 2008). The use of multiple sources and data collection 
techniques facilitates a ‘holistic understanding’ of the studied phenomenon and triangulation 
of evidence (Tellis, 1997; Baxter and Jack, 2008). The sources of information may include, 
first-hand accounts and testimonies, documentation, archival records, artefacts, direct 
observations, media records etc. (Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003; Baxter and Jack, 2008; 
Noor, 2008). The sources of data in this research were divided into primary and secondary 
sources. 
 
The data for this study was obtained from: first-hand testimonies and accounts, grey 
documents (NGO reports, government reports, policy documents, freedom of information 
[FOI] releases), legal case files, media records, archival records, video resources. Tellis (1997:  
12) posited that ‘the rationale for using multiple sources of data is the triangulation of 
evidence.’ Triangulation corroborates evidence, confirms facts and increases the overall 
reliability of empirical data (Denzin, 1978). The form of triangulation that uses multiple 
sources of data to corroborate evidence is called ‘data source triangulation’ (Denzin, 1978). 
Because the case studies differed in context, there was a variation in the sources between two 
cases. Case Study 1 included interview testimonies, legal case files, grey documents, media 
record, and FOI releases. Case Study 2 included interview testimonies, video resources, grey 
documents, media records and archival records.  
 
The research was conducted through qualitative interviews and documentary research. 
Interviews were selected because they offer meaningful, rich and verifiable life experiences 
or observations; accounts and testimonies are detailed, and they afford the capacity for 
clarification of answers (Patton, 2002). Interviews contain a reflexive element, i.e. 
researcher’s reflection on their own subjective world view and mindfulness of their own 
influence on the research process (Guillemin and Gillman, 2004). In case study research, 
respondents are seen as experts and agents, not mere data sources (Patton, 2002). The course 
and responses of an interview are guided by the direction of the conversation (Arthur and 
Nazroo, 2003). There is a spectrum of interviews, which is based on the amount of control the 




The spectrum includes structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. This research 
employed the middle ground of the interview spectrum, viz. semi-structured interviews. 
 
The use of multiple sources of data poses a technical challenge in terms of managing 
and organising the data. The diversity of sources and data collection techniques requires a 
rigorous protocol that indicates topics to be investigated and the type of data required (Yin, 
1981). There is a danger of collecting an overwhelming amount of information that might not 
contribute to the study. Due to the wide range of data sources the researcher has to assure all 
the evidence converges on similar facts (Yin, 2009; Stake, 1995). This is ascertained through 
analysis during the data collection process. Baxter and Jack (2008) recommend the use of 
computer qualitative data analysis software, where data can be stored, organised and analysed 
independently. In this study the researcher employed NVivo. Computer software offers 
different analytical instruments for coding and generating themes (Baxter and Jack, 2008; 
Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Nevertheless, early understanding of the case context is crucial 
for decisions about what type of information must be collected, wherefrom will it be sourced 
and who are the potential interview participants (Lewis, 2003). This is established by learning 
about the context of a case through literature review and background research, internet 
searches and media research. 
 
3.4.1.1 Semi-structured interviews 
 
Testimonies and accounts were collected by means of semi-structured interviews, also 
known as conversational or informal interviews. Longhurst (2016: 147) explains that semi-
structured interviews ‘unfold in a conversational manner offering participants the chance to 
explore issues they feel are important.’ In a semi-structured interview, the questions and 
answers are guided by the conversation flow (Barriball and While, 1994; Bailey, 2007; 
Zucker, 2009; Longhurst, 2016). Semi-structured interviews allow for the exchange of 
information to flow naturally, and thus, information evolves out of the conversation (Barriball 
and While, 1994). The outcome is unexpected responses, which is particularly beneficial 
where sensitive issues are explored and information is difficult to access (Bailey, 2007; 
Zucker, 2009). Semi-structured interviews are well suited where complex and sensitive issues 
require clarification by the respondent; where varied sampled group precludes the use of 
structured interview schedule (Barriball and While, 1994; Bernard, 1995). Schedules in semi-
structured interviews contain prompts, rather than set questions (Patton, 2002; Zucker, 2009). 
This affords greater flexibility and a conversational style of interviewing. This form of 
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interview schedule is, also, suited to broader range of sample groups, where different questions 
are designed for each interview group.  
 
This research used open-ended questions, which are preferred in semi-structured 
interviews. Open-ended questions have no answer categories or patterns, rather answer 
categories are provided by the respondent. Frey (2004) and Ballau (2008) concur that open-
ended question allow the interviewees to answer in their own terms or in a manner that reflects 
their own perceptions, rather than those of the researcher. Ballau (2008: 549) posited that ‘this 
structure gives respondents more freedom in crafting an answer and increases the cognitive 
effort.’ Since the respondent is not given a choice of answers, the respondent performs an 
additional cognitive task before responding. In this way, the interview data is immersed in a 
story with a context, a beginning, a middle and an end. However, there are technical 
drawbacks: interviews are more time-consuming than, say, questionnaires; and, the quality of 
data depends on the quality of interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee 
(Barriball and While, 1994; Hopf, 2004). To mitigate these limitations, the interview process 
was guided by a rigorous protocol. The protocol included an interview schedule, timeframe 
for interview process and strategically arranged interviews with NGO organisers who had 
access to a large number of potential respondents. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were employed in this research because of the following 
considerations. First, the research sought classified information that was difficult to access. 
Semi-structured interviews helped to focus the inquiry during the research process, constantly 
narrowing down and adjusting parameters of the study. Second, the researcher had a single 
opportunity to interview “elite” actors (government officials, NGO and movement leaders) 
and activists. The sensitive nature of the research meant that a lot of time had to be devoted to 
establishing trust with campaigners and activists. There were, additionally, time constraints 
and part of the fieldwork was conducted in India, which meant travelling abroad for extended 
period of time. Second, the complexity of the investigated issues required thorough 
explanations by the respondents. The use of open-ended questions allowed the respondents to 
give more information, clarify answers and explain issues. Third, due to the heterogenous 
sample group the interviews required different sets of questions.  
 
3.4.1.2 Interview sampling methods  
 
Case study research seeks idiosyncratic evidence, which, empirically, cannot be 




2009). Interview respondents are integral to the case and must have special knowledge of the 
context and events. Thereupon, this research employed purposive sampling method. Palinkas 
et al (2015) noted that purposive sampling involves ‘identifying and selecting individuals or 
groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a 
phenomenon of interest.’ There are several approaches available to purposive sampling to 
further narrow down or specify sample groups, e.g. intensity sampling, stratified sampling, 
homogenous sampling, heterogenous sampling etc (Ritchie et al, 2003). Where the researcher 
seeks maximum variation in participants to capture wide range of perspectives or opposing 
views to the phenomenon or case studied, the preferred approach is heterogenous sampling 
(Ritchie et al, 2003). Heterogenous sampling can corroborate facts and it broadens the 
spectrum of perspectives, which reduces the possibility of bias. These sampling methods were 
selected because of the following reasons.  
 
First, the study required specialist and context-bound information concerning 
government policy, regulation, sequence of events in resistance campaigns, the motivations 
behind direct actions, claims of illegitimate state-corporate conduct and evidence thereof, 
rationale behind specific strategies of resistance, and information about responses from state 
authorities. Second, the specialist information on different topics within the explored issues 
was dispersed between diverse and opposing groups of social actors. Interview participants in 
Case Study 1 were activists, NGO representatives and leaders, politician, and government 
officials. Interview participants in Case Study 2 included activists, NGO leaders and 
representatives, movement leaders, scientists and state officials. The researcher sought 
perspectives from all sides of the case to achieve an impartial view of the events.   
 
Interview participants were also identified in the fieldwork by means of snowball 
sampling or chain-referral sampling method. This method ‘yields a study sample through 
referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics 
that are of research interest’ (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981: 141). This type of sampling is well 
suited for studies that investigate sensitive issues or require the knowledge of insiders to locate 
interviewees (Biernacki and Waldorff, 1981). The danger of this approach is limited sample 
diversity, leading to subjective bias, though it is easily avoided by specifying the 
characteristics or type of information required when asking for referral to other participants 
(Biernacki and Waldorff, 1981). Gaining respondents’ trust was the primary problem in the 
interview process. Finding and becoming acquainted with gatekeepers – NGO representatives 
and activist leaders – was essential to gain access to resistance actors and campaigners. Chain 




The gatekeepers were identified through internet searches at an early stage of the study 
during background research on the cases and their context. A short list of sample groups was 
devised: activists, NGO actors, and state-corporate actors (i.e. government officials, 
politicians and company officials). The researcher, firstly, contacted respective NGOs and 
state-corporate actors introducing the research project by means of a formal letter. After 
establishing initial contact NGO and state-corporate actors were asked to participate in the 
study. Once in the field, the NGO actors referred the researcher to individuals involved in the 
investigated direct-action campaigns and individuals with expert knowledge on the cases. In 
Case Study 1 the gatekeepers were NGO reps from War on Want and the Coalition Against 
Arms Trade. In Case Study 2 the gatekeepers were leaders of KRRS, La Via Campesina 
volunteers and Coalition for GM-Free India organisers.  
 
3.4.1.3 The interview process 
 
Employing semi-structured interviews, the interviews were conducted in informal, 
conversational style and with open-ended. The schedules contained different prompts for each 
sample group (Appendix 2). The interviews were conducted in person or via Skype where 
respondents could not meet in person. To conduct interviews with respondents from Case 
Study 2 the research was taken to India. In person interviews were conducted in community 
hubs, cafes, NGO offices and public spaces. As tables 1 and 2 show (pp. 77), total of 29 
interviews were conducted, 4 Skype interviews and 24 in person interviews. Case Study 1 has 
12 interviews, and Case Study 2 has 16 interviews. For Case Study 1 the following number of 
actors were interviewed: 6 London Palestine Action activists, 3 NGO reps (the founder of 
Drone Wars UK, 1 CAAT organiser and 1 War on Want rep), and 3 state actors (1 
Conservative Party MP, 1 MOD official and 1 regulator from ECO). For Case Study 2, the 
following number of actors were interviewed: 5 KRRS members, 4 CGMFI campaigners, 1 
Navdanya representative, 1 Gene Campaign rep, 1 land owner and a representative of a 















Table 2: Case Study 2 participants 
 
Interview Location Organisation Date 
Anatole Kuragin Dehradun, India  Navdanya 07/04/2016 
Vasily Denisov Wardha, India Coalition for GM-
Free India 
22/04/2016 
Mikhail Kutuzov Wardha, India Coalition for GM-
Free India 
23/04/2016 
Nikolai Rostov Wardha, India Large farmer 24/04/2016 
Marya Karagina Bangalore, India Coalition for GM-
Free India 
12/05/2016 




Marya Bourienne India, New Delhi The Gene 
Campaign 
19/08/2016 
Scientist 1 Raichur, India State Agricultural 
University, Raichur 
27/08/2016 
                                                          
3 Participants’ testimonies were contributed through aliases. 
Interview Location Organisation Date 
Mikhail Botvinnik London London Palestine 
Action 
29/01/2016 
Lydia Litvyak London Campaign Against 
Arms Trade 
01/02/2016 
Natalia Peshkova London War on Want 03/02/2016 





Skype London Palestine 
Action 
18/02/2016 





Skype London Palestine 
Action 
21/05/2016 
Vasily Zaytsev London London Palestine 
Action 
27/06/2016 
Faye Schulman London London Palestine 
Action 
27/06/2016 
Official A London Export Control 
Organisation 
01/07/2016 
Official B London Ministry of Defence 23/10/2016 
Fyodor Okhlopkov London Drone Wars UK 24/10/2016 
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Scientist 2 Raichur, India State Agricultural 
University, Raichur 
27/08/2016 
Scientist 3 Raichur, India State Agricultural 
University, Raichur 
27/08/2016 








Barclay de Tolly Mysore, India Independent 
Researcher 
15/09/2016 














Testimonies were audio recorded and transcribed as soon as it was practicable. 
Verbatim accounts and testimonies in form of recordings and transcripts allow the researcher 
to revisit the original data (Silverman, 2005). The limitation of audio-recordings is their 
inability to capture non-verbal communication or signals (Bailey, 2007). The interviewing 
stage lasted ten months, from January to October 2016. Due to extensive travelling involved 
in research there were intervals in the interviewing process. During these intervals, 
documentary data was being compiled. The transcripts were generated during and right after 
the interviewing stage. Of course, transcribing during, as opposed post-fieldwork, affords the 
researcher awareness of emerging themes (Bailey, 2007). In a case study, this is important for 
sequencing events and collected data can inform further themes. Albeit, because of the 
extensive amount of documentary data being collected simultaneously, transcription was not 
always practicable. To keep on top of interview data, the researcher kept notes of emerging 
themes and unexpected information forged immediately after interviews.  
 
Several problems were encountered. Due to the sensitive nature of the research 
activists, as well as government and company officials, were apprehensive about participating 
in the study. Managers from UEL and MMB refused to participate in the research. A UEL 
manager proclaimed in email correspondence that the company does not manufacture drones 
for use by the IDF, while MMB ignored multiple audience requests. Several activists from the 
LPA refused participation in the project due to personal reasons. However, information was 




apprehensive about one-to-one interviews; therefore, group interviews were conducted to 
make respondents feel more comfortable. Important respondents from Navdanya, in India, 
turned down interview requests due to busy schedules.  
 
In the Indian case study, cultural and language barriers had to be resolved. While 
cultural barriers were overcome with the support from key gatekeepers, language barriers were 
resolved by hiring an interpreter. Two of the interviewed KRRS activists did not speak fluent 
English and the researcher did not speak Hindi nor vernacular languages. A La Via Campesina 
volunteer was hired as an interpreter who accompanied the researcher to the two interviews 
for a small financial reward. An issue occurred when a regulatory officer who refused to be 
audio-recorded. In response, the researcher wrote down abbreviated answers. However, the 
officer pulled out from the research at the end of the interview and demanded that the 
researcher leave the premises. To verify the evidence obtained from the interviews and to 
obtain the detail about state-corporate practices the study included extensive documentary 
research. 
 
3.4.1.4 Documentary research and triangulation 
 
Data source triangulation was conducted through extensive documentary research. A 
wide range of documentations were reviewed and analysed to corroborate evidence, verify 
certain facts stated by interviewees and to gain detailed information about state-corporate 
practices that were perceived as illegitimate by resistance actors and thereby censured. 
Triangulation entails the employment of a series of research instruments to verify facts, events 
and linkages (Ritchie, 2003; Flick, 2004). The documentary research employed was, also, used 
to add breadth and depth to the analysis (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). It can be revealing to 
understand why inconsistencies occur or how can different sets of data produce different 
findings (Bailey, 2007). Analysis of documentary evidence proved pertinent in three ways. 
Firstly, it helped to set the background context of the case studies. Secondly, the campaign 
claims activists made in censuring corporate entities and governments were verified. Thirdly, 
the interrelations between corporate entities and state institutions were confirmed.  
 
The documentary evidence differed between the two cases. Case Study 1 used policy 
documents, regulatory legislation, House of Commons Question Time records, parliamentary 
committees’ reports, export licence data, government and NGO reports, court case files and 
media records. Case Study 2 used policy documents, regulatory legislation, government and 
NGO reports, media records, published research, workshops and interviews archived on 
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YouTube. The documentary evidence was obtained through internet searches, FOI requests, 
email correspondence and NGOs. In Case Study 1, the main sources of NGO documents were 
DroneWars UK, War on Want and CAAT. In Case Study 2, the main sources of NGO 
documentation were Navdanya and the Gene Campaign. Having such a wide variety of data 
sources secures a fuller picture of the phenomenon (Lewis and Ritchie, 2003). In this sense, 
the research was holistic, as each data set added a unique piece to the entire puzzle. The use 
of multiple sources has, also, made findings more precise.  
 
In Case Study 1, the use of export licence data and policy documents verified the 
allegation that the UK government has certified the export of drones, manufactured by UEL, 
to Israel. The evidence in case files, verified activists’ conjecture that the UEL was hiding 
their business operation and export licences to conceal the use of their drones by the IDF in 
Gaza. NGO reports were used to set the context of the case study. The context entailed the 
background to the Israeli use of drones in Gaza, UEL’s and Elbit Systems’ operations, and the 
backstory to the Operation Protective Edge. In Case Study 2 secondary research, media 
records, government reports and NGO reports refuted censuring actors’ claims about the direct 
link between MMB’s Bt cotton and farmers’ suicides. On further investigation, testimonies 
from scientists, the Gene Campaign and Coalition for GM-Free India countered earlier 
suppositions. It turned out, that claims made by KRRS and Navdanya were highly 
hyperbolised. Similarly, to Case Study 1, publications and reports by NGOs, mainly Navdanya 
and the Gene Campaign, were used to lay down the context of the case.  
 
3.4.2 Data analysis, thematic coding and case study narrative 
 
The first step toward analytical interpretation of empirical findings is to organise and 
code raw data (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Liamputtong, 2009). Data in case study research can 
be coded through various methods, including: pattern matching, time-series analysis, 
discourse analysis, cross-case synthesis, direct interpretation, categorical aggregation and 
thematic analysis(coding) (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). The data in this research was organised 
by means of thematic coding. Thematic coding involves identifying repeated patterns of 
meaning, assorting them into themes, and finding links between them (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). This method was employed because the study pursues a ‘holistic understanding’ of 
resistance to state-corporate crime and because the data consisted of multiple sources (Stake, 
1978; Denzin, 1974; Yin, 2003). Holism is a philosophy which considers a phenomenon as a 
totality made up of interconnected parts, rather than isolated variables (Stake, 1978; 




of the “puzzle”, with each piece contributing to the researcher’s understanding of the whole 
phenomenon, rather than its individual parts or contributing factors’ (Baxter and Jack, 2008: 
554). The diversity of sources makes organisation of data difficult in terms of finding 
corresponding evidence or points of information (Tellis, 1997; Lewis, 2003). By generating 
themes, the researcher is able to group information from diverse sources into themes that 
represent events and process that contributed to the phenomenon as a whole.  
 
Themes can guide the researcher in drawing links between diverse sets of information 
(Patton, 2002). In holistically driven case study research the aim is not to identify patterns in 
diverse data sets to generate correlating variables, but to extract information about events or 
processes that contributed to the studied phenomenon (Stake, 1995). In this research themes 
represent events and processes, which contain pieces of different information that contribute 
to understanding the phenomenon as a whole. The themes serve the purpose of organising 
data, they are not definite categories in themselves. It is the task of theoretical analysis to 
infuse coded data with deeper and concrete meaning (Bukharin, 2005; Banaji, 2010; Lasslett, 
2010b, 2014b). Themes are unique to the content of the case; thus, they cannot be replicated 
across cases. They acquire a more general meaning through theoretical distillation. Once data 
is coded and analysed it can be presented with all its interconnected elements, sequences of 
events, connexions and processes as a whole. 
 
Thematic coding was assisted by a qualitative data analysis computer software, 
NVivo, developed by QSR International. The software removes the of manual coding, thereby 
affording more time to identify themes, links and conclusions (Hilal and Alabri, 2013). NVivo 
performs five crucial tasks: data management, idea management, data query, visual modelling 
and reporting (Bailey, 2007). NVivo was used to extract excerpts and organise them into 
themes, group it according to concepts and topics, interpret the findings through strategic 
query and utilise the excerpts to report findings. Interview transcripts and documents were 
transferred to NVivo. Subsequently, the data was broken down into relevant information in 
form of excerpts. Relevant fragments were identified and segregated into “nodes” that 
generate themes and organise data. In the subsequent coding stage, themes were put into a 
sequential order through linking threads. In this way, the data has taken a rudimental form of 
a whole. As Ilyenkov (1979: 87-8) argued, only when consciousness perceives a thing in its 
interconnections with all other things, it has understood the individual through the universal 
interconnections. The data was thought of dialectically. Each data set represented a single 




The final findings were reported as narrative, whereby events were recounted in a 
linear fashion and are related to each other creating a depth of meaning (Tellis, 1997; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006). In this way the narrative reflects temporal causality (Sommers and Gibson, 
1994). Meaning in a narrative is created through six elements: ‘abstract (a summary of the 
subject of the narrative); the orientation (time, place, situation, participants); the complicating 
action (what actually happened); the evaluation (the meaning and significance of the action); 
the resolution (what finally happened); and lastly the coda, which returns the perspective to 
the present’ (Elliot, 2005: 9). Evaluation is the most central element. The object of evaluation 
are stories, accounts of experiences, observations, actions and events. The evaluation is a 
categorical process, whereby the one narrating weaves a linear thread through all the 
sequences pulling together evidence from various accounts (Labov, 1997). ‘Categorical 
analysis’ extracts, classifies and places sections of data text into categories (themes) (Lieblich 
et al, 1998). Sequencing of events determines how the story is read, for events are dependent 
upon previous ones. The sequencing imposes a temporal dimension (beginning, middle, 
ending). Meaning is constructed, not solely through evaluation, but also by structuring a 
narrative into a story with a beginning, a middle and an end (Elliot, 2005). In this way, the 
case study is truly presented dialectically, as a whole. 
 
3.4.3 Ethical considerations 
 
In accordance with research practice governance, social research must be undertaken 
in a systematic and accountable manner (Sarantakos, 2005). Researchers are accountable and 
regulations protect personal information. Ulster University’s code of practice ensures that 
investigations involving human subjects are conducted in a professional and ethical way. 
There are broad ethical considerations that affected this study. These include, confidentiality, 
anonymity, privacy, informed consent. the British Society of Criminology’s (BSC) code of 
ethics and the British Sociological Association’s (BSA) ethical guidelines (2002) stress that 
‘the research should be conducted on the freely given informed consent’ and that the research 
must be conducted ‘within the confines of privacy and confidentiality, data protection and 
human rights’ (BSC, 2006). Drawing on ethical guidelines composed by BSC, Johnstone 
(2005) arranges these ethical issues under ‘intrusion’, ‘informed consent’ and ‘confidentiality 
and disclosure’. ‘Intrusion’ refers to sensitive or personal questions; ‘informed consent’ 
implies a responsibility to explain the purpose and outcome of the research; ‘confidentiality 
and disclosure’ refers to protection of personal information, confidential and anonymity. Also, 




governments and officials ‘unless there are clear and compelling public interest reasons not to 
do so.’ 
 
Following these guidelines, the research had to consider and address issues 
concerning respondents’ privacy, confidentiality and investigator’s safety/security. These 
ethical matters were addressed through a research protocol and a risk assessment. The protocol 
details research methods, the interview procedures, sample groups and how confidentiality 
was addressed. The risk assessment details the measures adopted to control inherent risks in 
relation to traveling abroad for fieldwork. In accordance with research governance at Ulster 
University, the RG1a and RG1c application forms were completed and submitted to the 
Research Governance department along with the research protocol, travel plan and record of 
stay, activities plan, information sheet and interview consent form (Appendix 1).  
 
In an environment marked by legal repercussions for engaging in industrial sabotage, 
fear of persecution by state authorities, libel, defamation or lose of liberty, privacy and 
confidentiality is of utmost importance. The respondents were informed about the nature of 
the study, aims and questions with an information sheet that included a consent form. 
Participation in the study was based on informed consent, the participants were informed of 
their right to withdraw from the study, they were asked for permission to audio-record the 
interviews and keep the testimonies. Respondents had an option of giving written or oral 
consent. Oral consent was given as an option because some respondents expressed concerns 
about having their name put on paper. Overall, seven interviews were conducted with oral 
consent and 22 with written consent (Appendix 3). The respondents’ confidentiality was 
preserved by anonymising them in the final report, their testimonies were contributed through 
a pseudonym. Respondents’ privacy was preserved by storing testimonies on a password 
protected computer, and the investigator was the only person with access to the information. 
The research also considered the sensitive information disclosed by participants, due to the 
issues inquired, i.e. illegitimate state and corporate practices. Albeit, no incriminating nor self-
deprecating information was disclosed by the participants. Nevertheless, throughout the study 
the researcher acknowledged the potential for self-deprecating or incriminating information.  
 
In terms of conducting research abroad, in a foreign social, cultural and political 
environment, there were inherent risks to the researcher’s safety. The safety and security risks 
were managed by following the Foreign and Commonwealth Office guidelines and 
recommendation on traveling to India (Appendix 4). The researcher produced a record of stay 
and plan of activities, which detailed the places to which the researcher travelled within India 
to conduct interviews. The researcher emailed the supervision team once a week during 
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fieldwork in India to update them on the research progress and movement. The researcher was 
accompanied by NGO volunteers (gatekeepers) to gain trust and access to respondents. There 
were also ethical implications of a Western academic interviewing Indian civil society, risk of 
exploitation due to status disparities and cultural barriers.  
 
The risk of exploiting Indian civil society for information was alleviated by working 
with the NGOs – Navdanya and KRRS – on who to interview. La Via Campesina and CGMFI 
volunteers accompanied the researcher to ten interviews as respondents knew and trusted 
them. The volunteers debriefed the respondents in advance, explaining the purpose of the 
research and their contribution. The NGO volunteers also took on the role of interpreters in 
three interviews. Additionally, the researcher spent three weeks in Navdanya’s research centre 
to learn about the context of the case. During that time the researcher became familiarised 
with social and cultural customs of India. This became very important in the interview process, 
as the researcher acquired a better idea about how to relate to respondents in a respectful 
manner. At a meeting of CGMFI group the members distrusted the researcher in fear of 
infiltration of the movement by Monsanto and refused to participate. The members have 
changed their minds after being briefed by a known volunteer from the CGMFI who 
accompanied the researcher, however they did not want to participate in the study. A regulator 
from the Department of Agriculture withdrew from the study after being asked questions about 
the relation between the agrarian crisis and transgenic cotton. Despite these two incidents the 
research was successful in obtaining the required data. No work was undertaken where the 




In brief, research into state-corporate criminality requires the consideration of, not 
only state-corporate interaction and objective legal criteria that define illegitimate actions, but 
the social process involved in the exposure of illegitimate state-corporate conduct and 
stigmatisation of that conduct as deviant (Ward and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 2004). 
That is because crimes of the powerful are oftentimes brought to the public’s attention and 
prohibited by civil society coalitions (Lasslett, 2012a). When the focus is on the social 
processes through which illegitimate state-corporate conduct is defined as criminal by civil 
society configurations that inscribe deviancy labels on such conduct, a very different set of 
methodological considerations emerges. One way in which state-corporate crime, as a 
phenomenon, comes into being is when practices that mediate state-corporate interaction 




subjected to censure by resistance communities. The Marxist dialectical approach is conducive 
to research that looks at relations between interconnected processes to understand a 
phenomenon as a whole (Lenin, 1976; Marx, 1981; Engels, 2010a; Ollman, 2008). To 
investigate this phenomenon empirically, the project investigated two disparate case studies.  
 
The study was operationalised through instrumental, multiple-case study research 
employing multiple sources of data and a thematic analysis of the findings. Two case studies 
were researched. Case 1 looks at the censure by anti-arms trade, Palestine solidarity 
campaigners of UEL and the UK Government for authorising defence exports of companies 
like UEL to Israel. Case 2 looks at the resistance of the anti-globalisation, Hindu-nationalist 
movement to biotechnology in India through censure of a biotech conglomerate, Monsanto, 
for introducing transgenic cotton and the Government of India for releasing transgenic cotton 
into Indian agriculture. The study investigated the illegitimacy in state-corporate conduct 
through documentary research focused on the routine practices, i.e. regulation, policymaking 
and business activities of the companies. The process of censure was investigated through 
semi-structured interviews with resistance actors. The interviews focused on the resistance 
campaigns and direct action organised to expose and censure respective institutions.   
 
The data, rather than contributed individually as single variables, were converged 
together in the analysis process. The data was broken down, organised and coded by means of 
NVivo, to identify relevant fragments of qualitative information. In so doing, each piece of 
information was imbued with meaning through thematic coding. These codes did not represent 
definite categories in themselves, but rather were used to represent a process in sequence of 
events, and each theme contained pieces of information that were put together to build a whole 
picture of the cases. Findings were put together forming a complex narrative organised 
through theoretical and conceptual categories. Taken together, findings from the two cases 
were used to draw conclusions about what are the criminogenic properties latent in routine 
state-corporate activities, how these latent properties surface in certain events and how state-









Chapter IV – Censure of the UK-Israel arms trade 




The foregoing chapters discussed the conceptual, theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of the study. These are, the process-driven approach, the Marxist dialectical 
method and the multiple-case study approach. Informed by this groundwork, the study 
contends that for a state-corporate crime to come into being, there must be illegitimate activity 
and some form of condemnation or censure that stigmatises such activity as deviant (Green 
and Ward, 2004, 2012; Ward and Green, 2000; Lasslett, 2010a; Lasslett et al, 2015). In 
furtherance of this, the research aims to empirically capture the criminogenic potential latent 
in routine state-corporate activities, the processes through which this potential is realised, and 
the social processes that actualise the being of state-corporate crime. To these ends, the 
research considers the particular properties of state-corporate activities that triggered social 
opprobrium, how resistance communities mobilised to ascribe deviant quality on concerned 
institutions, how censure affected targeted state-corporate conduct, and how the state-
corporate institutions responded.  
 
Pursuing these aims and research questions, this case demonstrates empirically how 
state-corporate crime events happen and how the quality of being criminal is inscribed on 
illegitimate state-corporate conduct. The study investigated the censure of the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) defence exports to Israel and production of unmanned aired vehicles (UAV) 
engines for the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) Hermes drones by an Israeli-owned subsidiary 
UAV Engine Ltd (UEL). The censure was configured through a resistance campaign, dubbed 
‘Stop Arming Israel’, in response to an attack on Gaza, dubbed “Operation Protective Edge”. 
The campaign was orchestrated by the London Palestine Action (LPA) with support from the 
Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT), War on Want, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign 
(PSC), and the Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) movement. The empirical analysis 
unpacks the censure of the UK Government and UEL, looking at: the practices that mediated 
the symbiosis between the Government and UEL; the illegitimate properties of UEL’s 
business and UK defence exports to Israel; the resistance community that censured UEL and 
the Government, looking at: the historical traditions of activism and the specific field of social 
struggle the resistance actors came from; the motivation and rationale behind the Stop Arming 




Government; and, the rationale for two connected direct actions, a rooftop occupation and a 
blockade of UEL.  
 
The analysis considers the effectiveness of the campaign, particularly the two direct 
actions, in imprinting deviant stigma on the licensing of defence exports to Israel by the 
Government and UEL’s business operations. It further considers how the state authorities, the 
Government and UEL responded to the censure in attempt to dilute the effectiveness of the 
resistance campaign. The LPA censured the UK Government for licensing defence exports to 
Israel and UEL for producing engines that were incorporated into drones used by the IDF for 
military operations in Gaza. The resistance actors contended that these exports abetted human 
rights violations committed by the IDF against Palestinians in the Operation Protective Edge.  
 
The chapter starts off with an outline of the background context in section 4.2. This 
section takes the reader through the events of the Operation Protective Edge; the context of 
the Israeli drone industry and use of drones in Gaza; UEL’s role in this industry; and the UK 
Arms Export Controls, a regulatory framework that controls exports of military and dual-use 
goods by the defence industry; and, the policy toward arms exports and Israel. This section 
provides the context of the alleged state-corporate crime and how it came about. The next 
section, 4.3, enquires into the regulatory and policy processes through which defence exports 
are authorised. These are considered as the mediating forces of the symbiosis between the UK 
government and UEL (Tombs, 2012; Tombs and Whyte, 2015). It also enquires into the 
allegations that UEL engines are incorporated into IDF’s Hermes drones, the ‘backbone’ of 
Israel’s Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions 
in Gaza (Amnesty International, 2009a). Section 4.4 explores the resistance campaign and its 
most pertinent moments, i.e. the rooftop occupation and ‘Block the Factory’ action. It explores 
the motivations and consequences of both actions, and how they censured defence export to 
Israel as deviant.  
 
The empirical evidence was sourced from interviews with LPA activists, 
representatives and heads of CAAT, War on Want, and Drone Wars UK as well as government 
officials; grey documents; media records; Government and CAAT licence database; Freedom 
of Information (FOI) release; and case files from the trial of LPA activists. In congruence with 
the Marxist dialectical method, the case is narrated as a whole made-up of interconnected 
elements, i.e. events, actions, policies, processes etc. The data is presented in entirety 
according to the sequence of events, piecing all the elements dialectically. In so doing, Marxist 
theory and concepts are employed to imbue the empirical data with concrete meaning. The 
analysis uses insight from Marxist approaches to state/corporate crime to breakdown the state-
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corporate processes that produced the illegitimate conduct. To understand the social processes 
of resistance the chapter draws on Gramscian concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony and 
civil society. 
 
4.2 Setting the context 
 
Chapter III emphasised that case studies produce context-bound knowledge (Stake, 
1978; Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The phenomenon studied has a real-life context, to 
understand how it occurred the case must consider the historical background of the field of 
social struggle and the tradition whence the resistance actors came. Furthermore, in a narrative 
presentation of findings events cannot be separated from their contextual and historical 
specificity (Elliot, 2005). This entails an outline of the event that triggered the censure of the 
UK Government and UEL, namely the Operation Protective Edge. Subsequently, the section 
provides an outline of the industry (the field of struggle) and the company that the ‘Stop 
Arming Israel’ campaign was directed against. This involves the business operations of UEL 
and its parent company, Elbit Systems Ltd. Additionally, the section gives an insight into the 
state practices that were censured, namely the policymaking and the regulatory process. In this 
case, the state practices pertain to the Arms Export Controls (AEC) and the licensing process, 
Defence Industrial Policy and policy towards arms exports to Israel. In this way, this section 
sets the case study in its historical context.  
 
4.2.1 Operation Protective Edge 
 
The Israeli bombardment of Gaza in July-August 2014 – euphemistically labelled 
“Operation Protective Edge” – culminated in the killing of more than 2,251 Gazans (including 
1,462 civilians) and 71 Israelis (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2015; Amnesty International, 
2016; United Nations [UN], 2015; International Criminal Court [ICC], 2015, 2016; Winter, 
2016). The 50-day offensive occurred in the context of mounting tensions between the Israeli 
government and Palestinian authorities, a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement, Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and the continued blockade of the Gaza Strip. It was flared by 
an alleged Hamas abduction of three Israeli teenagers found dead in the West Bank, and a 
retributive killing of a Palestinian youth by Israelis, followed by rocket-firing from Gaza into 
Israel. Following the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas members on 12 June 
2014, the IDF initiated Operation Brother’s Keeper in search of the teenagers and suspected 
abductors. Although, the Israeli state accused Hamas, it was later found and announced on 25 




2014). As part of the operation, the IDF and the Israel Security Agency swept through the 
West Bank detaining 381 and killing 10 Palestinians (Piven, 2014).  
 
On 30 June, the three teenagers were found dead south of Hebron. Two suspects, Jihad 
Dofsh and another, were killed on the same day, as the IDF detonated explosives in their 
homes. The third suspect, Husam Dofsh, was arrested on 4 July in Gaza. It has been reported 
that during the search the IDF conducted mass arrests, home raids and demolitions throughout 
the West Bank (Amnesty, 2014; HRW, 2014). Human rights organisations have called actions 
of the IDF “collective punishment” (HRW, 2014). The heavy-handed response from the IDF, 
during the search of suspects, incited rocket attacks on Israel. In response, the IDF launched 
an air assault against Gaza on 8 July, and a subsequent ground invasion on 17 July with the 
stated objective to degrade military infrastructure of Hamas (UN, 2015; Amnesty 
International, 2016).  
 
Both Palestinian military organisations and the IDF have been accused of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity (HRW, 2015; Amnesty International, 2016). However, the focus 
is on the Israeli state, given its position as an occupying power and the disproportionate use 
of force by the IDF. Apart from the unprecedented death toll in the Strip, the fighting caused 
destruction of property and vital services, displaced 500,000 people (28% of the population), 
and orphaned 1,500 children (UN, 2014a). The IDF has been indicted by the Palestinian 
authorities with disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, 
including schools sheltering civilians and hospitals, and targeting non-combatants (ICC, 2015, 
2016). According to international humanitarian law, the IDF has breached the Jus in Bello 
principles of military necessity, proportionality and distinction (ICC, 2016). 
 
The Israeli attack has been described by some organisations as “collective 
punishment”, designed to demoralise Gazans through intense bombardment (Rogers, 2014; 
Palestinian Human Rights Organisation [PHRO], 2015). The IDF also displayed a callous 
indifference to the lives of civilians and contempt for international law by following the 
‘Dahiya Doctrine’ when bombing Gaza (Shabaneh, 2014: 4; Rogers, 2014: 105). The doctrine 
refers to the obliterated Dahiya quarter in Beirut during the Second Lebanon War. A senior 
Israeli military commander, General Gadi Eisenkot, said in an interview in 2008 that  
 
Israel will use disproportionate force upon any village that fires upon 
Israel, “causing great damage and destruction.”  Eisenkot made very clear: this is 
not a recommendation, but an already approved plan - from the Israeli 





UAVs were used extensively throughout the operation in ISTAR missions. The Israeli 
government claims that drones allow its forces to target legitimate military objects with 
minimum collateral damage. Although, the Israeli government has never publicly admitted 
that it uses armed drones in Gaza, the IDF avowed that the UAVs play a pivotal role in military 
operations in the occupied territories (War on Want, 2013; Dobbing and Cole, 2014; Cooper 
and Anderson, 2015). Due to secrecy about the use of drones in Gaza it is difficult to confirm 
official figures of casualties caused by drone strikes. However, the Al Mezan Centre for 
Human Rights confirmed that in the 2014 attack 840 people were killed by drones (Cooper 
and Anderson, 2015: 6). That is a significant number of casualties caused by UAVs. Drones 
were used in the “roof-knocking” tactic, a practice of firing small “non-lethal” missiles at 
rooftops of buildings to warn civilians of an incoming larger strike, which was proclaimed by 
the Human Right Council inquiry, an ineffective and a highly parlous warning system (UN, 
2015: 66)4. The following subsection briefly outlines the history and the rationale behind 
drones, as they have become increasingly prominent in attacks on Gaza. Elbit Systems, and 
its subsidiary UEL, are at the forefront of developing UAV technology which appears to be a 
new form of warfare.  
 
4.2.2 Drones  
 
It should not be assumed, as Rogers (2014: 107) asserts, that ‘weapons of mass 
destruction are large and few – they can be small and many.’ In the last two decades UAVs 
have become the ne plus ultra5 of modern warfare. Drones are remote controlled aircrafts 
operated from the ground or autonomously following a pre-programmed mission (see Cole 
and Wright, 2010). Military drones fall into two categories: ISTAR UAVs and armed UAVs. 
The use of drones has proliferated in the recent decades, because they can stay aloft for many 
hours, they are much cheaper than maned aircrafts and they pose no danger to the flight crew 
since they are flown remotely. Cole (2014) informs us that some trace the history of drones to 
a remote-controlled aircraft dubbed ‘the Queen Bee’ used by the Royal Navy for target 
practice in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the modern ISTAR drones proliferated 
significantly during the Vietnam War, Yom Kippur War, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav Wars 
(Benjamin, 2013).  
 
                                                          
4 The independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-
21/1 Ensuring respect for international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East 
Jerusalem (23 July 2014). 




UAVs offer access, persistence, accuracy, cost efficiency and remove the potential 
risk to the pilot. Exponents of this technology claim that drones are ‘humanitarian’ as they 
supposedly reduce collateral damage by providing precision and accuracy. However, 
extensive research has shown that drones are just as lethal as other weapons, and the claims 
of no civilian casualties tend to be untrue (Human Rights Clinic, 2012; Ahmad, 2015). For 
example, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights reported that ‘825 Palestinians had died 
from attacks carried out by drones between June 2006 and October 2011’ (War on Want, 2013: 
11). Of course, what is not captured by such statistics are the long-term impacts. According to 
the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, 
drones facilitate low-intensity, drawn-out conflict and increase opportunities for military 
engagement which presents a danger to human life (UN, 2013). With a constant presence of 
drones above there is always a potential threat and constant fear of air strikes.  
 
As drones reduce the risk for the user, they are more likely to be used in extended 
conflicts, ultimately creating more potential threats. They increase opportunities for military 
actions, particularly in situations that would have been hitherto considered too hazardous. 
Rogers (2014: 97) argues that drones, because they increase opportunity for military action, 
‘increase the likelihood of collateral damage’. The frequent, small-scale discriminating attacks 
conducted with drones lead to prolonged conflicts with greater likelihood of harm being 
inflicted on a civilian population. They are particularly advantageous in a prolonged 
asymmetric warfare, where the aggressor operates a highly sophisticated military technology 
against ill-equipped insurgents (Saif, 2014). In turn, prolonged conflicts lead to the 
development of new military capabilities, and the improvement of existing ones. Israel has 
become a leading producer and exporter of UAV technology globally. The next -subsection 
expands on the success of the Israeli drone industry, focusing on Elbit Systems and UEL, and 
on the complicity of these companies in the violations of human rights and humanitarian law 
in the Gaza Strip.  
 
4.2.3 Israeli drone industry 
 
Israel has been developing and using UAVs since the 1970s, in Egypt during the Yom 
Kippur War, in the first and the second Lebanon War, and more recently in the Gaza operations 
(Dobbing and Cole, 2014; Cooper and Anderson, 2015). The IDF has been using armed UAVs 
in Gaza as early as 2006. Although, Israel does not admit to the use of armed drones, multiple 
sources confirm that drones were employed for air strikes in the operations Cast Lead, Pillar 
of Defence and Protective Edge (HRW, 2013, 2014). Israel is the sixth largest weapons 
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exporter with the third highest military expenditure per capita, exceeding £9.9 billion, and the 
leading exporter of UAV technology (SIPRI, 2012; War on Want, 2013; Dobbing and Cole, 
2014). Around 41% of the world’s UAV technology came from Israel between 2001 and 2011 
(SIPRI, 2012). Drones exports account for around 10% of Israel’s total arms exports, and it 
supplies drone technology to some 50 out of 76 countries known to have some form of military 
drone capability (Dobbing and Cole, 2014). 
 
Israel’s success in the drone industry is attributed by the Israeli Defence Ministry to 
‘combat experience…and immediate operational use since [Israel] is always in a conflict’ 
(Dobbing and Cole, 2014: 4). This unique situation allows Israel to rapidly test and improve 
its military capabilities. The Palestinian territories, especially Gaza, have proved an effective 
testing ground for its UAV technology. In Cooper’s and Anderson’s (2015: 19) words, 
‘Israel’s constant state of warfare has ensured a reliable marketplace for Israeli arms 
manufacturers.’ “Combat-tested” is a much-desired trademark in the global military industry. 
Recurrent military operations in Gaza provide Israeli drone companies with a major 
competitive edge, as the IDF can field test this technology in a real-life combat environment 
(War on Want, 2013; Tepper, 2014; Sadeh, 2014). Shlomo Bron, a former air force general, 
stated that ‘it may be true that in practice the military uses the occupied territories as a 
laboratory, but that is just an unfortunate effect of our conflict with the Palestinians…’ (Saif, 
2014: 44).  
 
The most advanced and iconic Israeli UAVs, Hermes drones, are produced by Elbit 
Systems. Cooper and Anderson (2015: 20) document that ‘85% of drones used by the Israeli 
military are manufactured by Elbit systems.’ Elbit Systems describes Hermes 450 as the 
‘backbone of Israeli army and air force ISTAR missions’ (Amnesty International, 2009a). 
Hermes 450 has been dubbed the ‘workhorse of the Israeli defence force’ (Saif, 2014:13). In 
addition, the Israeli forces refer to the Elbit developed Skylark drone as ‘a star [which] was 
born in the Gaza skies after hundreds of operating flights during Operation Cast Lead’ (Saif, 
2014:43). After the 2014 attack on Gaza, at the third annual Unmanned Vehicle Israel Defence 
conference, Israeli companies displayed ‘combat-tested’ UAVs among which was the Elbit 
Systems’ Hermes 900 (Tepper, 2014). The CEO of Elbit Systems, Bezhalel Machlis, declared 
that all Elbit’s products have been used during the bombardment (Hever, 2014). Elbit’s 
website advertisement of the Hermes 450 as IDF’s ‘primary platform’ corroborates the 
evidence. 
 
Elbit’s drones, especially the Hermes 450s, are powered by Wankel rotary engines 




Elbit Systems’ UK subsidiary, UEL, located in Lichfield, near Birmingham, Staffordshire 
(Pallister, 2009; Amnesty International, 2009a, 2009b). Even though, UEL admitted that it 
manufactures the engines for Hermes 450s, it continually denies that they are fitted to drones 
used by the Israel’s armed forces, claiming they are incorporated solely in aircrafts for re-
export to third countries (Amnesty International, 2009b). Notwithstanding, ample evidence 
suggests that engines produced by the UEL have been fitted to Hermes 450s used by the IDF 
(Airforce Technology6, 2014). The link between UEL’s engines and Elbit drones is not 
complete without considering the part played by the UK government in export of military 
goods to Israel. The UK government has been accused of complicity in international 
humanitarian law and human rights violations during the ‘Operation Protective Edge’, because 
it granted export licences to arms companies for military and dual-use items destined for Israel 
(War on Want, 2015; Smith, 2015). The UK regulates export of military goods through the 
AEC mechanism. To explain UK complicity in the events of summer 2014 in Gaza, it is 
imperative to comprehend how export controls work.   
 
4.2.4 UK Arms Export Controls 
 
The core piece of legislation that governs the export of controlled goods (military and 
dual-use goods) is the Export Control Order (ECO) 2008. Military and dual-use items that 
require export authorisation can be found in the UK Strategic Export Control List. The items 
relevant to this case study bear the code ML10d, i.e. ‘propulsion aero-engines and specially 
designed components therefor’. The Order requires all defence exporters to apply for a licence. 
There are several different types of export licences, but types relevant to this case study are 
the Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) and Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL). 
The licensing process is administered by the Export Control Organisation (ECO), the principle 
regulatory body of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS, now 
Department for International Trade [DIT]) responsible for maintaining, updating and 
implementing export control legislation (Lunn, 2017). Before making a final decision about 
an application the ECO consults the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD) and the Department of International Development.  
 
An application is evaluated against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export 
Licensing Criteria (Consolidated Criteria) (Appendix 5), based on the EU Code of Conduct 
(Lunn, 2017). The Consolidated Criteria set out commitments which guide the arms export 
                                                          
6 A marketing company for aerospace technology and industry. 
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authorisation. These commitments are encapsulated in eight criterions concerning the UK’s 
international commitments, human rights and international humanitarian law, the internal 
situation in the recipient country, regional stability, national security, the recipient country’s 
attitude to terrorism, the risk of diversion or re-export, and economic stability (DBIS, 2014a). 
All applications are considered on a case-by-case basis considering the information that is 
available at the time of application assessment (Lunn, 2017). An application is refused when 
there exists a ‘clear risk’ that either one of the above criterions would be broken. Authorisation 
of an export in knowledge of a ‘clear risk’ is an explicit infringement of the UK’s own law 
and international commitments.  
 
The UK government claims that ‘the procedures for assessing licence applications and 
our decision-making processes are robust and have stood the test of time (Cable, 2014). Yet, 
the AEC has been widely criticised, due to arms exports to countries with a record of human 
rights violations (DBIS, 2015a). The government recognises the perennial conflict between 
arms exports and human rights concerns. The UK government holds that its Arms Export 
Controls are the most robust in the world (DBIS, 2014a). In the 2010-15 review, the 
Committee on Arms Export Controls probed the Government on its criticism of human rights 
record of certain countries, whilst licensing arms exports (Brook-Holland, 2018). The 
government was urged to apply more cautious judgement when issuing export licenses. 
Notwithstanding, the government rejected this view and maintained that judgements made on 
a case-by-case basis is a strong and secure mechanism (Lunn, 2016). While regulators, the 
ECO as well as the FCO, assure licences meet the Criteria, the DSO must constantly work to 
promote growth in the sector. The arms export policy, overall, is geared towards promoting 
arms exports. 
 
The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw pointed out to the House of Commons in 2002 the 
challenge associated with rationalisation of the defence industry (Taylor, 2009). Military 
components are sourced from several different countries; and, licences are granted for 
components incorporated in defence equipment in a second country, which may be exported 
to a third country (ibid). Alas, there are no effective means of assuring that products with UK 
components exported to a third country meet the Consolidated Criteria. The defence industry 
is a global business, and a lucrative one. Diverse interests, actors, institutions and 
organisations are involved in the success of British defence industry. The UK government 
must collaborate with home companies, subsidiaries, industry organisations, trading partners 
and foreign governments to achieve its objectives. Often, the means of achieving policy 





4.2.5 The UK policy toward arms exports and Israel  
 
Opponents of the UK-Israel arms trade contend that the UK Government violates its 
own regulations and international obligations by licensing arms exports to Israel (Stavrianakis, 
2008; CAAT, 2010, 2015; War on Want, 2015). Although, the FCO recognises Israel as a 
‘country of concern’, the ECO continues to licence arms exports to Israel (FCO, 2014, 2015, 
2016). There are conflicting influences within the broader defence industrial policy and policy 
toward Israel. Politico-economic exigencies outweigh human rights considerations and legal 
obligations. Export controls are based on pragmatic considerations that the government 
perceives as favourable to its own interests, rather than ethical premises. The relevant policy 
framework is outlined in the Defence Industrial Policy 2002, the Defence Industry Strategy 
2005, the Defence Industrial Policy 2017 and the Defence Growth Partnership, 2013. General 
policy views on arms exports to Israel are found in the FCO and DBIS annual reports. 
 
The Defence Industrial Policy 2002 emphasised the need to expand market access for 
the UK defence industry. The time it takes to monetise on Research and Development (R&D) 
makes investment difficult (MOD, 2005, 2017). The UK Government does not have the 
purchase power nor the military demand as a monopsony to sustain defence production (MOD, 
2002). The UK defence industry must, thus, seek profitable relationships abroad and the 
Government must create a conducive regulatory environment and trade relations with foreign 
partners (MOD, 2002). The Labour Government proposed a ‘policy of accessible markets 
supported by open competition’, the goal of which is competitive UK defence market (MOD, 
2002: 15). The policy stipulated that ‘investment in defence programmes and technologies 
helps to create export opportunities for UK industry, which the Government further actively 
supports through the Defence Export Services Organisation [Defence and Security 
Organisation] (both directly through UK-led sales, and indirectly by contributing to export 
opportunities led by others)’ (MOD, 2002: 16). Export controls are an obvious area that create 
obstacles to the above policy objectives. The Government, de facto, is ‘committed to 
continuous process improvement, so that export controls do not represent an unnecessary 
obstacle to industry undertaking legitimate business overseas’ (MOD, 2002: 17).  
 
The policy objectives were implemented through the Defence Industrial Strategy 
(DIS). The DIS intimated the importance of global competitiveness for the UK defence 
industry and securing its position as a major arms exporter by encouraging steady development 
of the industry (MOD, 2005). Defence exports constitutes 20% of UK defence employment, 
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and further: support diplomacy and enable bi-lateral defence relationships, for instance 
defence systems partnerships (e.g. UK Watchkeeper project); build operational capability 
during peacekeeping missions; spread fixed overhead costs, and so benefits accruing to the 
industry may be shared by the government in the form of lower prices; build a stable industry 
with production capacity and engineering skills that do not require high government 
expenditure (MOD, 2005: 46-8). As the Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition took over 
executive power, the FCO Minister, Alistair Burt, intimated that, except for a ‘more 
commercial outlook’ the Government’s ‘approach to arms controls matters will be very similar 
to that of the previous Government’, one based on a case-by-case assessment (DBIS, 2011: 
16).  
 
The new Defence Industrial Policy (DIP) 2017 aims at increasing exports to ‘enable 
overheads to be spread and economies of scale achieved, reducing the cost of equipment and 
services to MOD. Exports are also at the heart of developing and maintaining our key strategic 
international alliances’ (MOD, 2017a: 27). Strategic alliances are used to expand the UK’s 
defence industry and trade. The DIP stipulated that ‘the UK’s global defence and diplomatic 
network, spanning 168 countries and territories plays a crucial role in opening opportunities 
for UK business, both in the civil and defence sectors (MOD, 2017a: 28). By targeting the 
needs of international partners, the Government seeks to improve the export success of UK 
based defence businesses. 
 
Through the Defence and Security Engagement Policy the UK government works 
with major international suppliers to maximise the UK’s supply chain and augment investment 
opportunities (MOD, 2017b). Facilitation of foreign investment to optimise trading 
opportunities is the key. The Policy proposes linking UK based exporters to foreign allies and 
partners. The DIP includes several initiatives designed to connect suppliers with costumers, 
e.g.  Defence Suppliers Forum and the Supplier Portal (MOD, 2017a). These initiatives serve 
as information platforms for suppliers and customers (MOD, 2017a). The International 
Capability Steering Board was set up to identify and inform the industry of ‘strategic 
international industrial interests and opportunities, informed by national security objectives’ 
(MOD, 2017a: 40). Additionally, the DIP 2017, involves the Defence Growth Partnership 
(DGP) in the implementation of policy objectives.  
 
The DGP is a partnership between the Government and the industry, intended to grow 
the UK’s market share and to improve competitiveness (Department of International Trade 
[DIT], 2013). These objectives are achieved by aligning the development and supply of 




partners. As stated by the MOD (2017a: 40) the purpose of the DGP is ‘to understand export 
and adjacent market opportunities, in order to build exportability and the needs of international 
customers into future products and services…’ The main body consolidating the Government-
industry partnership is the DIT’s Defence & Security Organisation (DSO). Its role is to 
promote UK defence exports by ‘building strong relationships with industry and overseas 
governments’ (DSO, 2017). The DSO coordinates arms selling activities by establishing 
relationships between the UK government and overseas companies, supporting arms fairs, 
setting up liaison with arms companies, and encouraging political intervention in support of 
arms exports (CAAT, 2015a). Its aim is to maintain a growing defence industry by targeting 
the specific needs of its customers (DSO, 2017). The policy implemented by the DSO is set 
on enhancing ‘market intelligence’ through coordination and information sharing, between 
the industry and the DSO, about the demand abroad (DIT, 2014). In this way, the Government 
links UK based exporters to foreign customers.  
 
The UK policy toward defence exports to Israel is grounded in the view expressed by 
the FCO that ‘all countries, including Israel, have a legitimate right to purchase conventional 
arms for their defence and security needs’ (Taylor, 2009: 9). Even though Israel is included 
on FCO’s list of Countries of Concern, the ECO insists that the case-by-case licensing system 
ensures all exports meet UK criteria (Taylor, 2009; DIT, 2014). The DBIS claimed that arms 
exports to Israel are licensed through the case-by-case assessment and recommendations from 
the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, the FCO and ministerial reviews (DBIS, 2015b). The ECO, 
however, consider solely the information available at the time of each licence application and 
only concerning the specific product. This means that the regulators do not take into 
consideration any past events, history of international law violations, human rights record or 
what the product will be used for (DBIS, 2015b). In other words, a licence application may 
stipulate that an export is for the use by the armed forces, but the controls do not consider what 
the armed forces may use that product for a year or two after receiving it. This would require 
a consideration of past events and a more stringent application of FCO recommendations. As 
long as individual licences receive ECO’s approval they are seen by the Government to adhere 
to the AEC. Also, the UK Government has no means of assuring that this is the case (CAAT, 
2015a; War on Want, 2015). Nevertheless, there is an obvious discrepancy, between FCO’s 
recommendations on exports to Israel and the actual policy stance on exports to Israel.  
 
The issue is not with the individual licences, but with the entire policy toward arms 
exports and Israel (War on Want, 2015). There is a contradiction between arms exports to 
Israel and listing Israel as a Country of Concern. There is a tension between the Government’s 
stated commitments and actual arms exports. In light of this, the licensing process is a mere 
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‘legitimisation mechanism’ (Stavrianakis, 2008; CAAT, 2010). It is argued that the 
assessment process of defence exports to Israel does not apply important information, i.e. past 
events, commitment to international law and FCO recommendations, which would otherwise 
disqualify defence export licences to Israel (War on Want, 2015). The UK Government does 
not directly to abet Israel’s military operations. Rather it maintains a system whereby private 
exporters supply weapons for Israel’s military efforts. According to the policy, Israel is 
considered a close partner and a customer. The relations between UK exporters, the UK 
Government and Israel are that of strict business. To further illustrate this complex symbiosis, 
the thesis considers the policy and Arms Export Controls in operation.  
 
4.3 State-corporate symbiosis between UEL and the UK government  
 
The defence industry went through a major transformation at the end the Cold War. 
Defence budgets were significantly reduced, the industry was taken over by private businesses 
and production was rationalised (Mills, 1956; Mintz, 1985; Dunne and Skons, 2010). In more 
recent decades, governments facilitate trade between the private military complex and other 
states. The technical division of labour has taken over the defence industry (Stohl and Griro, 
2009). Most defence products contain sub-systems sourced from various suppliers based in 
different countries. A high level of foreign investment in the UK’s defence industry created 
many subsidiaries of overseas companies, which opened opportunities for partnerships, gave 
greater market access and secured exports to specific customers (MOD, 2017a). In the case of 
Hermes drones, engines are manufactured by UEL, the radar system is manufactured by 
another company in Kent, while components like wings are made in other countries before 
they are finally assembled into the final product destined to Israel (Taylor, 2009; Dobbing and 
Cole, 2014; War on Want, 2015). Due to the technical division of labour, British regulators 
have no control over where components end up after they are integrated into defence systems 
in another country. 
 
The following sections aim to impress on the reader the role of policy and regulation 
as mediating processes of state and corporate symbiosis. The argument follows that the ECO 
has authorised exports of military goods, including engines from UEL, in contravention of the 
Consolidated Criteria. Previous military operations in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead in 2009 and 
Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012) substantiated the risk that Israel may use controlled goods 
from UK in violation of international law (Amnesty International, 2009b; War on Want, 
2015). Yet, exports to Israel continue, and when specific licences were questioned by 




(2015: 4) reported that ‘the value of licences awarded for export to Israel amounted to 
£11,615,840 for military use and £28,992,833 for dual use in 2014 alone.’ There was no direct 
collusion between UEL and the UK government, rather, the Government creates the system 
that mediates its relations to private capital through licensing transactions.  
 
The analysis presents findings from export licence databases, policy documents and 
House of Commons briefings papers, Parliamentary committees’ reports and case files from 
the trial of ‘Stop Armin Israel’ campaigners. Additionally, data was sourced from interviews 
with two government officials of the ECO and the MOD, as well as NGO representatives. The 
analysis of the data found that the licences to Israel come into conflict with the regulatory 
framework. While the UK Government may not licence exports of controlled goods with 
intention to support Israel’s military efforts in Gaza, it does have an interest in maintaining 
congenial trade relations and to expand its defence market base. UEL is entangled in the 
military-industrial complex which supports Israel’s military efforts in Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPTs). As Elbit’s subsidiary, UEL’s main market is Israel. By licensing UEL 
exports, the UK Government is implicated in the military-industrial complex.  
 
4.3.1 UEL’s licences and exports to Israel 
 
The government, as one of the interviewees proclaimed, events coordinator from 
CAAT, put it, ‘has very poor transparency around arms export licences’ [Interview: Litvyak, 
CAAC, London, Feb 2016]. The company is under no legal obligation to disclose any licences. 
Obtaining licence information is difficult. In annual reports, the government discloses only 
the type of licence issued, e.g. SIEL or OIEL, the broad category, e.g. ML10 (category for 
military aircrafts), the number and value of licences. The ECO reports do not include the 
names of actual products, names of companies nor the purpose. Even FOI releases, Litvyak 
[Interview: 2016] attests, ‘contain vague information with broad names and categories, and 
no specific details on the volume of products licensed...’ The government does not disclose 
information about what military products are exported, where to and how they are being used. 
Litvyak [Interview: 2016] intimated that ‘[CAAT] would rarely see the actual detail or the 
actual licences…the government leaves no paper trail’, and CAAT is the only UK organisation 
which processes the data on export licences into readable format. Thus, the question remains, 
how does one find out whether UEL products were licenced for export to Israel? 
 
From the 2013 Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report it is known that 10 
SIEL licences were granted to Israel for military aero-engines and UAV components, and that 
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licences were granted for armed forces end use (ECO, 2013: 273-283). In 2014, four SIEL 
licences were granted to Israel for military aero-engines and UAV components, and the end-
user were the armed forces (ECO, 2014: 292-299). However, no information is given on the 
exact products, the applicants, or the end-use. CAAT (2015b), informed that ‘there are also 
components that go into US-built equipment destined for Israel.’ Some components made in 
the UK are shipped to the US for further assembly before they find their way to Israel for the 
final incorporation. In a written question on arms trade with Israel, Allister Burt replied that 
the Government keeps ‘the situation in Israel under continued review’, but the FCO ‘does not 
collect data on the use of equipment after sale’ (FCO Minister, 2018). In 2013-2014, 26 SIEL 
licences were granted for export to USA, for military aero-engines and UAV components 
(ECO, 2013: 301, 2014: 312). Many of the components exported to the US are incorporated 
in defence systems destined for use by the IDF (Taylor, 2009: 7-10). A respondent from War 
on Want, relayed that ‘we know that components exported to the US are integrated into Israeli 
UAVs…’ [Interview: Peshkova, War on Want, London, Feb 2016]. 
 
UAS International (2012), a leading industry magazine advertising UAVs, indicates 
that AR902/AR802 are incorporated in Elbit Systems’ Hermes 450 drones. However, there is 
lack of paper trail on licences granted for specific products due to transparency issues. FOI 
and CAAT data shines brighter light on the licences, though it is partial and limited to broad 
categories. In 2013 UEL was granted six licences for export of military goods to Israel as the 
end-user (CAAT, 2016a). The Committee on Arms Export Control (CAEC) (2014) disclosed 
three SIEL (Permanent) licences granted for UAV components, worth £73,030, and one SIEL 
(Permanent) licence for military aero-engines, worth £92,456, to Israel and OPTs. A FOI 
response indicated that in 2013, UEL was granted a SIEL (permanent) for ‘single rotor 
reductive drive engine’, but the end user was marked N/A (Information Rights Unit [IRU], 
2016). A single rotor reductive drive engine may refer to the AR902 model, but it is not 
indicated on the Annex. The information granted to the researcher by the Information Rights 
Unit (IRU) turns out to be partial when compared with CAAT’s database. Out of the six 
licences that are included, which were granted between 2012 and 2015, four were for exports 
to India and two were unspecified. The Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
was unwilling to disclose any information about the licences and repeatedly refused FOI 
requests. The IRU explained the information was confidential and sensitive, therefore could 
not be disclosed. Whilst, vague information is available under public domain, it is construed 
in a way that does not point to the applicants.  
  
The type of licences granted, as indicated in the FOI release, informs us about who 




means that the licence is permanent, and goods exported under this licence go through no 
further assessment but fall under the discretion of the importer (DIT, 2017). Once a licence is 
issued, the issuer has no control over what happens to the exported goods, unless the licence 
is revoked. Licences, once approved, are seldom overturned, according to government 
officials who participated in the study [Interview: Official A, ECO, London, July 2016; 
Interview: Official B, MOD, London, Oct 2016]. Licences are revoked only when new 
information about the end-user or -use is available or when a clear risk that an exported 
product will be employed in violation of the Consolidated Criteria. The assessment process 
considers only the information available at the time of application. Therefore, it happens 
seldom that a licence is reviewed. Nonetheless, there was one such instance during the 
Operation Protective Edge.  
 
4.3.2 The Operation Protective Edge and suspension of export licences 
 
The UK Government granted export licences to Israel worth £42m to 131 British 
defence companies between 2010 and June 2014 (Milmo, 2014b; CAAT, 2016a). Then, 
between July 2014 and December 2017 the amount of export licences granted by the UK 
Government was £331m (CAAT, 2016b). During the Operation Protective Edge, the 
Government, in response to criticism from anti UK-Israel arms trade campaigners and CAEC, 
reviewed several licences. On 4 August 2014 the Prime Minister (PM) David Cameron 
commissioned a review of arms export licences to Israel (Neate, 2014). Business Secretary 
Vince Cable added that ‘no new licences of military equipment have been issued for use by 
the Israeli Defence Force during the review period and as a precautionary measure this 
approach will continue until hostilities cease’ (DBIS, 2014c).  On 12 August the government 
decided to suspend 12 licences in an event of resumption of ‘significant hostilities.’ The DBIS 
(2014d: 60) stipulated, 
 
[O]n 12 August 2014, the Government announced the findings of a 
review of licensed exports to Israel which identified twelve licences for 
components which could be part of equipment used by the Israel Defence Forces 
in Gaza. The Government made clear that, in the event of a resumption of 
significant hostilities, it would suspend these licences as a precautionary step. 
 
In addition, the Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond wrote in a letter, dated 19 August 
2014, to CAEC that ‘on the basis of information currently available to us, there could be a risk 
that the items [covered by the 12 licences] might be used in the commission of a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law’ (CAEC, 2015b: 42). War on Want (2015: 7) 
pointed out that when violence resumed the government did not deem it a ‘resumption of 
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significant hostilities’ and backtracked on previous commitments. A year after the attack the 
Government reinstated these licences maintaining that the review found the licences complied 
with UK regulation (DBIS, 2015b). An official statement stipulated,  
 
[The government] was concerned that, in these circumstances, it would 
be unable to clarify whether the export licensing criteria were being met. As a 
result of the most recent review this additional measure has now been lifted and 
the government is confident that all export licences in circulation for Israel meet 
Consolidated Criteria (DBIS, 2015b). 
 
Commenting on this, an LPA activist stated that ‘it does not matter whether the 
government suspends a licence, because the weapons have already been exported to Israel a 
year ago or two years ago…and even after the licences will be reinstated and exports will 
resume’ [Interview: O’Donel, LPA, Skype, Feb 2016). The LPA argued that the UK 
government is complicit in Israel’s military actions against Gaza because the weapons, like 
the UAVs powered by engines produced by UK companies, are already in use by the IDF. The 
argument follows that previous military actions in Gaza, e.g. Operation Cast Lead and 
Operation Pillar of Defence, established the risk of defence products being used in violation 
of the Consolidated Criteria. According to LPA, if the Government was serious about 
upholding its own regulation the 12 licences would have been revoked permanently. Another 
LPA activist asserted that, 
 
It is not just that the UEL supplied weapons to Israel, UEL is a subsidiary 
of Elbit Systems which is Israel’s largest military drone company. What you got 
here is a factory which is very much part of Israel’s military industrial complex. 
If you look at Israel’s economy, it is dependent on arms exports. It is very well 
documented how Israel its wars to test and market its weapons. You’ve seen that 
Elbit Systems, following from the last attack on Gaza, go to military trade fairs 
and make presentations on how effective its drones were. Israel’s military 
industrial complex is built upon [occupation of Gaza]. They say field-tested and 
by that they mean it’s been tested on Palestinian people…This UEL factory is 
bound up in this system [Interview: Botvinnik, LPA, London, Jan 2016]. 
 
The point made by Botvinnik [Interview: 2016] is that UEL is part of a two-way UK-
Israeli arms trade which props Israel’s military operations. As a subsidiary of Elbit Systems, 
UEL is part of the military-industrial complex that is profiting from a damaging human toll. 
UEL is only one agent in the chain that inflicts harm on the people of Gaza. Elbit’s drone 
technology is tested in a real-life combat situation, which affords its products the label ‘field 
tested’ or ‘combat tested’ (Dobbing and Cole, 2014). Equally, UEL’s returns, the activists 
contended, depend on the continuation of UK-Israeli trade, despite Israel’s recent history of 
human rights and international humanitarian law violations in OPTs [Botvinnik, 2016; 




Consolidate Criteria. CAAT works extensively on FOIs to access the information. However, 
according to an LPA activist, 
 
…you’ll never see an export licence. No company will ever release them, 
at least not to us [activists]…the supply chains that go the government does not 
check. Even if an export licence said that they are exporting to Israel, but it is not 
allowed to be used in Israel, it still doesn’t mean it is not being used [Interview: 
Zaytsev, LPA, London, June 2016).  
 
The vagueness and generality of the licence data prevents the public from following 
the commodity chain from the production line to the end-use. Botvinnik [Interview: 2016] and 
O’Donel [Interview: 2016] echo this testimony, adding that the issue lies in the regulation, 
which corresponds with the UK policy toward arms exports to Israel. This section 
demonstrated how the UK Government applied the AEC in the context of an attack on Gaza 
that breached international humanitarian law and human rights. To fully understand the 
Government’s indulgent response to the Operation Protective Edge and export licences to 
Israel, we need to consider the policy approach to arms exports to Israel and how it influences 
the application of AEC to export licences destined to Israel.  
 
4.3.3 ‘Regimes of permission’: the policy toward arms exports to Israel  
 
In terms of defence trade, the Conservative Government’s policy is oriented towards 
maximisation of exports and expanding its share of international markets (see Stohl and Grillo, 
2009). An MOD policy advisor and regulator stated that ‘if there is something we can do to 
boost British exports, in our case the defence sector, provided it is legitimate export going to 
a reputable country for reputable use, why wouldn’t we support British industry’ [Interview: 
Official B, 2016]. In the final quarter of 2014 the UK government, or ECO, authorised exports 
for military and dual-use goods worth £5 million (War on Want, 2015: 4). In 2011, the Defence 
Secretary, Liam Fox, of the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Government stated the 
Government made its policy to ‘maximise the UK’s share of global defence exports’ (DBIS, 
2011: 14). The then Minster of Defence, Mr Peter Luff, intimated that ‘in the past we were 
rather embarrassed about exporting defence products. There is no such embarrassment in this 
Government’ (ibid). This policy position raised concerns that prioritisation of arms exports 
might be detrimental to export controls.  
 
Addressing such concerns, the UK Working Group wrote that ‘prioritising the 
establishment of a more commercial culture could come at the cost of conflict prevention and 
by a reduced emphasis on responsible arms transfer controls’ (DBIS, 2011: 14).  While there 
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is a stated commitment to observing human rights and international law, the Government 
personnel are also asked to promote arms exports. Official B [Interview: 2016] admitted that 
‘if it is countries we trade with regularly regulation is not going to be too difficult.’ States that 
enjoy a strategic or close political relationship with the UK government, also enjoy close trade 
relations and companies find it easier to export to a specific destination if the two states have 
close politico-economic ties. Official A [Interview: 2016] affirms that ‘response to licence 
applications will be in line with how the current government policy views it.’ Government 
policy toward Israel, in terms of arms exports, is encapsulated in its position that all countries 
have a legitimate right to self-defence. For, the UK Government sees military operations in 
Gaza as self-defence.  
 
Policy priorities and government view on arms exports have changed little since the 
“New Labour” Government. The view of the Labour Government was that ‘all countries have 
a legitimate right to procure arms to meet their defence and security needs’ (Taylor, 2009: 9). 
This view is held also by the Conservative Government. The Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, highlighted Israel’s inherent right to self-defence from 
Hamas (DBIS, 2015b). While, over the years, numerous criticisms of the export policy to 
Israel were made, the British government remained firm in its current view. The UK control 
system is strict and there is no “clear” evidence of UK produced arms being used by IDF 
(Taylor, 2009; DBIS, 2014d, 2015b). Albeit, the FCO cautions UK businesses against exports 
to Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), due to Israel’s position as the occupier (FCO, 
2018). Moreover, Israel is listed by FCO as country of concern. Simultaneously, it considers 
Israel a close trade partner (FCO, 2018). There are clear inconsistencies in the Government’s 
policy on arms trade with Israel and the concerns raised about Israel’s respect for human 
rights.  
 
In response to concerns raised by NGOs about promotion of arms exports, DBIS 
Minister, Mark Prisk, informed the CAEC judgements are based on information available at 
the time, and he did not exclude the possibility of exports to countries of concern (DBIS, 
2011). In the case of Israel, the Government is confident in the robustness of the Consolidated 
Criteria. However, the DBIS acknowledged that circumstances can change rapidly, as they did 
during the attack on Gaza, leading to reassessment of risk (CAEC, 2015b). As the 
circumstances have changed during the Operation, the UK Government made clear that the 
12 licences reviewed on 12 August 2014 would be suspended if hostilities resumed. However, 
they were reinstated the next year. The FCO and DBIS both recognised the volatile situation 
in Gaza (CAEC, 2015b). The Government is fully aware of the track record of human rights 




into consideration, the information available to the ECO, at any time, should lead to a more 
preventive approach in assessment of defence exports to Israel.  
 
In 2011 the CAEC found that almost certainly UK produced arms were used by Israel 
in the Operation Cast Lead (DBIS, 2011). The CAEC stated, 
 
We repeat our conclusion that it is regrettable that arms exports to Israel 
were almost certainly used in Operation Cast Lead. This is in direct contravention 
to the UK Government’s policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used 
in the Occupied Territories. We further conclude that the revoking of five UK 
arms exports licences to Israel since Cast Lead is welcome, but that broader 
lessons must be learned from the post conflict review to ensure that UK arms 
exports to Israel are not used in the Occupied Territories in future (DBIS, 2011: 
51) 
 
In a response to the CEAC report, the Conservative Government stated, ‘the UK 
Government does not have a policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in the 
OPTs’ (DBIS, 2011: 51). The Foreign Office Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, clarified the UK 
policy on arms exports to Israel: ‘the use of arms in a specific area or a specific territory is not 
part of the criteria. What the criteria seek to make clear is that it is the end-use of the arms 
which is the determining factor’ (DBIS, 2011: 52). The issue is how the UK government views 
the end-use, according to criterion 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria. In the case of Israel, 
the end-use of controlled goods is judged through the lens of Israel’s right to self-defence 
(DBIS, 2015a). It appears that the judgment of licence applications to Israel are influenced 
more by this policy view of the right to self-defence than the Consolidated Criteria. In the 
House of Commons briefing paper No. 8312, Parliament recognised the incongruity in 
supporting, encouraging and facilitating military exports whilst criticising the human rights 
record of certain countries (Brooke-Holland, 2018). The CAEC questioned Government 
policy on arms exports in light of human right concerns. The Committee concluded that, 
 
whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights 
are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to 
acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms 
exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human 
rights at the same time rather than claiming…that these two policies “are 
mutually reinforcing” (Brooke-Holland, 2018: 9). 
 
As with Operation Cast Lead, the CAEC review of extant licences found that specific 
equipment has been employed in the Operation Pillar of Defence, 2012. MP Michael Fallon, 




Israel faces security threats, and we do not think that an arms embargo 
would increase our influence or lead to progress in the peace process. Where 
appropriate, we can and do refuse export licences to Israel. We have refused them 
in the past and will continue to do so if the criteria are not met. I do not want to 
go into detail about individual licences (CAEC, 2013: 221).  
 
Contrary to Mr Fallon’s assertion, licences to Israel are suspended or revoked only in 
a case of resumed or intensified hostilities (CAEC, 2013). In usual circumstances, the ECO 
overlooks IDF’s past actions and the risk of future attacks on Gaza (CAAT, 2014). The 
evidence available on the ECO database revels that between 2011 and 2015 22 licence 
applications to Israel were refused, and a total of 2,589 were issued, these include SIELs, 
OIELs, OITCLs, SITCLs (ECO, 2016). As Official A (2016) attested, ‘licences are rarely 
refused.’ 
 
In 2014 and 2015 CEAC raised similar concerns in reference to the Operation 
Protective Edge. The concerns related to the policy toward arms exports to Israel and the risk 
of controlled goods being used by the IDF in Gaza (CAEC, 2014, 2015). The CAEC (2014) 
intimated that there is a need for a policy change to assure that UK produced defence products 
are not used in the OPTs. Although, the Government temporarily suspended 12 licences at the 
time, no significant policy change has taken place. To the contrary, the Government insisted 
that the UK licensing system is par excellence (DBIS, 2015a). The ECO authorises exports to 
Israel without taking into account the past attacks on Gaza, Israel’s record of international 
law/human rights breaches, FCO’s Country of Concern recommendations, and the ‘clear risk’ 
of defence products being used by IDF in future operations. According to War on Want (2015), 
if the ECO did consider all these things then no defence exports to Israel would ever be 
authorised.  
 
The export controls should prevent arms sales: 1) where there is a clear risk of the 
equipment being used for “internal repression”; 2) where the export would “provoke or 
prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts”; and 3) where there is a 
“clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against 
another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim” (War on Want, 2015: 3). It is further 
argued that the regulators should take into account the past events and the likelihood of 
exported products being used in contravention of international law in future. War on Want 
(2015: 3) insists further that ‘if the government’s own export guidelines were properly applied, 
the result would be a de facto embargo on arms exports to Israel.’ In this part of the narrative 
we learn how the policy towards defence exports to Israel and the AEC permit the transfer of 




contravening the Consolidated Criteria due to Israel’s record of international law breaches. 
Next, we ought to consider how this ‘regime of ‘permission’ is formalised.  
 
4.3.4 The state-corporate symbiosis  
 
UK-Israel arms trade continues, despite claims of rigour and strict application of 
international law. The cause of failure on the part of export controls to curtail arms exports to 
Israel lies in the internal conflict found between the policy and international commitments 
stated in the regulation. The political (security/power) and economic exigencies outweigh 
other commitments, e.g. humanitarian law or human right commitment (Stavrianakis, 2008: 
13-19; Stohl and Grillo, 2009). Export growth in the defence industry is pertinent to UK’s 
commercial and political interests in the Middle East (Tylor, 2009; DIBS, 2014; MOD, 
2017a). On the strategic importance of defence exports, House of Commons briefing paper 
encapsulates government’s position: 
 
Responsible defence and security exports are essential for our security 
and prosperity, and underpin long-term relationships with our partners and allies 
and help deliver wider foreign policy objectives (Brook-Holland, 2018: 6). 
 
Official B [Interview: 2016] stated in an interview that ‘exports are generally refused 
if they are going to a country where arms exports are embargoed or sanctioned [UN, EU, UK 
Export Control Order sanctions] or if there is a danger of exported components being used for 
weapons of mass destruction.’ It is not about limiting defence exports to countries with a 
history of human rights issue, but rather about facilitating trade (Stavrianakis, 2008). In an 
interview with John Pilger, a senior defence industry official stated, ‘if the [UK] government 
abided by its own weapons control laws world peace could truly be at hand, but they won’t 
and never will’ (Flying the Flag, 1994). Indeed, the international defence market is very 
lucrative. Although, it is not UK’s leading industry, it does bring important economic, as well 
as political, benefits.  
 
The defence industry contributes around 1% of the total UK GDP, while the 
employment in the military industry is 0.6% of UK’s total workforce, and around 45% of these 
figures is contributed by military exports (Perlo-Freeman, 2016: 9). In macroeconomic terms 
this statistic may seem insignificant, however when it is translated into the actual national 
income and employment created it is more significant. The DGP stipulates that the British 
defence sector ‘generates annual revenues of over £22 billion, including exports worth £6.5 
billion per annum on average over the last decade, whilst directly employing 162,400 staff in 
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the UK and sustaining a further 114,200 jobs through the supply chain’ (DBIS, 2014b: 13). 
This one of the reasons why the UK Government maintains a large defence industry (MOD, 
2017b). The jobs and investment argument generates public acceptance of ‘indiscriminate 
arms selling’ (CAAT, 2010: 5). The defence industry is heavily subsidised by the UK 
government. Perlo-Freeman (2016: 15-18) estimated UK subsidies for arms exports at £104-
£142 million. The Government’s support of the military industry through subsidies is greatly 
disproportionate to its economic significance. Information available on military exports from 
the UK are negligible, thus it is difficult to establish exact estimates. Notwithstanding, the 
main economic beneficiaries of military exports are military companies, military exports are 
of political significance to the UK government.  
 
On the political front, the arms trade is used to strengthen ‘national security’, to 
reinforce alliances, and secure international position. Dorman et al (2015: 54) stress that 
military exports are used by the UK government to ‘signal a political commitment to a 
recipient state’, to ‘acquire influence and leverage over recipient states’, and to support 
strategic allies by making them militarily ‘self-reliant’ rather than engaging directly in 
conflict. Such use of military exports by the UK government emulates the ‘Nixon Doctrine’. 
It means that the UK assists the development of defence and security of its allies, but does not 
undertake direct defence (see Brzezinsky, 2007). It may be argued that the UK government 
uses exports to maintain strategic alliances. Heidenkamp et al (2011: 8) contend that military 
exports present ‘an opportunity to advance diplomatic and economic relationships with the 
recipient country…’  
 
Speaking at a Jewish Care Business Forum in October 2017, International Trade 
Secretary, Liam Fox, encouraged ‘deepening the economic links between the two countries. 
He pointed to the creation of the UK-Israel Trade Working Group, designed to identify and 
remove trade barriers between the two countries, as an important achievement’ (DIT, 2017b). 
Despite concerns over Israel’s commitment to international law, ‘the UK Government 
continues to emphasise the close ties between the UK and Israel and that it supports Israel’s 
right to defend itself’ (ibid). The position of the Conservative Government remains the same 
since the Trade and Investment for Growth plan, 2011. The plan expressed the UK’s deep-
seated commitment to build closer trade relations with Israel in all industry areas (DBIS, 
2011). The plan further advocated a partnership between British and Israeli companies to 
facilitate closer relations between the two countries. In the plan, the DBIS (2011: 33) stated, 
 
The Government will encourage a stronger partnership between British 




levels of innovation and British strengths in design, business growth and finance, 
as well as the UK’s own high technology and scientific strengths. 
 
The defence industry has a close relationship with policymakers and politicians. The 
DBIS (2014b: 19) stipulated that the ‘industry will play a key role in the Defence Security 
Organisation (DSO) through closer involvement in the defence exports prioritisation process, 
in market analyses and by providing resources overseas to better understand customer needs.’ 
For example, the DGP aims to generate ‘market intelligence’ by involving the industry in the 
policy process (DBIS, 2013). The defence Suppliers Forum and the Supplier Portal give the 
defence industry access to policymakers, whereby they can inform them of industry needs 
(MOD, 2017a). Cooperation with defence exporters has been highlighted in the Defence 
Industrial Policy (DIP) as the key to understanding the needs of suppliers as well as customers, 
and responding effectively (DBIS, 2014b; MOD, 2017a, 2017b). Such initiatives are intended 
to increase UK’s exports. 
 
Perlo-Freeman (2016: 4) postulated that ‘unlike other industries [arms industry] is 
subject to active government industrial policy.’ Hence, arms companies have a vested interest 
in engaging directly with government bodies to influence defence industrial policy and export 
control policy. Military companies have substantial presence on the MOD and UK advisory 
bodies, such as the Defence Export and Market Access Forum, the National Defence and 
Aerospace Systems Panel, the Defence Suppliers Forum and the Defence Growth Partnership 
(CAAT, 2010; Perlo-Freeman, 2016; CAAT, 2017). Additionally, arms companies operate in 
an exclusive market where the customer base is made up of governments. Stavrianakis (2008: 
8) highlighted that ‘the most important skill for a defence producer is the ability to persuade 
governments to give it money [through purchases and subsidies].’ Arms export policy is 
affected by the extent of the ‘revolving door’ between the industry and the government. 
 
CAAT (2015b) documented eight consultation meetings between representatives of 
Elbit Systems and MOD officials from 2013 to 2016. George Baber was a MOD official 
between 2002 and 2010, from December 2010 he took up a position at Elbit Systems of 
Business Development Director. On 18 September 2015, George Baber attended a meeting 
with Lord Francis Maude, Minister for Trade and Investment, Stephen Phipson, the head of 
DSO, and Simon Everest from the DSO (CAAT, 2015b). The meeting was part of the Defence 
and Security Equipment International, intended to identify industry needs. This shows the 
extent of potential influence the industry has over policy. Under the DGP and DIS the 
policymakers seek to make the policy process more accessible and removing unnecessary, 
bureaucratic restrictions. It is also an example of the ‘revolving door’ between the UK 
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government and the defence industry. By influencing the policy, the defence industry can also 
affect the regulation.  
 
4.3.5 The AEC in action: licensing defence export to Israel 
 
A major reason arms licences to Israel continue is the use of undefined terminology 
in the Consolidated Criteria, i.e. ‘risk’. War on Want (2015: 3) posited that ‘in practice the 
controls are interpreted so weakly as to allow sales to states that violate the criteria by any 
common sense definition.’ Furthermore, the policy is framed in a way that exports to allied 
countries that do not observe international law are subsumed in the rhetoric of the ‘right to 
self-defence’, ‘national security’ and ‘state sovereignty’ (Stavrianakis, 2008: 15). 
Additionally, the case-by-case approach is merely a schematic technical tool, the use of which 
depends on the government position reflected in industrial and trade policies. Stavrianakis 
(2008: 17) emphasised that ‘as the licensing system is currently configured, even if exports 
are restricted to a particular state at times of tension, it will already be in possession of 
equipment previously transferred and will be eligible for more transfers once flashpoints die 
down.’ War on Want and CAAT argued that the Controls are supposed to restrict the transfer 
of defence products to countries such as Israel. Yet, exports are encouraged, and the UK-Israel 
arms trade proliferates.  
 
Stohl and Grillo (2009: 63) contend that the UK system is ‘weighed towards 
favourable licence decisions, including advising defence companies of the likelihood of a 
licence, and permitting exports unless a persuasive reason not to is provided.’ The CAEC 
identified that in 2012, 2013 and 2014 there were over 3,000 export licences worth around 
£12 billion for military goods destined to Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) 28 
Countries of Human Rights Concern for each consecutive year (CAEC, 2013, 2014, 2015). 
Israel was one of the listed nations, with 381 export licences worth £7.9 billion from October 
2011 to September 2012, 470 export licences worth £7.9 billion from October 2012 to 
September 2013, and 470 export licences worth £7.9 billion from October 2013 to June 2014 
(CAEC, 2013: 35-6, 2014: 41-2, 2015: 42). On these grounds, CAAT (2015) questioned UK 
Government’s commitment to international law. Authorisation of arms exports to Israel 
reveals the inconsistency in regulation.  
 
An MOD official explained that the DIT makes sure that the business side of licence 
application is sound; then, the FCO assesses the application against Criteria two, three, four 




destination country [Interview: Official B, 2016]. The official continued, ‘the UK system is 
pretty robust’ and the regulators are ‘reasonably good on human rights issues…the whole 
system exists to make sure that arms do not go to [states] that violate humanitarian law’ 
(Official B, 2016). Contesting this view, an activist argued that ‘the fact arms exports to Israel 
continue after the recent attack on Gaza shows the government’s lack of commitment to 
international law’ [Interview: Botvinnik, 2016]. Even though, during a ceasefire between the 
IDF and Hamas in August 2014, the government announced a suspension of 12 licences for 
components that could have been part of military equipment used by IDF, a year later the 
government regained its confidence in IDF and withdrew the suspension.  
 
A regulator from the ECO, asserted that ‘export licences are considered against 
published criteria and we take into account all the information available at the time’ 
[Interview: Official A, 2016]. Relating to this, a CAAC representative mentioned that 
regulators do not consider, as is the case with arms exported by companies like UEL to Israel, 
information relating to past events, e.g. ‘Operation Cast Led’ or ‘Operation Pillar of Defence’ 
[Interview: Litvyak, 2016] (see also Amnesty International, 2009, 2016). Official B 
[Interview: 2016] attested that ‘just because a country has a bad record of human rights, it 
doesn’t prevent goods from being exported to them.’ From another perspective, the ECO’s 
approach to licence appraisal allows for exclusion of facts that would very likely disqualify 
military exports to countries like Israel (CAAT, 2010). The approach of evaluating solely the 
‘information available at the time’, effectively, spare export to Israel from scrutiny of the 
situation. Information is taken at face value, as the ECO seems not to probe into the past or 
future events. As long as Israel denies the use of UK produced weapons in Gaza, all future 
exports are secured. Official B [Interview: 2016] professed that regulators, ‘have to trust 
receiving countries when they say they are not using this or that technology for [human rights] 
violations.’ Official A [Interview: 2016] relayed that out of, around, 17,000 licence application 
a year about 2% are refused, usually when there is a risk in connection to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. 
 
Litvyak [Interview: 2016] argued that it is in the UK government’s interest to 
‘whitewash’ the attack on Gaza as ‘self-defence’, because of the two-way arms trade. While 
strongly condemning the events that occurred in July and August 2014, the FCO stood by the 
government’s position, which is that ‘Israel has the right to self-defence’ (FCO, 2014b). 
Baroness Warsi resigned as Foreign Office Minister on 5 August 2014 over Conservative 
government’s policy on Gaza and its arms trade with Israel (Warsi, 2014). In a subsequent 
interview for Huffington Post she stated, ‘it appals me that the British government continues 
to allow the sale of weapons to a country, Israel, that has killed almost 2,000 people, including 
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hundreds of kids, in the past four weeks alone. The arms exports to Israel must stop’ (Hasan, 
2014). The Government’s position on the Israel-Gaza conflict supports military exports to 
Israel. Commenting on this issue, Official A [Interview: 2016] declared, 
 
where there is a clear risk the export will be used to breach human rights, 
we would refuse an export licence. Every country has the right to defend itself, 
there is a right to basically buy weapons for self-defence. That should not be 
confused with human rights, they are two different issues, dealt with in different 
ways. 
 
If the product purpose is stated as self-defence an export licence is authorised, only 
when there is an embargo or when there is a clear risk of human rights violations a licence is 
withheld. Of course, in the course of ‘self-defence’ international law violations may occur. 
Notwithstanding, the point War on Want (2015) and CAAT (2015b) make is that there is a 
‘clear risk’ defence exports to Israel will be used in contravention of international law, on the 
basis of past events and Israel’s human rights record. According to what the ECO official 
stated, military exports to Israel are treated differently, as the government does not recognise 
IDF’s actions as human rights violations, but rather as self-defence. It is interesting to see the 
‘Bush Doctrine’ at play in the UK Government’s approach to arms exports. The Government 
frames wars of aggression as self-defence against terrorism. Official A [Interview: 2016] 
expressed a false dichotomy, whilst the Government uses counter-terrorism and self-defence 
arguments to justify arms exports, the counter-terrorism police is employed to stop peace 
protests (see subchapter 4.4).   
 
According to CAAT and War on Want arms exports to Israel breach the Consolidated 
Criteria (Doward, 2014; War on Want, 2015; Milmo, 2015). The UK government refuses to 
recognise that the IDF committed war crimes in the attack on Gaza (Cadman, 2015). This 
enables the regulators to approve exports of military products to Israel. As long as the UK 
government does not recognise Israel’s actions in Gaza as violations of international law the 
export licences comply with the Consolidated Criteria. Commenting on this aspect of licensing 
process Official A [Interview: 2016] stated: 
 
Who should determine that this or that is a breach of human rights or 
international humanitarian law? It is not necessarily for us. Is it for the UN to 
decide, or is it for the journalist to raise the profile of it? There are always 
arguments about no clear evidence. If there is enough residual background 
information, then we need to look at it. 
 
In brief, if the Controls were applied as strictly as the UK government claims, the 




past attacks on Gaza. The policy toward arms exports, and in particular toward Israel, as 
argued above, steers regulation in the direction prioritised by the DIP. Of course, growth of 
the defence industry through increased exports is expedient, and UK is one of Israel’s primary 
destinations for foreign direct investment, but there are other considerations. In a speech at 
Chatham House, the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, encapsulated UK-Israel diplomatic 
relations in a statement where he called Israel a ‘friend and a strategic partner of UK in the 
Middle East’ (FCO, 2011). In the speech the Foreign Secretary emphasised the Government’s 
commitment to supporting a country – Israel – that shares the UK’s practice of democracy that 
could maintain stability and security in the Arab world (ibid).  
 
Whilst, Israel continues to be listed as Country of Concern, UK-Israel arms exports 
continue. The UK-Israel arms trade is profitable to companies such as UEL and Elbit (Smith, 
2014). The process-driven approach points our attention to the illegitimate conduct, that being 
the authorisation of exports to Israel and defence exports by British manufacturers. Yet, these 
activities are not illegitimate per se, what makes them illegitimate are UK’s stated 
commitments encapsulated in the Consolidated Criteria and the AEC, and conflicting policy 
pursuits. Notwithstanding numerous criticisms of UK’s apparent lack of commitment to 





The illegitimate conduct is found in the conjuncture of practices integral to state 
function and organised capital’s existence (Tombs and Whyte, 2009; Whyte, 2014). 
Illegitimacy is not an exceptional activity or a unique situation of collusion. As this section 
demonstrates, illegitimate conduct is intrinsic to the everyday process through which export 
licences to Israel are authorised by the ECO (see Tombs, 2012). The section observed how the 
routine practices of the UK Government, structured to manage and facilitate export of defence 
companies, such as UEL, can become illegitimate. Even though the policy towards defence 
exports to Israel and the entire Defence Industrial Policy do not prohibit exports to Israel, on 
the basis of the ‘self-defence’ claim made for Israel, the AEC prohibit defence exports to 
countries with record of international law/human rights violations under Criterion 2 and 
Criterion 4 of the Consolidated Criteria.7 Where clear risk of exported products being used in 
                                                          
7 Criterion Two states, ‘Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles 
established by international human rights instruments, the Government will: 
a) not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression; 
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violations of the UK’s own international commitment and human rights exists, no licence can 
be authorised under the AEC.  
 
The ‘clear risk’ element is established by consideration of past events and the recipient 
state’s commitment to international law/human rights (CAAT, 2010; DBIS, 2014; CAEC, 
2015). Yet, the case-by-case assessment process does not consider other information than that 
relevant to the timeframe of the licence application, nor the FCO’s Countries of Concern list 
when it comes to Israel. Furthermore, the policy stresses the UK Government’s close, 
diplomatic relationship with Israel, which is considered the UK’s ‘strategic partner’ (FCO, 
2011). It, also, places a premium on expanding the UK’s share of the international defence 
market by increasing defence exports to strategic countries, e.g. Israel (MOD, 2005, 2017b; 
DBIS, 2013; DBIS, 2014b). The state-corporate illegitimacy can be observed in the dichotomy 
between the UK Government’s stated legal commitments and the reality of achieving ‘desired 
finalities’, in this case growth of defence exports to the UK’s ‘strategic partner’ (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2015; Lasslett, 2014c). By licensing exports to Israel, the Government facilitates 
companies like UEL in abetting Israel’s military intrusions in Gaza.  
 
This conduct was perceived as illegitimate because, according to some NGOs, the 
AEC and FCO recommendations prohibit the export of arms to countries such as Israel. In 
addition, the policy contradicts the AEC as well as the UK’s broader commitments upholding 
international law and human rights. The licensing processes, influenced by the policy 
framework, is a form of ‘regime of permission’ that simply manages and facilitates the private 
sector even when the permission of exports violates regulatory rules. This illegitimacy, 
observed by anti-arms trade groups and Palestine Solidarity Campaigners during the 2014 
bombing of Gaza triggered a social opprobrium of, not just the Government, but an Israeli 
owned subsidiary. This censure actualised the observed illegitimacy as deviant conduct 




                                                          
c) not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law (DBIS, 2014). 
Criterion Four states, The Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the intended 
recipient would use the items aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial 
claim. When considering these risks, the Government will take into account, inter alia: 
a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; 
c) the likelihood of the items being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of 




4.4 Censure of UK-Israel arms trade and UEL  
 
The observed illegitimacy of the Government’s regulatory-policy practices and UEL 
business activities triggered a resistance campaign that, then, inscribed deviancy labels on 
both institutions’ conduct (see Green and Ward, 2004; Lasslett et al, 2015). To capture the 
social processes that actualise the being of state-corporate crime, the chapter now examines 
how censure of the illegitimate conduct was configured, how effective it was and how the 
state-corporate institutions responded. The civil society and the tradition of social struggle, 
wherefrom the resistance actors came, is a site of counter-hegemonic ideals, values and 
practices. Indeed, such civil society configurations are one important and powerful 
counterforce to state-corporate power (Ward and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 2012). The 
values, ideals and norms upheld by the resistance actors in this case negate any state-defined 
national interests and private (corporate) interests (Whyte, 2012). When counter-hegemonic 
ideas are put into action through resistance, a latent state-corporate illegitimacy is exposed 
and acquires the quality of being criminal. 
 
As the IDF bombardments of Gaza intensified, London based peace activists 
responded by pressurising the UK Government to cease arms exports to Israel. To this end, a 
campaign, dubbed ‘UK Stop Arming Israel’, was launched by a broad coalition bringing 
together activists from War on Want, CAAT, Drone Wars UK, Palestine Solidarity Campaign 
(PSC), Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) movement and LPA. The campaigners censured 
UEL for producing engines for drones used by Israel in the Operation Protective Edge. The 
campaigners, also, censured the UK Government of complicity in war crimes committed by 
the IDF against the people of Gaza by authorising arms exports to Israel. The campaign, 
according to the organisers, was non-hierarchical, initiated through a collective consensus. 
The crime property ascribed on the UK Government and the UEL was actualised through 
material acts of resistance, 1) the rooftop occupation of UEL by LPA activists; 2) a blockade 
of UEL by ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaigners.  
 
The campaign started with several protests and demonstrations in London. It 
culminated with the rooftop occupation of UEL factory by the LPA in Shenstone on 6 August 
2014 (Smith, 2014). The action resulted in a court case, which was used by the LPA activists 
to advance the campaign aims. The resultant lawsuit was used by the campaigners to obtain 
UEL’s export licences. The company refused to give out license information. CAAT and War 
on Want continued to organise subsequent events after the ceasefire was reached between 
Israel and Hamas on 26 August. A year after the Operation Protective Edge, War on Want in 
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coalition with CAAT organised a blockade of the UEL facility on 6 July 2015, dubbed ‘Block 
the Factory’. Nineteen activists were arrested and charged with breaching a court order. The 
following section will examine data from interviews conducted with a Member of the 
Parliament, LPA activists, NGO representatives, and government officials; grey documents; 
CAAT’s database; NGO reports; and, media records.  
 
4.4.1 The ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaign 
 
The UK Government, Official A [Interview: 2016] admitted, balances ‘constant 
tension’ between expectations coming from the exporters, the public, and NGOs. Official B 
[Interview: 2016] proclaimed that ‘if you are a campaigner wanting to prevent export controls 
you’ll be beating-up the government…If you are an exporter, you will say the government is 
killing exports etc.’ According to Official B [Interview: 2016] this serves as proof as to how 
robust UK Export Controls are. From a different perspective, War on Want (2015) argues that 
this kind of attitude is at the heart of the issue. Even when faced with public scrutiny, War on 
Want (2015: 7) asserts, ‘the UK government is intent on allowing arms exports up to the limit 
of what the embarrassment of bad publicity will allow.’ Of course, the UK government wants 
to protect its public image from overt criticism. Official B [Interview: 2016] added that ‘there 
is a general desire to protect the UK’s public image…from overt criticism, of saying you 
provided X to Y to do Z.’  
 
As observed in this case study, however, moments of crisis, i.e. bombardment of Gaza, 
cause overt forms of resistance intended to censure the state and organised capital. In such 
moments, the censure of resistance communities, in effect, inscribes and actualised crime 
property on state and corporate conduct. Here, the case study captures the thesis that crime’s 
being is historically constituted. Indeed, crimes of the powerful are constituted by historic 
struggles from below, for justice or rights (Sumner, 1990). This case study is an example of 
oppositional censure which expresses and constructs crimes being. What the resistance 
community qualified as “crime” in this case came from the resistance actors’ consciously 
directed, material action.  
 
The mobilisation against UEL was influenced by a 2009 Amnesty International report, 
which revealed that certain UK based manufacturers produce components for drones that are 
used in military operations in Gaza. UEL was the focus of this report, as it manufactures 
engines for Hermes 450s. Hermes drones are considered by the IDF was the ‘backbone’ of 





[I]t began with an Amnesty International report that came out in 2009 
saying that there was strong evidence suggesting that the rotary engines fitted 
into Hermes 450s were being made at the Shenstone factory. That set the ball 
rolling and the CAAT did some more work around it to build a case [Interview: 
Pavlichenko, LPA, London, May 2016]. 
 
The Amnesty International (2009b) report accentuated the risk that rotary engines 
produced by UEL are incorporated into Hermes 450s, which were used by the IDF during the 
bombing of Gaza in 2009. It stipulated,  
 
UEL…has stated that it manufactures the engines for Hermes 450s 
produced by its parent company, Elbit Systems of Israel. Specifications displayed 
by Elbit Systems beside a Hermes 450 aircraft at a 2006 defence 
exhibition…state[d] that the Hermes 450 is powered by a ‘UEL AR-80-1010’ 
engine [also UEL AR741] manufactured by UEL (Amnesty International, 
2009b).  
 
This report prompted CAAT’s research into the export licences granted by the ECO 
to UEL. CAAT’s research, later, was important to the direct action, because it was used as 
evidence to build a legal case for the occupation of UEL. War on Want supported CAAT’s 
research and published much of the findings in its reports and organisational papers (War on 
Want, 2015). The NGO research formed the foundations on the evidence and political 
arguments advanced in the ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaign. By exposing these issues, the 
campaigners could effectively censure the UK Government and UEL. In this way, the 
groundwork for a campaign and direct action was already laid down.  
 
The Operation Protective Edge triggered a reaction from groups campaigning against 
the UK-Israel arms trade. The ongoing campaign against arms exports was the premise of the 
censure of UEL. When the UK Government rejected the claims made by CAAT and War on 
Want, London based activists took a more direct approach. Throughout the month of July 
peace activists from CAAT, BDS, PSC and LPA held numerous demonstrations, protesting 
UK’s involvement with Israel through the arms trade. According to an LPA activist and an 
CAAT representative, the ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaigners are linked through overlapping 
membership in several organisations, including CAAT, War on Want and the PSC [Interview: 
Pavlichenko, 2016; Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. Thereby, they were able to draw upon the 
support of CAAT and War on Want in the campaign.  
 
Protests, letter writing, petitions and demonstrations became more frequent as the 
fighting intensified. A prominent member of LPA mentioned a drop of a banner featuring the 
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campaign name ‘UK: Stop Arming Israel’ at the Westminster Bridge on 30 July [Interview: 
Schulman, LPA, London, June 2016] (see also Rucki, 2014). The direct action was intended 
to draw media attention. Earlier, on 18 July, estimated 15,000 people joined a march organised 
by PSC from Downing Street to the Israeli Embassy (BBC, 2014). August saw a greater 
frequency of protests. A mass protest on 9 August was organised by PSC and the BDS 
movement with support from groups such as LPA and NGOs, including CAAT (BBC, 2014). 
One LPA respondent expressed that the demonstrations and marches were intended to point 
the public’s attention to the UK’s involvement in the attack in Gaza to, ultimately, ‘stop a 
greater criminal act’ [Interview: Schulman, LPA, London, June 2016]. The protests received 
considerable media attention. 
 
The campaign adopted the slogan, ‘Stop Arming Israel’, as its official name. Two 
LPA activists expressed that they wanted this slogan to be the core message of the campaign, 
hence it featured in all the demonstrations [Interview: Botvinnik, 2016; Interview: Zaytsev, 
2016). The message it communicated was that, first, the UK Government is involved in an 
arms trade with Israel; second, the UK-Israel arms trade violates international law and 
domestic regulation; third, the campaign demands the exports to stop (Botvinnik, 2016; 
Zaytsev, 2016). Basing their evidence on CAAT’s research and Amnesty International press 
releases the group argued there was a clear risk of military equipment produced in UK being 
used in the attack on Gaza [Interview: Litvyak, 2016; Interview: Schulman, 2016].  
 
UEL’s business and UK arms exports to Israel were perceived by LPA as morally and 
legally wrong, because exported equipment was believed to be used in the attack on Gaza. 
Applying normative codes of conduct, e.g. human rights, has its benefit. Human rights 
encompass broad social values that resonate with the general public and civil society. 
Additionally, the object of censure is perceived as an opposer of these values. A War on Want 
campaigner explained they tried to make a link between human rights violations in Gaza and 
UEL’s products [Interview: Peshkova, 2016]. An LPA activist proclaimed,  
 
Making money of death is morally wrong. Not just making money of 
death, I think any corporation has to aggressively market its products in order to 
stay competitive, and so that’s the worst part of UEL and the entire arms trade. 
They will manufacture kind of scenarios for death and killing which is their 
market [Interview: O’Donel, 2016]. 
 
Interviews with the LPA activists indicate that they saw themselves as both advocates 
and watchdogs of human rights. There were other influences on the campaign. Some within 




Israel and UEL’s involvement in terms of ‘imperial oppression’ of Palestine by Israel. The 
LPA activists view human rights and international law as Western liberal constructs which do 
not truly reflect the situation in OPTs, but rather support imperialist oppression [Interview: 
Botvinnik, 2016; Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. Although, not a point of contention of the 
resistance movement, it diversified the voices within the campaign. Zaytsev [Interview: 2016] 
stressed that ‘human rights are a sentiment that everybody could agree with, but it was too 
vague and too broad. It wasn’t specific enough and it did not focus on how the UK was actually 
quite complicit in what was happening historically, but also literally.’  
 
As the death toll in Gaza surpassed one thousand, the activists felt that a more direct 
approach was required. Interviews with the LPA activists and members of NGOs reveal that 
the UK government’s indifference to the events in Gaza frustrated them. The demonstrations 
and marches had a marginal effect on the whole situation. The Government announced a 
review of 12 export licences, but no direct steps were taken to end the bombing of Gaza. The 
Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition remained steadfast in its arms export policy toward 
Israel, despite social opprobrium. The activists felt the Government ignored the message of 
their campaign. The activists felt that something direct and ‘tangible’ had to be done to make 
real impact.   
 
4.4.2 The rooftop occupation of UEL 
 
On 5 and 6 August 2014, nine LPA activists occupied the UEL facility in Shenstone, 
Birmingham. The action was undertaken after a month of protesting and demonstrating in the 
streets of London. The occupation, O’Donel [Interview: 2016] recounted, ‘was organised on 
fairly short notice in response to the attack on Gaza. But we had been thinking about it for 
some time before. Then when the attack happened, we had to quickly mobilise and do it then 
and now.’ As the death toll in Gaza grew the LPA decided to take a more radical, direct action 
to force the Government to act on arms exports to Israel. The main LPA organisers recruited 
supporters from the BDS movement and PSC to join them in their undertaking. A pertinent 
element of preparations for the action was a legal defence. Two weeks prior to the occupation 
the activists prepared a legal case in anticipation of potential arrest and charges. Schulman 
[Interview: 2016] recollected, ‘we met with a law firm, which we met before to say that we 
would do something that would result in that…We briefed ourselves legally, and we knew 
what we would be charged with.’ The LPA sought legal advice from Bindmans and Matrix 




O’Donel [Interview: 2016] proclaimed ‘we expected to be arrested for aggravated 
trespass, which if the business of the company had been lawful, we would have been guilty.’ 
Self-sacrifice was an intended element of the action. Self-sacrifice can be performed on 
various levels: safety (confronting police), liberty (arrested), health (hunger strikes) and life 
(suicide), in order to arouse public conscience to a moral cause. The activists put their safety 
and liberty at risk in order to arouse public consciousness, draw the attention to the issue and 
to force the Government to revoke its arms exports to Israel (see Franks, 2003; de Cleyre, 
2004; Nepstad, 2008). Effective resistance often entails some form of self-sacrifice 
(Friedrichs, 2012). As interviewees stated, the LPA hoped to be arrested and charged to use 
the legal case they had prepared to put the company on trial [Interview: Botvinnik, 2016; 
Interview: Pavlichenko, LPA, Skype, May 2016). The aim was to subvert the repressive 
elements of the state apparatus, in order to use them as tools for raising the public’s 
consciousness over UK complicity in war crimes abroad. Apprehension and legal charge are, 
indeed, an integral element of direct action (Franks, 2003; Nepstad, 2008). One interviewee 
stated that,  
 
direct actions often result in court cases. There is a chance, during court 
cases, to put the arguments forward that it is not us who are being criminals. We 
are trying to uphold the law, and it is the companies that are breaching the law 
[Interview: Okhlopkov, DroneWars, London, Oct 2016]. 
 
The rooftop occupation of UEL was a form of direct action. Some recognise direct 
action as a means of ‘last resort’ (Carter, 2005). One of the occupiers expressed that they ‘had 
already tried all other means: lobbying, letter writing, petitions, demos, marches etc. It didn’t 
work, and that is why we took direct action’ [Interview: Schulman, 2016]. Other occupiers 
contended that media and authorities respond to more radical and direct collective actions; a 
direct action provokes a direct response from the government [Interview: Haya, LPA, Skype, 
Feb 2016; O’Donel, 2016]. Albeit, direct action is not a mere performative act, it is intended 
to have a real and tangible impact (Nesptad, 2008; Moore and Shepard, 2013). Moreover, it is 
never enacted in isolation, it is an auxiliary means of a campaign. Okhlopkov [Interview: 
2016] proposed that ‘direct action is one of the tools in a tool box; it has to be accompanied 
by other forms of resistance.’ Such forms of industrial sabotage involve illegal measures, e.g. 
trespassing. It can lead to legal action, which can be used to further advance campaign 
objectives [Okhlopkov, 2016; O’Donel, 2016]. The occupation of UEL was not the final act 
of resistance, but a climatic point of the campaign which set a foundation for more such 





We had every reason to believe that engines from that factory were being 
exported to Israel in service of its attacks on Gaza at the time. I also think 
spectacular forms of direct action, like that, help to make clear political point and 
that’s the point about UK government’s deep complicity with Israeli apartheid 
[Interview: Botvinnik, 2016]. 
 
The occupation was not just about forcefully demonstrating a point to attract media 
and public attention. It was also about compelling the UK government to act. There is a 
longstanding history in left activist circles of raising working class consciousness by unveiling 
the state’s superficial liberal exterior (Thoreau, 2008; Gregg, 1960). This tradition is present 
in the anti-arms trade, anti-war and peace activism, which gives resistance campaigns, like 
‘Stop Arming Israel’, subversive values (Nepstad, 2008). The precedent of Raytheon 9 from 
Derry, where the Derry Anti-War Coalition and Foyle Ethical Investment Campaign ousted a 
company that was manufacturing weapons for Israel, was drawn upon one of the LPA 
activists, 
 
In Derry people [Derry Anti-War Coalition and Foyle Ethical Investment 
Campaign] throw out a weapons factory [Raytheon] because the community had 
enough, because the argument is made and once it is made enough people know 
that you shouldn’t be making drones for war and making money from it in any 
community [Interview: Haya, 2016]. 
 
During the attack on Gaza there was an urgency to act. Zaytsev [Interview: 2016] 
commented ‘it was along the lines of, this is happening right now, and we need to do 
something right now.’ Because the protests and petitions had peripheral impact, the activists 
felt they had to force the Government’s attention to the argument against the UK-Israel arms 
trade. Haya [Interview: 2016] explained, ‘what we were doing was making the connection that 
there is [in UEL factory] a huge contribution to a major crime taking place.’ A CAAT 
representative declared, 
 
People saw an opportunity to make a direct link. Often, people see things 
like that happening and think that’s very far away, it is happening to people I 
don’t know in another country and I think the idea behind the rooftop occupation 
was to pull the camera on the mechanics [Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. 
 
The linkage LPA activists were trying to make was between UEL and the use of UK 
manufactured defence products by the IDF in Gaza. One of the banners used by the LPA on 
the day of action read ‘UK govt complicit in Israel war crimes by allowing UEL to supply the 
engines for Israeli drones’ (Express and Star, 2014). As an Israeli owned company, UEL is 
subservient to Israel’s military complex. Moreover, the UK government is complicit in this 
relationship by licensing arms exports to Israel. The occupation of UEL was, in a way, a 
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tangible means of actualising the deviant label ascribed on the company as well as the UK 
government. The connection made was events in a foreign country and an immediate facility. 
The activists believed that the public does not have much influence over events abroad, and 
so they are disengaged [Interview: Haya, 2016; Interview: Litvyak, 2016). They do relate, 
however, to what is happening in their community and they can have a direct impact on it 
[Interview: Haya, 2016; Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. This is, also, why LPA was compelled to 
act on their conscience, because they could and did have a direct impact. On this note, 
Pavlichenko [Interview: 2016] stated, 
 
There was this factory on British soil that was contributing to this 
horrible atrocity of human rights in Gaza and as a citizen of this country I felt 
responsible that I had to do something more than just attend demos, sign petitions 
which didn’t seem to have much of an impact on the government. I don’t think 
there was a specific moment, it was a built-up of a feeling of despair about what 
was going on. 
 
The LPA were motivated by their Government’s inaction and the perception that a 
more radical approach would bear a direct result. The campaigners were further motivated by 
the values they upheld through Palestine solidarity, anti-war and human rights activism. Such 
values are connected to broader value systems of human rights and peace (Rothe, 2009; 
Friedrichs, 2009; Iadicola, 2009). The milieu of LPA activists, i.e. engagement with the PSC 
and BDS movement, human rights activism, anti-arms trade activism etc. is a strong influence. 
The value system held by these groups sensitises individuals to such events. The LPA activists 
drew on the long tradition established by the Nuremburg Trials [Interview: Haya, 2016; 
Interview: O’Donel, 2016; Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. Principle VII of the Nuremburg Charter 
states: ‘Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity (murder of civilians) as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law’ 
(UN, 1949: 93). Drawing on this, the LPA believed they had a moral and, indeed, legal 
obligation to act, within their capacity, to force their Government to act. They pertained to the 
Nuremburg Principle according to which individuals do not have to abide by the law when a 
State tramples on human rights.8 They felt they were justified in their attempts to prevent a 
commission of a much greater crime. 
 
                                                          
8 The activists referred to a Principle established under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
in Nuremburg, Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 which confer criminal responsibility on individuals who act on 
State orders in commission of international law violations and/or fail to stop acts that violate 
international law (Appendix 6). According to the Articles, when a State is breaking international law, 
e.g. committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, individuals have a capacity to disobey and act 
against State orders. Patterson (1972) expounded these articles are used in social movements to justify 





Such dramatic actions tend to attract considerable media attention. LPA activists 
mentioned that the Russia Today (RT), the BBC and the Guardian reported directly from the 
scene [Interview: Haya, 2016; Interview: Zaytsev, 2016; Interview: Pavlichenko, 2016). RT 
(2014) published an article entitled ‘UK protest group ‘shuts down’ factory for supplying 
Israel arms’. Haya [Interview: 2016] informed the interviewer that, 
 
RT were filming it throughout 24 hours. There were BBC as well. It 
shows the extent to which this can connect. Without protests you would not have 
the focus on the UK link to what Israel was doing…certainly we were aware that 
being up there for so long was a great thing because we didn’t expect it. 
 
LPA gave interviews from the roof, spreading the news of an issue that tends to be 
ignored by the mainstream media [Interview: Peshkova, 2016]. The police response afforded 
LPA time to broadcast their key message, namely that the UK Government facilitates the 
export of arms by companies like UEL to Israel and that these exports contribute to the attack 
on Gaza. Haya [Interview: 2016] stated,  
 
We were on the BBC, we were on some of the more international media, 
e.g. RT. All those things connect, and I think that global media is also coming 
closer now and they are affecting each other. The BBC is having to react just 
because Aljazeera is running an interesting story about this. So, they were there, 
they were interviewing quite a few of us. I mean, it’s a strange one with the BBC 
because we know how fluid they are with Palestine. They’ve been incredibly 
bullied into not covering this issue they should be…even if it was just social 
media, we would have had national coverage of this. Whereas, a vigil or anything 
else like that simply wouldn’t.  
 
A more direct approach risks a reaction from law enforcement, but it can be more 
rewarding in terms of the media coverage and impact (Schock, 2013; Moore and Sheppard, 
2013). By sacrificing their safety and liberty the LPA achieved two things. The first, they 
gained valuable media coverage which they used to arouse public consciousness about UK 
complicity in war crimes committed in Gaza. The second, they elicited the police response, 
which resulted in their arrest and charges of aggravated trespass the campaigners used in court 
to put UEL on trial. It, also, made the public and the media pay more attention to the campaign, 
particularly the link campaigners were making between UEL and the war crimes committed 
in Gaza by Israel. This has been exemplified in the increase in public vigils at UEL and 
emergence of Birmingham Palestine Action group (see section 4.4.7). The way in which 





4.4.3 The state reacts: police response 
 
The nine activists were met with a heavy-handed response from law enforcement. 
Around 30 police officers, 10 vehicles, fire trucks and ambulance vehicles arrived on the scene 
[Interview: Haya, 2016; Interview: Pavlichenko, 2016]. Reports from UEL (2015a) support 
these claims. Staffordshire Police blockaded the roads around the factory, preventing 
protesters from congregating around the site [Interview: Haya, 2016; Interview: Zaytsev, 
2016]. According to the LPA, local Palestine supporters staged a protest in support of their 
action, but due to the blockade they were prevented from approaching the main entrance. 
Throughout the occupation, police negotiators were in constant conversation with the 
protesters, warning them their action would result in charges of aggravated trespass (Express 
and Star, 2014; Smith, 2014).  
 
Initially, interviewees said that, Staffordshire Police engaged the Fire Brigade to use 
the fire truck to climb onto the roof and inspect the activists [Interview: Pavlichenko, 2016; 
Interview: Haya, 2016; Interview: Zaytsev, 2016; Interview: Schulman, 2016]. Much to their 
displeasure, the Fire Brigade left the scene after one of the activists ‘shouted at the firemen 
that they are colluding with the police to shut down the protest’ [Interview: Zaytsev, 2016]. 
According to one source, the Fire Service Union later stated that ‘it’s not our role to police 
protests, we will try to keep people safe, but once it comes to the stage of trying to limit what 
the [protesters] are doing we have nothing to do with it and that was never our intention’ 
[Interview: Schulman, 2016]. The police had no means of getting on top of the roof safely, 
and so the occupation proceeded until the next day. 
 
Haya [Interview: 2016] stated, ‘I think the officers were in a really difficult position, 
they were not exactly sure what to do…We were ready to defend ourselves on the roof…they 
didn’t have the right people that could come up safely, so they just ended up leaving us.’ The 
Staffordshire Police employed an unexpected tactic, which Zaytsev [Interview: 2016] 
described as very ‘annoying’ and ‘disruptive’. The negotiators, Zaytsev [Interview: 2016] 
continued, shouted almost incessantly through the megaphone at them and shined a floodlight 
at night, preventing the activists from sleeping. O’Donel [Interview: 2016] attested that ‘the 
police deployed a tactic that we weren’t expecting, it was incredibly annoying. They sent a 
police liaison team on a cherry picker to basically annoy us to get down.’ This was an 
interesting tactic. Police officers were impeding the protest, until they were in a position to 





The nine were arrested after 36 hours. Botvinnik [Interview: 2016] related, ‘after two 
days, specially trained police units climbed the roof and removed us physically and we were 
arrested on charges of aggravated trespass and taken to the Staffordshire police station.’ 
Around 30 officers were involved in the arrest of the activists [Interview: Pavlichenko, 2016]. 
They were later notified of the charges by court order. Schulman [Interview: 2016] recounted, 
‘once we were arrested, we spent a night in a cell, and we were interviewed, and then released. 
The charges came in a little bit later.’ Haya [Interview: 2016] described the way they were 
arrested as ‘man handling’; and further added that the police ‘were not friendly, they were 
violent.’ According to the activists, they were treated like felons. Zaytsev [Interview: 2016] 
argued that ‘this is what usually happens…protests get shut down by the police, while these 
companies are allowed to do their business…’ In a statement to The Guardian, the Chief 
Inspector, Jane Hewett of Staffordshire Police, said,  
 
Our duty is to provide fair and balanced policing – we’re here to keep 
the peace and to uphold the law, but when the law is broken we will take 
appropriate action…Since the protest began highly trained police negotiators 
have been in regular conversation with the protesters and have explained on 
numerous occasions that their actions in this protest will result in their arrest for 
aggravated trespass. We have also continuously provided the protesters with the 
opportunity to safely and peacefully hand themselves to police officers (Smith, 
2014).  
 
The Chief Inspector stated to the Birmingham Mail that their role in this incident was 
to ‘facilitate peaceful protest and minimise the impact on others, ensuring the safety of 
protestors, emergency teams and the wider community’ (Lillington, 2014). In another article, 
the Chief Inspector proclaimed they were ‘balancing between the role in facilitating the protest 
against unlawful impact to the community’ (Stuart and Richardson, 2014). From the 
Inspector’s point of view, they were there to ‘facilitate’ the protest whilst fulfilling their duty 
to protect the community from unlawful activity. On the scene, however, the police were 
obstructing the protest. 
 
Pavlichenko [Interview: 2016] commented that ‘some police officers just switch off 
about what they’re doing, and why they’re doing it and serving the state and what the state 
actually stands for…there was a mixed response from police officers.’ The activists got the 
impression that some officers were simply doing their job, whether they agreed with the 
protest or not. There were, also, those who had ‘bullying tendencies’ and tried to impose their 
‘power’ on the protesters [Interview: Pavlichenko, 2016; Interview: Botvinnik, 2016]. As a 
state apparatus, the police were there to exact the law and to detain the trespassers. One of the 




They were very nervous about the whole rooftop situation, about one of 
us falling of the roof or there being an accident. When they initially came onto 
the roof there was a lot of shouting for us not to move...Any of us who were near 
the edge, they dragged us down and away from the edge. They were very scared 
about bureaucracy of someone falling of the roof, that’s health and safety 
nightmare, and probably they care about individuals… [Interview: Pavlichenko, 
2016]. 
 
The police released activists’ names into local papers, including Birmingham Mail 
(Stuart and Richardson, 2014). The story in the local papers focused on the protesters and the 
charges of aggravated trespass (Lillington, 2014; Stuart and Richardson, 2014). A local 
representative, Mr Christopher Pincher from the Conservative Party, spoke out on the incident. 
In his opinion the protest was illegitimate because the activists trespassed on the company 
property. A politician who participate in the research asserted,  
 
…the law should be enforced. If people commit an illegal act like 
aggravated trespass, they should be prosecuted for it. People shouldn’t think that 
simply because you want to protest, which is a legitimate thing to do, you can 
then break the law, trespass and abuse other people. That is an illegitimate protest 
and I think there needs to be a very clear distinction between what’s right and 
what’s wrong. Police have a duty to enforce the law… [Interview: Politician, The 
Conservative Party, London, Feb 2016] 
 
Again, the state actors saw the action as illegitimate because the activists trespassed 
onto private property. Hence, they were treated as offenders. After being apprehended, the 
nine were charged with aggravated trespass. The subsequent prosecution was led by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS). The campaigners used the trial to advance their political argument 
against UEL, to further expose the UK’s complicity in Israel’s attack on Gaza and to obtain 
UEL’s export licences.   
 
4.4.4 UEL on trial 
 
Court cases are an integral part of direct action, and often a desired outcome (Schock, 
2013). For a direct action to be effective those performing it must be prepared to accept the 
consequences of their action. They tend to be undertaken when activists are confident that 
they can support their case. In a court, defendants have an opportunity to turn the attention 
from what they did to what a company or a state institution is doing. As mentioned above, the 
LPA anticipated to be apprehended and charged with aggravated trespass. They, then, 
subverted the legal state apparatus and used the court to put UEL on trial. The objective, the 




at the company’s business. In so doing, the activists directed the spotlight at the licensing 
system, the Government’s complicity in Israel’s military operations and UEL’s exports. One 
interviewee stated the following:  
 
Direct action like this is very useful, because it leads to aggravated 
trespass charges, and it requires the activity that you are stopping to be unlawful. 
It gives you a chance to run a defence on the grounds that the company’s business 
is unlawful. Direct action has been used time and again in various campaigns as 
a strategy to expose corporate crimes, because it allows you to change the case 
from about what you did to about what they’re doing [Interview: O’Donel, 2016]. 
 
UEL was pressurised by the magistrate, on the request of the defence, to disclose its 
licences, which the company did not want to discuss in front of a judge (UEL, 2015a). The 
Government never releases the actual licences, only some information in annual reports and 
FOI releases (CAAT, 2014; DBIS, 2014b). Therefore, the court room was an opportunity to 
gain insight into a company’s exports. The campaigners were strategically employing the 
power of the judicial apparatus against the executive apparatus. With aggravated trespass the 
company must prove that its activities, the cause of aggravated trespass, were lawful. 
Botvinnik [Interview: 2016] expounded that, 
 
[T]he causes of aggravated trespass in this case are that we were 
preventing unlawful activity. That allowed us to say in court that we dispute the 
legality of the operations taking place at the factory, because we have good 
reason to believe that this factory is helping Israel with attacks on Gaza and that’s 
clearly in violations of international law. That allowed us to bring in all sorts of 
political arguments into the court case. 
 
Questioning the legitimacy of LPA’s action, UEL (2015a: 15) testified, ‘the Defence 
case proceeded on the basis of claims the protestors were acting lawfully by preventing war 
crimes from being committed at the factory. The war crimes were alleged to be the 
manufacture and supply of UAV engines to Israel for the war against Palestine.’ A report of 
the UN investigation on the alleged war crimes committed in Gaza during summer of 2014 
with a document signed by the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon, is attached as 
proof to the claims of war crimes committed by Israel (Case File, 2015: 247-74). The company 
denied that it manufactures engines for the IDF’s Hermes 450s and any connection to the 
IDF’s air force. However, multiple sources, Amnesty International (2009), War on Want 
(2015), CAAT (2015), confirm that UEL is involved in manufacturing engines for IDF’s 
drones. Pallister (2009) reported that ‘commentators on reputable defence and aviation 
journals and Elbit’s own website suggest that the Lichfield factory produces engines for the 
Hermes.’ Indeed, the company advertised the use, performance and sales of its engines in UAS 




When the magistrate requested the company to provide the list of export licences, the 
company refused. UEL’s manager testified: 
 
During the course of the proceedings the magistrates court directed the 
company to produce a list of export licences that had been granted to Israel. The 
company however took the decision that it did not want to be used during the 
court proceedings as a political channel to further advance the cause of the 
protestors. The company declined the disclosure request for use as part of 
proceedings on the basis that it was not relevant to the prosecution case to 
disclose confidential information (UEL, 2015a: 16).  
 
Charges against the LPA were dropped by the CPS hours before a deadline to provide 
details of arms export licences granted to UEL to send its hi-tech engines to Israel for use in 
the Hermes 450 (Case File, 2015; Milmo, 2015). The company insisted that the drone models 
used by the IDF are not powered by their engines. In subsequent communications, the CPS 
told The Independent that it had been forced to discontinue the case after it was informed that 
two witnesses from the company were no longer prepared to give evidence, and that 
documentation – understood to be the arms export data – would not be forthcoming’ (Milmo, 
2015). The information would have cast brighter light on whether military products 
manufactured in the UK are being deployed by the IDF in Gaza. The magistrate, then, closed 
the case before the actual criminal proceeding, which was to be held in February 2015. The 
police declared that ‘this was a very disappointing outcome’ and one that ‘would send the 
wrong message to the protesters’ (UEL, 2015a: 15). The law enforcement, as well as the 
company, were of the opinion that such an outcome might encourage future protests.  
 
It is curious, however, why the company or the CPS did not pursue the case further. 
The defendants were convinced that they would have been convicted. According to Botvinnik 
[Interview: 2016], ‘in these kind of cases activists tend to get convicted…it was very unusual 
that the company dropped the charges.’ O’Donel [Interview: 2016] added, the fact ‘the 
company did not pursue the case, shows that they are hiding something about the export 
licences.’ Indeed, if the company had nothing to hide, they would not have had objected to 
disclosing exports licence information. An interview respondent said,  
 
The company did not pursue the case, even though they were almost 
certain to win, indicates that there was something about it that they didn’t want 
to happen, whether that was the manager being cross-examined in the stand by 
anti-arms activists, whether it was that UEL was pressured by Elbit, whether they 
just wanted to get out of the limelight, whether they didn’t want to release export 





The police continued to monitor the Stop Arming Israel campaign after the case was 
closed (UEL, 2015a). According to the LPA, the police used social media to keep track of 
campaign activities around UEL. Case files from another prosecution revealed that 
Staffordshire Police met with the company and informed the directors on a blockade planned 
by the campaign (UEL, 2015a). The next part of this section explores the continuation of the 
‘Stop Armin Israel’ campaign through a direct action, ‘Block the Factory’. In so doing, it looks 
at the tactics employed by the state apparatus to stifle the censuring efforts.   
 
4.4.5 ‘Block the Factory’ 
 
The ‘Block the Factory’ action was held on 6 July 2015 in several Elbit’s subsidiaries 
throughout the UK. Over fifty different organisations and activist groups have supported the 
action and participated in its mobilisation. War on Want was an official endorsing 
organisation, in cooperation with CAAT. Okhlopkov [Interview: 2016] explained that the 
blockade was decided upon because War on Want and CAAT wanted to focus more on the 
issue of drone components produced on UK soil for export to Israel, which breached the UK’s 
own law. Also, the previous year’s success proved that there is more potential for undertaking 
resource intensive actions in an effective way. The LPA did not participate in the blockade as 
a group because such actions are energy intensive. After the occupation the nine activists have 
stepped back from protests outside UEL due to the stress associated with the trial [Interview: 
Botvinnik, 2016; Interview: Zaytsev, 2016]. This can at times discourage activists from taking 
part in more direct actions. 
 
The blockade was better organised than the rooftop occupation with around 100 
attendees. As was the case with the action undertaken by the LPA, the blockade was intended 
to raise the public’s consciousness about the role the UEL facility plays in Israel’s military 
operations against the people of Gaza. One of the blockaded organisers, from War on Want, 
stated, 
 
…people do not necessarily make the connection between this factory 
and what is happening in Gaza. They don’t associate engines with what’s 
happening. We wanted to be able to do something that would close that gap in 
perception and make it clear that these places in our communities are 
manufacturing things that are directly used in [Gaza]. There is awareness 
building and mobilising to point out the companies’, but also UK government’s, 
complicity. Our demand is a two-way arms embargo…We put out a report 
Arming Apartheid a few days before we had ‘Block the Factory’. We can produce 
all the reports in the world, but we want the people to take notice of the issues 
and start thinking in their heads that it is a fair demand to ask the UK government 




The blockade was organised as a ‘family event’ to appeal to a broader range of 
participants and to engage the local community [Interview: Peshkova, 2016; Interview: 
Litvyak, 2016]. In this way, the action gave a less threatening impression. The message was 
that it was a peaceful, non-violent protest against a business that is dependent on war, and one 
that the UK Government supports in its policy ([Interview: Peshkova, 2016]; CAAT, 2016c; 
War on Want, 2015). The main character of anti-war and anti-arms trade protests is 
nonviolence. By making the action available to a wider audience the message spread farther, 
but more importantly that audience, once informed, has a choice whether to support, censure 
or ignore the reality. Okhlopkov [Interview: 2016] explained,  
 
Injustice is going on all the time, but we do not see it a lot of the time. 
Civil disobedience is about trying to expose that injustice. One of the things I talk 
about in my talks is that [people] like Rosa Parks were very confrontational, she 
refused to give up her bus seat and that led to the Montgomery Bus Boycott. 
People had to choose what side they were on, either to support the status quo or 
to support equality. Before, they did not have to choose. Civil disobedience is a 
bit like that. It is not very clean and straight cut…you have to argue it. Nonviolent 
direct action is a way to crystallise and expose the injustice. In the case of UEL, 
the company in this beautiful leafy suburb is supplying equipment to Israel which 
is believed to be used in Gaza. 
 
Here, Okhlopkov spoke of the fact that the injustice happening to people of Gaza is 
not directly experienced by people living in the UK. One of the protesters stated to 
Birmingham Live ‘we believe that by allowing this factory [UEL] to manufacture and sell 
parts for drones – which we know are going to Israel – the UK government is colluding in 
Israel’s war crimes against Palestinians in Gaza’ (Cartledge, 2015). The public was unaware 
that the UEL was connected to the IDF or the attack on Gaza. Performative actions materialise 
and expose the injustices that the public may be unaware about. Once public consciousness is 
aroused and people are galvanised by this consciousness to act directly, the government can 
be forced to act.  
 
On the day of the blockade, the protest was abruptly put down by the riot police. 
According to the event organisers from War on Want and CAAT, the police response was 
overwhelming [Interview: Peshkova, 2016; Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. The police tend not to 
interfere in protest, whereas on this occasion the police came in full force, dressed in riot gear 
and ready to disperse the protestors. Peshkova [Interview: 2016] alleged that prior to the 
blockade the police approached the local peace group which stages regular vigils outside the 
factory, probing them about ‘Block the Factory’, which they learnt about from social media. 




‘Block the Factory’ to aid the company in obtaining the injunction order against the activists 
[Interview: Peshkova, 2016; Interview: Okhlopkov, 2016]. Peshkova [Interview: 2016] related 
that the way in which the police were deployed ‘was as though they were protecting the 
factory. The company tried to present this as a case of unhinged crazy people who have an 
irrational hatred of the company, and they were spinning this story.’ 
 
Chief Inspector, Constable Bird, (2015) testified that when he arrived, he saw activists 
lying on the road and using lock-on tubes to lock their arms together. After a succinct 
assessment of the situation, considering people’s right to protest, the court order, and 
disruption caused to the community and business, the Chief Inspector ordered police officers 
to move the protestors away from the location (Chief Inspector, 2015). According to the 
Inspector, because some protestors were resisting orders by sitting on the ground and using 
arm lock-on devices, officers had to use force to move protesters away from the factory (Chief 
Inspector, 2015: 220). In the process, 19 protesters were arrested and charged with breaching 
Court Order. 
 
According to the activists the police response was disproportionate, considering the 
‘peaceful’, ‘nonviolent’ nature of the action [Interview: Okhlopkov, 2016; Interview: 
Peshkova, 2016]. In witness statements the company directors expressed they were seriously 
threatened by the allegations made by the protesters (UEL, 2015a). The company was in 
conversation with the Counter Terrorism Unit. The campaigners suspected that the company 
directors and the police misrepresented the situation and what the protest was about. One of 
the organisers of the blockade, asserted, 
 
UEL misrepresented, quite a lot, to the judge in order to get the 
injunction, what the nature of the protest was. That was everything from, I think 
at one point, part of the evidence that was submitted was that, two weeks before 
the demo someone had allegedly fired an air rifle at one of the windows and they 
thought it might have been protest related [Interview: Litvyak, 2016]. 
 
On 25 June 2015, UEL reported to the Staffordshire Police a broken window, 
allegedly broken by an air rifle (Staffordshire Police, 2015; UEL, 2015b). In the report, 
company director linked the incident to the upcoming protest. It was used as evidence of 
harassment when directors applied for Civil Injunction against the protestors. The company 
managers were advised by the Counter-Terrorism Unit and the CPS to take out a civil 
injunction against the LPA protesters and any other persons to limit the potential of protests 
around the factory (UEL, 2015c). This shows the severity with which democratic protests are 




The company used a back-door method for prosecuting protesters. In testimony to the 
police, a UEL manager stated that on 27 May 2015 the company met with the Counter 
Terrorism Unit and the CPS who ‘strongly advised the company to seek a Civil Injunction 
which would assist them in dealing with the foreseeable harassment, criminal damage and 
trespass that could be caused as a result of the planned activity on 6 July 2015 and any future 
similar action’ (UEL, 2015b: 224). The injunction points to the state’s managerial role, one 
where state apparatus is used to secure the stable process of capital reproduction. Next, this 
section looks at the issues surrounding the injunction in more detail.  
 
4.4.6 The civil injunction 
 
An injunction is a court order that compels an individual or a group of people from a 
specific activity. Civil injunctions are a common tactic used by state authorities to stop popular 
protest (Grose, 1993). In 2017, for example, Hong Kong authorities obtained a civil injunction 
to supress the Umbrella Movement (Smith, 2013). In a protest scenario, an injunction prohibits 
activists from approaching or holding a protest near a target. If breached, activists are charged 
with breach of a court order and may face trial for contempt of court. UEL applied for civil 
injunction against nine LPA protesters from the rooftop occupation and any other persons 
protesting outside the factory (Court Order, 2015). The company filed an application for the 
injunction order on 30 June 2015 and was displayed on the facility’s gate. The order was, also, 
served on 6 July to the LPA activists named on the order. Hence, those who were arrested 
were charged with breaching the court order. The solicitor, from Shakespeare Martineau 
Solicitors, representing the defendants found it peculiar why the company sought an injunction 
order on 30 June, given it received a notice about the demonstration in May 2015. Shakespeare 
Martineau (2015: 207) advised the judge that UEL was liaising with Staffordshire Police 
during that time, and only after a meeting with the police, where the company was advised to 
seek an injunction, did the company apply for court order.  
 
There were several technical errors made in the injunction order. 1) The court did not 
have the addresses of all the persons named, thus serving the Order was problematic; 2) the 
Order was served on the day of the action, thus nobody was aware of the injunction; 3) the 
Order named LPA activists (who were not involved) and ‘Persons Unknown who are 
conducting protesting and/or unlawful activities against the Claimant’, which was considered 




unwarranted; and 5) the injunction was obtained ex parte9 (Injunction Order, 2015: 189-98; 
Shakespeare Martineau, 2015: 208). One of the arrestees stated, ‘on the morning of 7th July 
2015 at Tamworth Police Station I was given a copy of the High Court Order obtained by UEL 
on 30 June 2015. I spent the night in the cells having been arrested on 6th July for breaching 
the Order. This was the first time that I had seen a copy of the Order’ (Cole, 2015: 312).  
 
At the injunction hearing, on 22 July 2015, a defendant, Chris Cole of Drone Wars 
UK, advised the judge (the same judge who served the court order), after the Shakespeare 
Martineau solicitor reviewed the documents, that ‘the Claimant did not give a full and frank 
disclosure regarding the history of peaceful protest’ (Shakespeare Martineau, 2015: 212). The 
only protest mentioned by the Claimant in the injunction application was the rooftop 
occupation of 5-6 August 2014. From other witness statements, it was determined that the 
Claimant, UEL, was dishonest about the nature of the protest. The defendants argued that the 
Claimant acted with intent to prevent any peaceful protest outside its factory, though the 
company representatives denied it (Injunction Hearing, 2015). The judge, however, expressed 
concern about the width of the order. Furthermore, the judge was of the opinion that the broken 
window and the rooftop occupation was not satisfactory evidence for allegations of 
harassment as the threat passed with the protest (Injunction Hearing, 2015: 176; Shakespeare 
Martineau, 2015: 215). The Claimant argued that the company did not wish to prevent 
peaceful protest, and the injunction was obtained to prevent protests that disrupt their business. 
Of course, small vigils and demonstrations do not interfere with the day-to-day business, and 
thereby are easily ignored. The point of direct action is to disrupt and draw attention.  
 
In the final hearing, on 2 September 2015, the Claimant pointed to the vocabulary 
used by one of the arrestees to infer that the protest was violent. ‘In the statement of Activist 
X at paragraph 2 he states he was “outraged” when he heard the factory even existed. The 
word “rage” is the very point at issue. When there are people outside the Company’s premises 
filled with “rage” and they are collective in their campaign of rage…’ (UEL, 2015c: 389). 
However, when the judge considered the history of peaceful protest with evidence brought 
forward by Chris Cole, he dismissed the claims of harassment. The judge, then, discharged 
the order ab initio10. One of the defendants affirmed, 
 
the judge did not just stop the injunction, he said that it should have never 
been in place because the UEL lawyers have not told the whole truth and the 
                                                          
9 An ex parte decision is made for the benefit of only one party, without requiring all the parties to the 
controversy to be present. 
10 Ab initio is a Latin term for “from the beginning”. It indicates that a contract or a court decision valid 
to begin with. 
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judge said that if he known what has happened, in terms of the whole history of 
protests, he would not have imposed the injunction. Once he said that it should 
not have been in place the CPS had second thoughts about going ahead 
[Interview: Okhlopkov, 2016]. 
 
At that point, the CPS came to a decision that there was no reason to continue with 
criminal charges against the defendants. This proved very disappointing to the campaigners 
who expected the company to be questioned on their business and export licences [Interview: 
Okhlopkov, 2016; Interview: Peshkova, 2016]. Just like in the previous case, as soon as the 
case started to turn in the favour of the campaigners the CPS and the company withdrew the 
charges. The LPA thought it was strange that the company did not want to pursue the case, 
knowing that in most cases protesters are convicted. However, as Litvyak [Interview: 2016] 
highlighted, ‘UEL has misrepresented, quite a lot, to the judge in order to get the injunction’. 
The judge was, thus, very critical of the Claimant and ruled in favour of the defendants.  
 
The injunction hearing revealed a genial relationship the company enjoyed with 
Staffordshire Police. Advising a company to obtain a civil injunction was considered by the 
defendants as an attempt by the police to protect the factory. Botvinnik [Interview: 2016] 
contended that ‘at the rooftop occupation and Block the Factory the police force and the CPS 
were mobilised to protect the factory.’ From a Marxist perspective, in order to maintain the 
natural flow of capital the state oversees business operations within its territory through, e.g. 
regulation (Miliband, 1969; Lasslett, 2014c). When this natural flow is interrupted by, for 
instance popular resistance, it is the role of state apparatus to restore that flow. As Lenin (1949: 
16) theorised, ‘the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check…’ It must 
keep them in check to preserve economic activities, e.g. manufacturing.  
 
Although, the campaigners never obtained the export licences through a court order, 
they were convinced the company was hiding something about its licences. The way UEL 
behaved, attempting to prevent peaceful protest through a court order, colluding with the 
Counter Terrorist Unit and Staffordshire Police to supress the blockade, and dropping charges 
in the previous lawsuit raised suspicion about the legitimacy of the company’s exports. In the 
end, the Stop Arming Israel campaign was successful in linking UEL to the UK-Israel arms 
trade. Additionally, by censuring a subsidiary of an Israeli company, Elbit Systems, the LPA 
sensitised the public’s consciousness about UK’s complicity in the war crimes committed in 
Operation Protective Edge. The following subsection breakdown in more detail the successes 
of the direct action, including the claim that the public’s consciousness was sensitised to the 





4.4.7. The success of ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaign 
 
The success of the ‘Stop Armin Israel’ campaign and the two direct actions is fourfold. 
First, the objectives of the rooftop occupation were achieved in a way that exposed UEL’s and 
UK’s role in arming Israel. In the court hearing the activists successfully put UEL on trial, 
whereby the company was requested by the judge to provide their export licences to prove 
that their exports were legitimate and did not contribute to war crimes committed in Gaza. The 
company, however, refused to provide this evidence, then both UEL and the State dropped the 
charges against London Palestine Action group. This brings us to the second part of the overall 
campaign success, the activists effectively won against organised capital and the State in a 
court. They turned the attention of the judge from their actions to UEL’s business operations, 
and they forced the company and the CPS to drop the charges. This shows, as Botvinnik 
[Interview: 2016] phrased it, that ‘Elbit Systems is unable to prevent us from occupying its 
factories, because it knows it is unable and unwilling to defend its actions in court. I think 
that’s a significant political victory that really highlights Elbit’s illegitimate activities in the 
UK.’ 
 
Third, the rooftop occupation and the blockade created much publicity on the issue, 
which was one of the campaign objectives. As one of the activists expressed, ‘we wanted to 
bring it out into the open’ [Interview: Zaytsev, 2016]. For the criminal label ascribed on UEL 
to hold, there had to be a much wider and sustained condemnation of its exports to Israel. This 
was achieved through publicity in the news and the formation of a local action group, 
Birmingham Palestine Action. Several large news outlets in UK and abroad (e.g. the 
Independent, the Guardian and Russia Today) reported on the censure of UEL and on its 
exports to Israel. A report by the Independent, Israel-Gaza conflict: revealed Britain’s role in 
arming Israel, highlighted UEL’s role in supplying engines for Israeli drones and UK’s 
complicity, which was something the LPA wanted the public to know and understand, in order 
to achieve the long-term objective of ending the UK-Israel arms trade.  
 
Haya [Interview: 2016] explained that through the direct action they were trying to 
draw a connection between the UEL facility and the events in Gaza, in a way that would raise 
the consciousness of the local community. The news coverage of the rooftop occupation and 
the blockade was crucial in achieving this. During the rooftop occupation, the LPA used the 
campaign’s banner, ‘UK Stop Arming Israel’, to communicate that the UK defence exports 
are contributing to Israel’s attacks on Gaza. Haya [Interview: 2016] posited, ‘…with that huge 
banner [UK Stop Armin Israel] we were basically connecting with the media…the mass public 
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started to understand and had started been building up to understanding that Israel isn’t what 
it presents itself, and what the media presented. So, it hit the spot.’ This message was reported 
in the Huffington Post, the Guardian and the Independent. The Huffington Post (201d), for 
instance, reporting on ‘Block the Factory’, wrote: 
 
Arming Apartheid: UK Complicity in Israel's Crimes Against the 
Palestinian People, a new report…published by Campaign Against Arms Trade, 
War on Want and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, shows that the UK 
government approved licences worth over £4 million worth of arms in the four 
months immediately after Operation Protective Edge came to an end. 
 
Numerous other articles were published by local papers, e.g. Birmingham Mail, 
documenting the rooftop occupation and the blockade, effectively publicising LPA’s censure 
of UEL and the UK-Israel arms trade. In an article entitled Shenstone factory 'shut down' in 
Israel drone protest, Birmingham Mail included a statement from an activist: 
 
Not only has the UK government done nothing to stop Israel massacring 
Palestinians, it actually provides Israel with enormous diplomatic, financial and 
military support. We believe that by allowing this factory to manufacture and sell 
parts for drones – which we know are going to Israel – the UK government is 
colluding in Israel’s war crimes against Palestinians in Gaza and beyond 
(Cartledge, 2015). 
 
Russia Today (RT) published a number of reports on the rooftop occupation and the 
blockade, highlighting the activists’ motives for censuring UEL and the UK-Israel arms trade. 
For example, in an article entitled ‘Complicit in Gaza’s misery’: Pro-Palestine activists shut 
down UK arms factory, RT reported on ‘Block the Factory’, outlining UEL’s connection to 
Elbit System and the occupation of Gaza. In another article, RT reported Judge Purle’s 
decision to dismiss the injunction obtained by UEL in June 2015:  
 
I think it inconceivable you would have got the same injunction, possibly 
even any injunction, if you [UEL] had disclosed relevant information to 
me…Accordingly the injunction I granted on 30 June is dismissed ab initio (RT, 
2015). 
 
Such reports show that the censure of UEL was effective in affixing the deviancy label 
on the company and the UK Government. This publicity and dissemination of information 
about UEL into the public domain rose in public’s consciousness, galvanising the formation 
of a local action group, Birmingham Palestine Action (BPA), which brings us onto the fourth 
part of the campaign’s success. The success of ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaigner’s censuring 
efforts is evident in the fact that the campaign prompted the local community from 




regular protest. As stressed by de Clayre (2004), direct action is the initiator of change; change 
is a result of prolonged, sustained struggle.  
 
The BPA, for example, occupied UEL in 2017. The activists were charged and 
potentially faced imprisonment, as in previous direct actions, however the company dropped 
the charges when the judge requested that the company provides licences as evidence 
(Mandhai, 2017; Gayle, 2017). The group holds frequent vigils at the sights and protests in 
the Shenstone area as well as Birmingham. O’Donel [Interview: 2016] contended that ‘in any 
direct action-based campaign you don’t know exactly your impact until you win…It is like 
kicking a wall…You have no idea [whether] it is crumbling on the other side until it all 
crumbles in one go.’ The point O’Donel is making here, is that struggle is a long process and 
its effects cannot be always quantified with each action, but each action contributes to the 




In this case, censure was performed through direct action employed strategically as 
part of a larger campaign. It is through palpable, practical activities of ‘Stop Arming Israel’ 
campaigners – sabotage, direct action and court hearings – that the UK Government’s 
regulatory/policy practices and UEL business activities acquired the quality of being criminal 
(see Schock, 203; Moore and Shepard, 2013; Roberts, 2011; Gregg, 1960; Franks, 2003; 
Nepstad, 2008, 2013). The rooftop occupation and the blockade mediated the social exchange 
between resistance actors and targeted institutions, an exchange that imbued the observed 
state-corporate conduct with concrete meaning. The resistance actors and the state actors 
expressed a divergent attitude towards the matter of defence exports to Israel. The values and 
ideas that motivated the campaigners to resist appeared to be fundamentally opposed to those 
on which UK-Israel and UEL’s business are based. This can be, partly, explained by the 
actors’ form of consciousness, constitutive of their ‘mode of life’, and in the case of resistance 
actors, the tradition of resistance whence they came (Lasslett et al, 2015). It is argued that 
social struggle and the ‘mode of life’ associated with resistance produces a very different form 
of consciousness than the ‘mode of life’ of state-corporate actors. 
 
Human beings act with a certain level of agency, they are conscious, productive social 
actors (Bukharin, 1925; Lukács, 1971; Gramsci, 1992). Marx theorised that consciousness is 
the force that directs social action, allowing social actors to perceive phenomena in a certain 
way and engage it accordingly (Marx, 1976, 1982, 2010b; Marx and Engels, 2010). Human 
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beings are both the objects and subject of historical process, they are moulded by the 
conditions they find themselves in and equally shape it using material and intellectual means 
inherited from previous generations (Lukács, 1971). Social phenomena are created and 
imbued with meaning by people who interact and enter into definite relations with each other 
and with their environment. The broadest system of mutual interactions, Bukharin (1925: 33) 
wrote, is society which ‘consists of persons who think, cogitate, pursue purposes, act.’ Society 
is an aggregate of subjects composing it as interacting elements, but the very existence of 
subjects suggests that these interacting elements, ‘acting in the most various directions, do not 
constitute a mere insane whirl, but move, as it were, through certain channels, according to 
internal law…’ (Bukharin, 1925: 88). The actions and practices of resistance actors, as well 
as state-corporate actors, are consciously directed.  
 
This consciousness corresponds to a certain ‘superstructure’, it is shaped by the ‘mode 
of life’ experienced by the subject (Gramsci, 1992). The way resistance actors think, cogitate, 
pursue purposes, act corresponds to a specific tradition and a field of struggle that forms part 
of their lives. It is argued that these traditions and fields of struggle foster counter-hegemonic 
values, ideas and practices. In this case, the ‘Stop Armin Israel’ campaigners came from the 
traditions of working-class/trade union movement, specific to the British history of capitalism. 
The strategies and tactics of political agitation, protest and direct action have roots in the trade 
working-class struggles against capitalist exploitation, British imperialism and for socio-
economic equity.  
 
The way in which the activists perceived and thought about observed state-corporate 
activities was informed by the field of struggle they were in. These fields of struggle, i.e. anti-
arms trade and Palestine solidarity movements, sensitised the campaigners to the 
Government’s and UEL’s illegitimate practices, compelling them to act upon by engaging in 
a practical, creative social activity, namely the rooftop occupation and ‘Block the Factory’. 
Furthermore, whereas resistance actors experience a mode of life that sensitises them to 
illegitimate state-corporate conduct, the mode of life experienced by state-corporate actors 
engenders protection of capital production (see Lasslett et al, 2015). The concern by state-
officials was mediated by their role in managing international trade and exports through 
regulatory assessments and policymaking. For the UEL actors it is mediated by the 






4.5 Conclusion: the UK Government-UEL symbiosis and direct 
action 
 
The case examined the conjuncture between illegitimacy and deviancy of state-
corporate conduct. Accordingly, for state-corporate conduct to become criminal it must, 
firstly, be objectively illegitimate and, secondly, it must be inscribed with the quality of being 
criminal (Green and Ward, 2004, 2012; Ward and Green, 2000; Lasslett, 2010a; Lasslett et al, 
2015). This thesis looked at the process of censure, through which illegitimacy of UK 
Government’s conduct and UEL’s business was actualised through direct action. The 
illegitimacy of the UK Government’s and UEL’s practices were found in the negation of the 
Government’s stated commitments and regulation by the policy priorities and an expectation 
to enable defence industry exports. There is a conflict between the ideological expectations 
from the neoliberal state and the actual pressures to manage, facilitate and oftentimes prioritise 
economic exigencies, i.e. production, investment, trade etc. (Whyte, 2014; Tombs and Whyte, 
2015). Censure was mobilised through the ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaign, and strategized 
through dramatic, practical sabotage – the rooftop occupation and ‘Block the Factory’ – that 
allowed the resisters to subvert state’s legal apparatus to expose UEL’s illegitimate activities.   
 
Accordingly, with the process-driven approach, state-corporate crime as a 
phenomenon with its own process of becoming has both objective (illegitimacy) and 
subjective (censure) moments (Green and Ward, 2004). The case study examined, firstly, the 
illegitimate features of the Government’s and UEL’s practices, i.e. licensing of exports, 
Defence Industrial Policy, production and export of UEL’s engines. Simultaneously, the 
chapter considered the interaction between these processes in production of claimed 
illegitimacy, namely supply of defence products to Israel in breach of the Consolidated 
Criteria, the FCO recommendations, international commitments and human rights. The 
chapter, then, examined the resistance campaign and the use of sabotage to expose, sanction 
and stigmatise the observed illegitimate conduct. This case demonstrates that illegitimacy is a 
hidden potential in routine practices, and when these practices are seen to produce or 
contribute to an overt social harm it can trigger social opprobrium. In this case study, the 
defence exports of companies such as UEL licences by the UK Government supplied Israel 
with weapons used in the Operation Protective Edge. Yet, these routine practices do not 
become recognised as deviant until they are exposed, prohibited and stigmatised by civil 
society configurations or another institution. When both these processes are present, we can 




There is a long tradition of social struggle which from current resistance communities 
can draw ideas, praxis, strategies of action etc. (Sharp, 1974; Thoreau, 2008; Moore and 
Shepard, 2013; Schock, 2013). Today’s resistance movements have emerged from past 
struggles and inherited from them the material as well as intellectual means of affecting 
change, obtaining justice, or emancipation (de Cleyre, 2004; Marx, 2010a). Likewise, the 
‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaigners inherited the material and intellectual means of resistance 
from a long history of anti-arms trade, peace and Palestine solidarity movements in the UK. 
Sabotage in the form of blockades and factory occupations are a common tactic employed by 
the Ploughshares and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign.  
 
The rooftop occupation and the blockade were intentionally dramatic, and that quality 
impressed the campaign’s argument that production of drone engines and licensing their 
export to Israel contributed to war crimes abroad. Additionally, the use of direct action at 
strategic moments, during the zenith of the Operation Protective Edge and on its anniversary 
the following year, prolonged the campaign and effectively exposed state-corporate 
illegitimacy, connecting the UEL and UK exports to an attack on Gaza. The direct actions 
prompted the state to use its legal apparatus in response. The charges of aggravated trespass 
in the first action and breaching of a court order in the second permitted the activists to subvert 
the state’s legal mechanisms to put UEL on trial by the backdoor, knowing that it would never 
happen through the usual route. 
 
In this way, the Stop Arming Israel campaigners put the company and the state on the 
defensive front. As was documented, the company directors and the CPS withdrew from the 
litigation. The campaigners were convinced the company withdrew to avoid the spotlight and 
because they were hiding the truth about their export licences. What the activists do know for 
certain is that the company does indeed produce engines for Hermes drones, it is difficult to 
prove, however, whether the drones which contain UEL engines have been used in Israeli 
attacks on Gaza. The reports produced by governments are very vague and do not reveal any 
specifics about export licences, and data compiled by CAAT is limited to whatever the 
government is willing to release. Having said this, the available information suggests that the 
campaign needs to be taken seriously and the licencing system ought to be reviewed. The case 
demonstrates that the actualisation of criminal quality latent in the official procedures of state-
corporate activities is a challenging task, one that requires a direct action. It has been observed 
that the UK Government abandoned its neutral role and mobilised to prioritise capital 





Another interesting observation made was the display of self-sacrifice by the LPA, 
CAAT and War on Want activists. The campaigners put their safety and liberty at risk in order 
to condemn state-corporate conduct. Self-sacrifice is a powerful quality of direct action. 
Lasslett et al (2015: 530) asserted, ‘through acts of self-sacrifice activists inscribed both worth 
and meaning on the victims of the censured practices, and at the same time ascribed 
wrongfulness to the state–corporate perpetrators.’ Practical, direct forms of resistance can be 
a very effective means of inscribing deviancy labels on state-corporate conduct. In this case, 
the rooftop occupation and the blockade were successful at exposing and stigmatising the UK-
Israel arms trade and UEL’s drone engines. Although, the export of defence goods to Israel 
continues, the campaigners drew the public’s attention to the illegitimacy in the UK-Israel 
arms trade and created a sustained campaign with a potential to pressure the Government into 































This study examines the processes of illegitimacy and deviancy, through which 
systemic, enduring state-corporate practices become defined as criminal (Ward and Green, 
2000; Green and Ward, 2004, 2012; Lasslett, 2010a; Lasslett et al, 2015). The research looks 
at state-corporate conduct that was exposed and censured as deviant through some form of 
direct action by civil society configurations. The empirical study analysed the properties of 
state-corporate activities that triggered social opprobrium, how censure was mobilised and 
strategized, how censure affected the targeted state-corporate activities, and how did they 
respond. The preceding case examined the illegitimacy in the arms export by the UK based 
producers to Israel. The case gained insight into how routine state practices enable the 
production of social harm by managing and facilitating economic transactions of organised 
capital; the mediating forces of state-corporate symbiosis; traditions of resistance specific to 
UK’s trajectory of capitalism influenced the censure of the Government and UAV Engines 
Ltd (UEL); and, what are the qualities of an effective direct action. 
 
This case examines the censure of a biotechnology11 (biotech) company Mahyco-
Monsanto Biotech Ltd (MMB) and the Government of India by a biotech opposition. The case 
study looked at the processes of state-corporate crime in a context where capitalist 
development followed a different trajectory and produced divergent traditions of resistance, 
and a different field of struggle. Unlike Case 1, this case revolves around an ineffective 
deployment of direct action against conduct that lacked clear illegitimacy. The social harm 
around which resistance was mobilised was produced by different processes than it was 
claimed. While the deviant property was ascribed on state-corporate activities, the illegitimate 
property was absent. This case demonstrates that social harm is not always produced by 
illegitimate state-corporate activities, but rather can be a consequence of broader issues, e.g. 
economic development.  
 
                                                          
11 Biotechnology is the ‘technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use’ (United Nations 




The case revolves around an opposition to transgenic cotton, commercially known as 
Bollgard, with insecticidal properties. It was introduced to India in 2002, against the 
background of neoliberal reforms (1990-2002). The transgenic plant was developed by a joint 
venture between the conglomerate Monsanto and an Indian seed company Mahyco. An 
amorphous movement founded on national-populist, Gandhian sentiments opposed the 
development on the grounds that it would lead to corporate control of agriculture and the 
dispossession of smallholders (Shiva et al, 1999; Shiva, 2001; Nanjundaswamy, 2001; Shiva 
and Jalees, 2006). The movement censured MMB as criminal, linking farmer suicides to Bt 
cotton. The censure was performed through campaigns dubbed ‘Operation Cremate 
Monsanto’ and ‘Monsanto, Quit India’. It then censured the Government for authorising the 
commercial release of Bt cotton. The resistance was led by Karnataka State Farmers’ 
Association and an ecological NGO, Navdanya. However, the censure by the Association and 
Navdanya was unsuccessful. Then, a new organisation emerged from the struggle, namely the 
Coalition for GM-Free India. The Coalition employed a different narrative and resistance 
strategy.  
 
Isolated from the mainstream-populist thrust, NGOs such as the Gene Campaign 
opposed biotechnology without linking Bt cotton to indebtedness or suicides. Indebtedness 
and suicides are, de facto, a development issue (Herring, 2006, 2009). The chapter begins by 
outlining the background context in Section 5.2. India has been experiencing an agrarian crisis 
for several decades due to politico-economic instability following Independence, famine and 
productivity issues in the period 1950-80, outdated means of agricultural production, and the 
rolling back of government support because of liberal reforms in the 1990s. Section 5.3 
explores the state-corporate illegitimacy. It considers how the policy and regulatory ‘regimes’ 
mediated the Government-MMB symbiosis and enabled the Bt cotton release.  
 
Section 5.4 analyses how the opposition to biotechnology mobilised and strategized 
resistance to transgenic cotton. It details the sequences of events, examining the rise and the 
subsequent failure of the resistance. The section considers the flowing and ebbing of 
resistance, the shift in tone and supersession of leading organisations. The empirical content 
consists of interviews with activists, NGO and organisational leaders, commentators and 
scientists; policy papers and legislation; organisational documents; archives; video footage; 
secondary interviews; public lectures, and; government reports. The data is corroborated with 





5.2 Setting the context 
 
The phenomenon studied has a real-life context, to capture the processes that produced 
the researched events one must understand how these processes came about. Case studies 
produce context-bound knowledge, it is important to set the case in its historical specificity to 
preserve the real-life sense of events (Stake, 1978; Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Furthermore, 
in a narrative presentation of findings events cannot be separated from their historical 
specificity (Elliot, 2005). The case study approach requires that the case is set against a 
historical background. This study does so by including the roots of the relevant branch of 
capitalist production; the specific features of state practices that are considered as mediating 
forces of symbiosis with organised capital and ‘regimes of permission’; and, the field of 
struggle the biotech opposition emerged from. To this end, the section considers agricultural 
development in India, looking at the pivotal moments, namely the colonial legacy, the ‘Green 
Revolution’, the liberal reforms and the Gene Revolution. Next, the section gives background 
information on the biotechnology industry and Monsanto. Lastly, it looks at the historical 
trajectory of the field of struggle that Navdanya and KRRS came from.  
 
5.2.1 Indian agriculture, cotton cultivation and colonial history 
 
Colonisation of the Indian Subcontinent left a lasting legacy on its economy, 
especially agriculture. The colonial rule, Siddiqui (2015) holds, inhibited independent 
development of industry, whilst maintaining agrarian social formations and pre-capitalist 
modes of exploitation, from tributary tax collection to the most abusive forms of tenancy and 
bonded labour. Colonisation of Indian subcontinent began with the East India Company 
(1757-1858), chartered by Queen Elizabeth I, before the British Crown assumed direct rule in 
1858 until 1947. Colonisation integrated India into the capitalist world system, but imposed 
an international division of labour, with unequal terms of trade (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 
1979). India supplied mills in Manchester and Liverpool with cheap indigo and cotton lint, 
and in turn imported high consumption goods, such as textiles.  
 
Prior to colonialism, the subcontinent was under a tributary mode of production, 
whereby peasantry – the primary productive force – was subjected to taxation by the state 
through a system called Manasabdari or Zamindari established by the Mughal Empire (1555-
1857) (Banaji, 2010). The Zamindari was a system in which landowners, known as 
Zamindars, levied taxes on behest of Mughal rulers from their respective tributary 




tributary jurisdictions of Zamindars were converted into estates with masses of raiyats 
(peasant tenants or cultivators) ‘living from hand to mouth’ (Banaji, 2010: 39). Indian peasants 
were simple-commodity producers, under internalised logic of subsistence production 
(Randhawa, 1983; Kumar and Desai, 1989; Banaji, 2010). The British Empire imposed 
cultivation of cotton for its own trade, often at the expense of subsistence farming that left 
peasants without a means of existence. Subsistence production is characterised by small-scale, 
parcellised land property or tenure and employment of the household in the production 
process.  
 
The entire Indian economy was fashioned to meet the textile production of industrial 
England. India was ‘deindustrialised’ and transmogrified into a cotton-growing nation, a 
subservient producer of raw material for British manufacturing (So, 1990). Accumulation by 
dispossession was projected on India as colonialism drew more labour, lands and resources 
into the capitalist circuit of accumulation concentrated in Western Europe (Harvey, 2003; 
Weis, 2007). By means of colonialism India was integrated into the ‘world economic system’, 
where cheap raw materials are transmitted from ‘the periphery’ to ‘the core’, and transfer of 
high profit consumption goods and technology was inverted (Wallerstein, 1979). Capitalist 
development in India has, thus, been articulated, unevenly, through historical trajectory linked 
to colonialism, and merged with India’s socio-political and cultural formations. Capitalism, in 
different regions of the planet, has taken an ‘uneven and combined development’. As Trotsky 
(2011: 28) theorised,  
 
Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself 
most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the 
whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. 
From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the 
lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development – by which 
we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining 
of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms. 
 
Two centuries of colonial rule left India in a state of ‘underdevelopment’. Primary 
industries, mainly agriculture, became the main source of national gross income. The colonial 
rule inhibited India’s own development trajectory and forced the preservation of agrarian 
relations. After independence, as a former colony, India was given an inconceivable task of 
‘catching up’ with industrialised nations (see Frank, 1966). As an agrarian nation, agriculture 
was, and still is, the dominant economic sector. The restructuring of the agricultural sector in 
the first four decades after independence proved crucial to India’s economic development. The 
agricultural reforms and development programmes in the post-independence decades have 
shaped Indian agriculture and heralded the social issues that ensued in the 1990s. 
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5.2.2 Agriculture after Independence and the Green Revolution 
 
The prolongation of pre-capitalist relations caused stagnation and backwardness of 
agriculture, weak industrial base etc. (Thorner and Thorner, 1962; Patnaaik, 1984). After 
independence in 1947, productivity in agriculture plummeted against the rapid population 
growth; land ownership remained in the hands of the Zamindars; heavy taxes caused 
indebtedness and landlessness (Thorner and Thorner, 1962). India’s harsh climate combined 
with traditional farming practices (rainfed cultivation, natural fertilisers, wooden ploughs etc.) 
made it difficult to meet the needs of a growing population. Additionally, between the 1940s 
and 1970s India experienced frequent famines and droughts. More than 70% of India’s 
population lived in rural areas, and around 70% were employed in agriculture (Chand, 2005). 
Subsistence farming still dominated – except in cash crops e.g. cotton and tobacco – thus less 
agricultural produce was sold on the market. Yet, agriculture was the dominant sector, with a 
55% share in the GDP (Chand, 2005). Thereupon, the agricultural sector became the basis for 
the overall economic growth.  
 
To achieve this, the Jawaharlal Nehru’s Indian National Congress government (1947-
64) initiated successive Five-Year Planning Strategies for the formulation and execution of 
reforms, policies and development programmes (currently 14th Five Year Plan). The first 
major reform was the Zamindari Abolition Act (1950) to give land rights to the tillers and 
stimulate an improvement in the quality of the landholding (Arora, 2013). Nehru’s 
government prioritised rural development through tenancy reforms and ceilings on maximum 
landholding, which secured tenure and regulated rents (Chand, 2005). To minimise 
exploitation of smallholders by traders and moneylenders a cooperative credit system was 
expanded between the 1950s and late 1990s. India maintained a highly protectionist economy 
in those decades. Agriculture was protected from foreign influences and extensively supported 
by central government to stimulate internal development.  
 
Notwithstanding, the output of food grains was so low it led to rampant malnutrition 
and starvation. Shortfalls in production from 1957 to 1971 made India heavily dependent on 
food imports from the US, under the US government’s PL 480 (Colding and Pinstrup-
Andersen, 2000; Sahai, 2004). Chand (2005: 2) posited that ‘as this was considered a threat to 
national integrity, the government decided to follow a policy of self-sufficiency in food.’ To 
achieve this objective the government took the decision to adopt a development programme, 




intensification of agriculture through higher yielding varieties (HYV), chemical inputs 
(fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides), monocultures and machinery.  
 
The HYVs were funded by both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation 
(Shiva, 1991). The technology was disseminated by scientists through a system of 
International Agricultural Resource Centres, a quasi-public domain (part of Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research, based at World Bank) (Weis, 2007). The World 
Bank and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the credit 
for countries that accepted the intensive agricultural model and the technology package 
transferred by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations (Shiva, 1991; Engdahl, 2007). Starting 
from 1975, the World Bank funded National Seed Projects, to provide infrastructural facilities 
for seed production and distribution (Shiva and Jalees, 2006). This meant that HYVs were a 
public technology, hence free of any proprietary or exclusionary clause.  
 
Between 1960-1980 the central government, under Indian National Congress (1964-
77; 1980-89), and Janata Party (1977-80), established several state institutions to enhance 
credit flows, expand services, and subsidise inputs to ultimately stimulate investment in 
agriculture: Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, the Food Corporation of India, the 
Central Warehousing Corporation, State Agricultural Universities, the Seed Corporation of 
India, State Seed Corporations, Indian Cotton Corporation, the National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (Arora, 2013). Simultaneously, the central government put 
restrictions on private seed firms, kerbing imports and exports of seeds (Pray and Ramaswami, 
2001). Other policies included minimum support prices, procurement and distribution of food 
grains and trade protection measures (Shiva and Jalees, 2006; Arora, 2013). Results were 
quantum jumps in grain productivity, self-sufficiency, improved farming income, and increase 
demand for industrial goods (Chand, 2005; Arora, 2013). The success of the Green 
Revolution, however, had some adverse consequences.  
 
The Green Revolution prompted the industrialisation of agriculture through 
monocultures, chemical inputs, capital intensive cash crops, and relocation of input production 
from the farm to the factory (Harris, 1987). By the late-1980s the productivity gains of the 
HYVs began to slow down and deplete natural resources and international competition 
depreciated the price of the agricultural produce (Chand, 2005). Subsidies offered through the 
institutional credit system burdened fiscal resources, causing a decrease in public investment 
from 1981 (Chand, 2005). The HYVs and the credit system favoured well-endowed farmers 
who had sufficient capital and irrigated regions, thereby creating regional disparities 
(Siddiqui, 2015). Although, productivity increased the distribution of food remained as before, 
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the costs were bore by the farmers whose returns decreased, apart from large landowners who 
turned to industrial farming (Weis, 2007). By the 1990s the population growth once again 
surpassed production. Shiva (1991) argues that the food-sufficiency objective projected to 
match the aggregate demand with supply of domestically produced grains at consistent market 
prices, and not securing food for every household. The Revolution had one significant impact, 
it set the foundations for the liberalisation of agriculture.  
 
5.2.3 Liberal reforms and the WTO 
 
India began to liberalise its trade and markets as early as 1986, at the pressure from 
the World Bank and the IMF to adopt a structural adjustment policy (Pray and Ramaswami, 
2001; Arora, 2013). Agriculture’s contribution to the GDP began to decline considerably after 
the Green Revolution, despite half the nation’s labour force working in agriculture (Pray and 
Ramaswami, 2001). The exhaustion of the Green Revolution led to a shift in cropping pattern 
from food-grains to export crops (Siddiqui, 2015). Input subsidies and formal credit declined, 
and trade liberalisation drove the prices down (Patnaik, 2003). The new international trade 
regime, GATT (1994), under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) brought the controversial 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). By signing up to the WTO India entered the neoliberal 
phase of capitalism. 
 
Before the 1990s, agricultural policies focused on land reforms, expansion of 
cultivated land, self-sufficiency, rural development, subsidies and agricultural credit, trade 
was regulated through quota restrictions and high tariffs (Patnaik, 2003; Tripathi and Prasad, 
2009; Arora, 2013). After the Green Revolution, the policies shifted to private investment, 
diversification into cash crops, export oriented production, and increasing India’s 
competitiveness in international markets (Tripathi and Prasad, 2009). The National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, for instance, invested 40% less between 1990 and 1999, 
than in the Green Revolution era (Shiva and Jalees, 2006: 67). To meet the World Bank and 
the IMF recommendations, the GI reduced agricultural subsidies from 14.5% in 1985-90 to 
6% in 1995-2001 (Siddiqui, 2015: 5). The policies favouring private financial institutions 
caused a ‘decline in the extension of the institutional credit to cultivators per capita’ (Shiva 
and Jalees, 2006: 58). Commercial banks were unwilling to lend to smallholders due to a lack 
of credible collateral security, as there was a high default rate on interest repayments by 





The seed market became one of the most salient markets within Indian agriculture. 
India’s rich biological diversity makes its seed market very desirable to foreign companies. 
90% of our planet’s biological wealth is concentrated on 10% at land around the equator 
occupied by developing nations which are also among the poorest (UN, 1999: 70; 
Venkataraman and Latha, 2008: 326). In 1986, the list of core industries of the Industrial 
Policy Act (1969) was extended to agriculture, which allowed companies with more than 40% 
a foreign equity to enter Indian seed markets (Pray and Ramaswami, 2001). The New Policy 
for Seed Development (1988) opened the Indian seed market to private capital. These reforms 
increased the commercial viability of private research on hybrids cash crops – cotton being a 
significant one. This encouraged companies such as Cargill and Monsanto to invest in India. 
The AoA demanded promotion of export crops, hence the agricultural policy was revamped 
toward export-oriented growth (Arora, 2013). Millions of hectares, between 1995 and 2002, 
were transferred to the cultivation of cotton, sugar cane, tobacco etc. (Government of India, 
2013). Hybrids became the new trend, at the expense of straight line and indigenous varieties, 
traditionally maintained by and exchanged between farmers.  
 
Liberal reforms have strengthened domestic demand, increased exports, raised private 
investment, and raised the GDP (Tripathi and Prasad, 2009). Having said this, the decline in 
subsidies and institutional credit pushed farmers toward more usurious sources of loans, 
leading to indebtedness; opening of agriculture to international markets diminished domestic 
prices; private investment increased at the expense of public investment; cropping patterns 
changed from food-grains to cash crops; self-sufficiency was abandoned in favour of export-
oriented growth; and privately-owned hybrids replaced farmer saved varieties. Siddiqui (2015: 
18) found that ‘indebtedness among the small cultivators rose from 20% in 1991 to 35% in 
2002.’ The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO, 2013: 32) reported that 52% of agricultural 
households were estimated to be indebted, and the average outstanding loan per agricultural 
loan was, approximately, Re. 47,000. Between 1997 and 2012 around 300, 000 indebted 
farmers committed suicides (Vaidyanathan, 2006; Government of India, 2010; Mishra, 2014).  
 
Today, 67% of landholdings average 0.38 ha12 and another 17.9% average 1.42 ha 
(Arora, 2013). According to the 2011 census there were 118.9 million farmers, constituting 
24.6% of the total workforce of 481 million, and 144.3 million are employed as agricultural 
labourers (Salve, 2014). Currently, the agricultural sector contributes 17% of the GDP, a 
significant drop from 60% in 1951, while it provides employment to 57% of India’s work 
force, compared to 70% in 1950 (Chand, 2005; Siddiqui, 2015; Department of Agriculture, 




2017). The astounding growth of indebtedness and suicides – arround 300,000 since 1999 
(Thomas and Tevernier, 2017: 2) – correlates with economic liberalisation. Because of this 
correlation New Social Movements blamed the agrarian crisis on international institutions and 
foreign corporations, e.g. Monsanto. An anti-globalisation movement, founded on Hindu-
nationalist ideology, mainly Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS [Karnataka State Farmers 
Association]) and Navdanya, perceived foreign corporations through a neo-colonial lens as a 
threat to India’s independence. These organisations placed liability on corporations, such as 
Monsanto, for causing farmer suicides.  
 
5.2.4 The resistance movement 
 
The opposition to transgenic cotton and censure of Monsanto is associated with three 
organisations: KRRS, Navdanya and Coalition for GM-Free India (CGMFI). The Gene 
Campaign is another prominent organisation, though it is critical of the movement. Respective 
organisations have their own unique history, but they are part of the larger movement that 
sprouted in the era of neoliberal restructuring (Assadi, 2002). Present-day farmers movements 
have evolved from: past struggles for land reforms following independence (1948-1970s); 
issues concerning state interventions and subsidies in the wake of the Green Revolution, and 
debt (1970s-1990); opposition to globalisation symbolised by the WTO and transnational 
corporations (1990-2000s) (Lipton, 1977; Lindberg, 1997; Pai, 2010). The KRRS was formed 
in August 1980 by Sundarash Rudrappa, Baba Gowda Patil (first president) and M. D. 
Nanjundaswam among several others as ‘a direct-action programme’ [Interview: Dolohov, 
KRRS, Shivamogga, May 2016]. The struggle called ‘land to the tiller’ – the tillers of the land 
are its rightful owners – is the origin of the KRRS [Interview: Bolkonskaya, KRRS, Bangalore, 
Sept 2016; Interview: Dolohov, 2016]. The association was involved in struggles for greater 
political representation, input subsidies, electricity subsidies, prising issues and against the 
urban bias of development (Reitan, 2007; Gowda, 2010). Bolkonskaya [Interview: 2016], a 
prominent member of the KRRS, informed the interviewer that the Association ‘began in 1980 
as a result of farmers’ revolt against the bad policies on the pricing of agricultural produce.’  
 
The KRRS, though a Gandhian movement, was heavily influenced by the Socialist 
teachings of Rammanohar Lohia (Gowda, 2010). The late Professor Nanjundaswamy (former 
leader of KRRS 1991-2003) was the leader of Samajvadi Yuvajana Sabha, a youth wing of 
the Yuvajana Sabha, a socialist party directed by Gopala Gowda and Rammanohar Lohia 
(Gowda, 2010). Nanjundaswamy carried over Lohia’s social, political and economic ideals to 




new phase of contentions stirred by the GATT negotiations. The KRRS coalesced as a broader 
farmers movement in response to, 
 
IMF austerity measures introduced in the early 1990s that abruptly 
reversed the Nehruvian socialist-developmentalist trend. Austerity was 
compounded with trade liberalization under the GATT and subsequently WTO, 
which threatened Indian small farmers’ interests and recently won rights (Reitan, 
2007: 156). 
 
In the early 1990s Nanjundaswamy became KRRS’s new president, as liberal reforms 
and IMF’s structural adjustment policies stirred a new phase of contention. Pursuing an 
agitational style of politics, Nanjundaswamy launched an anti-globalisation programme in the 
early-1990s. The KRRS took direct actions against a Cargill office in 1992 and a Cargill Seed 
plant in 1993, as well as a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet in 1996 (Assadi, 1995, 1997; 
Nanjundaswamy, 2003). These actions earned KRRS international recognition among 
international networks, e.g. La Via Campesina and People’s Global Action.  
 
Navdanya calls itself ‘a movement for Earth Democracy’. It is a Gandhian-nationalist 
principled NGO working in the fields of biodiversity conservation, organic farming, and 
farmers’ rights (Shiva and Shroff, 2015). Navdanya was founded in 1987 by an outspoken 
physicist and environmentalist, Dr Vandana Shiva. Since 1991 Navdanya has been 
campaigning against the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement on the grounds that it undermines farmers’ ‘seed sovereignty’. 
Navdanya (2013: 35) explains, ‘seed sovereignty, in terms of informal exchange, means self-
governance by farming communities…seed sovereignty implies the recognition in law, the 
sovereign rights of farmers.’ The organisation has been campaigning against biotechnology, 
especially Monsanto, since 1998.  
 
The Gene Campaign is a research and advocacy NGO, founded by Dr Suman Sahai 
together with a group of environment experts in 1991 (Gene Campaign, 2013). It started up as 
a campaign against patents on genetic material, working to ensure legal rights for farmers in 
Indian law. An interviewee from the Gene Campaign explained, 
 
[T]he initial trigger for the organisation was Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) regime coming through the WTO, which meant shifting in the ownership 
of genetic resources because of patent demands on biological materials. That is 
the reason for the name of campaign – campaign to protect genetic resources 




The ratification of TRIPS by the Indian government in 1994 obliged India to confer 
sui generis IPR protections in 2000 (Paarlberg, 2001). The Gene Campaign opposed this, 
because it permits foreign companies to appropriate India’s genetic material, without 
compensation (Sahai, 1999a). The Gene Campaign was involved in drafting legislation and 
policy (e.g. Protection of plant variety and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001), to ensure farmers’ 
rights as custodians of indigenous knowledge vis-à-vis farming and seeds (Sahai, 2003a).  
 
The CGMFI (2011) describes itself as ‘a loose, informal network of scores of 
organizations and individuals from across India, campaigning and advocating to keep India 
GM-Free, and to shift our farming towards a sustainable path.’ A CGMFI convenor, described 
it as an ‘amorphous network of hundreds of disconnected organisations across 23 states of 
India’ [Interview: Karagina, CGMFI, Bangalore, May 2016]. The network was set up in 2006 
as a joined effort between environmental and farmers’ groups. It is central to the broader 
education of farmers about biotechnology and building of alternatives to the industrial 
agriculture that dominates the farming landscape. The coalition pioneers organic farming and 
sustainability in agriculture. In a way, the CGMFI is a direct response by farmers’ and 
environmental organisations to Bt cotton. Karagina [Interview: 2016] explained, the CGMFI’s 
role is to synergise a wide set of organisation and individuals, put pressure on the GI through 
lobbying, policy advocacy, organise protests, promote sustainability and devise viable 
alternatives to hybrids and biotechnology. The resistance communities organised the 
resistance to Bt cotton and the censure of MMB in the context of neoliberal reformation and 
the Gene Revolution. Next, the section considers the politico-economic background of the 
field of struggle from which the resistance to Bt cotton emerged.  
 
5.2.5 The Gene Revolution 
 
The term ‘Gene Revolution’ denotes the rise of the biotechnology industry and its 
dominance over agriculture in the 1990s. Biotechnology is defined in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity as ‘technological application that uses biological systems, living 
organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use’ 
(United Nations, 1992: 3). It is the genetic modification of living organisms to achieve 
desirable traits. Swaminathan (2004: 7) postulated that ‘the 20th century began with the 
rediscovery of Mendel’s law of inheritance.’ Gregor Mendel’s pea plant experiments (1856-
63) established the rules of heredity and genetics on which genetic engineering is based. In 




molecule that contains the genetic code of every living organism. Their research gave birth to 
molecular biology and spurred a frantic race for biotechnology.   
 
Monsanto was at the forefront of the race. This US based company was one of the 
first to genetically modify a plant cell with published results in 1983 and conducted one of the 
first field trials of a genetically modified crop in 1987 (Engdahl, 2007; Robin, 2010). 
Monsanto was established in 1901 as a chemical company and is behind some of the most 
controversial chemicals, including Dioxins (toxic environmental persistent organic 
pollutants), Agent Orange (defoliant used in the Vietnam War), and glyphosate, the active 
component in the herbicide Roundup (Navdanya, 2004). The company increased its 
involvement in seed industry under Robert Shapiro in 1995. Monsanto consolidated its 
dominance over the biotech industry in a wave of mergers and acquisition of seed companies, 
e.g. Agracetus in 1996 and Cargill’s seed business in 1998 (Robin, 2010). Concurrently, 
Monsanto was working on a potentially lucrative transgenic hybrid cotton in India. 
 
In May 1998, Monsanto entered into a 50/50 joint venture with Mahyco, procuring a 
26% stake in Mahyco’s operations, forming Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech Limited (MMB) 
(Bharathan, 2000; Ramanna, 2006). MMB is the sole company behind the Gene Revolution 
in India. Between 1998 and 2002, MMB developed a hybrid cotton containing Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt). Bacillus thuringiensis is a soil bacterium that produces Cry endotoxins 
upon sporulation which have insecticidal properties (Barathan, 2000; Kalaichelvi et al, 2008). 
Bt gene confers insect resistance, which is expected to protect the yield potential from 
American bollworms (Herring and Rao, 2012). In April 2002, the Government of India 
approved (event MON531) the commercial release and cultivation of three Bt hybrids 
(MECH-162, MECH-184 and MECH-12) for three years (Kalaichelvi et al, 2008: 273; Gandhi 
and Namboondiri, 2009; Choudhary and Gaur, 2015;). MMB released its seeds under the 
commercial name Bollgard-I, which contained single a Bt gene, Cry1Ac. This was the first 
approval event, but by no means the only.  
 
The second approval event (MON15985), Bollgard-II, was in 2006 which featured 
two Bt genes (Cry1Ac and Cry2Ab), also developed by MMB (Chaudhary and Gaur, 2010; 
Chaudhary and Gaur, 2015). There were several other approval events of Bt hybrids developed 
by other companies, e.g. JK Seeds and Nath Seeds, following the 2009 wide scale adoption of 
Bollgard-II and multiple Bt gene hybrids (Chaudhary and Gaur, 2010). By 2010 more than 
90% of cotton cultivated in India were Bt hybrids, and by 2014 95% (Chaudhary and Gaur, 
2015). Within the space of 10 years MMB achieved a monopoly over the cotton seed market. 
All indigenous varieties were pushed out of the market. Cotton cultivators ceased the practice 
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of seed saving, eventually causing indigenous varieties to disappear. Today the only seeds 
available to cotton farmers are Bt hybrids. In this context, KRRS and Navdanya have ascribed 
farmer suicides to Monsanto. Simultaneously, they have censured the GI for enabling the 
production of social harm by approving Bt cotton. Although, MMB has been stigmatised as 
deviant, we ought to consider whether the state-corporate conduct was objectively illegitimate.  
 
5.3 State-corporate symbiosis between MMB and the Government of 
India 
 
The politico-economic circumstances have a determining influence on types of 
investment, business activities, labour market, development, economic growth etc. (Quinney, 
1977). In a neoliberal state, the government’s responsibility is to create stimulating conditions 
for production, exchange and accumulation of capital. It does so through specific ‘regimes of 
permission’ that facilitate the operations of organised capital (Tombs and Whyte, 2009; 
Tombs and Whyte, 2015). Having said this, it does so within already existent conditions, 
inherited from the past (Marx, 2010a). In the case of India, neoliberal reforms meant that, in 
order to achieve ‘desirable finalities’, e.g. economic growth, the Government had to improve 
agricultural production through exports and direct foreign investment. One of the primary 
areas of agricultural production in India is cotton. The Department of Textiles (2016) reported 
that cotton ‘contributes 4% of GDP and 12% to industrial production…cotton production 
sustains the livelihood of an estimated 5.80 million cotton farmers and 40-50 million people 
engaged in cotton processing and trade…’ Cotton contributes Rs 360 billion (US$8 billion) 
towards the overall export income (Witjaksono et al, 2014). As of 2016 India is the largest 
cotton producer, having produced nearly 6.21 million metric tons in 2015-16 (Department of 
Agriculture, 2016; Ministry of Textiles, 2016). 
 
These underlying circumstances led to the opening of the agricultural market to 
Monsanto, facilitated the development of biotechnology and expediated the introduction of Bt 
cotton. There was an intersection of interests between the Government and the biotech 
industry. India pursued a market-led growth in target areas, such as cotton, and Monsanto 
pursued viable investment in agriculture. This ‘symbiosis’ was mediated by the regulatory and 
policy ‘regimes’ (Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014). It is argued that an assessment system and the 
Agricultural Biotech Policy enabled Monsanto’s investment and the release of Bt cotton, 
which later had an adverse consequence. The section examines this state-corporate symbiosis, 





5.3.1 ‘Regimes of permission’: the regulatory framework and assessment 
 
The previous section set the context of the events and processes that produced the 
claimed illegitimacy. This chapter examines whether said events and processes were of 
illegitimate character. The regulation controls negative externalities and assures transgenic 
crops serve public interest (Kolady and Herring, 2014). Biosafety and agroeconomic 
performance are the key areas of biotechnology regulation. Since the 1980s the Government 
anticipated a tremendous economic potential of biotechnology (Mahendra, 2012; Shah, 2012; 
Arora, 2013; Kolady and Herring, 2014). An intricate regulatory system was devised in a bid 
to secure biotech investment. The Government began by setting up the National 
Biotechnology Board in 1982 – the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) from 1985 – under 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST). The role of the DBT is to promote, screen, 
approve and monitor the development of biotechnology. As an apparatus of a neoliberal state, 
the role of DBT is to manage the capital creating activities (Tombs, 2012). The purpose of 
regulation is not just control, which are within state’s coercive capacity, but as Whyte (2014) 
highlighted, enabling the industry and commerce, i.e. maintenance of stable system of 
production, distribution and consumption.  
 
The core legislations that affect biotechnology are the Environmental Protection Act 
(EPA) 1986 and ‘The Rules for the Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of 
Hazardous Microorganisms/Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells’, 1989 (Rules 1989). 
The EPA, 1986 contains no direct reference to genetically modified organisms. Instead, it lays 
down the legislative provision to control ‘hazardous substances.’ The EPA Rules, 1989 
include genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the legal definition of ‘hazardous 
substances’ (Kolady and Herring, 2014). As such, genetically modified material is subject to 
environmental and biosafety regulation. Biosafety means, the prevention of large-scale loss of 
biological integrity (United Nations, 2000). Biosafety was brought into the regulatory light by 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992 and further advanced by the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) 2003.  
 
The DBT provisioned the Biosafety Guidelines 1994 and the Guidelines for Research 
in Transgenic Plants 1998, which outline the structure of committees and regulatory bodies. 
The environmental safety assessment and commercial release are also governed by: The Seed 
Act 1966 and the Seeds (Control) Order 1983, the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ 
Rights Act (PPVFRA) 2001 and Biological Diversity Act (BDA) 2002. The main areas 
addressed by the biotechnology regulation are: toxicity and allergenicity, environmental risks 
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(gene flow, invasiveness of GMOs, changes to biodiversity), horizontal gene transfer (i.e. 
genetic pollution through pollen or seed dispersal and transfer of foreign gene to 
microorganisms), resistance/tolerance of target organisms, intellectual property rights, and 
agronomic performance (Samal and Bhattacharya, 2017). Apart from environmental safety, 
the transgenic crop must show superior agronomic performance against other varieties in order 
to be considered for commercial release.  
 
Before the commercial release of transgenic crops, genetically modified organisms 
are subjected to extensive evaluation. The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RDAC) 
oversees the initial application stage for import, research and production of transgenic 
products (Swaminathan, 2004). The Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM), 
comprised of experts from molecular biology and biotechnology background, monitors 
biological and environmental safety aspects of biotech research; evaluates applications; and 
assesses transgenic products through laboratory and greenhouse tests (Swaminathan, 2004). 
The data from laboratory and greenhouse tests is monitored by Institutional Biosafety 
Committees (IBSC), technical bodies appointed by the RCGM.  
 
A successful product is passed on for further evaluation to the Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC), which is part of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
(MoEF). The GEAC assesses environmental releases, i.e. large-scale field trials, seed 
multiplication and commercial release (Swaminathan, 2004; Samal and Battacharaya, 2017). 
While the RCGM provided the technical, scientific advice to the GEAC, the GEAC is ‘the 
formal, bureaucratic rubber-stamping body’ (Scoones, 2006: 61). After the commercial 
release, the monitoring of transgenic crops is the responsibility of respective state 
governments (Scoones, 2006). State Biotechnology Coordination Committees and District 
Level Committees monitor the progress of the transgenic crop after the commercial release 
(Swaminathan, 2004). Whilst, the MoEF issued the approval of Bt cotton release into the 
environment, the licence for commercial sale of Bt seeds was administered by state 
governments under the provision of the Seed Act 1966 and Seed (Control) Order 1983. 
 
Again, the regulatory system anticipated the development of biotechnology. In the 
context of neoliberal reforms, opening of markets to foreign private investment, i.e. Monsanto, 
and shift to export-led agricultural development in policy regulation appeared to serve two 
purposes. The first, control of Bt cotton for environmental and health safety. The second, 
assuring of high agronomic performance of Bt cotton. This suggests that biotech regulation is 
as much about advancing transgenic products for economic growth, as it about safety 




apparently coercive imposition on factory owners of legal protections for workers was 
fundamental in the transition to factory production, ‘the shift from extraction of absolute to 
relative surplus value’ (Tombs, 2012: 172). Regulation develops in contradictory ways and 
combines the interests of organised capital and the state. Regulation neutralises conflicts and 
coalesces interests, i.e. public interest with private interest (Poulantzas, 1978). Regulatory 
authorities are not mere “policemen”, but agencies that reproduce the conditions necessary for 
stable capitalist processes. That is, regulation maintains the uninterrupted functioning of 
industry, distribution and commerce; and so, it maintains the process of capital reproduction. 
Another element of the regime that permitted the investment from Monsanto is the policy. 
 
5.3.2 Enabling the biotech industry: the agricultural biotechnology policy 
 
The agricultural biotechnology policy (ABP) refers to several policies across different 
sectors. It was constructed during the assessment and introduction of Bt cotton, though 
policies in the seed industry and agriculture that affect biotechnology were established much 
earlier. Policy is a functioning mechanism used to fulfil the economic potential of 
biotechnology application in agriculture (Samal and Battacharaya, 2017). The architecture and 
implementation of the ABP spans across Ministry of Commerce and Industry, MST, Ministry 
of Textiles, Department of Agricultural Cooperation and Farmers Welfare etc. The DACFW 
provides broad policy guidelines, but its implementation is the responsibility of respective 
state governments. The Government of India has taken several noteworthy policy actions: The 
National Textile Policy (NTP), 2000; the Technology Mission on Cotton, 2000; the National 
Seeds Policy, 2002; the National Science and Technology Policy, 2003; the Report on the 
Application of Agricultural Biotechnology, 2004; National Biotechnology Development 
Strategy (NBDS), 2007. Additional policy action that ought to be considered is the New Policy 
on Seed Development, 1988, including the 2002 amendment.  
 
The policy addresses matters of investment, R&D, technological transfer, intellectual 
property rights and patenting, pricing, laboratory and production, promotion of industry and 
trade, regulatory issues, agricultural development infrastructure and public confidence (Samal 
and Bhattacharya, 2017). Conservation of biodiversity, environmental safety, market volatility 
and farmers’ needs are amalgamated with the priority areas for safe planning. The policies, in 
general, aim to stimulate growth in agriculture through technology and innovation, private 
sector investment, export-oriented production, market competition (Spielman et al, 2014; 
Dang et al, 2015). The focus is on enhancing productivity, cost-effectiveness of cotton 
production, environmental safety and rural development (Kuruganti, 2009). Agricultural 
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biotechnology is a bequest of the post-reform era, where private investment economic growth 
and technology form the same package (Scoones, 2006). As such, the growth of foreign private 
investment in agriculture precipitated the arrival of Bt cotton. 
 
Under neoliberalism, policymaking combines entrepreneurial flair, liberal ideology 
and capital accumulation with scientific credibility and national interests (Larner, 2000). 
Where development, growth and innovation are led through export-oriented production 
policymaking is decentred, diffused, fragmented and network-based (Newell, 2002). The ABP 
was formulated by molecular biologists, biotechnologists, industry stakeholders (agribusiness 
and farmers) and biotech entrepreneurs (Dang et al, 2015). The policy must accommodate 
entrepreneurial interests as well as public interest. Biotechnology is considered a ‘public good 
technology’, even though it is a private enterprise (Newell, 2002). Although, environmental 
considerations and public interest are amalgamated, the ABP promotes transgenic crops as 
economic exigency. The former Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proclaimed at the 
Science Congress in Delhi in 2001 that ABP was based on the vision of ‘shaping 
biotechnology into a premier precision tool of the future for creation of wealth and ensuring 
social justice especially for the welfare of the poor’ (Herring, 2005: 204). The prevailing 
perception is that biotechnology is necessary for India’s productivity demands. 
 
Policymaking involves a network of stakeholders. In the case of the ABP, the network 
includes the seed and biotech industries (Dang et al, 2015). The Association of the Seed 
Industry (ASI), the Seed Association of India (SAI), the Confederation of Indian Industry 
(CII) and All India Biotech Association (AIBA) were heavily involved in making of the 
National Biotechnology Development Strategy (Scoones, 2006). Industries were represented 
on policy teams, vision groups, advisory groups and committees by organisations such as CII 
and SAI. Additionally, private companies were represented in policy networks by Kiran 
Muzumdar-Shaw, the CEO of Biocon a biotech research firm, and Dr B. R. Barwale, director 
of Mahyco, among others (Scoones, 2006). Scientists, such as, M. S. Swaminathan (director 
of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute), C. N. R. Rao (Professor at the Institute of 
Economic Growth), Keshev Kranthi (director of the Central Institute for Cotton Research and 
member of the International Cotton Advisory Committee), worked closely with the private 
sector on policy seeking funding/research opportunities (Arora, 2013). The involvement of 
agronomists and scientists who brought the Green Revolution, namely M. S. Swaminathan, 
signalled continuity in the Gene Revolution (Dang et al, 2015). They brought institutional 
influence from the Indian Institute of Science, the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research, 




formed, with varied influences from the industry and neoliberal ideology. Next, we need to 
examine the key policy documents and how they influenced the growth of biotechnology. 
 
5.3.3 ‘Desired finalities’: the ABP at work and Bt cotton 
 
To begin with, the National Textile Policy (NTP) 2000, is one of the key policy actions 
that affects cotton cultivation. Its key objectives expansion of the textile industry, 
augmentation of production output, and increase of India’s share of the international textile 
market (Ministry of Textiles, 2000). Whilst, the NTP highlights farmers benefit from growth 
consistent with environmental safety standards, it stipulates a commitment to liberalisation of 
controls to maximise India’s performance in a competitive environment, enhancing 
productivity through technological upgradation and private investment (Ministry of Textiles, 
2000). In relation to cotton production, the NTP’s commitment is to ‘achieve increase in cotton 
productivity by at least 50% and upgrade its quality to international standards, through 
effective implementation of the Technology Mission on Cotton (TMC)’ (Ministry of Textiles, 
2000: 4). The TMC is a programme launched in February 2000 under the Department of 
Agricultural Cooperation and implemented by the national agricultural research system 
comprised of Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) institutions, e.g. the Central 
Institute for Cotton Research (CICR) in Nagpur. The Mission was launched to help with 
enhancement of cotton productivity through technology and innovation.  
 
The TMC was implemented in three phases: 2000-1 to 2006-7, 2007 to 2012 and 2012 
to 2017. In the first phase, the TMC emphasised improved management systems for control 
of biotic stress and improvement of cotton varieties through hybridisation (ICAR, 2000). In 
the second phase, following the three-year conditional release of Bt cotton, the TMC began to 
promote Bt hybrids. The Mission statement 1.4 of the second phase set an objective for the 
agricultural university in Dharwad to transfer Bt hybrid events to varieties developed by public 
institutions to reduce the high costs of Bt seeds (ICAR, 2007). Phases two and three had a 
special interest in the promotion of Bt cotton. CICR is the principle institute that works on 
development and promotion of Bt cotton, under the leadership of Dr K. R. Kranthi (Scoones, 
2006). The research is used to find the most optimal pathways for enhancing cotton 
productivity. Agricultural universities and institutes under the ICAR system led the research 





In the Report on the Application of Agricultural Biotechnology 2004, M. S. 
Swaminathan, doyen of agricultural development in India, excogitated the potential of 
biotechnology application to agriculture and policy priorities. Chapter 2, section 1.2 of the 
report stipulated 
 
biotechnology provides an opportunity to convert bioresources into 
economic wealth…The bottom line of our national agricultural biotechnology 
policy should be the economic wellbeing of farm families, food security of the 
nation, health security of the consumer, protection of the environment and the 
security of our national and international trade in farm commodities. 
Recommendations of the Task Force are based on these considerations 
(Swaminathan, 2005: 12). 
 
The Report further emphasised, in section 1.3, that infusion of technology is necessary 
to raise competitiveness and renumeration of agricultural enterprise. The long-term policy on 
biotechnology application prioritises commercialisation of transgenics, increasing 
productivity and profitability, environmental sustainability and conservation, reducing costs 
of production, generating employment, and enhancing competitiveness in global markets 
(Swaminathan, 2005). The Report also recommends that ‘transgenic approach should be 
considered as complimentary and resorted to when other options to achieve the desired 
objectives are either not available or not feasible’ (Swaminathan, 2005: 13). Despite the push 
for technological innovation in agriculture through biotechnology, the report recommends a 
cautious approach.  
 
The National Seed Policy (NSP) 2002, has brought some changes to the seed industry 
that have benefited the private sector. The policy promotes and encourages private seed sector 
(Department of Agriculture, 2002). Additionally, it encourages investment in non-traditional 
areas, e.g. cotton hybrids and transgenics (Department of Agriculture, 2002). The NSP 
stipulates, 
 
Globalization and economic liberalization have opened up new 
opportunities as well as challenges. The main objectives of the National Seeds 
Policy, therefore, are the provision of an appropriate climate for the seed industry 
to utilize available and prospective opportunities, safeguarding of the interests of 
Indian farmers and the conservation of agrobiodiversity. While unnecessary 
regulation needs to be dismantled, it must be ensured that gullible farmers are not 
exploited by unscrupulous elements. A regulatory system of a new genre is, 
therefore, needed, which will encompass quality assurance mechanisms coupled 






The NBDS 2007 (drafted in 2005), is the most comprehensive policy action 
addressing the application of biotechnology. The NBDS put forward a 10-year vision plan for 
the development of biotechnology in agriculture. NBDS places the premium in agricultural 
development on biotechnology, generating new products and expanding existing ones, namely 
Bt cotton (DBT, 2007). Among several important proposals, the report recommended an 
independent regulatory body, the National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority (NBRA), and 
a single-window process to make regulation less cumbersome and to facilitate private 
investment (DBT, 2007). The problem is that an independent regulatory body would give the 
private sector easier access to India’s resources at the expense of farmers (Bourienne, 2016; 
Karagina, 2016). Although the NBRA was not implemented, the policy promotes 
biotechnology as the best route to agricultural growth. To understand how, one must look at 
how the regulatory assessment enabled and the ABP promoted Bt cotton.   
 
5.3.4 Uncertainty of Bt cotton and the assessment process 
 
The very fact the Union Government began to prepare the regulatory framework in 
anticipation of biotechnology since the 1980s shows government’s interest in transgenic crops. 
Although, management of risk is the fundamental purpose of biosafety regulation, only risks 
that can be approximated, measured and defined technically are relevant; uncertainties about 
long-term effects on the ecosystem are omitted (Sahai, 2004). According to some interview 
respondents, the state is willing to accept a certain level of risk to accommodate investment 
[Interview: Bourienne, 2016; Interview: Scientist 1, Agricultural University, Raichur, Aug 
2016; Interview: Berkley, Independent Researcher, Mysore, Sept 2016]. The regulators 
generate trust in the industry by sustaining the belief that risks are containable [Interview: 
Karagina, 2016]. In fact, the regulatory process is a rigorous one. The assessment of Bt cotton 
took 7 years, from the initial application by MMB in 1996. However, it ignored two 
uncertainties: 1) the impact of transgenic cotton on biological diversity and the ecosystem, 
especially the impact on pest populations; and 2) Bt’s agronomic performance in India’s 
diverse landscape and dry semiarid climate.  
 
A campaigner from the Coalition for a GM-Free India (CGMFI), contended that ‘the 
government tries to design and pass acts for the [biotech industry] …global pressure and 
economy are most important’ [Interview: Kutuzov, CGMFI, Wardha, Apr 2016]. Indeed, 
regulation, as a government function, facilitates investment, innovation and growth (Tombs, 
2012; Whyte, 2014; Lasslett, 2014c). Of course, within broader considerations of 
environmental safety and public/national interest. Kutuzov [Interview: 2016] added that the 
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state ‘[frames] regulation for the industry.’ A renowned critic of biotechnology from CGMFI 
argued that the Congress Party government, under Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s leadership, sought 
to advance transgenic crops, like Bt cotton, as the new Green Revolution [Interview: Wilarski, 
CGMFI, Skype, Oct 2016]. Despite formal warnings to the Prime Minister, by figures such as 
Vandana Shiva and Devinder Sharma, the government pursued Bt cotton as a ‘bailout for 
India’s indebted farmers’ ([Interview: Wilarski, 2016]; GM Watch, 2012). The aim of testing 
transgenic products is to ensure there are no risks before commercial release. In the case of Bt 
cotton, despite uncertainties it was pushed through the assessment process. Wilarski 
[Interview: 2016] contended, 
 
the government represents the industry interests…except for one or two 
scientists, who were there to stick their neck up, [would not] say that GM is not 
required. If they said that Bt cotton is not required, they would be hounded 
out…everybody has a job to protect…who cares whether people support the 
environment or not. I think agriculture scientists have to be held responsible… 
 
The scientists who were involved in the assessment of Bt cotton had a special interest 
in biotechnology and transgenic crops as their field of research [Interview: Karagina, 2016]. 
Scientist 1 [Interview: 2016], a plant breeder from an agricultural university involved in the 
assessment of Bt cotton, explained the main problem with the evaluation of Bt cotton was that 
it did not consider uncertainties associated with ecological imbalances caused by hybrid 
monocultures (uncertainty 1) and rainfed agriculture (uncertainty 2). The main problems faced 
by Bt cotton producers are pest resistance and drought.  
 
Regulation of biotechnology, Newell (2002: 10) argued, tends to ignore effects 
‘beyond an immediate, visible impacts on ecosystem, regard long-term studies as an 
unnecessary burden and potential harms as restricted to those that are predictable and 
precedential.’ What matters is an efficient and speedy turnaround to realise the commercial 
potential of the product. Regulation aims to provide an efficient environment for business, not 
to impede it (Tombs, 2012; Lasslett, 2014c). As assessments are conducted in a controlled 
environment, on a specific temporal and spatial scale, issues of uncertainty are excluded 
[Interview: Bourienne, 2016; Interview: Scientist 1, 2016]. Regulators and scientists agree that 
‘assessments are only able to look at relatively short-term impacts…they have to be 
concentrated in artificially small spatial scales because otherwise the requirements for 
containment and pre-release testing would not be met…in any case longer term and broader 
scale impacts are picked up through monitoring later on’ (Scoones, 2006: 272). Due to the 
lack of long-term assessment there was high uncertainty about pest resistance and agronomic 




cotton was intended only for irrigated land and financially endowed farmers, the risk 
assessment did not consider the outcomes of Bt cotton cultivation by smallholders in draught 
prone regions.  
 
Scientist 1 [Interview: 2016] added that ‘many trials were conducted…and I said at 
the time, when the technology is new, when the Cry Protein is new the pests will not survive. 
However, the ones that survive will become resistant. It takes a while, resistance does not 
happen in a year or two.’ There are certain aspects of biotechnology which regulatory 
evaluation is, quite simply, unable to predict or control. The evaluation side-lined many of the 
uncertainties to push Bt cotton through the evaluation. Bourienne [Interview: 2016] 
maintained, 
 
GM technology is fraught with risk. You don’t know where the genes are 
inserted, and you cannot control how many genes will be inserted…when you 
are modifying a chromosome you are sending in large numbers of genes either 
through agrobacterium or through gene gun pushing it into the cell. You cannot 
control where they are going…Scientifically this doesn’t exist. Monsanto do not 
say they can control this. Monsanto is not stupid…If this process cannot be 
controlled, then it cannot be known what that cell is producing…That is the crux 
of the problem with this technology. That is why biosafety regulation is very 
important, because it tests the safety of the product…Why are these tests done? 
Because new proteins can and will be formed in a genetically modified plant. 
They can be harmless or harmful. That is why biosafety testing of every GMO is 
paramount. Then all the data fudging takes place. The industry goes on saying 
that their products have been tested a thousand times, it’s been tested in the best 
possible way, there has never been any problem with it, but there are problems. 
All the data that comes out showing problems is immediately suppressed…Until 
you can control this there will be an uncertainty of something toxic or allergenic 
being produced in the cell. It happens all the time, there are several studies that 
show you that this will happen. It’s not that every new protein is always 
poisonous, that’s not the case, but if two out of ten are poisonous that’s enough. 
That’s the flaw in the technology. My position is that testing must be done 
transparently and the data must be shared. Monsanto or any GM industry is not 
the depositary of all the brains, there is a whole scientific community outside that 
understands genetics and can read that data. 
 
Howbeit, regulation of agricultural biotechnology lacks transparency. The evaluation 
of transgenic products is a private matter between the applicant and the regulator, the public 
does not have open access to data or trial results (Newell, 2002). Regulation, Scoones (2006) 
claimed, often involves backdoor negotiating and lobbying. It is difficult to gauge how MMB 
might have influenced the evaluation of Bt cotton. Notwithstanding, Monsanto maintained 
dozens of PR companies and regulatory affairs office in Delhi to engage in routine 
negotiations with government officials over assessment developments and policy ([Interview: 
Kutuzov, 2016; Interview: Scientist 1, 2016]; see also Newell, 2002). Lobbying played an 
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important role when the issue of Bt cotton release in rainfed regions came up. Bourienne 
[Interview: 2016] asserted,  
 
there was at that time of Bt cotton trials a condition that it should not be 
released in states with rainfed agriculture, but only in irrigated areas. That’s when 
lobbying comes into play, and that’s when Monsanto lobbied very successfully. 
Somehow this condition that was present in the early years of Bt cotton was 
lifted… 
 
Bt cotton was assessed in the ICAR institutes, state agricultural universities and CICR 
in Nagpur. For example, Dr P. K. Ghosh, who came from ICAR and was heavily involved 
with MMB, was the key architect of the assessment process having served as chief advisor to 
the DBT Secretary and served on the RCGM during Bt cotton trials (Scoones, 2006; Newell, 
2002). Additionally, Dr B. R. Barwale was a member of several committees and regulatory 
panels within the DBT (Dang et al, 2015). There might have been potential bias of data 
produced by MMB. The composition of policy and regulatory committees alerts observers of 
potential ‘revolving door’. Committees are composed of cliques of scientists who often rely 
on largesse from DBT and the industry (Samal and Bhattacharaya, 2017). Of course, biotech 
experts have a special interest in biotechnology as their field of research. Therefore, regulation 
of biotechnology has drawn more attention to the positive outcomes of testing, reinforcing the 
notion of predictability and ignoring uncertainty. The guiding premise of the emerging policy 
and regulation was increase of cotton productivity through technological innovation and 
export-oriented production (Sahai, 2000; Ramana, 2006). It is, thus, argued that the 
assessment process was conducted in a narrow spectrum, one which excluded an alternative 
outcome. No clear illegitimacy has been observed, but rather a regulatory framework and 
policy that pushed Bt cotton through, supported by a neoliberal agenda of economic growth 
through private investment and export-oriented production. Yet, we need to take a closer look 
at Monsanto’s role in the state-corporate symbiosis.  
 
5.3.5 The introduction and release of Bt cotton 
 
Thus far, the section considered the regulatory and policy regimes that enabled the 
introduction of Bt cotton. Now, the section examines how Bt cotton was released into Indian 
agriculture. The Department of Agriculture (2016: 169) reported that ‘cotton exports used to 
be subjected to quantitative restrictions…With sufficient availability to meet domestic 
demand and stable prices, export of cotton has been made free since October 2011.’ Until 
1990s India’s agricultural sector was subject to quantitative restrictions, strict licensing 




Nehruvian-protectionist economic planning to neoliberalism. The shift entailed deregulation 
of imports and export-oriented production (Tripathi and Prassad, 2009). Furthermore, 
reorientation of regulatory priorities, decline of government support, promotion of private 
investment, devaluation of the exchange rate etc. encouraged the transfer of private technology 
to stimulate agricultural development (Chand, 2005; Tripathi and Prassad, 2009; Siddiqui, 
2015). These changes set forth the conditions for the introduction of Bt hybrids. Monsanto 
was the first conglomerate to approach India with a transgenic crop.  
 
Monsanto initiated negotiations with the DBT in 1990-3 to backcross Bollgard cotton 
with Indian varieties, but the request was rejected by the DBT committee headed by V. L. 
Chopra of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (Bharathan, 2000; Ramanna, 2006; Shah, 
2012). The application was rejected because Monsanto’s technology fee was too high 
(Panagariya, 2004). Additionally, importation of foreign germplasm and seeds for research by 
private companies was restricted by the Seed Protection Act 1966 and Industrial Policy Act 
1969 (Panagariya, 2004). Pray and Ramaswami (2001: 409) noted, ‘the Industrial Policy Act, 
1969 restricted Indian firms that had more than Rs.1 billion in assets to “core” industries…The 
seed industry was not a core industry. Therefore…firms with more than 40% foreign 
ownership were not allowed to enter the industry.’ The liberalisation of the seed industry 
began with its inclusion on the list of core industries in 1986. Then, the New Seed Industry 
Development Policy, 1988 permitted the import of commercial seeds. Next, came the 
neoliberal reforms which opened Indian agriculture to foreign capital, deregulated markets 
and created space for private technology.  
 
In 1991, the government extended liberal reforms to technology transfer and foreign 
investment in agriculture. In March 1995, the initial rejection of an application was revised 
and Mahyco obtained permission from the RCGM to import 100 grams of Monsanto’s Bt 
seeds to conduct laboratory studies for biosafety and agronomic performance (Shah, 2012). 
This time round, Mr Chopra was no longer member of the committee (Bharathan, 2000). 
Greenhouse trials were permitted in 1996, before limited field trials were permitted in 1997-
8 (Shah, 2012). In May 1998, Monsanto embarked on a joint venture with Mahyco, procuring 
26% stake in Mahyco’s Bt cotton operation, forming Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech Limited. The 
introduction of Bt cotton ‘proceeded…through marriage of convenience between western 
biotechnology firms and national seed companies’ (Shiva et al, 1999: 601). It meant that Bt 
cotton was associated with a local enterprise and the technology was supported by the state. 




1997 was a watershed of neoliberal transformation for Indian agriculture. In July that 
year, the US government filed a complaint to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO 
over India’s quantitative restrictions on import of agricultural, textile and industrial products 
(Shiva et al, 1999). As a signatory to the WTO, India was legally bound to remove trade 
barriers. India’s import policy restricted imports of more than 2,700 agricultural and industrial 
products to protect home markets (WTO, 1999). Seeds were included in the restricted items 
list, meaning that a licence had to be procured to import foreign seeds. The quantitative 
restrictions violated Art XI:1 and XVIII:11 of the GATT and Article 4.2 of the AOA (WTO, 
1999). The Government of India failed to defend quantitative restrictions and in December 
1999 was forced to fully comply with the Agreement (Bhat, 2011: 12). By April 2001 the 
Government eliminated all import restrictions and fully opened its markets to foreign capital.  
 
Between July and August 1998, the MMB was granted permission for small-scale, 
multicentric field trials in 40 locations (Bharathan, 2000; Ramanna, 2006). In 1999 GEAC 
expressed satisfaction with trial results, however due to popular resistance requested more 
tests (Shah, 2012). In July 2000, MMB commenced open field trials on 85 hectares as well as 
seed production on 150 hectares in 395 locations (Barathan, 2000; Barwale et al, 2004). In 
March 2002 ICAR submitted “satisfactory” results of Bt cotton trials and in April GEAC 
authorised commercial cultivation of three single Bt gene hybrids for three years (2006; 
Kalaichelvi et al, 2008; Gandhi and Namboodiri, 2009). The crop was released in six states: 
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu. The 
progress of Bollgard-I was to be monitored by State Biotechnology Coordination Committees 
and District Level Committees until an assessment of the three-year-period in 2006 (Scoones, 
2006). By 2006 Bollgard-I was cultivated on 1.3 million hectares (Khadi, 2007; Chaudhary 
and Gaur, 2010). Due to the increase in area under Bt cotton, productivity of cotton increased 
by 71% between 2002 and 2006, and in some regions, it increased by up to 259% (Shah, 2012). 
The rapid adoption rate suggested popular support of the technology.  
 
In the early period, MMB owned the only Bt gene that could be legally introgressed 
into cotton seeds (Kalaichelvi et al, 2008; Kuruganti, 2009; Chaudhary and Gaur, 2010). 
Following the assessment of the three-year period, the three single Bt gene hybrids were 
withdrawn due to a poor performance in 2005-6, but 30 new Bt hybrids were approved and 
released by three companies: MMB, JK Seeds and Nath Seeds (Kalaichelvi et al, 2008; 
Chaudhary and Gaur, 2015). In 2007, 62 Bt gene hybrids were released by 15 different 
companies; in 2008, 131 Bt hybrids were released by 24 companies; in 2009, 274 Bt hybrids 
were released by 30 companies; and, in 2010, 522 different Bt hybrids were released by 35 




gene varieties, Bollgard-II hybrids or stacked gene hybrids. They were introduced because 
Bollgard-I became susceptible to pink bollworm, a monophagous cotton insect. The insect 
developed resistance to the Bt gene and caused substantial crop losses in 2008-9. Pest 
resistance to Bt became a recurrent problem and crop losses are more common.  
 
An agronomist from an agricultural university in Raichur commented that ‘Bt cotton 
is needed because…there is an international demand for cotton. In a black soil this is the most 
profitable crop. Cotton takes around 40 days for initiation of flowers. In case of Bt cotton there 
will be continuous flowering’ [Interview: Scientist 2, Agricultural University, Raichur, Aug 
2016]. The commercialisation of Bt cotton was not a simple case of a state working for the 
industry, but an economic pressure to increase productivity and the overall output. 
Additionally, international pressure exerted by the DSB compelled India to open its 
agricultural markets to private capital (Shiva et al, 1999; Sahai, 2001). In terms of farmers’ 
welfare, the rationale for Bt cotton was that it would alleviate the agrarian indebtedness by 
reducing costs of production and raising farmers’ returns (Swaminathan, 2004; Sahai, 2004). 
The main problem cotton producers faced were crop losses to bollworms and high expenditure 
on insecticides. Stone (2012: 62) posited that ‘Bt cotton seeds…entered [the market] just as 
the widespread adoption of hybrid pesticide-intensive seeds was sending smallholder farmers 
onto a catastrophic treadmill of pesticide and debt.’ The introduction of Bt cotton was not, as 
claimed by some, done illegitimately. Rather, the economic and international pressures 
engendered changes that made Indian agriculture conducive to biotechnology, and in turn 
transgenic cotton was necessary to India’s economic objectives. The proliferation of Bt cotton 
indicated wide support for the crop, but controversy surrounding its introduction revealed 
certain issues concerning its release.  
 
5.3.6 Adoption of Bt cotton 
 
As of 2014, 95% of cotton available on the market are Bt hybrids. There are two 
opposing arguments as to how Bt cotton became the only cotton seed available. The KRRS 
and Navdanya saw Bt cotton as a conspiratorial ploy by Monsanto to extract inordinate profits 
from Indian smallholders. On the other spectrum of resistance, proliferation of Bt cotton was 
attributed to market forces and farmers’ choice. There are many factors involved in the 
proliferation of Bt cotton. Having said this, the way Bt cotton was marketed had a significant 
influence on farmers’ choice. Farmers switched to Bt cotton because they were promised by 
the Indian Government and MMB lower costs of production, higher yield and higher income 
(Visawadi et al, 2006; Venugopalan et al, 2009; Swaminathan and Rawal, 2011). Additionally, 
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several interviewees contend that Bt cotton was pushed by the Government [Interview: 
Bolkonskaya, 2016; Interview: Karagina, 2016; Interview: Wilarski, 2016). The Union 
Government was, indeed, actively involved in the promotion of biotechnology through policy 
and regulation. However, there were many more factors involved.  
 
Navdanya and KRRS saw Monsanto as a threat of globalisation to farmers’ 
independence and sovereignty. From this standpoint they reasoned that Monsanto duped 
farmers with a ‘miracle seed’ story (Nanjundaswamy, 1999, 2003a; Navdanya, 2004: 24). 
Representatives of seed companies ‘came to villages with leaflets and seeds and told farmers 
to grow Bt cotton…’ [Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]. A documentary by Michael X. Paled 
entitled Bitter Seeds captured one such transaction in a village in the state of Maharashtra. 
Seed company agents distributed brochures advertising a high yielding cotton variety – a Bt 
hybrid (Paled, 2014). Farmers were uninformed about biotechnology or Bt cotton. The Gene 
Campaign conducted a study on farmers’ perception of biotechnology and found that ‘the level 
of awareness and perception about biotechnology and Bt cotton is very low’ [Interview: 
Bourienne, 2016]. Farmers trust the government and agronomists to tell them what to grow, 
but they are uninformed about how Bt cotton works is potential effects [Interview: Karagina, 
2016; Interview: Scientist 1, 2016]. However, it is an oversimplification of a dynamic 
phenomenon to state that farmers were simply duped by the industry. Bourienne [Interview: 
2016] asserted,  
 
Between 2003 and 2014 there is this whole period when Bt cotton 
proliferated in an insane way. However dramatic and fanciful the NGO rhetoric 
is, it is something that was…a gradual process…the market forces played out, 
and the industry played with the market forces…It is much more complex than 
this dramatic rhetoric, “Monsanto crushed the indigenous seed industry”. I think 
the process that happened is something that came from many sources, and 
underlying again Monsanto’s big influence in policy, regulation and government 
is such that its hybrids, despite failing, continued to get approval.  
 
Bt cotton was adopted because it was considered to be a ‘wonder product’ [Interview: 
Karagina, 2016; Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. It was thought of this way because the industry 
and the Government promoted it as a ‘miracle seed’, an alternative to expensive insecticides 
and debt [Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]. The seed companies expected that Bt cotton would 
be very popular with farmers, so starting in 2006 seed companies began buying licences for 
the Bt trait until every company supplied only Bt seeds [Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. These 





Farmers adopted Bt cotton out of interest calculation for higher yields, less 
expenditure on pesticides and higher returns. The high pesticide demand in cotton production 
was sending Indian smallholders on a ‘treadmill of debt’ (Stone, 2012). The cost saving on 
pesticides and superior performance were a strong influence on consumer choice (Herring and 
Rao, 2012; CCI, 2016). Scientist 1 [Interview: 2016] maintained that farmers are rational 
actors, they understand their industry and know what will bring profit. This reflects with 
Herring’s (2009) criticism of the opposition to Bt cotton, where he pointed out that KRRS and 
Navdanya represented Indian farmers as gullible and irrational actors, easily duped by the 
industry and with no understanding of agriculture. Scientist 2 [Interview: 2016] concurred, 
 
farmers calculate what will bring them money…cotton is known among 
farmers as ‘white-gold’, because it’s so profitable…Bollgard was a solution to 
pesticides and low yields…today, they won’t take any other variety than Bt 
cotton. In a sense, the farmers were given a cake with honey…The farmer will 
not take the dry bread instead. 
 
Another factor in the proliferation of Bt cotton was the appearance of seed dealers. 
The seed dealers are a new institution that appeared with the release of Bt cotton [Interview: 
Karagina, 2016]. These dealers, according to two respondents, became the primary source of 
input packages, information, knowledge and credit [Interview: Scientist 2, 2016; Interview: 
Scientist 3, Agricultural University, Raichur, Aug 2016]. They became an unofficial 
advertising and promotional mechanism for Bt cotton. Dolohov [Interview: 2016] commented,  
 
these middle people [seed dealers] go to the farmers and try to convince 
them to buy Bt cotton…but they don’t explain these are GM seeds…they just 
say: “buy this seed, it will give higher yield and it does not need pesticide for 
bollworm”. 
 
The credit function that seed dealers stepped into was, according to Bourienne 
[Interview: 2016], a decisive factor that led to widespread adoption of Bt cotton. The 
respondent expounded,  
 
The formal credit systems [became] practically unavailable to farmers. 
The banks do not lend to the farmer because they consider it high risk…They 
used to go to private money lenders and get ruined in the process with usurious 
interest rate. Then there was a new agency that developed, and that was the seed 
dealer, import provider…He became the credit source by default. This the 
industry understood, this the companies understood. That was began by Bt 
cotton, because by that time many companies were producing Bt cotton. 
Whichever gave the seed dealer a better commission the seed dealer would 
recommend that. The seed dealer doesn’t care what the farmers want to plant. If 
a company is giving him 10% commission and another is giving him less, 
obviously he will promote the company with 10% commission because he will 
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make more money. The finance shifted from the private money lender to the seed 
agent. For the farmer it was less usurious interest rates because the seed dealer 
would give farmers credit with the seed and chemical and pay up when the farmer 
was done. This made the seed dealer or the input provider a very powerful figure 
and would influence what would be cultivated…This is a very powerful and very 
important reason why farmers selected what they did. They didn’t select it 
because they wanted to, but it was the selection that came with the credit. The 
farmers were given seed and credit, but only for specific product. This brought 
in a huge influence, and companies used this, which is really the reason why the 
non-Bt seeds disappeared. Nobody was pushing them. That is how the choices at 
the seed shop became more and more restrictive to the extent that ultimately only 
Bt was available and a few of the companies that were able to input commissions 
stayed in the market [Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. 
 
The government supported biotechnology through policy and regulation. The farmers 
trusted the Union Government’s seal of approval. In fact, many thought that it was a 
Government product because it was assessed by state institutions, e.g. ICAR, CICR, SSI 
[Interview: Bourienne, 2016; Interview: Karagina, 2016; Interview: Denisov, 2016]. The 
National Congress Party had a vision of India as a modern, industrialised nation. 
Biotechnology was conceived as part of this vision. After 2006, the Union Government 
supported Bt cotton cultivators through the Minimum Support Price. There are annual 
fluctuations in net income from Bt cotton due to volatile market prices, thus the state assures 
farmers receive adequate return by fixing the Minimum Support Price (Choudhary and Gaur, 
2015). The system was set up mainly for cash crops recommended by the Government 
[Interview: Scientist 1, 2016; Interview: Scientist 2, 2016]. The problem today is that farmers 
no longer have the consumer option to buy non-Bt seed. The KRRS and Navdanya, however, 
censured Monsanto and the Government claiming that the transgenic cotton was the cause of 
farmer suicides. The resistance movement inscribed deviant properties onto corporate actors, 




In contrast to Case 1, the analysis of state-corporate practices and symbiosis revealed 
no illegitimate conduct. Certainly, the Government of India enabled the release of Bt cotton 
through regulatory and policy ‘regimes’, and there was a clear ‘symbiosis’ between the 
Government and the biotech industry (Tombs and Whyte, 2009; Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014). 
Notwithstanding, neither the Government nor MMB contravened the regulatory law or other 
normative code of conduct. The Government followed a broad policy objective of economic 
growth and development realised through opening India’s markets to foreign capital, export-
oriented production, intensification of agriculture through capital intensive monocultures etc. 




2012; see also, Lasslett, 2014c). As part of this broad policy objective, the ABP prioritised 
technological development in target areas, e.g. cotton, to increase productivity and 
contribution to GDP, increase India’s competitiveness in international markets, and to raise 
farmers’ incomes (ICAR, 2000; Swaminathan, 2005). During the liberal reforms, 
biotechnology was envisioned as an integral part of technological progress in agriculture since 
mid-1980s. Furthermore, the representation of Monsanto as a malevolent entity, intending to 
harm Indian smallholders in order to make a profit is not helpful. Rather, what has been 
observed is that Monsanto took advantage of the ‘market forces’ [Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. 
Bt cotton was subjected to a rigorous assessment for environmental safety and agronomic 
performance. As the section demonstrated, the Government of India and MMB observed the 
regulatory assessment.  
 
Bt cotton was released without careful enough consideration of risk and uncertainty 
intrinsic to biotechnology [Interview: Scientist 1, 2016; Interview: Scientist 2, 2016; 
Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. The prioritisation of free-market, export growth and 
industrialisation in the ABP created the conditions wherein smallholders are exposed to socio-
economic stress factors. The introduction of biotechnology may have adverse socio-economic 
impact on smallholders with no irrigation or capital who made the consumer choice of 
cultivating Bt cotton (Stone, 2007; Swaminathan and Rawal, 2011; [Interview: Scientist 2, 
2016; Interview: Bouriennes, 2016]). Having said this, indebtedness and suicides are a much 
broader issue, not specific to Bt cotton, but rather symptomatic of a market-led economic 
development (Mishra, 2014; Mariott, 2017; Thomas and Tevernier, 2017). Indian 
smallholders are transitioning from semi-subsistence agriculture, to industrialised agriculture 
marked by intensive farming, monocultures, and cash cropping. It is in the context of this 
development that Bt cotton was linked by a resistance movement to indebtedness and suicides. 
Next, the chapter examines how the resistance movement inscribed deviant properties to 
objectively legitimate state-corporate practices, and with what effects.  
 
5.4 Opposition to Bt cotton and censure of MMB 
 
The preceding section demonstrated that the state-corporate symbiosis in this case 
lacked clear, illegitimate property. This section examines the process of censure, looking at 
the motives of resistance, the claims on which it was based, mobilisation and strategies. The 
Bt cotton issue is fraught with contention. From the onset, the biosafety and agronomic 
performance of Bt cotton was hotly disputed. MMB sold Bt cotton to Indian farmers as a 
remedy to indebtedness (Shiva et al, 1999; Nanjundaswamy, 2003). The KRRS and Navdanya 
172 
 
censured the state-corporate conduct over Bt cotton seeds as deviant, in order to prevent its 
release. After the release, the CGMFI changed the tactics of resistance to stop its proliferation. 
The resistance can be divided into three periods: pre-commercial release period (1998-2003), 
post-commercial release period (2003-2009), and Bt monopoly period (2010-2016).  
 
In the initial period, resistance was led by the KRRS through a direct-action 
programme, whilst Navdanya engaged in a ‘public relations battle’ (Stone, 2012). This period 
was marked by strong leadership of M. D. Nanjundaswamy from KRRS and Dr Vandana 
Shiva, the founder of Navdanya. The second period saw the failure of the opposition and the 
proliferation of Bt cotton. In this period the opposition transformed into an amorphous 
network, under the banner of CGMFI, made up of disjoined groups, NGOs and regional 
groups. It was then that many critics of biotechnology gained prominence, e.g. Devinder 
Sharma and Vandana Shiva. The third period saw a dramatic change in approach and tactics. 
Herring (2006: 469) commented on the movement, ‘the movement waxes and wanes, 
regionally and over time, and has no coherent structure…the sum total of anti-transgenic 
activities bears enough commonalities to be analysed collectively.’  
 
On the other spectrum of opposition, a more measured and composed resistance came 
from the Gene Campaign, led by Dr Suman Sahai, and organisations such as Alliance for 
Sustainable and Holistic Agriculture (ASHA). They turned their attention to the issues of 
neoliberal policies, regulatory defects, agronomic performance, suitability of Bt cotton to 
Indian agriculture and market dependency. The defining moments of the resistance were the 
‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ and the ‘Monsanto, Quit India’ campaigns. The section 
considers the different stages of resistance, how the state-corporate illegitimacy was framed, 
the mobilisation of direct-action campaigns, how Monsanto and the Government were affected 
and the response from the state-corporate institutions.  
 
5.4.1 Pre-commercial release period (1998-2003)  
 
Here, the chapter examines how the claims of deviancy were inscribed on Monsanto 
and the Government in the initial stage of the resistance. According to some sources, the 
censure of Monsanto was founded on hyperbolic pronouncements and fallacious claims 
[Interview: Bourienne, 2016; Interview: Karagina, 2016]. There are several, crucial moments 
in the campaign. Karagina [Interview: 2016] asserted that ‘when you are talking about direct 
actions against Bt cotton, you are talking about the period when Nanjundaswamy was still 




contributions to struggles for land rights, fair pricing, and the WTO. The charismatic 
leadership Prof Nanjundaswamy and his agitational style of politics drove the opposition. The 
KRRS spearheaded on-the-ground resistance with ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’, the 
Intercontinental Caravan and several attacks on Monsanto facilities in Bangalore. 
Simultaneously, Navdanya launched the ‘Monsanto, Quit India’ campaign. Navdanya, also, 
led a Public Interest Litigation against Monsanto in the Supreme Court in an attempt to stop 
Bt cotton through a court order.  
 
5.4.1.1 ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ 
 
The Operation followed from conjecture about Bt cotton containing ‘terminator 
technology’. The terminator technology, i.e. ‘gene use restriction technology’ (GURT), ‘is 
designed to control plant fertility through a genetic process triggered by a chemical inducer 
that…[makes] second generation seeds sterile’ (Lombardo, 2014: 995). GURT restricts 
replanting, thereby making farmers dependent on the seed market each season. The label 
‘terminator’ was devised by the Rural Advancement Foundation International of Canada and 
the Genetic Resources Action International based in Spain (Herring, 2006; Scoones, 2008). 
The KRRS borrowed the term from international networks to galvanise farmers. Alarmed, the 
Indian government banned GURT via Office Memorandum No. 82–1/98 PQD, in Lok Sabha 
and Rajya Sabha, dated May 25, l998 (Herring, 2005). However, as Karagina [Interview: 
2016] pointed out, GURT was never used in Bt cotton. GURT was a big issue among 
international networks at the time, but not much was known about it and the KRRS was 
misinformed about the nature of Bt cotton. Karagina [Interview: 2016] asserted that ‘there 
were several critiques how KRRS were misinformed, they thought it was terminator 
technology being used because all the slogans and discourse at that time were about pushing 
back the terminator technology.’ The belief that transgenic cotton would cause harm to the 
biodiversity and farmers’ livelihoods precipitated the ‘termination’ of field trials through a 
direct-action programme. 
 
The Bt cotton issue went public on 24 November 1998. During a press conference the 
Minister of Agriculture of Karnataka, Byre Gowda, was pressured to disclose the locations of 
MMB’s field trials (Nanjundaswamy, 2003; Scoones, 2006). Nanjundaswamy promptly 
issued an open letter calling on KRRS members to join a direct-action programme, ‘Operation 
Cremate Monsanto’. The letter stipulated, 
 
Monsanto's field trials in Karnataka will be reduced to ashes, starting on 
Saturday…On Saturday the 28th of November, at mid-day, thousands of farmers 
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will occupy and burn down the three fields in front of the cameras, in an open, 
announced action of civil disobedience. These actions will start a campaign of 
direct action by farmers against biotechnology, called Operation Cremate 
Monsanto, which will not stop until all the corporate killers like Monsanto, 
Novartis, Pioneer etc. leave the country (Nanjundaswamy, 2003: 152).  
 
On 26 November, KRRS activists conflagrated two test plots in Raichur and Bellary 
districts of Karnataka. Dolohov [Interview: 2016] explained that ‘when we organised 
Operation Cremate Monsanto, the farmers did not know anything about transgenic seeds, 
biotechnology or Bt cotton…We went to the farmers and convinced them that Bt cotton is bad 
for the soil, biodiversity and the farmer. After that the farmers joined us and burnt the crop 
with us.’ According to KRRS, the farmers owning the fields on which Bt trials were conducted 
had no knowledge of Bt cotton (Shiva et al, 2004; Nanjundaswamy, 2004; Shiva and Jalees, 
2006). Bolkonskaya [Interview: 2016], a prominent KRRS activist, recalled that the 
Association would have received information about field trials from inside the Ministry of 
Agriculture and would then convince farmers to let them burn the plots.  
 
One interviewee proclaimed that ‘the intention of these direct actions [Operation 
Cremate Monsanto] was to draw the attention of government. It was the main reason of our 
direct action’ [Interview: Bezukhov, KRRS, Raichur, Aug 2016]. Although, direct action is a 
performative strategy of resistance, it is not intended solely to raise awareness or attract 
attention, but to impose a change (Franks, 2003; de Cleyre, 2004; Moore and Shepard, 2013). 
In this sense, another respondent asserted that ‘direct action is the only way for farmers to be 
heard’ [Interview: Drubetskoy, KRRS, Raichur, Aug 2016]. Direct action is a powerful means 
of resistance, especially for those who do not have institutional authority (de Cleyre, 200; 
Thoreau, 2008). The response from the company and state authorities was different to that in 
Case 1. There were no arrests, charges or trials. Drubetskoy [Interview: 2016] recounted,   
 
The police government officials came to the fields, and farmers 
convinced them: ‘look this is in my field, this is my crop, and it is very harmful 
to the society and nature…We are not [burning] others, we are [burning] our own 
crops and in our own fields.’ We convinced the farmers and gained their 
confidence. The farmers readied direct action programme themselves.  
 
MMB and the Government let the crop burnings proceed because they were conducted 
with the owners’ consent. The MMB and the state ignored the resistance campaign. They were 
able to do so because the operation was conducted on a few fields in Karnataka district, and 
some farmers have blocked the campaign by not giving the KRRS consent to burn their crops. 
For example, Shankarikoppa Mahalingappa, from Haveri district in Karnataka precluded the 




activists who approached him to burn his Bt crop (Scoones, 2006). Not all farmers were 
against transgenic cotton, seeing the potential for profit from cost savings on pesticides and 
higher yields potential. The operation received considerable attention among international 
networks, e.g. La Via Campesina and People’s Global Action, but the farmers unions 
supported the technology [Interview: Karagina, 2016]. A 2001 controversy of ‘stealth seeds’ 
– unauthorised Bt cotton seeds – demonstrated farmers’ support for the technology (see section 
5.4.1.3). Bezukhov [Interview: 2016] expounded that, 
 
…the government ignored us…if the Government ignores then what can 
we do. We opposed Monsanto seeds, but government has not taken our appeal. 
We had to convince the farmers against Monsanto seeds. Direct action was the 
only way. So…we burnt Bt cotton.  
 
Dolohov [Interview: 2016] added that ‘our farmers don’t believe in saying, they 
believe only in action. If you demonstrate action, then they will follow.’ In this sense, the 
operation was enacted not to target MMB or the Government policies in a practical manner, 
but to win farmers’ support for the opposition. Drubetskoy [Interview: 2016] proclaimed that,  
 
We started direct action to educate the farmers…We picked the crops in 
the fields convincing the farmer not to grow Bt cotton. The farmers themselves 
came with us and picked all the crops and we set it on fire. This is how we stated 
agitation against Monsanto in Karnataka. 
 
The KRRS did not target trial plots in State Agricultural Universities, nor did they 
target Monsanto facilities. Rather, the direct-action programme was conducted with the 
consent from Bt plot owners. Thereby, the operation did not express the key features of direct 
action, mainly self-sacrifice and dissent, as the crops conflagrated crops did not belong to the 
activists themselves. The state and MMB were able to ignore the programme, especially 
knowing that biotechnology was supported by the farmers’ unions, e.g. the Kisan 
[agriculturalist] Coordination Committee (KCC) and the Bharatiya Kisan Union [Interview: 
Rostov, farmer, Wardha, Apr 2016]. There was another important direct action which ought 
to be given attention. The next subsection considers how other forms of direct action were 
employed and with what effect.  
 
5.4.1.2 The Intercontinental Caravan  
 
As Bt cotton was introduced by a foreign corporation on the back of the WTO and 
liberal reforms, the KRRS and Navdanya linked it to globalisation. Thereby, the censure of 
Monsanto was immersed in the anti-globalisation rhetoric. Esteemed KRRS activists 
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proclaimed that the WTO, liberal reforms and foreign corporations were ‘anti-farmer’, in a 
sense that agriculture would be controlled by multinationals, while farmers would lose their 
sovereignty and control over their means of production [Interview: Bezukhov, 2016; 
Interview: Drubetskoy, 2016]. In an interview from 1995, Nanjundaswamy asserted ‘the new 
economic policy [neoliberalism]…is the entry point for multinationals…[which] will have 
direct effect on agriculture’ (Nanjundaswamy, 1995). Monsanto and Bt cotton were perceived 
as a corporate threat to Indian farmers. Bezukhov [Interview: 2016] holds that the struggle 
against Bt cotton was not just about biotechnology, ‘it was a struggle against corporate power, 
globalisation and liberalisation…’ Nanjundaswamy (2003) proclaimed that globalisation, 
extended through the WTO, ‘is a recolonization of the South by Northern corporations…’. He 
argued that the neoliberal project of the WTO set the stage for the takeover of the cotton seed 
market by Monsanto.  
 
In this context, the KRRS leadership decided to take the resistance directly to the 
organisations they felt were threatening Indian farmers through, for instance, biotechnology 
[Interview: Bezukhov, 2016; Interview: Dolohov, 2016]. In May-June 1999, the KRRS held 
several protests across Europe to protest the WTO, transnational corporations, biotechnology 
etc. The campaign was dubbed the ‘Intercontinental Caravan’. Around 450 KRRS activists, 
farmers and union representatives travelled to Europe (Bharathan, 2000; Ainger, 2003). 
Demonstrations were held at WTO headquarters in Geneva, the European Commission in 
Brussels, the Monsanto headquarters and the Organization of Economically Developed 
Countries in Paris. The action coalesced issues of transgenic cotton, corporate threat, and the 
TRIPS (Scoones, 2006). In a speech outside of Monsanto headquarters Prof Nanjundaswamy 
cautioned ‘don’t come to India, don’t damage our biodiversity…if you don’t want to be 
cremated, don’t come to India’ (Nanjundaswamy, 1999). The campaign made KRRS famous 
among the international networks and Nanjundaswamy became an icon of the anti-
globalisation movement (Notes from Nowhere, 2003). Notwithstanding, the ‘Intercontinental 
Caravan’ did not stop Bt cotton field trials. The Association, then, attempted to censure 
Monsanto by demolishing its greenhouse and laboratory.  
 
In 2001 and 2003 the Association demolished Monsanto facilities in Bangalore’s 
Institute of Agricultural Research (Nanjundaswamy, 2008). However, the actions were 
disorganised and poorly executed [Interview: Karagina, 2016]. Again, the Government and 
MMB ignored the actions. In the 2001 action, Bolkonskaya [Interview: 2016] relayed, the 
police did not come, so Nanjundaswamy directed the activists to turn themselves in. However, 
‘the police told them that the campus doesn’t come under our jurisdiction, you have to go to 




released the following day’ [Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]. Similarly, in the 2003 action the 
police responded mildly. Karagina [Interview: 2016] recounted, ‘the police didn’t press any 
charges against us, they just took us away and kept us in a police station for a few hours.’ 
MMB responded by moving their research facility to Mumbai. Nanjundaswamy’s direct action 
programme had marginal impact, while the state secured farmers’ support through the unions. 
The inscription of deviancy on Monsanto and the Government did not resonate with the 
farmers. The state was able to ignore the opposition and proceed with the assessment of Bt 
cotton, eventually releasing it in 2001. Simultaneously, Navdanya led another campaign, 
censuring MMB and the Government.  
 
5.4.1.3 The ‘Monsanto, Quite India’ campaign and ‘seeds of suicide’ 
 
In the late-1990s, Navdanya launched the ‘Monsanto, Quit India’ campaign, centred 
on issues of farmers’ sovereignty, corporate control of agriculture, suicides and indebtedness 
(Shiva and Jalees, 2006; Navdanya, 2004). Navdanya argued that due to the monopolistic 
tendencies of transnational corporations, transgenic cotton would lead to an increase in the 
costs of cotton production, loss of seed diversity and market dependency (Navdanya, 2004; 
Shiva and Jalees, 2006). Navdanya was the first organisation that linked Bt cotton to farmer 
suicides. It started with an outbreak of farmer suicides in Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh 
in 1998. The case was published by Navdanya in Seeds of Suicide, titled after MMB’s Miracle 
Seed advertisement (Shiva and Jalees, 2006 [1999]). According to Shiva the suicides in 
Warangal were most prevalent among Bt cotton producers, even though Bt cotton was still at 
a trial stage (Shiva and Jalees, 2006). The publication, however, ignored the losses incurred 
by conventional cotton producers due to drought (Herring, 2005, 2007; Stone, 2007). The 
emergent rhetoric dovetailed with a nationalist-Gandhian leitmotif of corporate invaders, as 
Shiva and Jalees (2006) connected the losses to corporate control of agriculture.  
 
A representative of Navdanya insisted that ‘when we show the Government that Bt 
cotton is failing they still don’t acknowledge the fact that it is failing; it is causing debt, it is 
causing suicides, it is causing misery to our farmers’ [Interview: Kuragin, Navdanya, 
Dehradun, Apr 2016]. The Gene Campaign representative contested such claims, because they 
were based on anecdotal evidence [Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. It was surmised that the 
transgenic cotton was the cause of farmer suicides, just because, at the time, Warangal was 
one of the key districts for field trials (Stone, 2007; Herring, 2007). Bt cotton was not linked 




Kuragin [Interview: 2016] relayed that Navdanya’s main contributions to the 
resistance was made through organisational literature, educational workshops and discourse 
in the media. Coordinating with international networks, Navdanya launched a ‘public relations 
battle’ through the ‘Monsanto, Quit India’ campaign (Herring, 2005; Scoones, 2006). The 
campaign was, primarily, an awareness raising effort via media. The slogan resonated 
Gandhi’s ‘Quit India’ struggle against Britain. Navdanya used national symbols appealing to 
nationalist sentiments (Assadi, 2002; Herring, 2005; Reitan, 2007). For example, they 
employed independence and Gandhian principles in activist narratives, e.g. Bija Swaraj (Seed 
Self-Rule) and Seed Satyagraha (Seed Sovereignty) (Shiva, 1997; Nanjundaswamy, 1998, 
2003; Navdanya, 2004, 2013). One study participant relayed that, 
 
in 1993 KRRS launched Seed Satyagraha…Similar to Gandhi’s Salt 
Satyagraha. During this period, we ransacked Cargill Seed Company’s office in 
Bangalore, laboratory in Ballari district. Later, we did the same with KFC and 
Monsanto. The resistance against Bt cotton was part of this Satyagraha 
[Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]. 
 
Both, Navdanya and KRRS, being part of international networks, employed fallacious 
claims in a rhetorical, demagogic manner (Herring, 2006; Stone, 2012). Yet, they were 
detached from the grassroots resistance. Karagina [Interview: 2016] asserted that ‘Navdanya 
is an international organisation…but on the ground most of the work around Bt cotton is done 
by grassroots groups, such as Alliance for Sustainable and Holistic Agriculture (ASHA).’ 
Navdanya and the KRRS were closely connected to international networks, namely La Via 
Campesina and Peoples’ Global Action (PGA) (Herring, 2005). The PGA is a ‘network of 
direct action, urban and rural collectives for autonomy and against capitalism…inspired by 
the 1994 Zapatista uprising against neoliberal reforms’ (Reitan, 2007: 188). La Via Campesina 
is a global network of peasant movements, concerned with food sovereignty, smallholders’ 
rights, rural poverty, environment etc. (Nanjundaswamy, 2003). The KRRS and Navdanya 
were often criticised for the upper-caste background of the leaders who were removed from 
the reality of the issues they campaigned on (Reitan, 2007). Nevertheless, the Government 
and MMB ignored the campaign. In response, Navdanya sought to force the issue onto the 
state by filing a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). 
 
This litigation contrasts with Case 1, where the resistance actors subverted the state’s 
legal apparatus in order to put UEL on trial and to obtain data about illegitimate conduct. 
Similarly, the resistance actors in this case tried to use the power of the judiciary to obtain 
data and censure state-corporate conduct. However, in this case, rather than using the judiciary 




In January 1999, the Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology (RFSTE), 
headed by Vandana Shiva, filed a PIL challenging the legitimacy of Bt field trials (see Shiva 
and Jalees, 2006: 85). The RFSTE, associated with Navdanya through Shiva, contested the 
legitimacy of field trials, on alleged technical failings by the Review Committee on Genetic 
Manipulation (RCGM) of regulatory procedure under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 
(Navdanya, 2004). According to the RFSTE, the first large-scale trials were conducted on 40 
plots of 1 acre, in June-July 1998, in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Haryana and 
Punjab, a month before RCGM endorsed them in July-August 1998 (Shiva et al, 1999; 
Bharathan, 2000).  
 
Under the additional Rules (1989) of the Environment (Protection) Act, the 
permission of open field trials can be granted only by the GEAC (Shiva et al, 2002). The 
RCGM must evaluate transgenic material for biosafety before recommending it for large scale 
field trials to GEAC (Bharathan, 2000). The post facto approval of field trials by RCGM raised 
questions about the legitimacy of the trials. Commenting on this, Bolkonskaya (2016) posited 
that ‘Bt came in very silently, nobody knew what was going on, already at that time there was 
a lot of resistance to GM technology all over the world, a lot of debates were going on. While 
we were debating about it, it already entered India through the illegal field trials.’ The PIL led 
to a number of court hearings where evidence was submitted against Monsanto at the Supreme 
Court. Albeit, the PIL never succeeded in changing the approval decision, and by 2005 was 
dropped. Apart from the failure of the resistance, there was another important factor that led 
to the release of Bt cotton. The ‘stealth seeds’, further, frustrated the resistance, revealing 
KRRS and Navdanya’s detachment form the issues on the ground.  
 
5.4.1.4 ‘Stealth Seeds’ and faltering resistance 
 
In 2001, Gujarat authorities discovered ‘£30 million worth of unauthorised transgenic 
cotton grown in some 11,000 hectares in Gujarat’ (Jayaraman, 2001: 1090). The seeds – 
Navbharat-151 – containing Monsanto’s Bt gene were sold by the company Navbharat Seed 
(Ahmedabad), in violation of the Environment Protection Act (1986). The issue was labelled 
‘Stealth Seeds’ because they came in through the cottage industry and farmers were unaware 
the seeds carried the Bt gene [Interview: Bourienne, 2016; Interview: Kuruganti, 2016; 
Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]. The Union Government ordered the destruction of all Bt 
fields. However, the authorities were met with resistance from the farmers, because the illegal 
cotton proved very effective. Bourienne [Interview: 2016] contended that ‘the early Bt cotton 
sold illegally was a good genetic material, that’s why farmers liked it.’ The crops expressed 
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resistance to cotton eating bollworms and had higher yield. The rumours of high yields and 
savings on pesticides from illegal Navbharat-151 seeds were a promotional showcase for 
MMB’s Bt hybrids. 
 
Indian farmers encountered Bt cotton for the first time through contradictory rhetoric; 
misinformation of the opposition and rumours from Gujarat (Scoones, 2006; Herring, 2007; 
Stone, 2012). Nevertheless, because the Navbharat seeds were effective the news that Bt gene 
works spread quickly throughout the country and farmers were eager to get their hands on the 
new technology [Interview: Bourienne, 2016; Interview: Kuragina, 2016]. On 25 March 2002 
the Kisan [agriculturalist] Coordination Committee (KCC), led by Sharad Joshi, threatened 
with civil-disobedience if Delhi did not release Bollgard (Ramana, 2006). The following day 
Bt cotton was approved by the GEAC and released for commercial production in April. 
Farmers, de facto, did not oppose the technology, the anti-globalisation movement did. 
Herring (2009) stressed that farmers are rational, economic actors and have interest in 
potentially profitable technologies.  
 
The KRRS and Navdanya were disconnected from farmers’ real experience and did 
not represent their immediate economic interest. The misrepresentation of Bt cotton in 
constructs of ‘suicide seeds’ and ‘terminator technology’ played into Monsanto’s hands, as 
Navbharat seeds contradicted the dramaturgical narrative. Herring (2007: 140) posited that 
‘the micro-economic success of Bt technology outweighed the more indirect, distal and 
hypothetical arguments about foreign control and dangerous genes: oppositional discourse 
outran agricultural interests.’ The ‘stealth seeds’ episode discredited the movement.  
 
The KRRS’s leadership waned from 2004, in part, due to Nanjundaswamy’s failing 
health and eventual death in February 2004. An internal rift within KRRS was another factor 
of subsiding resistance (Ramana, 2006; Herring, 2006). Following an unsuccessful State 
Assembly election in 1999, the Association split into two separate factions. The rift was 
caused by an ideological dichotomy between a camp, led by K. S. Puttanaiah, wanting to 
pursue electoral politics, and Nanjundaswamy’s followers who remained dedicated to the 
agitational politics and the idea of ‘village republic’ (Madsen, 2014). The offshoot led by 
Puttanaiah took the name Sarvodaya Karnataka and pursued electoral politics.  
 
Navdanya was heavily criticised in the academic literature for promulgating false 
claims about the correlation between farmer suicides and Bt cotton hybrids (Herring, 2005). 
Additionally, Navdanya toned down the ‘terminator technology’. For instance, the new edition 




biodiversity and the possibilities of ecological and sustainable agriculture based on the 
conservation of biodiversity’ Shiva and Jalees (2006: 100). Other NGOs, e.g. the Gene 
Campaign, rebuked the claims of ‘terminator technology’ and ‘seeds of suicides’. Bourienne 
[Interview: 2016] expressed the following disapproval: 
 
One thing that saddens me is a lot of what is being said is factually 
incorrect. A lot is hyped in rhetoric and dramatic pronouncements…I sat on a lot 
of committees, also on the GEAC, and I cringe with embarrassment when 
somebody quotes outlandish statements that there are poisonous genes in our 
food…it harms the struggle inordinately…It may feel popular and sound as 
something clever, but it is something that causes me despair because it gives an 
upper hand to your opponent, because they can then say: “look this is the kind of 
crap they are talking about, you don’t need to take them seriously”. There are 
others who do some fantastic work and research, make careful measured 
statements, but there are many who make very irresponsible and dramatic 
statements for effect rather than to try really change something. Monsanto is not 
stupid, they hire very qualified scientists. Make no mistake, every scientist hired 
by Monsanto or any such company is technically very qualified, so when you say 
such crap, they will throw it back in your face within 5 seconds. The moment 
somebody is able to say that you talk rubbish you have already lost credibility – 
with the general middle class that’s fence sitting, that’s not pro or anti, and 
doesn’t understand too much, but is watching this debate from the sides. That 
hurts your case. I wish many of our partners would understand that short term 
gain of something dramatic is a long-term damage. 
 
The national, elite organisations pursued their own anti-globalisation agenda, but did 
not appeal to the interests of smallholders who sought some way out of indebtedness and 
poverty. Bt cotton was offered to Indian farmers as a market choice and an answer to 
unprofitable crops. The point is that farmers are rational actors, and Rostov [Interview: 2016] 
pointed out that ‘farmers will go for whatever gets them more money.’ The resistance failed 
to effectively censure the Government and MMB. Deviancy labels were inscribed on MMB, 
but the illegitimacy was absent from state-corporate conduct. Nevertheless, Bt cotton was 
released into agriculture. The struggle, then, changed from preventing the release of Bt cotton 
to convincing farmers to shift to non-Bt alternatives. With it new narratives and counter-
narratives emerged.  
 
5.4.2 Post-commercial release (2003-2009) 
 
In this period, resistance was mobilised around research findings on Bt cotton, rather 
than direct action ascribing criminal intent on Monsanto and the Government. The resistance 
actors used a ‘failure narrative’ to discredit MMB and link indebtedness to Bt cotton. The 
main architects of the failure narrative were CGMFI and Navdanya, who used research to 
advance their campaign objectives. Many anticipated the 2005/6 review of the three-year Bt 
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cotton period. There was a continuous torrent of Bt cotton performance studies published in 
scientific journals, media, government and industry reports. From one spectrum of the debate, 
economists, government institutions and industry hailed Bt cotton a success, from the other, 
academics working with NGOs argued that Bt cotton failed (Stone, 2012; Herring, 2013). 
CICR in Nagpur, Cotton Corporation of India (CCI), GEAC, International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) focused on Bt’s rapid adoption, overall 
growth of land under Bt cotton and yield potential (Barwale et al, 2004; Visawadi et al, 2006; 
Sadashivappa and Qaim, 2009; Choudhary and Gaur, 2010; Gruere and Sengupta, 2011; CCI, 
2017). The CGMFI and Navdanya linked transgenic hybrids to indebtedness and suicides with 
poor empirical support (Kuruganti, 2009; Swaminathan and Rawal, 2011; CGMI, 2012; 
GMWatch, 2012). However, arguments on both sides of the debate were linked to private 
interests, whether corporate or NGO.  
 
Economists Qaim and Zilberman (2003) published one of the first studies of Bt cotton 
performance in Science, entitled Yield Effects of Genetically Modified Crops in Developing 
Countries. Their study forecasted 87% yield advantage (Qaim and Zilberman, 2003). 
However, it was subjected to severe criticism because it was based on a single set of data 
obtained from Mahyco. Sahai (2003: 974) pointed out that ‘[based on] a single set of trial data 
of Bt cotton from one season in India, Qaim and Zilberman project high yields for all GM 
crops in all developing countries.’ The evaluation conducted by the Gene Campaign (Sahai 
and Rahman, 2003) contradicted Qaim and Zilberman’s (2003) prognostics. Sahai and 
Rahman (2003) found that yields in Bt cotton were lower than in non-Bt varieties due to mixed 
factors, e.g. technical assistance, seed price, irrigation, insect population etc. NGO-connected 
scientists, Abdul Qayum and Kiran Sakkhari (2003) reported a 53% yield disadvantage for Bt 
cotton. Bourienne [Interview: 2016] revealed,  
 
We [conducted performance studies] in Vidarbha and in Andhra. We 
found that in both locations the Bt cotton was way behind the normal hybrid stem 
from a second growing. The performance was a failure and when we did the 
calculation, I remember the figures, Re. 1275, I think, per acre was the loss that 
the farmers incurred… 
 
The second approval event took place in 2006, as GEAC authorised the release of 
double Bt gene hybrid Bollgard-II, and in 2009 GEAC approved stacked gene Bt hybrids 
(Choudhary and Gaur, 2010; Chaudhary and Gaur, 2015). The second event included Bt 
hybrids introduced by two domestic companies that licensed the technology from Monsanto, 
JK AgriGenetics Ltd and Nath Seeds Ltd, sourced from the Indian Institute of Technology and 




Bt cotton performance was closely observed by NGOs and farmers’ organisations. The KRRS 
was crippled by internal turmoil and Navdanya’s credibility was damaged nationally. New 
organisations, mainly CGMFI, picked up the pieces left by KRRS and Navdanya. The release 
of Bt cotton and its evaluation resulted in new narratives, i.e. ‘Bt cotton success’ and ‘Bt cotton 
failure’.  
 
Stone (2012: 67) acknowledged that both narratives have problematic empirical basis 
‘generated, authenticated, and disseminated by a particular system of interacting parties with 
overlapping interests.’ For example, Choudhary and Gaur’s (2010) ISAAA publication, 
Herring (2009), Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009) etc. grounded their claims of Bt cotton success 
in rapid adoption rate. Rapid adoption of Bt cotton by farmers, Herring and Rao (2012) argue, 
‘tells a success story’. Sales performance, Stone (2007: 68) documents, was 72,000 packs in 
2002 and 230,000 in 2003; in 2004 sales jumped to 1.3 million packs; in 2005 sales grew to 
over 3 million packs. CICR study, Success Story of Bt cotton in India (Khadi, 2007), attributed 
the adoption rate to lower pesticide demand for Bt cotton and higher yields. Studies by 
Barwale et al (2004), Bennett et al (2006), Gandhi and Namboodiri (2006) from the Indian 
Institute of Management, Subramanian (2009) and many more reported 21%-50% decline in 
pesticide spraying, 31% yield gains and overall 71% increase in net profit margin. Shah’s 
(2012) review of research conducted since 2002 concluded with a positive portrait of Bt 
cotton, pointing out the gains in yields and savings on pesticides. Sadashivappa and Qaim, 
(2009: 172) concluded that ‘on average, Bt-adopting farmers realize pesticide reductions of 
roughly 40%, and yield advantages of 30–40%.’ Dozens of other studies published by the 
CICR, MMB, ISAAA and other institutions supported the success narrative.  
 
The performance of Bt seeds was disputed, mainly, in independent and unofficial 
studies by organisations with campaign interests (Stone, 2007). The Gene Campaign 
contributed research output important to the construction of ‘Bt cotton failure’ narrative since 
early 2000s (Sahai, 2003; Sahai and Rahman, 2003; Sahai, 2004), CGMFI has been claiming 
failure of Bt cotton since 2006 (Kuruganti, 2009). Devinder Sharma, a renowned critic of 
biotechnology, contributed to the narrative by labelling Bt cotton as a ‘scientific fraud’ 
(GMWatch, 2002; Sharma, 2006). Navdanya, persisted with the ‘seeds of suicide’ narrative 
imbedding it in the ‘failure’ narrative by claiming Bt cotton failed to deliver industry’s 
promises, exacerbated indebtedness and caused suicides (Navdanya, 2004; Shiva and Jalees, 
2006; CGMFI, 2012, 2017). A respondent from CGMFI stated,   
 
when the Bt cotton was introduced we were promised that it would raise 
farmers’ income, it will take them out of the kind of crisis that exists today…as 
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we all know 70% of famer suicides are happening among cotton cultivators. 
These are the farmers who should have yield, which means that they should not 
be committing suicide… [Interview: Wilarski, 2016]. 
 
CGMFI’s (2010) report, 10 Years of Bt Cotton: False Hype and Failed Promises 
Cotton, argued that Bt cotton has been effective only in the North Zone, e.g. Gujarat, where 
well-endowed farmers with irrigated lands have the resources to invest in capital-intensive 
crops. Whereas, in the Central Zone, mainly Maharashtra, and the South Zone, where 60% of 
crops are cultivated on rainfed land and farmers rely on informal credit, Bt cotton fared poorly 
(White, 2008; Kuruganti, 2009; CGMFI, 2010; Stone, 2012). Based on such findings, CGMFI 
argued the ‘failure’ case.  
 
Herring (2009) repudiated the ‘failure’ narrative because it renders Indian farmers 
gullible and incompetent ‘peasants’, incapable of market rationality. Additionally, the MMB 
is portrayed as a malevolent actor intent on harming Indian smallholders. Take for example 
Navdanya’s (2004) publication Monsanto the Gene Giant: Peddling Life Science or Death 
Sciences. Though, the ‘failure’ narrative’s rendition of the actual scenario is imposing with its 
sensational tone, it exaggerated the situation. Herring (2007: 136) argues that, just as the 
‘terminator technology’ and ‘seeds of suicide’, the ‘failure’ narrative, although ‘strategically 
partisan’, is ‘empirically groundless’. Attacking the ‘Bt cotton failure’ story, Bourienne 
[Interview: 2016] accentuated that, 
 
there is no point in being rhetorical, use facts. Facts damn this 
technology, in these 20 years this technology has been tested and so much has 
been hidden, so much subterfuge has taken place, so much of these shenanigans 
of the industry, all of that is on the record now. There is no need to say something 
[inaccurate]. When all this evidence is put together, it’s demining enough. 
 
The results of Bt cotton after seven years were ‘inconclusive’ (Smale et al, 2009: 21). 
The ‘success’ narrative overlooked spatio-temporal variability in performance studies. While, 
Gujarat demonstrated 70% surge in yields (Gruere et al, 2008), in drought prone states, e.g. 
Maharashtra, yields have dropped by up to 50% (Bennett et al, 2006). The common limitations 
of most research claiming ‘success’ are, the focus on brief periods and selection bias towards 
affluent farmers (Stone, 2011). For example, Morse et al (2007) selected Bt producers with 
58% more land and 75% more non-land assets; Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009) found Bt 
adopters to own up to 36% more land; Lalitha et al (2009) found Bt-adopters to be better 
educated and more diversified. Several well-known studies were, in fact, sponsored by 
Monsanto (Sheridan, 2009), used data collected by Mahyco (Bennet et al, 2006; Qaim and 





Hence, Bourienne (2016) insisted that facts tell the truth, while hyperbolic and 
dramatic pronouncements weakened the arguments against transgenic cotton to their dubious 
empirical grounding easily denied by the success narrative. The failure narrative did not 
explain changed cropping patterns and did not explain why farmers shifted to Bt cotton. The 
resistance to Bt cotton was a struggle to ‘keep the control over the cotton seed in the hands of 
communities, in the hands of the farmers’ [Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]. Today, 90% of 
cotton seed on the market are Bt hybrids. Nevertheless, the issue of Bt cotton, in relation to 
indebtedness and suicides, was a development problem, not a case of state-corporate 
illegitimacy as claimed initially by the KRRS and Navdanya. However, this became evident 
only after Bt cotton became the only cotton seed available in the market. 
 
5.4.3 Eight years after the commercial release (2010-2016)   
 
The fast adoption rate resulted, within a couple of seasons, in abandonment of seed 
saving practices. Kuragin [Interview: 2016], a representative of Navdanya, proclaimed that 
since 2009 ‘95% of India’s cotton is Monsanto’s Bt cotton. This happened in the last 15 years. 
All of our cotton diversity has been replaced with [transgenic hybrid].’ Indeed, Chaudhary and 
Gaur (2015: 8) reported that 7.7 million farmers, representing approximately 95% of the total 
cotton producers, cultivated Bt hybrids in 2010-14. The oppositional discourse shifted from 
exaggerated vision of environmental and agricultural catastrophe to carefully measured 
criticism of biotech industry’s claims, questioning the veracity of the ‘success’ narrative. This 
was evident in the resistance mounted to halt industries attempts to introduce Bt brinjal (2009-
2010) and then genetically modified (GM) mustard (2014-2016). Social opprobrium was 
redirected at the fact that Bt cotton has not reduced indebtedness, as was promised by the 
industry, ecological balance between cotton and cotton insects was destabilised, and farming 
communities’ lost control of the cotton seed. The strategies of resistance, also, changed from 
dramatic campaigns and direct-action programmes to awareness raising and building 
alternatives.  
 
It would be somewhat inaccurate to surmise that MMB monopolised India’s cotton 
seed market. Until 2016, MMB was the sole proprietor of the only Bt gene, the company only 
licensed it to domestic seed companies (Arya, 2016). In 2015, there were 45 Indian seed 
companies producing and distributing Bt hybrids (Choudhary and Gaur, 2015). This unique 
position afforded MMB the exclusive privilege to charge royalty fees on licences. Due to a 
high demand for Bt hybrids, other varieties of cotton seeds were pushed out of the market. 
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Although, not a monopoly, cotton seed market turned into an oligopoly. As cotton production 
became homogenised, problems with Bt gene began to emerge. Kutuzov [Interview: 2016] 
asserted ‘it took some time, 10 years, but farmers learnt from the adverse effects about the 
risks of Bt cotton.’ Bt cotton is a capital-intensive crop, it requires a lot of external input. There 
are several issues worth mentioning. The first, between 2003 and 2016 the cost of Bt cotton 
was four times the cost of non-Bt seeds, Rs. 1,600 compered to Rs. 400 (Pray and Nagarajan, 
2010). The second, it is a high input crop, i.e. it requires fertiliser, insecticides for secondary 
pests, and irrigation (Kuruganti, 2009). The third, it is not suitable for rainfed agriculture, 
especially in drought prone regions (Sahai, 2003a). Due to these reasons the Gene Campaign 
and CGMFI have argued that Bt cotton is not suitable to Indian agriculture, which is still 
transitioning from subsistence farming to industrial farming.   
 
In 2009-10 Bt cotton started to create problems for smallholders. While the threat of 
American bollworm was effectively addressed with transgenic hybrids, many secondary 
insects, e.g. pink bollworm, have proliferated. Pink bollworm developed resistance to Bt gene. 
The first pink bollworm infestation occurred in Gujarat, in 2010, and caused inordinate losses 
(Kranthi, 2015). More pink bollworm attacks were reported in 2014, 2015 and 2016 (Kranthi, 
2015). Such incidents propped the connections made by the opposition between Bt cotton and 
indebtedness. This emboldened CGMFI, which persisted with the ‘Bt cotton failure’ narrative. 
In a report, entitled 15 Years of Bt cotton in India: Admission of Failure Official Now, CGMFI 
(2017) documented the gradual development of resistance by pink bollworm to Bollgard.  
 
Albeit, since the Operation Cremate Monsanto and the failed ‘Bt cotton failure’ 
narrative, the movement has changed strategies of resistance. Drubetskoy [Interview: 2016], 
of the KRRS, avowed that ‘initially when the field trials were happening, we uprooted the 
crops and burnt them, that was the way of protest. Now that Monsanto is already here, we are 
protesting by calling on farmers and encouraging them not to plant Bt cotton.’ Kuragin 
[Interview: 2016] asserted that currently Navdanya teaches ‘farmers how to transition to 
organic farming; we give them financial support, we link them to markets; we empower the 
women; we run awareness campaigns, and seed distribution campaigns.’ CGMFI, too, leads 
public education campaign about, 
 
…what biotechnology [Bt cotton] is, who these corporations [Monsanto] 
are, and what is the decision-making process regarding transgenic crops 
[regulation]…To make resistance effective we need people to come together. As 
far as that goes, collectivism and voluntarism is important. There is lack of people 
coming together…Yes, there are examples of some people and organisations 




way to do that is through educating farmers and wining them over [Interview: 
Denisov, CGMFI, Wardha, Apr 2016]. 
 
The problem, Denisov [Interview: 2016] pointed out, is that ‘public resistance is 
limited…it is dispersed into isolated pockets.’ Corroborating this, Kutuzov [Interview: 2016] 
stressed that ‘the movement is very weak, it is limited to a handful of people…It is not a mass 
movement. There may be many NGOs working in India, but they are isolated, and resources 
are limited.’ Because the CGMFI is fragmented they command limited resources, which then 
precludes their ability to mobilise people, events, actions etc. In addition, Denisov [Interview: 
2016] identified three divergent camps and views within the campaign. The first is the 
environmental camp, which argues that all biotechnology should be banned because it harms 
the ecosystem and biodiversity. The second is the leftist camp, which opposes privately 
owned, but support publicly owned, biotechnology. The third, dominant camp, is the Hindu-
nationalist camp, which opposes all foreign influences in agriculture and campaigns for Desi13 
crop varieties. As Herring (2015) emphasised, farmers and the civil society do not speak with 
a single voice, interests are polarised. 
 
Therefore, Kutuzov [Interview: 2016] argued that most importantly the movement 
must bring all the groups together, involve farmers in campaigns, build awareness about 
alternatives to Bt cotton and use scientific facts to educate farmers about hazards associated 
with biotechnology. When farmers realise the detriments of Bt cotton, and simultaneously, are 
offered viable alternatives they will join the opposition to biotechnology [Interview: Kutuzov, 
2016; Interview: Karagina, 2016]. Denisov [Interview: 2016] insisted that, in order for the 
opposition to have an impact, the movement ‘must be more than just NGOs and groups of 
individuals who are in different parts, working on different topics…Resistance involves public 
education of farmers.’ One of the key limitations previous campaigns identified by CGMFI is 
the lack of alternatives. In the initial stage the KRRS and Navdanya failed to offer a viable 
alternative to the farmers.  
 
Although, not unanimous in their voice nor effective, opponents of Bt cotton created 
a powerful ‘aura’ of uncertainty and distrust towards the biotech industry, which later 
influenced the resistance to Bt brinjal and GM mustard (Herring, 2015). Having learnt a lesson 
from the Bt cotton episode, a broad coalition of diverse NGOs, movement organisations, 
unions etc. stopped the introduction of Bt brinjal in 2009-10 and GM mustard in 2016. Kuragin 
[Interview: 2016] informs us:  
 
                                                          
13 Desi refers broadly to the people, cultures, and products of the Indian subcontinent. 
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…there was a debate in India to get GM mustard to be the first food crop 
in India, and Navdanya resisted that. Right now, there is a moratorium on that. 
We even fought when they tried to introduce GM brinjal. We fought that and said 
‘no’, GM crop should not be allowed in India. In fact, recent ruling comes that 
agricultural minister has said that Monsanto is not allowed to collect the high 
royalties that it has been collecting so far. Things in India have taken quite a turn 
that seems like it’s a first major defeat for Monsanto in India right now. 
 
Kutuzov [Interview: 2016] stated that ‘there is no programme for success. Some 
activists do direct action…some write petitions and go to court, and nothing happens. Success 
is not in my hands, only action is in my hands.’ According to Kutuzov [Interview: 2016], they 
do not have control over the outcome of resistance, they only control the action itself. Success 
comes as a result of a continued struggle. The failure of the Operation Cremate Monsanto does 
not signal the end of the resistance to transgenic cotton and corporate power it evokes 
(Herring, 2006). The struggle for independence took over thirty years. Likewise, this struggle 
may take several years or decades before Indian farmers return to seed saving practices and 
non-Bt cotton seeds.  
 
Although the resistance continues, MMB profited inordinately from Bt cotton. MMB 
made a 45% internal rate of return on initial US $ 2 million investment (Shah, 2012). The 
resistance failed to censure and prohibit the biotech industry, mainly because there was no 
explicit state-corporate criminality. What happened instead, was a slow process of social 
harm. In pursuing development objectives through neoliberal policy, the Indian Government 
created a situation that had a harmful, long-term effect on smallholders. Additionally, the 
KRRS and Navdanya did not understand the issue nor represented farmers interests. 
Bourienne [Interview: 2016] argued that ‘most NGOs were clueless about biotechnology. 
Very few people knew about Bt cotton issue…hence MMB was able to work under the radar.’ 
Instead of using facts to win the case, as Bourienne [Interview: 2016] stressed, the movement 
opted for sensational and hyperbolic narratives which distanced them from farmers.  
 
Following on from the above, rather than winning farmers over by offering a viable 
alternative, Navdanya, KRRS as well as CGMFI entertained political rhetoric, i.e. ‘terminator 
technology, ‘seeds of suicide’ and ‘Bt cotton failure’. The correlation between Bt cotton and 
the agrarian crisis was given a causative dynamic, by linking it to suicides. In reality, Bt cotton 
correlated to suicides because it was introduced into a crisis situation. Illegitimacy was absent 
from state-corporate activities, therefore the deviancy labels inscribed on MMB and the 
Government were ineffective. The social harm that resulted from market monopoly by MMB, 
loss of seed diversity, indebtedness and suicides are a development issue, and perhaps better 







To summarise, the censure of the Government and MMB was performed through a 
rather incongruous resistance campaign. In the section the analysis divided the resistance into 
three stages to demonstrate how the camping initially escalated, but then receded and 
transformed according to the changing circumstances. Initially, the KRRS led on-the-ground 
resistance with a direct-action programme, including the ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ and 
attacks on Monsanto’s facilities. Additionally, 450 KRRS activists participated in the 
Intercontinental Caravan to protest the WTO and foreign corporations, such as Monsanto. 
Simultaneously, Navdanya organised the ‘Monsanto, Quit India’ campaign, mostly a public 
relations campaign intended to discredit MMB and to galvanise farmers to reject Bt cotton. 
Both organisations tried to incite a popular rejection of biotechnology through Gandhian, 
national-populist rhetoric. They used demagogy and Gandhian symbolisms to arouse 
independence sentiments, e.g. ‘Monsanto, Quit India’, seed satyagraha, bija swaraj, etc. They 
presented the issue of Bt cotton as one of neo-colonialism by foreign corporations, a backdoor 
entry to control Indian agriculture, and the threat of globalisation to farmers’ independence 
and sovereignty.  
 
The deviant properties inscribed on MMB were grounded in the anti-globalisation, 
Hindu-nationalist rhetoric. The KRRS and Navdanya made fallacious claims about 
‘terminator technology’, ‘seeds of suicides’ and malicious intent to take control over Indian 
agriculture (Shiva et al, 1999; Nanjundaswamy, 1999, 2001; Shiva and Jalees, 2006). 
However, the direct-action programme and Navdanya’s ‘public relations battle’ failed to 
prevent the release of Bt cotton. It is argued that, the movement elites were disconnected from 
farmers’ real experience; the campaign reached international networks rather than grassroots 
and regional organisations; the movement elites represented these international networks and 
not the farmers; and, stigmatisation of MMB was based on fallacious and hyperbolic 
allegations without revealing substantive evidence (see Frank, 2003; de Cleyre, 2004; Moore 
and Shepard, 2013; Schock, 2013). Additionally, direct actions lacked the element of self-
sacrifice, they were disconnected from the farmers’ lived experience, they misrepresented the 
issue of Bt cotton, and they did not expose any illegitimacy (see Friedrichs, 2012; Lasslett et 
al, 2015). Rather than targeting Monsanto directly, the ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ was 
performed on farmers’ fields. The resistance actors convinced individual farmers to grant them 
permission to conflagrate Bt crops. However, they omitted the widespread support for the 




The experience of direct-action campaigns taught the movement that direct resistance 
would not work unless there is a widespread rejection of biotechnology. Direct, practical forms 
of resistance may be effective where resistance actors seek to censure state-corporate conduct 
as deviant in order to stop it. In a situation where a social struggle deals with issues created by 
economic development, a more subtle, sustained form of resistance works better (Sahai, 2005). 
Hence, a broad, decentralised coalition, viz. the CGMFI, proved an effective means for 
building a large support base for alternatives to Bt cotton. The coalition used farmers’ 
experience of Bt cotton to galvanise them against biotechnology. Yet, an exaggerated narrative 
of ‘Bt cotton failure’ proved ineffective, as Bt cotton failed only under certain conditions. 
Other NGOs, e.g. the Gene Campaign, turned attention to different issues: 1) the 
monopolisation of the cotton seed market by MMB created market-dependency, dispossessed 
farmers of their means of production and caused loss of seed diversity. 2) MMB charged 
inflated royalty fees which made the costs of Bt cotton production considerably high. 3) Bt 
cotton is a capital-intensive crop intended for well-endowed farmers with irrigated land, not 
for smallholders. 
 
The CGMFI, the Gene Campaign, scientists and independent groups pointed to the 
apparent failure of Bt cotton to deliver on the promises made by the biotech industry and the 
Government (CGMFI, 2010; Thomas and Tevernier, 2017). The industry and the Government 
promised lower costs of production, elimination of primary pests and higher income. Yet, 
cotton farmers continued to fall into debt. Unlike the KRRS and Navdanya, the CGMFI and 
the Gene Campaign focused its efforts on documenting the said failure, building viable 
alternatives, conserving biodiversity, and promoting sustainability (Sahai and Rahman, 2003; 
Sahai, 2004, 2005). Indebtedness and farmer suicides are not caused by an illegitimate state-
corporate activity, but rather are a symptom of economic development (Scoones, 2006; Stone, 
2012). The chapter revealed in the foregoing section that biotechnology and Bt cotton was 
part of the Government’s development vision for agriculture. Bt cotton were intended for 
industrialising farmers, not for smallholders, to stimulate intensification of agricultural 
production in congruence with the neoliberal model of export-led economic growth. As such, 
it is argued that indebtedness and farmer suicides are better understood as a social harm 
produced by an accelerating transition from semi-subsistence agriculture to industrial 







5.5 Deconstructing social harm  
 
The preceding sections examined the claims of illegitimacy by analysing the state-
corporate processes through which Bt cotton was introduced, viz. the regulatory assessment 
and the ABP. It then examined the censuring campaigns by means of which resistance actors 
attempted to inscribed deviancy labels on the Government and MMB. According to the 
evidence, the state-corporate activities were not illegitimate, and the deviancy labels were 
based on fallacious claims and populist-national rhetoric. The social harm that resulted from 
the proliferation of Bt cotton is better approached as a ‘structural violence’, because it is a 
development problem. Cotton is a capital-intensive crop, it requires intensive application of 
external inputs, mainly pesticides due to a large number of cotton eating insects. Until the 
introduction of Bt cotton American bollworm caused havoc to cotton cultivators. The Bt gene 
was supposed to reduce losses to American bollworm, reduce pesticide expenditure and raise 
returns. The Indian Government and Monsanto pushed transgenic cotton but did not consider 
the hazard of uncertainty. This section deconstructs the social harm by examining the specific 
aspects of Bt cotton cultivation and problems associated with capital intensive cash crops.  
 
5.5.1 The current state of the Indian cotton market 
 
By 2010, 90% of cotton grown in India were Bollgard hybrids, and by 2016 95% 
([Interview: Kuragin, 2016; Interview: Bolkonskaya, 2016]; ICAR, 2017; Choudhary and 
Gaur, 2015). Wilarski [Interview: 2016] explicated that ‘once you get the entire market or 
once you clear the entire stock of traditional seed from the market people have no choice but 
to go for the Bt cotton. That is because it’s a hybrid. Every year you have to buy new seeds.’ 
With the release of Bt cotton, farmers abandoned traditional seed saving and sharing practices. 
Karagina [Interview: 2016] relayed that ‘it takes just two seasons for a farming community to 
stop saving its own seeds…when somebody else provides you seeds you lose sovereignty over 
your entire farming, not seeds only, for all time to come.’ As foreshadowed by Navdanya, 
transgenic cotton led to corporate control of the seed market (Shiva et al, 1999; Navdanya, 
2004). As Bt cotton became a success story, the rise of national cotton production was 
attributed to the Bt trait. 
 
Bt was advertised as a yield enhancing technology (see Choudhary and Gaur, 2010, 
2015). In reality, the Bt trait is a pest-control mechanism, it protects yield potential from biotic 
stress, but it does not enhance yields (Sahai, 2003a; Kuruganti, 2009; Venugopalan et al, 
2009). MMB advertising promised ‘15 quintals of yields/acre and Re. 10,000 of additional 
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incomes’ (GMWatch, 2012). Transgenic cotton increased the overall productivity by reducing 
crop loss to the American bollworm and it raised farmers’ returns by reducing pesticide 
expenditure (Zilberman et al, 2010; Kathage and Qaim, 2012). Having said this, there were 
other factors involved in the growth of cotton production. 
 
Since independence, the cotton area has increased from 58 lakh hectares in 1950-1 to 
78 lakhs in 2000-1, and yield increased from 89 kg per hectare in 1950-1 to 180 kg in 2000-1 
(Gupta and Gupta, 2006: 481; Sharma, 2007: 259-61; CCI, 2017). Since the introduction of 
Bt cotton, the area increased from 78 lakh hectares in 2000-1 to 118.77 lakhs in 2015-16, and 
yield increased from 180 kg per hectare in 2000-1 to 512 kg per hectare in 2015-16, which is 
still below the world average of 700 kg per hectare (Gupta and Gupta, 2006:481; Sharma, 
2007; Cotton Corporation of India, 2017). National production, however, was not raised, as it 
is commonly believed, by the higher yield potential of Bt cotton, but rather by the overall 
increase of land cultivated with cotton.  
 
An independent researcher group, who investigated pest resistance to Bt gene, 
concurred that contrary to the common belief that the increase of cotton production was 
achieved through bollworm control and yield potential of Bt trait, it was the overall cotton 
cultivation that increased [Interview: Bagration, Mysore, Sept 2016; Interview: Berkley, 
Mysore, Sept 2016]. Farmers switched to cotton cultivation because there was a general trend 
towards cash crops. In the words of Scientist 1 [Interview: 2016], ‘cotton in India is considered 
to be “white gold” – Lakshmi. You will find no other crop that fetches the money cotton does.’ 
This is one of the reasons why farmers switched to Bt cotton. With the availability of credit 
from seed dealers, cotton cultivation became more viable. However, there are several issues 
with the cost of Bt cotton cultivation and returns, i.e. pricing, input expenditure and yields.  
 
5.5.2 The costs and returns of Bt cotton 
 
Bt hybrids yield 15 quintals per hectare, against 9-10 quintals of conventional 
varieties, and registered profits almost Rs 15,000 more than the conventional hybrids 
(Kalaichelvi et al, 2008: 277-8). An agronomist from Raichur proclaimed that ‘earlier, to get 
10 quintals per acre was a very difficult task, but after the release of Bt cotton the yields were 
almost doubled…15 quintals per acre is average’ [Interview: Scientist 3, 2016]. The average 
income reported in studies between 2003-2014, was Rs 39,000 – Rs 53,000 per hectare 
(Bennet et al, 2006; Gandhi and Namboodiri, 2006; Choudhary and Gaur, 2015). Accordingly, 




et al (2006) found that the average total cost per hectare was Rs 44,553 for Bt hybrids, and Rs 
39,816 for conventional hybrids; pesticide costs per hectare were Rs 3,407 in Bt hybrids and 
Rs 4,486 in non-Bt hybrids. The Acharya Report, by the Department of Agriculture, found 
that Bt cultivation required nearly Rs 48,000-54,000 per hectare in comparison Rs 8,000-
12,000 required by non-Bt cotton, chiefly because of the expense incurred on fertiliser, 
secondary pest control and seeds (Thomas and Tevernier, 2017: 9). According to Gandhi and 
Namboodiri (2009: 29), because the use of ‘yield increasing inputs’ is considerably high in Bt 
cotton, the overall cost of production is high.  
 
Until 2016, Bt cotton seeds were four times the price of conventional varieties due to 
MMB’s royalty fee. Initially, the price for 450gm of Bt seeds was Rs 1,600 -1,800; whereas, 
none-Bt seeds were sold at Rs 400-500 per 450gm (Gandhi and Namboodiri, 2009; Pray and 
Nagarajan, 2010). In 2016 the Government of India capped MMB’s royalty fee by 70%, fixing 
the price of Bt seeds at Rs 600-800 per 450gm. MMB’s license on Bt trait application to cotton 
specified technology fee of Rs 1,250 per 450gm until 2010 (Tirado, 2010; Arora and Bansal, 
2012). MMB was making Re 3.6 billion (72% million) in royalties, a 45% internal rate of 
return on a $2 million investment (Pray and Nagarajan, 2010). Between 2002 and 2010 
Monsanto made a profit of over Rs 1,500 crores ($200 million) from royalties on Bt trait 
(Jishnu, 2010). 
 
As for pesticide use, before Bt cotton, 75% of cotton pesticides were used for the 
management of American bollworm (Choudhary and Gaur, 2010). The industry and the state 
reported that the use of pesticides in Bt cotton is 50% (variable) less than conventional cotton 
(Sadashivappa and Qaim, 2009; Witjaksono et al, 2014). Albeit, Bourienne [Interview: 2016] 
stressed that ‘the pesticide applications have decreased with Bt cotton, but only for primary 
pests (American bollworm) …farmers still use chemicals to control secondary pests.’ In a 
similar tone, the agricultural scientist from Raichur declared,  
 
Initially they said Bt technology has assured that the pesticide use is 
reduced. You take the figures now, it has decreased in the chemicals meant for 
American bollworm, but chemicals used for secondary pests have been on the 
rise…I said, initially the technology will work well, with less sprays the cotton 
came up early. It was two or three sprays. Now it has reached ten sprays in one 
cycle [Interview: Scientist 1, 2016]. 
 
Three other respondents concurred that Bt cotton requires pest managing chemicals 
for insects such as, jassids, white flies, thrips, mealy bugs and mirid bugs [Interview: Scientist 
3, 2016; Interview: Bagration, 2016; Interview: Berkley, 2016]. The costs of Bt cotton 
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production are considerably high when different factors are taken into account. Its agronomic 
performance is dependent on these factors.  
 
5.5.3 The performance of Bt cotton in the Indian context  
 
The performance of Bt hybrids varies greatly, due to manifold variables interacting in 
complex and unpredictable way, e.g. climate, soil, pest variance, weather vagaries, input 
availability. Its performance has been inconsistent due to several factors. According to 
Bourienne [Interview: 2016] the problem ‘is not the technology itself, it is the circumstance 
under which the technology is sold and adopted’. First of all, India’s agriculture is 
predominantly rainfed, in fact 68% of cotton is produced on rainfed land (Harris-White, 2008; 
Sharma et al, 2010: 25). The major cotton belts are located in India’s most drought prone 
regions: Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh. Secondly, smallholders, who constitute 
76% of India’s farmers, do not command sufficient capital to invest in capital-intensive cash 
crops, hence they depend on formal or informal credit (Kuruganti, 2009; Manjunatha and 
Ramappa, 2017). Bt cotton performed well in field trials where availability of water and 
fertiliser was not an issue but performed poorly in the field (Sahai, 2003a; Sahai and Rahman, 
2003; Kranthi et al, 2011). Monocultures, like Bt cotton, are net suited to these kinds of 
conditions. Berkley [Interview: 2016] stressed that ‘when you introduce monocultures with 
clusters which spread over thousands of acres, they require a lot of management and planning.’ 
 
Monoculture is the practice of producing or growing a single crop under 
intensive/industrial agriculture (Shiva, 2001). Monocultures are predominantly capital-
intensive cash crops, which require irrigation and yield-enhancing inputs. Monocultural 
cultivation of cotton hybrids in the 1990s caused a surge of American bollworm population, 
which in turn increased pesticide requirements [Interview: Bagration, 2016; Interview: 
Berkley, 2016]. Monocultures may be profitable in the right conditions but are unviable in the 
Indian context due to the dry climate and predominance of smallholdings. Not only does Bt 
cotton require yield-enhancing inputs, but further the Bt gene does not produce enough Cry 
toxin that is responsible for the control of bollworms [Interview: Kuruganti, 2009; Interview: 
Kranthi, 2015; Interview: Bourienne, 2016]. Insufficient moisture in the soil will make an 
entire crop vulnerable to bollworm attacks.  
 
The pro-Bt studies are based on ‘a sample biased toward successful farmers, and Bt 
plots often receive extra care, making synchronic comparisons problematic’ (Stone, 2011: 




exposed to a broader range of factors it performs poorly [Interview: Bourienne, 2016; 
Interview: Karagina, 2016]. Whilst the Bt cotton has improved productivity, farmers’ incomes 
have not increased proportionately. Incomes from cotton cultivation are variable across 
seasons and regions (Swaminathan and Rawala, 2011; Marriot, 2016; Thomas and Tevernier, 
2017). Ultimately, the performance of Bt cotton in the Indian context is not what the industry 
and the Government claims. The agronomic performance of Bt cotton has vacillated. The 
increased costs of production combined with the precarious conditions of cotton production 
created a precarious situation for cotton producers. Furthermore, recurrent droughts and the 
development of insect resistance have added to the issues surrounding Bt cotton.  
 
5.5.4 Drought, insect resistance and crop losses  
 
Pest resistance to the Bt gene began to show in 2007-8, which prompted the 
introduction of Bollgard-II in 2009; then again in 2010, which prompted stacked Bt gene 
hybrids [Interview: Scientist 1, 2016; Interview: Scientist 2, 2016; Interview: Scientist 3, 
2016]. Pesticide use has recurrently increased in the years when bollworms displayed 
resistance to the Cry toxin [Interview: Berkley, 2016; Interview: Bagration, 2016]. Bt hybrids 
disturbed the ecological balance between bollworms and cotton. Bourienne [Interview: 2016] 
explained that by targeting the American bollworm Bt trait removed competition for other 
insects, e.g. pink bollworm, which propagated on a mass scale and developed resistance. 
Farmers were able to save on pesticides, but as secondary pests developed resistance, farmers 
had to go back to using pesticides. While the problem of American bollworm was solved, 
secondary insects posed a new danger. The pink bollworm, a secondary cotton pest, became 
a major problem to Bt cotton producers.  
 
Bt cotton was advertised as resistant to all bollworms. Scientist 2 [Interview: 2016], 
however, commented that ‘whatever is written on that label – about Bt cotton resistance to 
bollworms – it is not resistant, it is tolerant. There is a difference between resistance and 
tolerance.’ Resistance implies a permanent quality, tolerance ‘is not permanent, it is dynamic’ 
[Interview: Scientist 2, 2016]. Bt gene is only a temporary solution to a dynamic problem. 
Apart from applying chemical sprays for secondary pests, Bt farmers are required to sow five 
rows (20%) of ‘refuge seeds’ around the field [Interview: Scientist 1, 2016; Interview: 
Berkley, 2016]. The refugee seeds are cotton seeds without the Bt trait. It is provided with Bt 
cotton packages and is intended to reduce bollworms resistance to the Bt gene. Insects that 
feed on non-Bt plants will not develop resistance, but they will breed with the specimen that 
have developed resistance. The result is a generation with lower resistance to the Bt gene. 
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Farmers, however, do not follow this recommendation as the 20% refugee cotton will be lost 
to bollworms, and no farmer is willing to sacrifice 20% of crop [Interview: Berkley, 2016]. 
When one of the many conditions is not met or if the crop is exposed to weather vagaries or 
biotic stress, Bt cotton performs poorly, with low yields and occasional failures. Because 
smallholders growing Bt cotton rely on credit from seed dealers and moneylenders, they risk 
falling into debt. Those that do fall into debt also lose livelihoods, many are forced to migrate 
and in extreme situations commit suicide. However, the socio-economic pressure cotton 
growing farmers experience is not caused directly by Bt cotton.  
 
5.5.5 The agrarian crisis and Bt cotton: indebtedness and suicides 
 
Since 1995 around 300,000 farmers have committed suicides (Marriot, 2017; 
Manjunatha and Ramappa, 2017; Thomas and Tavernier, 2017). Contrary to Navdanya’s 
Seeds of Suicide narrative, Karagina (2016) admitted that ‘tracing a complex phenomenon, 
with so many variables, to transgenic cotton and its producer is next to impossible.’ Suicides 
are caused by a combination of different factors unrelated to Bt cotton. In 2015, from a total 
of 1490 farmer suicides 20 were committed by Bt cotton farmers (Manjunatha and Ramappa, 
2017: 11). The problem of farmer suicides is most prevalent among commercial farmers, who 
cultivate capital-intensive cash crops [Interview: Bagration, 2016; Interview: Berkley, 2016]. 
There is a general consensus that indebtedness is the chief cause of farmer suicides. Studies 
have shown that rising costs of production, dependence on credit, depreciated prices, low 
yields and low returns are correlated to indebtedness (Mishra, 2014; Thomas and Tavernier, 
2016; Mariott, 2017; Manjunatha and Ramappa, 2017). Suri (2006: 1523) notes that while 
‘agrarian distress is not new to India…farmer suicides are insisting that what is happening 
today seems to be qualitatively different.’ The upsurge of suicides coincided with the liberal 
reforms and a shift toward export-oriented production of cash crops (Mishra, 2014; Marriot, 
2016). Commenting on these issues, Bagration [Interview: 2016] stated,  
 
The economy is changed now, even the agricultural science is focused 
more on productivity in the name of economic growth. Once we talk more about 
productivity, the outcome is high input-oriented crops, like sugar cane, cotton, 
maze, etc. Because farmers are increasing external inputs, they have to spend 
more money… 
 
Monocultures require higher investment, the problem is that Indian smallholders do 
not possess capital to invest in cash crops [Interview: Bagration, 2016; Interview: Berkley, 
2016]. Therefore, they rely on bank loans or credit from the seed dealers. Due to ecological 




six years failure of Bt cotton due to drought and pest attacks has become more frequent. Most 
notable cases were in Gujarat in 2014, Karnataka in 2015/16 and Maharashtra in 2016/17 
(Buradikatti, 2015; Kasabe, 2016; Deshpande, 2017; Jain, 2017; Seetharaman, 2018). The 
2015/16 season saw the largest Bt cotton failure in Raichur district, Karnataka.  
 
During the 2015-16 season, around 80% of Bt cotton – 45,000 hectares of land – was 
lost to pink bollworm due to late rainfall and insect resistance to the Bt trait (Buradikatti, 
2015). Studies at the Raichur State Agricultural University, based on samples from cotton 
fields, found that the Pink Bollworm expressed resistance to the Bt gene, while the expression 
of Cry toxin in plants was very low (Scientist 1, 2016; Scientist 2, 2016; Scientist 3, 2016). 
Farmers were blamed for the outbreak because they do not follow recommendations and 
guidelines for Bt cultivation, i.e. refugee seeds, crop rotation, field management (Scientist 2, 
2016; Scientist 3, 2016). According to a fact-finding team, 12 Bt cotton farmers committed 
suicide in Raichur that year, while hundreds fell into debt [Interview Bagration, 2016; 
Interview: Berkley, 2016].  
 
Indebtedness causes financial pressure which manifests itself in the daily life as 
farmers are forced to take out additional loans to maintain their households or sell their labour 
to larger farmers; many cannot afford to pay for their children’s education; marriages are 
cancelled; and, they have no money for basic needs and medicine [Interview: Bagration, 2016; 
Interview: Berkley, 2016]. Apart from not being able to meet their basic needs, accumulation 
of these effects feeds into loss of social status and exemption from cultural participation 
(Manjunatha and Ramappa, 2017). This demonstrates that the social harms that have been 
linked by the resistance actors to MMB are not a result of illegitimate state-corporate practices, 
but of broader development issues. As such, the analysis of farmer suicides in India is a 




To summarise, as discussed above, farmer suicides are not caused directly by Bt 
cotton nor MMB, rather it is an issue of economic development. Having said this, Bt cotton 
has contributed to indebtedness in certain cases in several ways. The first, until 2016 Bt seeds 
were four times the price of non-Bt seeds, which meant higher cost of production. The second, 
Bt hybrids were exceedingly susceptible to weather vagaries (Pray and Nagarajan, 2010; Shah, 
2012; Stone, 2015). The third, after several years some bollworms, mainly pink bollworm, 
have developed resistance to Bt gene and caused large losses. In an economy transitioning 
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from semi-subsistence agriculture, these four factors combined in ways detrimental to the 
smallholders (Mariott, 2016). It is contended that these issues were enabled by a careless 
regulatory approach to the management of risk and uncertainty. Attention should be given to 
the socio-economic dynamics behind indebtedness and how Bt cotton figures in this scenario. 
The agrarian crisis was in the making prior to the release of Bt cotton. The Government and 
MMB introduced Bt cotton as a solution to indebtedness. Howbeit, the opponents of 
biotechnology argued that transgenic cotton is not the answer to the problems faced by Indian 
smallholders [Interview: Berkley, 2016; Interview: Bagration, 2016]. That is because the 
problem for Indian farmers is not one of productivity at a national level, but rather the cost of 
the means of production and prices of agricultural produce.  
 
Rather than state-corporate illegitimacy we are seeing is the process of 
commodification in the cotton seed market due to biotechnology. Biotechnology extends the 
commodification of means of production to biological resources, e.g. seeds (Kloppenburg, 
2004). Through biotechnology organised capital, e.g. Monsanto, dispossesses farmers in the 
developing nations of their means of production (Araghi, 2009). The cotton seed has been 
traditionally maintained by the farming communities through seed-saving and -sharing 
practices. Now, through monocultures, capital intensive cash-cropping and intensification to 
increase national output have facilitated the production of surplus value on smallholdings 
transitioning from semi-subsistence agriculture. The Green Revolution prompted the 
development of general commodity production in Indian agriculture. Biotechnology marked 
a stage in Indian agriculture, where reproduction of the means of material existence 
(subsistence) cannot exist outside commodity production (see Bernstein, 2010). In a neoliberal 
economy, Indian smallholders are compelled to produce raw materials to exchange for money 
in order to maintain the household.  
 
Simultaneously, the same process of commodification relocated the provision of the 
means of production from the farm to the factory, as observed in the case of Bt cotton. Where 
means of agricultural production meet the farmer as commodities, ‘agriculture no longer finds 
the natural conditions of its own production within itself, naturally, arisen, spontaneous and 
ready at hand, but these exist as an industry separate from it’ (Marx, 1993: 527). Consequently, 
the autonomy of the simple-commodity producer is dissolved. Unlike the HYVs, for instance, 
Bt cotton is owned by industrial capital. By taking over the production and provision of cotton 
seeds Monsanto sucks up the capital produced by the farmers via the free-market, and its 
further extracted from the farmers by loan capital in form of interest. In the case of 
smallholders, because they rely on seed dealers, banks and informal moneylenders for 




uncertainty intrinsic to Bt cotton is bore by the cotton producers. The producer does not control 
the seed, he only controls the price of his labour power, i.e. the part of value that constitutes 
subsistence. What appeared on the surface as a case of state-corporate illegitimacy, is an 
instance of economic development. 
 
5.6 Conclusion: the censure of legitimate state-corporate conduct 
 
In conclusion, the chapter presented a case where a deviant quality was ascribed to 
objectively legitimate state-corporate activity. According to the process-driven approach, it is 
not enough to stigmatise a state-corporate practice as deviant, there must be a moment of 
illegitimacy (Green and Ward, 2004, 2012; Ward and Green, 2000; Lasslett, 2010a; Lasslett 
et al, 2015). Otherwise, as was the situation in this case study, state-corporate institutions can 
ignore or deny adjudication from below. This case observed a historical instance of censure 
by a resistance community rooted in the anti-globalisation and Gandhian-nationalist tradition 
of symbiosis between the Government of India and MMB (Monsanto). In contrast to Case 1, 
the inquiry into the state-corporate symbiosis as well as the regulatory and policy ‘regimes’ 
did not disclose significant evidence of illegitimate state-corporate conduct.  
 
There was a symbiosis between the Government of India and the biotech industry; 
and, the regulatory/policy regimes have permitted the release of Bt seeds (Tombs and Whyte, 
2009; Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014). Additionally, the Government enabled the investment 
from Monsanto to realise certain ‘desired finality’ (Lasslett, 2014c). Transgenic cotton 
became part of the ABP objective to increase productivity for export-oriented growth. 
Certainly, the opening of the Indian cotton seed market to Monsanto, without evaluation and 
planning for sustainable, long-term growth contributed to a much broader social harm. 
Notwithstanding, it does not fit the concept of ‘illegitimacy’ as conceived in the process-
driven approach. Hence, this case study is observing something different to Case 1. A 
resistance movement censuring as deviant legitimate state-corporate conduct. A question, 
thus, arises; why would civil society stigmatise legitimate state-corporate practices as 
criminal? The chapter, then, turned attention to the resistance community’s motivations and 
the impact of adopting such stance to a problem that is more a development issue than state-
corporate criminality.  
 
The chapter follows the evolution of the resistance movement, from its inception and 
initial downfall to its restructuring. It demonstrates how framing and choice of tactics can 
affect the outcome of resistance. The use of direct action to stigmatise state-corporate conduct 
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proved ineffective when it was based on fallacious claims and hyperbolic rhetoric. Equally, 
by immersing the issue of Bt cotton in the anti-globalisation, Gandhian-nationalist narrative 
may have drawn international attention and support, but it disconnected the movement from 
the farmers’ lived experience. The ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ and the ‘Monsanto, Quit 
India’ campaign were unsuccessful because the KRRS and Navdanya misrepresented the 
issues. It appears that the resistance community used the Bt cotton issue to advance their own, 
anti-globalisation agenda, which was evident in the ‘Intercontinental Caravan’. The criminal 
stigma was imprinted on MMB through claims that Monsanto sought to monopolise India’s 
seed market, by linking Bt cotton to farmer suicides, and using Monsanto as a symbol of the 
corporate threat to India’s sovereignty. Learning from the failure to prevent the release of Bt 
cotton, the CGMFI built the opposition to Bt cotton and the resistance to MMB around the 
issues of sustainability, pricing, costs of production and market monopoly. Additionally, the 
coalition changed the repertoires of action to represent farmers’ lived experience and to seek 
a solution to the issue of indebtedness.  
 
Like in Case 1, the resistance community employed direct action to censure state-
corporate conduct, but its deployment was ineffective. The state and the company disregarded 
the direct attempts to censure their conduct. Thereby, the resistance actors were unsuccessful 
in inscribing deviancy labels on the Government and MMB. The direct actions by the KRRS 
lacked certain features that were observed in Case 1. Thereupon, the chapter deconstructed 
the social harm, to demonstrate that, contrary to the KRRS’ and Navdanya’s claims, MMB 
did not cause of farmer suicides. Rather, farmer suicides are caused by a dynamic interplay of 
factors whence Bt cotton is just one part. The case, thus, offers insight into an ineffective use 
of direct action to censure objectively legitimate state-corporate. It reaffirms that in order for 
a state-corporate activity to be effectively censured as deviant, it must have some properties 


















This thesis employed the dialectically informed, process-driven approach to capture 
the social relations and processes that create the possibility of illegitimate state-corporate 
conduct and social practices that actualise this conduct as criminal. As Lasslett et al (2015) 
argued, deviant state-corporate conduct is a necessary precondition, but in itself it does not 
actualise the latent quality of being criminal. That quality is actualised through definite social 
exchanges, whereby consciously driven social actors engage in practices intended to censure 
and inscribe deviancy labels on offending institutions (Green and Ward, 2012). Oftentimes, 
when certain state-corporate practices cause social harm and are perceived as illegitimate civil 
society converges into resistance movements that expose and condemn these practices (Ward 
and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 2004). Direct action is a forceful means of censuring 
deviant state-corporate conduct. In its varied forms, direct action is an active and a practical 
method of resistance.  
 
In the case studies, the historically specific experiences of capitalism fostered very 
different fields of social struggle. The antagonisms specific to the different branches of 
capitalist production (defence industry and biotech seed industry) engendered resistance 
mediated by direct action with varied effects. In censuring corporate entities, the resistance 
actors condemned the respective governments for enabling the production of social harm. The 
different branches of capitalist production caused distinct forms of social harms. This thesis 
contends that direct forms of resistance can be very effective in exposing, defining and 
prohibiting state-corporate crime, but only when applied appropriately to a field of struggle. 
Different fields of struggle require different repertoires of action. A dramatic form of 
resistance, e.g. industrial sabotage, may be well suited to situations where there is a clear 
illegitimacy in state-corporate conduct. This was the case with the Operation Protective Edge, 
the London Palestine Action (LPA) sought to make an immediate impact on the UK-Israel 
arms trade by targeting an exporter of defence products to Israel, UAV Engines Ltd (UEL). 
Such form of resistance proved counterproductive in the case of Bt cotton, where the claimed 
social harm – farmer suicides – was produced by economic development. The illegitimacy 
was absent from the state-corporate conduct. Overall, the two cases reaffirm the dialectical 




This final chapter links the empirical findings to the conceptual and theoretical 
literature that this study is grounded in. The analysis begins with a summary of the key 
findings in Section 6.2, looking at how illegitimacy was constituted and how illegitimate 
conduct was defined as criminal through social struggles. To understand how certain state-
corporate conduct is actualised as criminal, we have to look into such struggles (Green and 
Ward, 2004; Stanley and McCulloch, 2012; Lasslett et al, 2015). In view of this, Section 6.3 
draws on the emergent, Marxist traditions to analyse the illegitimacy in systemic, routine 
practices of state-corporate institutions, as well as the social process of resistance (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2009; Lasslett, 2010a, 2014c). This scholarly current offers insight into the ‘regimes’ 
that enable the illegitimate state-corporate symbiosis, and which transcends the heuristic 
perspective of state/corporate facilitated/initiated crime. Lastly, Section 6.4 presents a 
comprehensive synopsis of thesis, deconstructing the dialectic of state-corporate crime. 
Therewith, the chapter points to the specific contributions the thesis is making to the state-
corporate crime field. 
 
6.2 The multiple case study of crime-control from below: illegitimacy 
and deviancy 
 
The multiple-case study research has produced two different cases, where censure of 
state-corporate activities perceived as illegitimate occurs in context-specific settings. These 
contextual settings produced different branches of capitalist production, forms of social harm, 
fields of struggle and traditions of resistance. It is within these differences that the conceptual 
and theoretical propositions can be effectively replicated (Yin, 1981; Stake, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Furthermore, the case studies have arrived at divergent, empirical results. Case 1 offers 
insight into an effective use of direct action, whilst Case 2 offers insight into an ineffective 
use of direct action. The differences observed make a very interesting and revealing 
comparison. Of course, as intimated in Chapter III, comparison in a multiple-case study is 
implicit, rather than explicit (Stake, 1978; Yin, 2003; Baxter and Jack, 2008). This section 
recapitulates the key empirical findings and the knowledge they contribute about how criminal 
potential latent in routine state-corporate practices is realised and how it is actualised.   
 
6.2.1 The criminogenic potential in state-corporate practices 
 
In Case 1, there was a clear illegitimacy in the symbiosis between the UK Government 
and UEL. The company was accused of abetting the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) attack on 




in this by enabling UEL’s exports to Israel in contravention of the Consolidated Criteria of the 
Arms Export Controls (AEC), international law and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 
(FCO) recommendations (Amnesty, 2009b; CAEC, 2014, 2015; DBIS, 2015; CAAT, 2015). 
It has been observed that the Defence Industrial Policy (DIP) and the policy towards arms 
exports to Israel adjust export controls in ways that make defence exports to Israel legitimate 
(MOD, 2002, 2005; Taylor, 2009; Government, 2014; DBIS, 2014b). As a producer of engines 
for Hermes drones – the backbone of military operations in Gaza – and subsidiary of Elbit 
Systems, UEL is part of Israel’s military industrial complex (Amnesty, 2009b; Dobbing and 
Cole, 2014; Cooper and Anderson, 2015; War on Want, 2015). The regulatory and policy 
‘regimes’ mediated the ‘symbiosis’ between the UK Government and UEL (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2009; Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014). These ‘regimes’ are designed to enable and 
facilitate the stable reproduction of capital, i.e. production and trade.  
 
In contrast, the analysis of Case 2 found no illegitimacy in state-corporate practices. 
The assessment of Bt cotton did not contravene any regulatory law, Mahyco-Monsanto 
Biotech Ltd (MMB) joint-venture was legitimate, and no direct link was found between Bt 
seeds and farmer suicides (Government of India, 2000, 2002; Swaminathan, 2005; DBT, 2007; 
Department of Agriculture, 2015). Havin said this, the assessment of Bt cotton omitted the 
factors of uncertainty in terms of environmental safety and agronomic performance (Sahai, 
2005; Swaminathan and Rawal, 2011). Although, the agricultural biotechnology policy (ABP) 
included farmers’ welfare and growth in GDP per capita, its priorities focused on export 
growth, private investment, reduction in government support, industrialisation etc. (Sahai, 
2000; Tripathi and Prassad, 2009; Arora, 2013; Siddiqui, 2015). There was a neoliberal 
reorientation of the Government’s priorities in the policy, which increased the costs of 
production, depreciated the prices of agricultural produce, increased market dependency for 
means of production and subsistence, and consequently produced socio-economic pressures 
that cause indebtedness and suicides. These are development issues and are better understood 
as a form of ‘structural violence’, and not state-corporate produced harm. These two instances 
of state-corporate symbiosis were censured through direct action, with divergent effects. 
 
6.2.2 The censure of state-corporate activities 
 
In Case 1, the ‘Stop Arming Israel’ campaign opposed the UK-Israel arms trade 
configured through an intricate licensing system that authorises the exports of companies such 
as UEL. There was the element of intention, as the resistance was a purposeful, conscious 
activity performed by productive human agents. The resistance actors (human agents) used 
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performative repertoires of action to communicate to the Government and the public that the 
production and supply of drone engines to Israel was deviant/wrongful. The resistance 
campaign was orchestrated to make the issue public and to bring an end to the UK-Israel arms 
trade, by decommissioning the means of production of defence companies and/or influencing 
a change in the AEC. The resistance actors came from traditions of anti-imperialism, peace, 
anti-arms trade and solidarity movements. The campaign fused a range of forces from NGOs 
like the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) and War on Want, the Boycott, Divest 
and Sanction (BDS) movement, and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC). These forces 
were the foundation of LPA’s campaign, and the direct actions.  
 
To imprint deviant properties on the observed illegitimate conduct, the ‘Stop Arming 
Israel’ campaigners performed two direct actions, the rooftop occupation in August 2014 and 
‘Block the Factory’ action in July 2015. The occupation was triggered by the Operation 
Protective Edge, where international humanitarian law violations were committed by the IDF 
(ICC, 2015; UN, 2015). The social being of resistance actors motivated them to challenge the 
illegitimate state-corporate practices. Through direct action campaigners sacrificed their 
safety and liberty, which framed the resistance as morally and politically meaningful act 
(Stanley and McCulloch, 2012; Lasslett et al, 2015). The deviancy label was effectively 
imprinted on the Government and UEL. The state authorities responded by charging the 
activists with legal charges and prosecution. However, the resistance actors subverted the 
state’s legal apparatus to put the company on trial, in order to obtain evidence of illegitimacy. 
The state and the company dropped the cases when the judge’s attention was turned to their 
conduct.  
 
In Case 2, a disconnected, amorphous movement opposed the release of transgenic 
cotton by the Government of India and MMB. There was a conscious effort by social actors 
to inscribe deviancy labels on MMB through direct action. These labels communicated to the 
public, the perpetrators and international networks that MMB, by introducing Bt cotton, 
caused indebtedness and farmer suicides. The transformative drive was in that the Karnataka 
State Farmers Association (KRRS) and Navdanya tried to prevent the release of Bt cotton, and 
later the Coalition for GM-Free India (CGMFI) worked to reverse the proliferation of Bt 
cotton. The resistance communities were rooted in the anti-globalisation, Gandhian, 
nationalist movements. These forces coalesced into an amorphous and disorganised 
movement, made up of isolated pockets of resistance.  
 
The motivation was to protect smallholders’ sovereignty and independence from 




However, the opposition was communicated in a demagogic, and misconceived way. The 
movement elites were closely connected to international networks but disconnected from the 
farmers’ lived experience. The ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ and Intercontinental Caravan, 
and Navdanya’s ‘Monsanto, Quit India’ campaign drew on Gandhian symbolism to excite 
independence sentiments among the farmers, however they were based on fallacious claims 
of ‘terminator technology’ and ‘seeds of suicide’. The Government and the company 
disregarded the censuring efforts, proceeding to release Bt cotton. Learning from this 
experience the CGMFI changed the repertoires of action and the narrative. They came from 
different fields of struggle, mainly sustainability and conservationism. The CGMFI addressed 
the issues of market dependency, the failure to deliver smallholders out of indebtedness and 
seed monopoly. Though, the Coalition did exaggerate claims of ‘Bt cotton failure’ in order to 
counter the ‘Bt success’ narrative. The Gene Campaign pointed to regulatory defects in 
managing the risk and uncertainty inherent in biotechnology. Drawing on these two cases, a 
revealing insight can be gained about the social process of defining certain state-corporate 




The empirical cases offer a valuable insight into the historical and social processes 
that constitute state-corporate crime. Illegitimacy and deviancy are dynamic processes. 
Illegitimacy is a potential latent in routine practices and becomes realised when these routine 
practices contravene an accepted conduct norm (Ward and Green, 2000; Green and Ward, 
2000, 2004, 2012). The realisation of this potential involves actions of individual human 
agents, influence of superstructure on human agency, institutional activities, the 
interdependency between the state system and organised capital etc. (Lasslett, 2010b; Lasslett 
et al, 2015). Deviancy actualises an illegitimate conduct as criminal, when human agents 
engage with the objective reality in practical and meaningful ways. The act of censure imbues 
a perceived illegitimacy with a criminal property. There is a dialectic process in the formation 
of rules that define illegitimacy and constitution of these rule in practice. The next section 








6.3 The dynamics of illegitimacy and deviancy in state-corporate 
activities 
 
The thesis advances a Marxist dialectical understanding of the latent, criminogenic 
potential in routine state-corporate practices. Not because of the incessant compulsion pushing 
the normative boundaries in order to achieve organisational goals (Kramer et al, 2002), but 
because the achievement of ‘desired finalities’ under neoliberal capitalism require the capital 
reproduction to exceed the limits imposed by social as well as natural/environmental bounds 
(Lasslett, 2014c). The routine state-corporate practices – activities through which states and 
corporations reproduce their existence and ensure the functioning of social metabolism – bear 
impact on human beings and their environment in unpredictable and deleterious ways. 
Sometimes it erupts into an ‘overt moment of rupture’, for example the space shuttle 
challenger explosion or the crash of ValuJet Flight 592 (Kramer, 1992; Matthews and 
Kauzlarish, 2000). Oftentimes, routine activities contribute to crime or produce social harm 
in mediated and indirect ways, for example arming Israel during the 2006 attack on Lebanon 
or the 2008/9 crisis and austerity (Lasslett et al, 2015; Tombs, 2016). From this approach, 
state-corporate crime is not a mere omission, regulatory failure, accident or an aberration 
caused by corporate avarice or a structural weakness of the state as “policeman” (Whyte, 
2014). It is actively produced by activities integral to state system and organised capital.  
 
As a social practice, resistance shapes our social, political and cultural environment, 
and in turn this environment fosters resistance traditions that shape resistance actors (see 
Marx, 2010a). Throughout history direct action has been used in social struggles for justice, 
emancipation, rights etc. (de Cleyre, 2004; Thoreau, 2008; Roberts and Ash, 2011). Resistance 
can be also conceived as a means of engaging with our institutions, in practical and meaningful 
ways. The four defining features of resistance are opposition, intention, communication and 
transformation (Rothe, 2009; Stanley and McCulloch, 2012; Friedrichs, 2012). In resistance 
there is a drive to oppose something perceived as unjust or illegitimate, communicate it to the 
perpetrator as well as the wider audience, and enforce a change. Direct forms of resistance are 
a powerful means of enforcing a change (de Cleyre, 2004).  It is argued that this drive for 
change is fostered by resistance traditions, where the counter-hegemonic consciousness 
germinates within civil society (Green and Ward, 2004). The reproduction of ideas and 
practices that sensitise social actors to the illegitimate state-corporate practices takes place 
through specific ‘mode of life’ experienced in day-to-day life (Lasslett et al, 2015). This 
section links the thesis back to its core conceptual and theoretical foundations to demonstrate 





6.3.1 State-corporate symbiosis, regimes of permission and routine 
practises 
 
The dominant, neoliberal formulation of the private-public relationship is that the 
public and the private are separate spheres (Whyte, 2014). The public sphere encounters the 
private sphere only as a “policeman” which controls and mitigates harmful activities of private 
organisations (Whyte, 2014). State-corporate collusion occurs when this liberal-democratic 
segregation is “ruptured”, and both spheres collude in anomalous ways that break the normal 
procedures (Whyte and Tombs, 2015). According to the integrated theoretical framework 
these unique, criminogenic events are motivated by organisational goal seeking, e.g. profit 
maximisation or taxation, and regulatory disfunction or state corruption (Kauzlarich and 
Kramer, 1998; Kramer et al, 2002; Michalowski and Kramer, 2006). This is an important 
starting point that points to specific, criminogenic properties of the state-corporate conduct. 
Albeit, in order to understand what creates these properties we have to transcend the focus on 
‘discrete acts’ and adopt a more systematic analysis of practices integral to the existence of 
state system and organised capital (Tombs, 2012). As the empirical cases revealed, state-
corporate crime or social harm are often produced in mediated, indirect ways by the practices 
intended to preserve the stable functioning of ‘social metabolism’ (Lasslett, 2014c; Tombs, 
2016). This study looked at these systemic, enduring and less ostensible moments of state-
corporate crime.  
 
Though, the classical liberal view might have been true in the early 20th century and 
during the Keynesian economic era, ‘neoliberal era intensified and made more visible the 
interconnectedness of public and private sphere’ (Whyte, 2014: 239). The neoliberal project 
relegated the government’s role in the economy to a manager of profitable business, 
investment, free trade etc. (Chomsky, 1999; Larner, 2000; Harvey, 2003). Rather than 
standing in opposition to free-market, the neoliberal order encourages close collaboration with 
organised capital. The fundamental tenet of state-corporate crime scholarship should be taken 
seriously, viz. the intersection of state-corporate functions is subject to political-economy of 
capitalism (Michalowski and Kramer, 2007). Yet, the state-corporate symbiosis is not a simple 
case of an interaction motivated by an alignment of politico-economic interests and goal 
seeking (see Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000; Kramer et al, 2002; Mullins and Rothe, 2008). 
The state and the corporation exist in a symbiotic relationship (Tombs, 2012). That is, 
mutually reinforcing interaction that reproduce the conditions for the existence of both 
institutions, e.g. regulation, policymaking, provision of infrastructure, production, 
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employment, investment, trade etc. The concept of ‘regimes of permission’ alerts us to the 
enabling role the state plays under conditions where economic production is controlled by 
private enterprises (Whyte, 2014). These varied relations and processes constitute broader 
structural determinations of the material, social existence. By looking at these relations and 
processes we can uncover the causes of state-corporate crime. Whether a company produces 
engines for defence products or seeds for agricultural production, they are products of 
expanded reproduction through which capital is accumulated.  
 
The two enterprises in the case studies invest their capital in two different spheres of 
production. UEL manufactures industrial commodities, i.e. engines for drones. MMB makes 
transgenic seeds for agricultural production, i.e. Bt cotton. As a subsidiary of a larger 
company, Elbit Systems, UEL is part of a larger network of production. It produces parts for 
other products, assembled and finished in another country, by another company. Its engines 
are produced for export. MMB, which is a venture between a biotech conglomerate Monsanto 
and Indian seed company Mahyco, makes the means of agricultural production, the Bt cotton 
seed. By claiming a monopoly over the cotton seed market, MMB was able to charge an 
inflated royalty fee on each packet of cotton seed. The company sucked up capital from the 
cotton producers making instant profit on the sale of seeds, while the risk of an unproven 
technology was bore by the farmers. However, the farmers with no available capital to invest 
in the expensive seeds, rely on banks and private moneylenders for loans, or on credit provided 
by the middlemen, i.e. the seed dealer. In essence, MMB sucked up loan capital via cotton 
producers, while taking advantage of the market forces to monopolise the cotton seed 
production.  
 
In both cases, despite empirical disparities, we can observe the same dynamics. Both 
UEL and MMB produced commodities with definite value and surplus value realised through 
exchange (Marx, 1976, 1982). In both branches of production, regulation and policymaking 
are intended to facilitate investment, production, trade etc. Regulation provides the legal 
environment for economic processes (Tombs, 2016). To facilitate their own interests, national 
interests and private interests, governments structure conducive environment for investment, 
production and trade through policy design (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1978; Lenin, 1996; 
Callinicos, 2007). Investment, production and trade are needed to create jobs, generate 
national income, provide consumer goods and means of production. Industrial policies, which 
are sector specific, are a government’s official strategic frameworks to stimulate the 
development and economic growth. As such, policies stipulate a government’s approach to an 
industry, plan for support and growth, implementation framework and regulatory 




In order to be actualised is must be defined as criminal, and oftentimes it is defined as such 
through censure enacted by diverse communities of resistance.   
 
6.3.2 Resistance to illegitimate conduct: the process of censure 
 
As the thesis theorises, the criminogenic potential of state-corporate practices is 
realised when state-corporate practices breach conduct norms and/or cause social harm 
(Hillyard and Tombs, 2004; Green and Ward, 2004; Lasslett, 2010a). The criminal property 
of state-corporate practices is actualised when it is stigmatised as deviant by a substantial 
social audience (Green and Ward, 2000; Lasslett et al, 2015). Censure in the case studies was 
performed by resistance communities with diverse historical origins. The historical specificity 
of resistance traditions and the unique fields of social struggle shaped the resistance campaigns 
in diverse ways and with different outcomes. Past, historical struggles have brought forth 
standards of behaviour that are now recognised as codes of conduct against which state-
corporate behaviour is judged (Green and Ward, 2012; Lasslett et al, 2015). Resistance is a 
consciously driven social practice and by enacting practical forms of resistance human agents 
engage with the objective reality, inscribing it with meaning. 
 
Human beings are the agents of historical process, they create and change the 
conditions they find themselves in (Marx, 2010a; Trotsky, 2011). Through resistance social 
actors engage materially in social struggle, by means of which norms of behaviour are 
grounded and against which future generations can draw on to control state-corporate conduct. 
Gramscian concepts of civil society and hegemony or counterhegemony represent the 
processes that shape our political, economic and cultural reality (Boggs, 1976; Mouffe, 1979; 
Ward and Green, 2000). As Lasslett (2010b: 4-5 emphasis added) observed, ‘human 
consciousness, by being absorbed into the concrete processes of social being, has become an 
instrument through which individuals can appropriate certain social culture, and engage 
creatively in historical practices with a fluctuating degree of agency and freedom.’ 
 
Human beings are conscious, sensuous agents. Consciousness drives human agency 
to engage in specific social practices (Lukács, 1971; Gramsci, 1992). As sensuous, conscious 
agents, resistance actors perceive the world around them and imbue it with concrete meaning. 
It is argued that resistance is associated with certain form of consciousness, one that sensitises 
groups of people to illegitimate state-corporate conduct and through which they engage in 
productive practices (Ward and Green, 2000). In Marxist theory consciousness and action are 
bonded, human beings acquire consciousness through purposive, material and socially 
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necessary actions (Lukács, 1971). In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
Marx wrote: ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social 
existence that determines their consciousness’ (Marx, 2010b: 263). Social consciousness 
corresponds to ‘mode of life’ (social being) experienced by human agents (Lasslett et al, 
2015). It was observed in the case studies that the respective traditions of resistance the 
campaigners came from influenced their perception of state-corporate conduct and their 
actions.  
 
Adopting the conceptual foundations of the resistance and state crime scholarship, the 
study considered what caused and motivated resistance in the case studies, who were the 
agents of resistance, what were the objectives, and how resistance emerged (White, 2009, 
2012; Friedrichs, 2009; Rothe, 2009). Exploring these determining aspects of resistance, the 
researcher was aware of White’s (2009) observations that resistance is context-bound 
(culturally, socially, nationally), it is related to specific consciousness (New Social 
Movements or grass-roots organisations), and is determined by social experience (victim, 
activist, citizen, observer). Drawing on the definitional features and suggested motivations of 
resistance the study found that resistance is multidimensional and dynamic, it cannot be 
reduced to simple set of variables or factors, but rather must be represented in its dynamic and 
contextual form (Friedrichs, 2009; Rothe, 2009; Stanley and McCulloch, 2012). The 
documented instances of resistance were motivated by specific values, caused by breach of 
norms that express these values, structured by context and driven by productive and conscious 
social actors. Even though the research’s case studies represent only instances of historical 
process, these instances are part of a larger social and political relations that shape the 
institutional, political, economic, and cultural environment. In other words, these instances are 




To recapitulate, state-corporate crime’s being is constituted through dialectical 
processes that interact in a dynamic way. To understand how state-corporate practices become 
defined as criminal we must look at the social processes through which it is inscribed with 
deviant properties. However, deviancy must have an objective basis, which is conceptualised 
through the concept of illegitimacy. Illegitimacy informs us that an observed state-corporate 
crime is wrongful. Yet, to explain how this illegitimacy is produced, we ought to look at the 
specific features of state-corporate practices. Oftentimes, the less ostensible crimes are 




is, practices through which states and corporations reproduce each other. Both institutions 
enter into definite relations with one another in the social metabolism functions, through which 
social existence is reproduced. The routine practices that reproduce social existence pertain to 
activities such as: regulation of contracts, markets and trade; policymaking, economic 
production, investment, trade, taxation, provision of infrastructure, employment, exchange 
etc. (Tombs, 2012; Lasslett, 2013). These activities are undertaken in pursuit of ‘desired 
finalities’, e.g. economic growth, provision of subsistence, increasing market share, 
decreasing unemployment, geopolitical advantage etc., and are crucial to everyday social 
metabolism functions (Lasslett, 2014c). By looking at such practices dialectically we can 
reveal their criminogenic features. Additionally, the focus on routine practices, rather than 
unique instances of collusion, can sensitise criminology to less ostensible, yet significantly 
harmful, state-corporate crime events. 
 
The study observed that state-corporate actors and resistance actors experience very 
different ‘modes of life’, which shaped their consciousness and influenced their actions. 
Whereas, resistance actors were sensitised to state-corporate illegitimacy, compelled by the 
values they upheld to act appropriately to influence change, state-corporate institutions 
approach their reproducing practices as ‘business as usual’. When confronted by palpable and 
practical opprobrium state-corporate institutions responded with prosecution in one case and 
disregard in the other. Such reactions signify ‘a sense of managerial and administrative 
[governmental] alienation from the concrete impacts of their actions…’ rather than malice 
(Lasslett et al, 2015: 530). This kind of reaction might suggest that, because state-corporate 
actors are disconnected from the lived consequences of their practices, they ‘bear no 
meaningful sense’ of harms caused and thereby are able to continue the same operations as 
“business as usual” (ibid). This poses serious difficulties in establishing and enforcing 
normative codes of conduct, as state-corporate institutions can ignore norms that designate 
certain practices as wrong and dismiss attempts by civil society to hold them accountable. 
 
6.4 Last words: the dialectics of state-corporate crime 
 
This research study is one of the first, substantive attempts to investigate how different civil 
society configurations, i.e. resistance communities, mobilise to censure and deliver stigma on 
illegitimate state-corporate practices. It does so in a context laden way, which revealed that 
the way social actors perceive objective reality in terms of state-corporate illegitimacy and the 
way they imprint deviant labels on these institutions are subject to specific historical 
trajectories of capitalism and social struggle. The study advances the process-driven and a 
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Marxist dialectical approach to understand how state-corporate crime comes into being. In the 
case studies we can observe that crime’s being is historically constituted through structurally 
situated social practice, organised from below through historical struggles of resistance 
communities (Green and Ward, 2000; Green and Ward, 2004, 2012; Lasslett, 2010b). These 
communities inscribe deviancy labels on certain state-corporate practices by engaging in 
concrete, material exchanges through practical forms of social action, e.g. direct action.  
 
These resistance communities emerged from different traditions and different fields of 
struggle. The way in which these communities mobilised was influenced by the specific 
development of different branches of capitalist production and how organised capital has 
entered a symbiosis to realise capital accumulation. Moreover, the cases contributed 
understanding of what makes the use of direct action effective. Its effectiveness hinges on the 
conduct being censured, meaning that the stigmatised state-corporate practices must indeed 
be illegitimate in order for deviancy labels to hold (Lasslett et al, 2015). As such, the process 
through which state-corporate crime comes into being as a phenomenon is a dynamic one. It 
involves socially mediated exchanges between state-corporate institutions and social actors.   
 
The study contributes to the emergent Marxist tradition in state-corporate crime research, by 
demonstrating how routine state-corporate practices, rather than ‘discrete acts’, cause less 
ostensible, yet significantly harmful state-corporate crime events (Tombs and Whyte, 2009; 
Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014). It offers an understanding into subtle, mediated forms of 
institutional activities that are systemic, enduring and have latent, criminal potential. The cases 
contribute further insight into how resistance is mobilised, what motivates resistance actors, 
and how resistance is strategically performed. They demonstrated that, indeed, resistance is 
defined by four features: opposition, intention, communication and change (Rothe, 2009; 
Stanley and McCulloch, 2012; Friedrichs, 2012).  
 
Again, resistance is context-bound, subject to cultural traditions; it is related to specific 
consciousness that this thesis argues can be found within the counter-hegemonic spheres of 
civil society; and is determined by social experience, or as Lasslett et al (2015) put it by ‘mode 
of life’, i.e. individual’s social being (White, 2009, 2012). These defining elements of 
resistance can be categorised through Gramscian concepts of counter-hegemony and civil 
society. Additionally, the motivating forces of resistance (consciousness and values) can be 
identified by looking at the traditions of struggle particular resistance communities emerged 
from. Now, what we recognise as illegitimate state-corporate conduct has been established by 
previous struggles in written rules, regulations, laws and norms. Furthermore, these norms 




resistance actors in the case studies judge perceived state-corporate illegitimacy against these 
rules, norms and values. 
 
Human beings are conscious agents who engage with the objective reality that they perceive. 
Lukács (1971: 19) postulated, ‘Marx urged us to understand ‘the sensuous world’, the object, 
reality, as human sensuous activity…[man is] simultaneously the subject and object of the 
socio-historical process.’ When acting upon objective world human beings, as active subjects, 
reproduce it and imbue it with definite meaning. In this way, when resistance actors enact 
direct action to censure illegitimate state-corporate practices, they engage with objective 
reality and create its meaning. It is argued that such actions require consciously driven agency, 
which is shaped by the ‘mode of life’ experienced by the social actors (Lasslett et al, 2015). 
According to this, state-corporate actors experience a mode of life that elevates the goal of 
capital accumulation in mediated ways. Whereas, resistance actors experience a mode of life 
that sensitises them to the wrongdoings by the powerful and fosters subversive practices. 
These dimensions of state-corporate wrongdoing and social struggle pose questions of human 
consciousness and how it comes into being. The thesis contends that different modes of life 
produce opposing forms of consciousness that correspond to specific ‘modes of life’ 
experienced by human agents (Lasslett et al, 2015). Moreover, the civil society is the space 
wherein counter-hegemonic traditions/communities emerge. 
 
Following from the above, state-corporate crime has its own process of becoming. This 
process is dynamic and constituted through a dialectical process that entails the interaction of 
conscious, social actors with objective reality of state-corporate crime events. The norms 
against which resistance actors sanction illegitimate conduct were cemented by past struggles. 
Therefore, to capture what constitutes illegitimate or criminal behaviour critical criminologists 
ought to look at past, historical struggles. The case study research, informed by a Marxist 
dialectical thinking, is a helpful approach as it produces context-specific knowledge, 
embedded in real-life events. This is an advantageous approach, as long as case studies are 
used to reveal the more substantive relations and processes underlying state-corporate crime 
and resistance. The empirical cases capture significant moments in the resistance campaigns 
researched. However, social struggle is a continuous process which drives social development.  
 
Moreover, under neoliberal capitalism many state-corporate crimes become less ostensible, 
but no less destructive. To capture, effectively, the increasingly routinised practices of 
illegitimate state-corporate conduct criminology as an intellectual endeavour must develop 
approaches that are more sensitive. The emergent Marxist traditions advanced by Lasslett, 
Tombs and Whyte offer such sensitive approaches. While stat-corporate crime and social harm 
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of development have not been overcome, the struggle continuous. Case 1 demonstrates that 
direct action is a powerful means of resistance, where clear illegitimacy is present. Case 2 
demonstrates that direct action is rather counterproductive in a situation where a social harm 
is a product of very slow, gradual processes that do not have the property of being illegitimate. 
Nevertheless, by forcing state-corporate institutions to respond to censure, both institutions 
have demonstrated their commitment to capital accumulation over other considerations. In 
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• The application must be considered by the Filter Committee in accordance with the 
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• The Filter Committee should complete form RG3 and write to the Chief Investigator 
indicating the outcome of its review 
 
• Depending upon the outcome of the Filter Committee review, the Chief Investigator 
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• The Filter Committee should retain a complete set of original forms. 
External funding has been sought from Socio-Legal Studies Association to travel 
to India. Decision still pending.  

















4.  Background to and reason(s) for the Project 
 
Please provide a brief summary in language comprehensible to a lay person or non-
expert.  Full details must be provided in the description/protocol submitted with this 
























5.  Aims of the Project 
 
Please provide a brief summary in language comprehensible to a lay person or non-
expert.  Full details must be provided in the description/protocol submitted with this 













6.  Procedures to be used  
Start: 01/10/2014 End: 01/10/2017 Duration: Three Years 
N/A 
 
This project investigates how and why state-corporate criminality is resisted by civil 
society through direct action. It tests whether understanding of state-corporate 
‘crime’ as a socially constructed phenomenon through direct acts of censure and 
prohibition by social audiences is indeed a useful approach. The study also adopts 
Marxist literature to understand more deeply the structures and social forces that 
foster criminal state-corporate collusion. To this end the project employs a 
comparative case study method. Two case studies will be researched and 
compared: first, resistance through direct action to arms industry in United Kingdom; 
second, resistance through direct action to agricultural biotechnology industry in 
India. The reasons for this study are to cover the lacunas in criminological literature 
on state and corporate ‘crime’, to advance academic knowledge on crimes of the 
powerful and to advance an alternative avenue of understanding state-corporate 
‘crime’. The project also anticipates extending academic knowledge that can 
support diverse social movements by theorising vehicles for nonviolent censure and 
stigmatisation of state-corporate practices. 
  
 
The aims of this project are: 
• To explain the social processes through which state-corporate practices 
acquire the quality of being criminal. 
• To empirically document how social audiences, employing different forms of 
direct action, censure and stigmatise state-corporate actors who engage in 
socially harmful practices that contravene fundamental conduct norms. 
• To theorise the social content and dynamics of state-corporate practices. 
• To examine how different strategies of direct action impact on criminal 
collusions b tween state and corporate actors. 
• To identify common motives and reasons for action, how distinctive class 
configurations influence unique resistance struggles and what connects 




  a.  Methods  
Please provide a brief summary in language comprehensible to a lay person or non-
expert.  Full details must be provided in the description/protocol submitted with this 



















b.   Statistical techniques  
      Please provide details of the statistical techniques to be used within the  




7.  Subjects: 
     a. How many subjects will be recruited to the study (by group if 
 appropriate)? 
 
     b.  Will any of the subjects be from the following vulnerable groups - 
  
                        YES   NO 
 
Children under 18 
 
Adults with learning or other disabilities 
 
Very elderly people 
 
Healthy volunteers who have a dependent or  
subordinate relationship to investigators  
 
Other vulnerable groups    
 
          If YES to any of the above, please specify and justify their inclusion 
 
 
Group 1 - Activists, campaigners, campaign supporters.  
          50 
 
Group 2 - Politicians and government agencies officials, 
politicians and company officials.  
















This project adopts qualitative research methods. It will employ semi-structured 
interviews and documentary research. There are essentially two participant groups. 
Group 1 is made up of activists, campaigners, campaign supporters, and social 
movements’ members. Group 2 is made up of politicians, government agencies’ 
officials and company officials. Interviews will use open-ended questions and 
purposive sampling. Snowball sampling will also be employed to make contacts with 
other interviewees. There will be two sets of interview schedules with different 
questions designed for Group 1 and Group 2. To view the question plan please refer 
to interview schedules attached to this form. 
 
Documentary sources will be obtained from UK and Indian governments and relevant 
government agencies, as well as companies/firms that are researched. Some 
documents are available under public domain. However, due to their probative nature, 






    
 c.  Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
    Please indicate, with reasons, the inclusion criteria for the project 
 
      
 

















































Inclusion of Group 1 will be based on participants’ engagement in direct action 
campaigns orchestrated by activist groups and social movements to censure and 
prohibit practices of state/corporate actors they perceived as criminal. In UK I will 
approach activists from: Derry Anti-War Coalition, Foyle Ethical Investment 
Campaign and London Palestine Action, as well as Stop the War Coalition. In India 
I will approach: Karnataka State Farmers’ Association, Adivasi Gothra Mahasabha 
activists and Bhatiya Kissan Union activists. These participants will have first-hand 
experience in resisting practices of states and corporations they stigmatised as 
‘criminal’, which is valuable to study’s understanding of motives and repertoires 
involved in direct action. 
 
Group 2 participants will be made up of politicians and other government officials, 
and company officials. In UK I will approach the Ministry of Defence, Stormont 
Politicians and Westminster Politicians, as well as government agencies such as 
Invest NI. Companies to be approached are Raytheon Systems Ltd and UAV 
Engines Company. In India I will approach the Department of Agriculture and 
regional governments. I will also approach Mahyco, Indian subsidiary of Monsanto, 
and other subsidiary firms of companies such as DuPont and Syngenta. State and 
corporate actors have direct insight into practices their institutions pursued, in 
terms of why their governments and companies named above cooperated 
together, what policies they followed, what are their interests and how/why they 
responded to direct actions orchestrated by social movements. 
  
There are no specific exclusion criteria for this project. 
 
Potential participants in the first group have been identified through Google/media 
search and on NGO/activist groups’ websites. Additional contacts have been also 
obtained from a friendly contact who previously conducted research on 
environmentalism in India. They will be contacted via email, phone or social media 
(Facebook) available on NGO/activist groups’ websites. Participants in the second 
group will be recruited through participants already identified. Government and 
corporate officials will be identified through documentary research, media 
searches and internet trawls. Contact details will be obtained from company and 
government websites. 
No inducements will be offered. 
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8.  Ethical implications of the research 
Please provide an assessment of the ethical implications of the project  
 
This doctoral project is supervised by Dr Kristian Lasslett, Dr Rachel Monaghan and 
Goretti Horgan. The researcher will use their expertise to address any ethical issues 
and to mitigate any risks to the participants as well as the researcher. Dr Kristian 
Lasslett is a leading global expert on state and corporate crime, who has conducted 
complex fieldwork in conflict and post-conflict environments. He has extensive 
experience interviewing community activists and elite actors involved in contentious 
social issues. Dr Rachel Monaghan is a leading terrorism expert, who also has wide-
ranging experience conducting fieldwork with activists engaging in different forms of 
direct action, in addition to senior state officials working on national security and 
counter-terrorism. Goretti Horgan is a widely acclaimed activist academic, who has 
extensive experience working with marginalised communities on a range of sensitive 
issues including economic marginalisation, poverty, and gender discrimination. She 
also has been involved in direct action campaigns centring on the weapons industry, 
and is especially well positioned to understand the sensitivities this type of research 
may involve.  
 
As interviews will be conducted with activists who participated in contentious actions 
against powerful institutions, some who live in India and some who live in UK, 
important ethical challenges must be handled in a culturally sensitive manner, while 
also meeting best disciplinary practice.  
 
1) Voluntary participation – it is important that no one is pressured to participate 
and that consent is given on purely voluntary basis. 
 
2) Informed consent – participants need to be made informed in language and 
terms meaningful to them what the research is about, why it is being undertaken and 
who is it funded by and how findings are to be disseminated before they consent to 
participate. Participants will be asked to consent to participate in the study by signing 
the consent form. However, oral consent will also be available as an option for 
participants who do not wish to sign a written form. Gordon (2000) advises to have 
procedures for both written and oral consent as to assure the participation of all 
potential interviewees. Oral consent might be preferred by participants from India who 
might not be able to read English. Oral consent might be preferred by participants 
who are cautious about signing written documents, in fear of having their names 
recorded by authorities. In such cases oral consent can be audio recorded with the 
rest of the interview. Consent forms and information sheets will be translated to 
relevant language when conducting research in India.  
 
3) Translation – in India, interviews will be conducted with experienced and some 
internationally recognised activists who speak English. However, some participants 
will not be speaking English, in which case an interpreter will have to be hired to 
translate the information on the information sheet, questions and responses from 
participants.  
 
4) Confidentiality and disclosure – all personal information concerning 
participants must be kept confidential to protect their identity. This applies particularly 
to activists who speak negatively about their government and thus might be fearful of 
repercussions. Activists may fear that the authorities will read their testimonies. 
Interviewees will have a choice of whether to remain anonymous, however it is 
expected that participants from the first group will want to be named in the research. 




to have their names included in the study, thus in the study they can be referred 
through their institutional affiliation if they prefer to remain anonymous. 
 
5) Intrusion – participants’ must not be asked sensitive or personal questions, so 
as not to intrude on their privacy or personal life. Intrusive questioning may cause 
discomfort, unpleasant experience, stress and/or anxiety. This might be experienced 
particularly by activists who might fear their testimonies will be seen by the authorities 
who will identify them. In relation to this they might fear of being arrested or harassed 
by the police.  
 
6) Interviews will be audio recorded. However, participants will be given a choice 
whether to be recorded or not.  
 
7) Withdrawal – Participants will be informed they have the right to refuse 
permission or withdraw from the research at any time or stage. In case a participant 
does withdraw from the research all personal information and testimony she/he gave 
will be terminated. 
 
8) Incrimination - interviewees may be in danger of incrimination if they disclose 
information about offences they have not been convicted for, or if they disclose 
information about activities that could potentially harm other persons. Participants 
must be informed that in case they do disclose such information the researcher is 
legally obliged to pass the information to the appropriate authorities. 
        
 
9. Could the research identify or indicate the existence of any undetected 
healthcare concern?  
 
      
        Yes  No   
 
 
      If Yes, please indicate what might be detected and explain what action will be 





10.  Risk Assessment **  
       Please indicate any risks to subjects or investigators associated with the project
  
Potential Harm to Participants: 
 
1) Incrimination - some interviewees may be in danger of incriminating 
themselves as the information they will be disclosing could be regarded by some as 
‘criminal’. Or is they disclose information about offences they have not been 
prosecuted for, or if they disclose information about activities that could potentially 
harm others or damage property. Activists who will be interviewed will have been 
involved in direct actions which involved trespassing and/or damaging property in the 
past. 
 
2) Information disclosed by participants - especially activists in India who 
participated in contentious actions against governments and corporations - and 
published in the final report might be used against them by the authorities. India has 





Movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. However, it also has a history of political violence 
and repression of dissent by the state. Cases of violent attacks and beatings of 
peaceful demonstrators by the police are very common in India. Interviewees may 
face arrest or harassment by the police if they are found to malign the government. 
For instance, following a demonstration in 2012 against GM field trials a number of 
Adivasi Gothra Mahasabha activists have been arrested and severely beaten by the 
police. The leading members and organisers, including Chekot Karian Janu, remain 
under close police monitoring. However, such incidents occur when violence erupts 
and they are not part of this study.  
 
Safety and Security of the Researcher: 
 
3) Whenever engaging in research abroad, in new social, cultural and political 
environments, there are risks to the researcher’s health, safety and security that must 
be addressed. 
 
11.  Precautions 
 
1) In order to minimise the risk of incrimination all participants will be informed 
before conducting the interview, and on the information sheet, about the danger of 
incrimination. They will be informed that the researcher is legally obliged to pass the 
information about any illegal activity, past or future, to the police. Greater caution shall 
be taken when interviewing, for instance the researcher will ask questions solely 
about direct actions he knows about from the media and the internet. This means that 
if there has been any illegal activity the activists would have been already prosecuted. 
This will reduce the opportunity for interviewees to speak of any illegal activities which 
fall outside of what is being discussed and for which they have not been prosecuted. 
Additionally, all information obtained from interviewees will be stored on encrypted 
USB pen-drives. This will include participants’ contact details (email addresses, 
phone numbers), names, and testimonies. 
 
Finch (2001) informs us that it is the researcher’s discretion whether to inform the 
authorities of a criminal conduct. Finch (2001:41) states:  
 
‘Although the law cannot compel the researcher to maintain 
confidentiality, it cannot compel him to disclose the 
information in the absence of a court order. The decision on 
whether to maintain the confidence becomes an ethical one. 
Ethical decisions arise when one has to decide between one 
course of action or another…by reference to standards of 
what is morally right or wrong. Formulation of ethical 
principles is contingent on the subjective moral evaluation of 
the situation made by the researcher.’ 
 
Group 1 – it is not necessary to report testimonies for potential illicit activities to the 
authorities, if this is done in the best interest of the participant or if they are not 
harming other people. Fitzgerald and Hamilton (1996:1597) assert that the researcher 
may refuse to disclose confidential information about illegal behaviour when harm 
resulting from disclosure outweighs the harm done by refusing to disclose such 
information, especially when future potential to conduct research into illegal behaviour 
is threatened.  
 
Group 2 – public figures are susceptible to public scrutiny, thus any illicit behaviour 
they engage in has to be made known to the public. According to BSA (2002) code 




being abused, obligations of trust and protection may weigh less heavily.’ The BSA 
suggests that in cases where power is being abused by those in power, or when it is 
in the public interest, then researcher’s obligations of trust, protection and 
confidentiality do not apply as strictly. Similarly, Finch (2002:39) argues that when 
public interest is at play, and potential harm resulting from illicit conduct outweighs 
the obligations of confidentiality, then the researcher under his discretion should 
reveal it to the public.  
 
2) All testimonies and information disclosed by the participants will be kept in 
utmost confidence. All personal information, data from the interviews and consent 
forms will be available solely to the researcher and no one else. It will be stored on 
password protected computer, password protected hard drive or encrypted USB pen-
drive, and in a locked filing cabinet in the Research Graduate Office on Ulster 
University premises. Participants will be assured greater confidentiality so that they 
cannot be identified by the authorities, as some may fear repercussions for speaking 
out critically about their government. If activists desire they have the option to remain 
anonymous in which case their testimonies will be attributed using a pseudonym, 
meaning that those participants will be unidentifiable by their names. If state-
corporate actors decide to remain anonymous their testimonies will be attributed 
through their institutional affiliation. Also, if any interview testimony risks of revealing 
a participant’s identity it will not be used in the final output.  
 
Additionally, the actions undertaken by activists, such as crop burning, field trampling, 
occupation of private buildings etc. are very common strategies of direct action 
employed regularly by activists in various fields of struggle. These may seem as 
extreme forms of sabotage, but these forms of resistance are nonviolent and are 
seldom a reason for severe police treatment. 
 
3) The researcher shall follow all Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
guidance and recommendations on traveling to India. As advised by FCO the 
researcher will monitor the progress of approaching storms, cyclones and any 
earthquake warnings issued by local media/authorities. Destinations that fall within 
the areas to which the FCO advises against all travel will be avoided. These include 
Jammu, Kashimr, Phalgam, Gulmarg, Sonamarg and any boarder region between 
India and Pakistan. The FCO states that: ‘Over 800,000 British nationals visit India 
every year. Most visits are trouble-free.’ I will produce photocopies of all documents 
as advised by the FCO. I will travel only with hotel or airport designated transport, and 
keep to designated travel routes and roads avoiding all high risk areas. When away 
in the field I will email the PI several times a week to keep them updated on my 
progress and movements. Also, someone will be expecting me each day, if I do not 
return at the end of the day that person will know to sound the alarm. I will be in 
regular contact with my supervisors and family. Additionally, a trusted interpreter, 
recommended by someone who conducted research in similar area in India, will be 
hired. He will be able to advise the researcher on safest means of travel. 
 
12.  Consent form 
It is assumed that as this study is being conducted on human subjects, an 
information sheet and associated consent form will be provided.  A copy 
of the information sheet and form must be attached to this application. See 
Notes of Guidance. 





13.  Care of personal information 
Please describe the measures that will be taken to ensure that subjects’ personal 
data/information will be stored appropriately and made available only to those 
named as investigators associated with the project. 
 
 










14.  Copyright    
       Has permission been granted to use all copyright materials including 
questionnaires and similar instruments? 
         Yes          No 
   






Once you have completed this form you should also complete form RG1d for 






















All personal information and data from the interviews and documentary sources 
shall be stored in a secure manner by means of encrypted pen drive, password 
protected computers or password protected hard drives, and in a secure locked 
filing cabinet in the Research Graduate Office on University premises.  
 
The consent forms will also be stored in a locked filing cabinet in the Research 
Graduate Office on University premises, and will not be available to anybody other 






RG1c - Risk Assessment Record 
 
Faculty/School/Research Institute  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
 
 
Name of Chief Investigator 
Dr Kristian Lasslett 
Room No/Campus 




Hazard(s) – Please identify and describe 
 
Potential Harm to Participants: 
 
1. Incrimination – Interviewees may be in danger of incriminating themselves if they disclose 
information about offences they have not been prosecuted for, or if they disclose 
information about activities that could potentially harm others or damage property. Activists 
who will be interviewed will have been involved in direct actions which involved trespassing 
and damaging property in the past for which they have not been arrested or caught.  
 
2. Information disclosed by participants - especially activists in India who participated in 
contentious actions against governments and corporations - and published in the final 
report might be used against them by the authorities. India has a long history of resistance 
and direct action dating back to the Independence Movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. 
However, it also has a history of political violence and repression of dissent by the state. 
Cases of violent attacks and beating of peaceful demonstrators by the police are very 
common in India. Interviewees may face arrest or harassment by the police if they are 
found to malign the government. For instance, following a demonstration in 2012 against 
GM field trials a number of Adivasi Gothra Mahasabha activists have been arrested and 
severely beaten by the police. The leading members and organisers, including Chekot 
Karian Janu, remain under close police monitoring. However, such incidents occur when 
violence erupts and they are not part of this study.   
 
 
Safety and Security of the Researcher: 
 
3. Whenever engaging in research abroad, in new social, cultural and political environments, 
there are risks to the researcher’s health, safety and security that must be addressed. 
 
 
Who is exposed to the hazard? (e.g. University staff/students/other research subjects) 
Research participants, the researcher.  
 
Inherent Risk (i.e. the risk present before any precautions are put in place) – Please refer to the 
table overleaf to assess the risk and then record it below 
 
None   
 
Low    
 
Medium   
 
High   
 
Very High   
 
Project Title 
Non-Violent Direct Action: A Comparative Study of Censuring State-Corporate Actors 
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Controlling the Inherent Risk  
1) In order to minimise the risk of incrimination all participants will be informed before conducting the interview, 
and on the information sheet, about the danger of incrimination. They will be informed that the researcher is legally 
obliged to pass the information about any illegal activity, past or future, to the police. Greater caution shall be taken 
when interviewing, for instance the researcher will ask questions solely about direct actions he knows about from 
the media and the internet. This means that if there has been any illegal activity the activists would have been already 
prosecuted. This will reduce the opportunity for interviewees to speak of any illegal activities which fall outside of 
what is being discussed and for which they have not been prosecuted. Additionally, all information obtained from 
interviewees will be stored on encrypted USB pen-drives. This will include participants’ contact details (email 
addresses, phone numbers), names, and testimonies. 
 
Finch (2001) informs us that it is the researcher’s discretion whether to inform the authorities of a criminal conduct. 
Finch (2001:41) states:  
 
‘Although the law cannot compel the researcher to maintain confidentiality, it cannot 
compel him to disclose the information in the absence of a court order. The decision on 
whether to maintain the confidence becomes an ethical one. Ethical decisions arise 
when one has to decide between one course of action or another…by reference to 
standards of what is morally right or wrong. Formulation of ethical principles is 
contingent on the subjective moral evaluation of the situation made by the researcher.’ 
 
Group 1 – it might not be necessary to report testimonies for potential illicit activities to the authorities, if this is done 
in the best interest of the participant or if they are not harming other people. Fitzgerald and Hamilton (1996:1597) 
assert that the researcher may refuse to disclose confidential information about illegal behaviour when harm resulting 
from disclosure outweighs the harm done by refusing to disclose such information, especially when future potential 
to conduct research into illegal behaviour is threatened.  
 
Group 2 – public figures are susceptible to public scrutiny, thus any illicit behaviour they engage in has to be made 
known to the public. According to BSA (2002) code of ethics ‘where the public interest dictates otherwise and 
particularly where power is being abused, obligations of trust and protection may weigh less heavily.’ The BSA 
suggests that in cases where power is being abused by those in power, or when it is in the public interest, then 
researcher’s obligations of trust, protection and confidentiality do not apply as strictly. Similarly, Finch (2002:39) 
argues that when public interest is at play, and potential harm resulting from illicit conduct outweighs the obligations 
of confidentiality, then the researcher under his discretion should reveal it to the public.  
 
2) All testimonies and information disclosed by the participants will be kept in utmost confidence. All personal 
information, data from the interviews and consent forms will be available solely to the researcher and no one else. It 
will be stored on password protected computer, password protected hard drive or encrypted USB pen-drive, and in 
a locked filing cabinet in the Research Graduate Office on Ulster University premises. Participants will be assured 
greater confidentiality so that they cannot be identified by the authorities, as some may fear repercussions for 
speaking out critically about their government. If activists desire they have the option to remain anonymous in which 
case their testimonies will be attributed using a pseudonym, meaning that those participants will be unidentifiable by 
their names. If state-corporate actors decide to remain anonymous their testimonies will be attributed through their 
institutional affiliation. Also, if any interview testimony risks of revealing a participant’s identity it will not be used in 
the final output.  
 
Additionally, the actions undertaken by activists, such as crop burning, field trampling, occupation of private buildings 
etc. are very common strategies of direct action employed regularly by activists in various fields of struggle. These 
may seem as extreme forms of sabotage, but these forms of resistance are nonviolent and are seldom a reason for 
severe police treatment. 
 
3) The researcher shall follow all Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) guidance and recommendations 
on traveling to India. As advised by FCO the researcher will monitor the progress of approaching storms, cyclones 
and any earthquake warnings issued by local media/authorities. Destinations that fall within the areas to which the 
FCO advises against all travel will be avoided. These include Jammu, Kashimr, Phalgam, Gulmarg, Sonamarg and 
any boarder region between India and Pakistan. The FCO states that: ‘Over 800,000 British nationals visit India 
every year. Most visits are trouble-free.’ I will produce photocopies of all documents as advised by the FCO. I will 
travel only with hotel or airport designated transport, and keep to designated travel routes and roads avoiding all 
high risk areas. When away in the field I will email the PI several times a week to keep them updated on my progress 
and movements. Also, someone will be expecting me each day, if I do not return at the end of the day that person 
will know to sound the alarm. I will be in regular contact with my supervisors and family. Additionally, a trusted 
interpreter, recommended by someone who conducted research in similar area in India, will be hired. He will be able 
to advise the researcher on safest means of travel. 
 









    
Please refer to the table overleaf to assess the remaining risk and then record it below  
 
None   Low   Medium   High   Very High   
Please note that if the residual risk is not in the none/low range, you might need to take further 
steps to address the risk or consider redesigning your research proposal 
 
 




Signature …………………………………                                                      Date……………………… 
(Chief Investigator) 
 
Please use the table below to assess the inherent risk and then the residual risk.  For example, where 
the potential harm is assessed to be minor (e.g. slight physical discomfort or pain, temporary 
emotional upset or similar) and the probability is assessed to be likely, then the risk is deemed to be 
in the medium range. 
 
It is expected that research being conducted by staff or students of the University will fall within the 
None to Medium range of risk.  Studies that are likely to fall within the High to Very High range of risk 
are unlikely to be permitted to proceed. 
 
 POTENTIAL HARM 
PROBABILITY NONE INSIGNIFICANT MINOR MODERATE MAJOR 
UNLIKELY None Low Low Medium High 
POSSIBLE None Low Medium High Very High 
LIKELY None Low Medium High Very High 





INSIGNIFICANT – reflective of trivial, routine or commonplace day-to-day levels of harm 
 
MINOR – unexpected event requiring minor remedial action e.g. first aid attention sufficient to treat 
minor injury, interview suspended due to temporary upset of participant 
 
MODERATE – e.g. results in time of work, broken bones, hospitalization, reversible disablement, 
serious emotional upset or psychological reaction, threat of violence to researcher, potential legal 
challenge to the researcher or the University 
 
MAJOR – e.g. loss of limb, loss of sight in one or more eyes, permanent disablement, death, 






UNLIKELY – probably will never happen 
 
POSSIBLE – might happen but would be an unusual occurrence  
 
LIKELY – expected to happen sometimes 
 
ALMOST CERTAIN – expected to happen frequently 
Will these precautions eliminate, significantly reduce or otherwise reduce the inherent risk?  Please 




Short Activities Plan 
 
 
Arriving to India (Delhi) 31st March: 
 
On 31st March I will be travelling to Navdanya Biodiversity Farm, just of the Shimla Bypass 
16km from Dehradun. There I will be attending a course Making Peace with the Earth & Each 
Other: Gandhi, Globalisation & GNH. The course will take place from 1st April to 10th April, 
where I will learn about biodiversity and natural alternatives to industrial farming.  
 
Fieldwork in Maharashtra 11th April – 18th May: 
 
Between Tuesday 12th and Friday 15th April I will meet with activists from Kalpavriksh 
organisation to establish further contacts with potential interviewees (exact days and times to 
be confirmed). I will be meeting ‘gatekeepers’ to potential participants. I intend on conducting 
interviews with activists campaigning on issues around corporate takeover of agriculture, GM 
crops (Bt cotton), land grabs, debt bondage, farmer suicides, field trials etc. I also intend on 
interviewing farmers who have been affected directly or indirectly by the agricultural biotech 
industry and the GM crops.  
 
I will be meeting journalists writing critically about state’s relaxation of laws that facilitate 
corporate takeover of Indian agriculture. The second week of my stay in Pune I will travel to 
Gujarat to meet with activists struggling against land grabs by corporates. I intend on meeting 
with some representatives from Mahyco Company, as well as state actors from the department 
of agriculture to ask their opinion on the issues that I am exploring.  
 























Travel Plan and Record of Stay  
 
I will arrive to Delhi on 31st March. From Delhi I will travel with the Navdanya 
organisation to their Biodiversity Farm/Bija Vidyapeeth (see address below) to attend 
a course Making Peace with the Earth & Each Other: Gandhi, Globalisation & GNH. 
The course will take place from 1st April to 10th April, it will be conducted by Dr 
Vandana Shiva who is an important contact for the research. During the course I will 
be staying at the Biodiversity Farm where I intend on networking and making further 
contacts for fieldwork.   
On 11th April I will travel from Delhi to Pune in Maharashtra where I have affiliated 
to Symbiosis Law School of the Symbiosis International University (see address 
below). Professor Shashikala Gurpur, director of the school, will be the point of 
contact. I will be accommodated in Symbiosis University guest house from 11th April 
to 19th May. There I have offered to share my research with Symbiosis Law School.  
 
In Pune I will be coordinating with activists from Kalpavriksh and Gomukh 
organisations who are active in the anti-GM movement, anti-Bt cotton campaigns, 
land grabs and other related environmental and social issues. Suhas Kolhekar, Bharat 
Mansata and Seemu Kulkarini are the gatekeepers to interviewees in farming 





Navdanya Office - Delhi 
A-60, Hauz Khas 
New Delhi - 110 016 
Phone: 91-11- 26968077 / 26532561/ 26532124 
Email: navdanya@gmail.com  
 
Navdanya - Biodiversity Farm/Bija Vidyapeeth  
Village Ramgarh / Shishambara 
Old Shimla Road, P.O Sherpur 
Dehradun, Uttaranchal  
Phone: 91-135-2693025 / 2111015 
Email: dehradun@navdanya.net  
 
Symbiosis Law School Pune 
Opp. Pune International Airport, 
VIP Road, Viman Nagar, 
Pune - 411014. 
























My name is Dawid Stańczak, I am a PhD student at Ulster University currently doing research 
on social movements and direct action. I’m writing to you because you have been involved in 
the occupation of UAV Engines Ltd in August 2014. Your campaign had a significant 
stigmatising effect on this company exposing its involvement in commissioning war crimes 
abroad. The process by which private companies are censured and stigmatised is the focal 
point of my PhD research. The study examines specifically the way direct action is employed 
by social movements to censure and stigmatise private companies which engage in socially 
harmful practices. The study also examines the relationship between private companies and 
the governments. 
 
Through this research I hope to achieve a greater understanding of how direct action can be 
employed to effectively censure and prohibit deviant state-corporate practices. Additionally, 
this research aims to support those working on social justice to connect with one another in 
order to provide opportunity for collective action. Your experience in employing direct action 
to censure arms companies and knowledge of the issues I’m exploring are of significant value 
to this study, thus I’m hoping you might be willing to be interviewed for my research.  
 
I will contact you in seven working days to confirm you’re availability. Alternatively, you 
may contact me using the information below. I appreciate your consideration of my request.  
 








Tel: +44 (0)28 9036 8243 






Interview Schedule (template) 
 
 
1. What tradition of activism would you say you come from? 
 
2. Why have you become involved in the anti-GM movement?  
 
3. What is your position on the agricultural biotech industry and GM seeds? 
 
4. Tell me about the problems associated with cultivation of GM crops, and how is this 
related to other social issues and corporate takeover of Indian agriculture?  
 
5. Would you define the conduct of biotech companies, such as Monsanto and Mahyco, 
as wrong? If so, then on what bases? 
 
6. Does the biotech industry receive any form of support from the government and 
local/regional authorities? If so, what support does it receive? 
 
7. How did the Indian government facilitate the corporate takeover of Indian agriculture?  
 
8. How did the resistance campaign against agricultural biotech industry begun? 
 
9. What triggered the decision to undertake a direct action against Mahyco’s field trials? 
 
10. What were your motives and objectives behind the direct action, as well as the entire 
campaign?  
 
11. Tell me what happened prior, during and after the direct action?  
 
12. What was the response from the police, the media, the public, the government and the 
company?  
 
13. Were you charged? If so, what were you charged with?  
 
14. Have the charges and/or response from the government and the police deterred future 
actions?  
 
15. Have you received any support from outside organisations, NGOs, politicians or 
political groupings?  
 
16. What do you think was achieved by the campaign and the direct action you undertook, 













Project Title: Prohibiting State-Corporate Crime through Non-Violent Direct Action: 
A Comparative Study of Crime-Control from Below 
 
Name of Researcher: Dawid Stańczak 
 
 
• I confirm that I have been given and have read and understood 
the information sheet for the above study and have asked and 
received answers to any questions raised.     
 
 
• I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without my 
rights being affected in any way. 
 
 
• I understand that the researcher will hold all information and 
data collected securely and in confidence and I give permission 
for the researchers to hold relevant personal data. 
 
• I confirm that I have been given the choice to remain 
anonymous, in which case any information I disclose will be 
attributed using a pseudonym. I would prefer my testimony to 
be used anonymously. 
 
 
I, _______________________________________________, agree to take part in this 
study. 
 
_____________________________________________                      
___________________ 
Signature                                                                                               Date 
 
____________________________   _________________________  
___________________ 
Name of Researcher                        Signature                                    Date 
 
 
Researcher’s contact information                                                
 
Email address: stanczak-d@email.ulster.ac.uk                     
                         dawids154@gmail.com  
 
 
Yes       No 
Yes       No 
Yes      No 







Foreign Travel Advice – India: Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Advice 
https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/india  
 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advise against all travel in the 
immediate vicinity of the border with Pakistan, other than at Wagah. 
The FCO advise against all travel to Jammu and Kashmir with the exception of (i) 
travel within the city Jammu, (ii) travel by air to the city of Jammu, (iii) travel within the 
region of Ladakh. The FCO advise against all but essential travel to the city of Srinagar and 
travel between the cities of Jammu and Srinagar on the Jammu-Srinagar national highway. 
The tourist destinations of Pahalgam, Gulmarg and Sonamarg fall within the areas to which 
the FCO advise against all travel. See Local travel and Terrorism 
The India Meteorological Department has issued a red alert about extremely heavy 
rain expected on 7 October 2018 in the districts of Idukki, Palakkad and Thrissur in Kerala 
state. The Kerala State Government recommends that travel into hilly areas, especially to the 
hill station of Munnar, is avoided during this period. If you’re in or travelling to any of these 
districts, you’re advised to monitor media and weather reports closely, follow the advice of 
local authorities and keep up to date with this travel advice. 
Terrorists are very likely to try to carry out attacks in India. Recent attacks have 
targeted public places including those visited by foreigners. There have been recent media 
reports suggesting Daesh (formerly referred to as ISIL) interest in attacking targets in India. 
There may be an increased threat to places visited by British nationals such as religious sites, 
markets, festival venues and beaches. You should be vigilant at this time, monitor local media 
and take all precautions for your safety. See Terrorism 
If you’re travelling in or through Srinagar you should remain vigilant, avoid protests 
or large gatherings, follow the advice of the local authorities and your travel company and 
monitor the curfew restrictions in place and the local media. Srinagar Airport is currently open 
as is the road leading to Srinagar Airport. Take all precautions for your safety. If you’re 
travelling with a tour operator you should keep in touch with them and contact them for further 
information on arrangements they may be making for you to leave the area. Due to the 
accessibility and current unrest the level of consular assistance that the British High 
Commission can provide in Jammu & Kashmir is extremely limited.Additional security 
measures have been implemented at airports across the country. If you’re travelling through 
an airport you should allow additional time to complete check-in and security as you and your 
baggage may be required to undergo random x-rays and baggage checks. 
Authorities across north-eastern states have increased security presence after the 
publication on 30 July of a revision of the National Register of Citizens in the state of Assam. 
Anyone travelling to the region should check the latest travel news before they travel, and if 
you’re in the region take precautions like avoiding large crowds.Severe air pollution is a major 
hazard to public health in Delhi, and a serious concern in many other Indian cities. See Health 
UK health authorities have classified India as having a risk of Zika virus transmission. 
For information and advice about the risks associated with Zika virus, visit the National Travel 
Health Network and Centre website. If you’re abroad and you need emergency help from the 
UK government, contact the nearest British embassy, consulate or high commission. 
Before you travel, take out comprehensive travel and medical insurance and read the 
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